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Abstract 
 
The rationale for the legal protection of copyright works is based on the perceived 
need to encourage the creation of works which are considered to be socially 
beneficial.  By awarding authors proprietary rights in their creations, copyright law 
allows authors the ability to earn direct financial returns from their efforts, and, thus, 
copyright law provides the required incentives for authors to create copyright works.  
Since the early days of commercial software development, copyright protection has 
been extended to computer programs; thus, by providing such protection it was 
assumed that their production should be encouraged, and that without such 
protection they will not be produced to the extent required by society.  Comparatively 
recently, we have witnessed large-scale production of open-source software, which 
is licensed on generous terms, giving users the right to freely use, modify and 
redistribute such software.  By adopting such licensing terms, the authors of open-
source software are unable to charge licensees a fee for permission to use their 
software, which is the reward which copyright assumes authors seek to create such 
software.  This development has made it necessary to re-evaluate the rationale for 
copyright protection of computer programs, and determine whether the continued 
protection of computer programs is justifiable. 
 
This study seeks to first establish a coherent theoretical justification for 
copyright protection, which it is submitted should be an economic justification, rather 
than a moral justification.  The legal analysis in this work seeks to establish whether 
the copyright protection of computer programs is consistent with the economic 
justification for copyright protection.  In particular, the analysis focuses on the current 
scope of copyright protection, and seeks to establish whether such protection is 
excessive, stifling creativity and innovation, and, thus, imposing too high a social 
cost.  It is contended that copyright doctrine has generally sought to minimise these 
costs, and that current scope of copyright protection of computer programs leaves 
enough creative room for the production of new software. 
 
Despite the fact that the effect of open-source software licences is that 
authors are unable to earn the direct financial rewards which copyright enables 
authors to earn as an incentive to create such software, their authors continue to 
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have financial incentives to create such software.  Commercial firms who invest in 
open-source software do so because they seek to provide financially-rewarding 
related services in respect of software, or because it serves to promote sales in their 
complementary products.  Similarly, the participation of individual computer 
programmers is largely consistent with the standard economic theories relating to 
labour markets and the private provision of public goods.  Individuals are principally 
motivated by economic motives, such as career concerns. 
 
Copyright protection gives participants the choice to opt for the direct financial 
rewards which its proprietary protection enables, or the more indirect financial 
rewards of open-source software development.  It is submitted within this research 
that rather than undermining the rationale for copyright protection of computer 
programs, the development of open-source software has illustrated that copyright 
protection allows for the emergence of alternative business models, which may be 
more economically advantageous to authors. 
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Abstrak 
 
 
Die rasionaal agter outeursregbeskerming wat deur die reg verleen word is 
gebasseer op 'n behoefte om die skepping van werke wat sosiaal voordelig geag 
word te bevorder.  Outeursreg verleen aan outeurs direkte finansiële vergoeding vir 
hul inspanning deur die vestiging van eiendomsreg oor hul werke.  Dus, outeursreg 
voorsien outeurs van die nodige insentiewe om sulke werke te skep.  Sedert die 
begindae van kommersiële sagteware ontwikkeling, is outeursregbeskerming 
uitgebrei om aan rekenaarprogramme sulke beskerming te bied.  Deur die bied van 
outeursregbeskerming word daar aangeneem dat die ontwikkeling van 
rekenaarprogramme aangemoedig word en dat sonder die genoemde beskerming 
programme nie geproduseer sal word tot in 'n mate benodig deur die samelewing 
nie.  Onlangs egter, is daar 'n grootskaalse ontwikkeling van oopbronsagteware 
opgemerk.  Hierdie sagteware word onder ruime terme gelisensieer en gee aan 
gebruikers die reg om die genoemde sagteware te gebruik, te wysig en vrylik te 
versprei.  Deur sulke terme van lisensiëring aan te neem word outeurs verhoed om 
vanaf lisensiehouers 'n fooi te vorder vir die toestemming om die sagteware te 
gebruik.  Outeursreg neem aan dat hierdie vergoeding die basis vorm waarom 
outeurs sulke sagteware ontwikkel.  Hierdie ontwikkeling maak dit nodig om die 
rasionaal agter outeursregbeskerming van rekenaarprogramme te her-evalueer en 
ook om vas te stel of die volgehoue beskerming van rekenaarprogramme 
regverdigbaar is. 
 
Hierdie studie poog om, eerstens, 'n samehangende teoretiese regverdiging 
vir outeursreg te vestig.  Daar word aan die hand gedoen dat hierdie beskerming 'n 
ekonomiese, eerder as 'n morele regverdiging as grondslag moet hê.  Die 
regsontleding vervat in hierdie werk poog om vas te stel of die 
outeursregbeskerming wat aan rekenaarprogramme verleen word in lyn is met die 
ekonomiese regverdiging van outeursregbeskerming.  Die analise fokus in besonder 
op die huidige bestek van outeursregbeskerming en poog om vas te stel of sodanige 
beskerming oormatig is, of dit kreatiwiteit en innovasie onderdruk en derhalwe te hoë 
sosiale koste tot gevolg het.  Daar word geargumenteer dat outeursreg in die 
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algemeen poog om sosiale koste te verlaag en dat die huidige omvang van 
outeursregbeskerming van rekenaarprogramme voldoende kreatiewe ruimte vir die 
ontwikkeling van nuwe sagteware laat. 
 
Die effek van oopbronsagteware is dat outeurs nie in staat is om direkte 
finansiële vergoeding te verdien, wat as insentief gesien word vir die ontwikkeling 
van sagteware, nie.  Ten spyte hiervan is daar steeds voldoende finansiële 
insentiewe om sodanige sagteware te ontwikkel.  Kommersiële firmas belê in 
oopbronsagteware om finansiëel lonende verwante dienste ten opsigte van 
sagteware te voorsien.  Dit kan ook dien om verkope in hul onderskeie aanvullende 
produkte te bevorder.  Eweweens is die deelname van individuele 
rekenaarprogrameerders oorwegend in lyn met die standaard ekonomiese teoriëe 
ten opsigte van die arbeidsmark en die privaat voorsiening van openbare goedere. 
Individue word gemotiveer deur ekonomiese motiewe, soos byvoorbeeld oorwegings 
wat verband hou met hul loopbane. 
 
Outeursregbeskerming bied aan deelnemers die keuse om voordeel te trek uit 
die direkte finansiële vergoeding wat moontlik gemaak word deur 
outeursregbeskerming of uit die meer indirekte finansiële vergoeding gebied deur die 
ontwikkeling van oopbronsagteware.  In hierdie navorsing word daar geargumenteer 
dat die ontwikkeling van oopbronsagteware geillustreer het dat 
outeursregbeskerming die onstaan van alternatiewe besigheidsmodelle toelaat wat 
ekonomies meer voordelig is vir outeurs in plaas daarvan dat dit die rasionaal vir die 
outeursregbeskerming van rekenaarprogramme ondermyn. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
“[T]he soundness and effectiveness of the law of copyright is a significant 
factor in the creation of intellectual property and ultimately in enriching our 
culture and promoting our knowledge and well-being.”1 
 
As the above quote suggests, the rationale for copyright protection is a distinctly 
instrumental one.  The reason we consider it appropriate to protect copyright works, 
such as computer programs, is that we consider such works to be socially beneficial, 
and, therefore, their production should be encouraged.  Thus, by protecting 
computer programs, copyright law has assumed that such protection is warranted by 
the need to encourage their creation; without such protection, they will not be 
produced to the extent required by society.  As copyright protection was extended to 
computer programs in its earliest phases of commercial software development, the 
critics of the decision to provide such protection may have had an arguable case at 
that time to claim that such protection was inappropriate or unnecessary.  Whether 
the assumption to afford such protection was justified will probably remain a moot 
point.  It is, however, more important to try and determine whether the continued 
protection of computer programs by way of copyright is necessary.2  Intellectual 
property scholarship in South Africa has, arguably, focused on the immediate issues 
concerning black-letter law, with very little analysis of the conceptual foundations of 
intellectual property as a legal institution. 
 
What has made a reassessment of copyright protection of computer programs 
a pertinent subject of enquiry is the ubiquity of software in our lives, whether in our 
work environment, personal lives or leisure activities, and the emergence and growth 
of open-source software.  Software has — in a period of approximately 35 years — 
become, and will, no doubt remain, central to how we function as humans.  Because 
                                            
1
 Dean O 1988 The Application of the Copyright Act 1978 to Works Made Prior to 1979 Thesis: 
Stellenbosch University 2. 
2
 This work will be confined to an analysis of the copyright protection of computer programs, and it will 
not concern itself with other legal methods by which computer programs may be protected, namely 
patents and confidential information (or trade secrets). 
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of the functional nature of computer programs we should be more vigilant about the 
social costs of affording them copyright protection than the other types of copyright 
works.  Copyright protection does not come free: it imposes social costs, and it is 
expensive to administer such a system.  Information, like a computer program, in the 
era of the Internet, can be reproduced and disseminated at practically no cost, and, 
thus, any restriction on its use is a social cost.  The generous terms under which 
open-source software is licensed generally gives users the right to freely use, modify 
and redistribute such software, which avoids some of the social costs associated 
with proprietary software.  These rights are given added signifance by the fact that 
users are provided with the human-friendly source code of the licensed software, 
which facilitates users’ knowledge of its operation, and possible modification.  This is 
in sharp contrast to the manner in which proprietary software is licensed: authors 
reserve to themselves the exclusive rights afforded by copyright, charge users a fee 
for access to the software, and do not reveal the source code to licensed users.  In 
terms of incentives, from an economic perspective, the effect of the liberal licensing 
terms associated with open-source software means that their authors are unable to 
charge licensees a fee for permission to use their software, which is the reward 
which copyright assumes authors seek to create such software.  In other words, the 
developers of open-source software have forsaken the direct financial rewards which 
copyright protection makes possible, while still producing software of the highest 
quality.  It, therefore, appears that copyright protection, and its associated direct 
financial rewards, is not central to the incentives of open-source software authors in 
the sense assumed to be necessary by copyright law.   
 
The level of participation by individual programmers, and investment by 
commercial firms, in open-source software development, suggests that there must 
be incentives that go beyond ideological concerns about the morality of protecting 
software by way of proprietary rights.  Not all of these participants are hostile to the 
policy of copyright protection for computer programs.  In addition, the level of 
cooperation between software developers appears to confound previous notions 
about the assumed desire to produce products which give their creator a competitive 
advantage.  It is for this reason that it is important to be able to distinguish open-
source software from proprietary software in a way that plausibly accounts for open-
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source software development.  If such an account cannot be provided, it is strongly 
arguable that open-source software strikes at the rationale for copyright protection of 
computer programs: at best, the emergence of open-source software casts doubt 
over the assumption that copyright protection for computer programs is necessary, 
and, probably worse, that such protection is socially detrimental because such 
protection is unnecessary, and is socially harmful. 
 
The emergence, and impressive subsequent growth, of open-source software 
development can, thus, be considered as providing us with a kind of natural 
experiment, or case study, into the incentives, if any, required for software 
production, and, thus, calls for an investigation into the behavioural determinants in 
relation to the production of computer programs.3  Are they the economic incentives 
which are assumed to be required by authors, and form the basis of copyright law?  
Have advances in technology and the profusion of the Internet changed the way we 
create copyright works, particularly computer programs, which makes our previous 
concerns of seeking to encourage the creation of such works largely unnecessary?4  
Does the emergence of open-source software development suggest that in the 
absence of copyright protection we would still be assured of having the necessary 
level of software development, but at lower social costs than is currently the case 
with such protection?5  Consequently, the purpose of this work is to investigate 
whether the development and growth of open-source software provides us with any 
insights concerning the current policy of providing copyright protection for computer 
programs.  In other words, does the emergence of open-source software require us 
to reconsider whether computer programs should be among the types of works that 
are afforded copyright protection? 
 
The issue of copyright protection, and intellectual property law generally, and 
its impact on society has become a highly politicised matter.  Open-source software 
                                            
3
 McGowan D "Legal Implications of Open-Source Software" 2001 U Ill L Rev 241 242. 
4
 Boyle J The Public Domain: Enclosing the Commons of the Mind 1ed (2008) 186; Trosow S "The 
Illusive Search for Justificatory Theories: Copyright, Commodification and Capital" 2003 Can J L & 
Juris 16 217 220. 
5
 McGowan "Legal Implications of Open-Source Software" 243. 
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has, for some time now, been the flagship for counter-culture, and has been held out 
as a shining example of needless property rights in information, which is exploited by 
corporations.6   Copyright protection, or specific instances thereof, has been 
criticised as being an inhibitor to the dissemination of information and harming 
creative endeavours.  The emergence of open-source software has been a catalyst 
for a wave of other collaborative efforts, such as the Creative Commons licenses, the 
iCommons/free culture movement, the Science Commons project, and the 
OpenCourseWare educational resources, which all seek to replicate its permissive 
licensing paradigm in other areas of creative endeavour.7  While it may be true that 
in certain cases copyright protection does appear to result in imposing unacceptably 
high social costs, and that copyright law needs to adapt to changing behavioural 
determinants brought about by technological changes, the debates concerning the 
merits of copyright protection have, unfortunately, largely been conducted from 
polarised positions.  If the critics of copyright protection have been guilty of focusing 
on exceptional instances of the failure of copyright to serve the public interest and 
proclaiming, rather overdramatically, “the death of copyright,”8 the defenders of 
copyright protection have also, too easily, succumb to the temptation of resorting to 
inflammatory and emotive language.  Examples of the latter, with particular reference 
to the subject matter of this study, have been the claim that open-source software 
amounts to “an intellectual-property destroyer,” or the description of the Linux open-
source software as “a cancer.”9 
 
Accordingly, an ancillary goal of this work is to provide a more balanced 
assessment of the significance of the open-source phenomenon, steering away, as 
far as possible, from arguments which resort to, or seek to exploit, popular 
aphorisms, hyperbole or dismissive retorts.  Instead, the analysis will proceed by 
                                            
6
 Lambert P "Copyleft, Copyright and Software IPRs: Is Contract Still King?" 2001 EIPR 23 (4) 165 
167. 
7
 Bollier D Viral Spiral: How the Commoners Built a Digital Republic of Their Own 1ed (2008) 40. 
8
 Dusollier S "Open Source and Copyleft: Authorship Reconsidered?" 2003 Colum JL & Arts 26 281 
282. 
9
 Azzi R "CPR: How Jacobsen v. Katzer Resuscitated the Open Source Movement" 2010 U Ill L Rev 
1271 1273; Miller J "Allchin's Folly: Exploding Some Myths About Open Source Software" 2002 
Cardozo Arts & Ent LJ 20 491 491-2. 
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establishing the theoretical basis for copyright protection generally, and to determine 
whether the protection of computer programs is consistent with such rationale.10  It is 
submitted that a sound rationale for copyright protection should not merely serve to 
provide a basis for such protection, but should also be able to provide a basis for 
determining the scope and term of copyright protection.  Having established a sound 
rationale for copyright protection, the protection of computer programs should be 
assessed against such rationale to ensure that it is consistent with it.   
 
The analysis of the protection of computer programs will focus on the current 
scope of copyright protection of computer programs, which is central in trying to 
determine whether such protection is excessive, stifling creativity and innovation, 
and, thus, imposing too high a social cost.  Computer programs, due to their 
intrinsically functional nature, are materially different to other types of works 
protected by copyright.  While other types of copyright work may be created for 
ideological, reputational or aesthetic reasons, this is almost certainly not the case 
with computer programs; they are primarily created to perform some function, and 
the technical efficiency of their design in achieving the desired result tends to be of 
overriding importance.  Consequently, it is important to see whether the law has 
appreciated this distinction, and whether it has informed its determination of the 
appropriate scope of copyright protection.  The analysis concerning the scope of 
copyright protection of computer programs will focus on the legal developments in 
the US and the UK (as there is a dearth of case law on the subject in South Africa ), 
which are, arguably, the leading jurisdictions concerning copyright protection of 
computer programs, and software development.  Finally, there will be an 
examination, and analysis, of open-source software development and whether it 
affects, or undermines, the rationale for the protection of computer programs. 
                                            
10
 The economic analysis in this work does not include, or take into account, anti-competitive conduct 
by, or amongst, authors or publishers.  It is assumed that authors (or publishers) compete amongst 
themselves for consumers in their particular markets, and publishers compete to secure the rights of 
competing authors.  The analysis of any anti-competitive conduct amongst authors or publishers such 
as cartel behaviour, or price fixing, is the subject of competition law. 
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Chapter 2: History of copyright and the moral justifications for copyright 
protection 
 
“In the 50 or so years that policy makers, lawyers, judges and academics 
have been discussing intellectual property (as intellectual property) there has 
not yet developed any consensus as to its fundamental nature or 
justification."1 
 
2 1 Introduction 
 
As indicated in Chapter 1 (Introduction), the purpose of this work is to investigate 
whether the development and growth of open-source software provides us with any 
insights concerning the current policy of providing copyright protection in respect of 
computer programs.  The open-source software phenomenon serves as a kind of 
natural experiment.  In other words, does the emergence of open-source software 
require us to reconsider whether computer programs should be among the types of 
works that are afforded copyright protection?  In order to answer this question, it is 
necessary to consider the justifications for affording copyright protection to specified 
categories of works, and computer programs in particular.  We will first examine the 
justifications for copyright protection generally before considering the position with 
respect to computer programs. 
 
2 2 Why seek justifications? 
 
We have witnessed a digital technological revolution during the past 40 years, with 
developments such as the personal computer, mobile communications, and the 
Internet, transforming the way in which we communicate and coordinate social 
activities.  There has been a convergence of computers and telecommunications; 
phone calls are now made via the Internet using VOIP technology,2 and so-called 
                                            
1
 Deazley R Rethinking Copyright: History, Theory, Language 1ed (2006) 137. 
2
 Voice over Internet Protocol. 
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smart mobile phones have the ability to run a wide range of computer software.  The 
importance of intellectual property rights in digital technology needs no elaboration.  
Computer programs are not only present in communication devices and computers.  
The use of computer programs is ubiquitous; a wide range of domestic and office 
electrical appliances, such as DVD players, washing machines and fridges, rely upon 
computer programs which have been incorporated into their manufacture. 
 
Although copyright as a form of intellectual property,3 like other forms of 
property, exists by virtue of its recognition by the state, specifically through 
legislation, “[l]aw needs some form of social justification if it is to be successfully 
legitimised.”4  Intellectual property rights are legally, economically and socially 
significant; they are the “most spectacular” form of limited monopoly grant to private 
individuals by governments.5  However, we no longer merely accept laws or social 
institutions (or consider such laws or institutions to be justified) simply because they 
emanate from an established authority such as the legislature.6  We condemn “blind 
mandates of power” and seek reasons for the existence of laws; we require that laws 
are based on sound philosophical or economic justifications.7  Power and authority 
are subject to greater scrutiny than at any point in human history. 
 
The intangible nature of copyright means that it is not intuitively perceived by 
laypeople — and even some lawyers — as property.  It is because of these 
                                            
3
 “Intellectual property” is the generic term used to refer to the different legal regimes concerning 
copyright, patents, trade marks, designs, and confidential information, “which began their existence 
independently of each other and at different times in different places.” (Drahos P A Philosophy of 
Intellectual Property 1ed (1996) 14.) 
4
 May C A Global Political Economy of Intellectual Property Right: The new enclosures? 1ed (2000) 
17. 
5
 Hurt R and Schuchman R "The Economic Rationale of Copyright" 1966 The American Economic 
Review 56 (1) 421 421. 
6
 Spector H "An Outline of a Theory Justifying Intellectual and Industrial Property Rights" 1989 EIPR 
11 (8) 270 270; Hughes J "The Philosophy of Intellectual Property" 1988 Geo L J 77 287 288. 
7
 Spector "An Outline of a Theory Justifying Intellectual and Industrial Property Rights" 270. 
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perceptions that intellectual property requires specific justification.8  A further 
problem in relation to intellectual property is the perception that it is liberty-inhibiting: 
copyright, for example, prevents a person from performing a song in public, or from 
using his property, such as computer, to make a copy of the song.9  The intangible 
nature of intellectual property makes this perceived incursion on personality 
troublesome because there is no physical interference with another’s person or 
property.  The performance or copying appears to harm no one.10 
 
It is, arguably, the younger generations who are, increasingly, challenging the 
status quo and the rationale of social institutions.  For example, Tunisia has just 
seen a change of government following an uprising that has been dubbed the 
“Twitter revolution” because the use of various forms of digital communication was 
considered to be instrumental in the coordination of the protests.11  The main 
demographic of users of new technology, and the various methods of digital 
communication such as Twitter, Facebook, and MXit, are the young — those under 
the age of 30.  They are not only enthusiastic users of technology, but are probably 
also the largest consumers of intellectual property.  However, their attitude towards 
intellectual property appears to be wholly at odds with how the law seeks to regulate 
intellectual property. 
 
It is not uncommon today to find persons under the age of 30 years old, the 
cyber generation, who have never purchased music or computer software.  
Accessing and copying copyright works has become easy and, more importantly, 
socially acceptable, particularly amongst the members of the cyber generation.  In 
                                            
8
 Gordon W "An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and 
Encouragement Theory" 1989 Stan L Rev 41 1343 1347.  As discussed below, Hegel, for example, 
did not consider there to be a need to justify intangible property — it was just property. 
9
 Bently L and Sherman B Intellectual Property Law 3ed (2009) 34-5; Palmer T "Are Patents and 
Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philospophy of Property Rights and Ideal Objects" 1990 Harv J L & 
Pub Pol'y 13 817 855. 
10
 Gordon "An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and 
Encouragement Theory" 1345-6; Posner R "Intellectual Property: The Law and Economics Approach" 
2005 Journal of Economic Perspectives 19 (2) 57 64. 
11
 Legalbrief 2011 Analysts downplay Twitter revolution 1369ed Juta Cape Town. 
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fact, we have witnessed the emergence of political parties — Pirate Parties — in 
various countries whose agenda it is to campaign against, or seek the dilution of, 
intellectual property rights.  There is probably only one other area of law that has 
involved such political campaigning in recent years: environmental law.   
 
The emergence of these Pirate Parties should not be considered as merely 
providing light-hearted comic relief to the elections in which they participate.  The 
new Tunisian State Secretary for Youth and Sport in the wake of Twitter Revolution, 
Slim Amamou, is a member of the Tunisian Pirate Party.12  The Swedish Pirate Party 
has two Members of the European Parliament (MEPs).  These parties will continue 
to augment their positions because they appeal to the cyber generation, who are 
already generally apathetic toward the political process.  They represent something 
with which the cyber generation (who will, in the course of time, comprise an ever-
larger proportion of the electorate) associates itself: free and unrestricted access to 
copyright works.   
 
It would, therefore, not be an exaggeration to state that it is only if intellectual 
property law in its present, or an amended, form can continue to be justified that will 
it be able to withstand the criticisms and the sustained attacks to which it has been, 
and will be, subjected.13  The aim of finding coherent justifications is, accordingly, not 
merely an academic or esoteric exercise; it will, ultimately, determine whether 
intellectual property law continues to exist as a legal institution.   
 
What we seek to establish when considering the justifications for intellectual 
property is why it exists and what purpose it serves.14  As will become apparent in 
this chapter and Chapter 3 (Economic justification for copyright protection), 
intellectual property is “not so obviously or easily justified as many people think.”15  
Although this work may refer to the justifications for “intellectual property” generally 
                                            
12
 ibid. 
13
 Spector "An Outline of a Theory Justifying Intellectual and Industrial Property Rights" 270. 
14
 Deazley Rethinking Copyright: History, Theory, Language 137. 
15
 Trosow "The Illusive Search for Justificatory Theories: Copyright, Commodification and Capital" 
 245, quoting Hettinger E, “Justifying Intellectual Property” 1989 Phil. & Publ. Affairs 18 31 at 39-40. 
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where the arguments are equally applicable to other forms of intellectual property 
such as patents and trade marks, the scope of this work is more modest: the focus 
will be on copyright protection, which will serve as the basis for a closer examination 
of the copyright protection of computer programs.  Of course, should it be 
established that copyright protection of computer programs is justified, that will only 
serve as the starting point to a further enquiry: we then need to consider the extent 
to which computer programs should be protected by copyright.16 
 
2 3 Description and nature of copyright 
 
Before considering the issue of justifications for copyright protection, it may be 
helpful to briefly consider what is meant by “copyright”, and the nature of copyright.  
Of course, attempting to give a short overview of a subject as technical as copyright 
has its inevitable pitfalls; it must necessarily involve a certain level of abstraction.  
However, this is not intended to be an introductory work on the subject of copyright.  
The following description of copyright and its nature should be sufficient to provide 
the background for a meaningful consideration of the justifications for copyright 
protection. 
 
Broadly, copyright is the statutorily created system providing a limited period 
of protection to a creator of specified types of works of intellectual creation, or 
products of the mind, allowing its creator to exploit such creations for personal 
gain.17  The protected works are principally “creative expression[s] of ideas in 
tangible form”.18  It is because copyright seeks to protect intellectual creations that it, 
together with other areas of the law such as patents, trade marks, confidential 
information and designs, falls under the collective term “intellectual property.”19  
Hughes describes it as follows:20  
                                            
16
 May A Global Political Economy of Intellectual Property Right: The new enclosures? 28. 
17
 Dean The Application of the Copyright Act 1978 to Works Made Prior to 1979 Thesis: 2. 
18
 Palmer T "Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law and Economics Approach" 1989 Hamline L 
Rev 12 261 264. 
19
 Davis J Intellectual Property Law 3ed (2008) 1.  According to Reichman, “[t]he term “intellectual 
property” was not coined until the late nineteenth century. Only when Josef Kohler and Edmond 
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“A universal definition of intellectual property might begin by identifying it as 
nonphysical property which stems from, is identified as, and whose value is based 
upon some idea or ideas.” 
 
Copyright, as is the case with other intellectual property, is different from real 
rights, personal rights and personality rights, and is a distinct category of subjective 
rights.21  Due to its intangible nature it is not a real right.  Although its intangible 
nature might resemble a personal right, it does not represent a claim to receive any 
performance by another.  Intellectual property rights "do however operate like rights 
in rem in imposing a duty of non-interference on all subjects within the legal 
system.”22  Our courts appear to regard copyright as giving rise to a proprietary 
interest, and, therefore, copyright can be “called "intellectual property", as indeed it 
is.”23  More recently, the Supreme Court of Appeal has held that, due to their 
territorial nature, intellectual property rights such as copyright constitute immovable 
incorporeals.24   
                                                                                                                                       
Picard perceived that copyright, patent, and trademark laws had more in common with each other 
than with the older forms of property known to Roman law was it recognized that a new class of rights 
in intangible creations had arisen.” (Reichman J "Charting the Collapse of the Patent-Copyright 
Dichotomy: Premises for a Restructured International Intellectual Property System" 1995 Cardozo 
Arts & Ent LJ 13 475 480). 
20
 Hughes "The Philosophy of Intellectual Property" 294. 
21
 Klopper H, et al. Law of Intellectual Property in South Africa 1ed (2011) 145; Deazley Rethinking 
Copyright: History, Theory, Language 141. 
22
 Deazley Rethinking Copyright: History, Theory, Language 141. 
23
 Video Parktown North (Pty) Ltd v Paramount Pictures Corporation; Video Parktown North (Pty) Ltd 
v Shelburne Associates and Others; Video Parktown North (Pty) Ltd v Century Associates and Others 
1986 (2) SA 623 (T) 631. 
24
 Gallo Africa Ltd and Others v Sting Music (Pty) Ltd and Others 2010 (6) SA 329 (SCA) 336.  
Section 22(1) CA 1978 provides that “copyright shall be transmissible as movable property by 
assignment, testamentary disposition or operation of law.”  This characterisation appears to be 
confined to matters relating to transfers of copyright, and is not meant to be a definitive description of 
the nature of copyright.  In contrast, section 1(1) CDPA 1988 expressly provides that copyright is a 
property right. 
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However, the idea that copyright and other forms of intellectual property 
constitute “property” has been criticised by some commentators.25  Property can be 
thought of in terms of relations between persons, and a contest for the control of 
objects that are desired or required by individuals.26  Insofar as property is 
categorised by the legal relations between persons, the ability to exclude others is 
essential (the requirement of excludability), not the determination of the use by the 
right holder.  The other essential requirement for property is the ability to alienate the 
thing owned (the requirement of separability).27  Because of its intangible nature, 
copyright is unable to satisfy the proprietary criteria of excludability and separability.  
Deazley illustrates his point as follows:28 
“[Copyright] adheres to no rational understanding of the notion of excludability in that 
once publicised (whether orally or captured in tangible form) it is beyond the power of 
an author to exclude others from making use of his or her original expression; nor will 
use by another exhaust the original expression or prevent either the author (or 
indeed anyone else) making an exactly identical and concurrent use of the same.  
Neither does it accord with any sensible concept of separability.  An author’s original 
expression, by definition, cannot be given, traded or licensed to another so as to 
become the original expression of that other – the original expression must always be 
contingent upon, and so linked to, its originating author.” 
 
It is claimed that the reason for the initial difficulty in accepting intangible 
matter such as copyright as constituting property was due to a stubborn adherence 
to “the Roman law doctrine of occupancy, which was said to underlie the foundation 
                                            
25
 For example, Spector states that “there is a marked tendency to consider that the true nature of 
copyright and patent rights is not that of proprietary rights but rather that of legal monopolistic 
privileges.” (Spector "An Outline of a Theory Justifying Intellectual and Industrial Property Rights" 
 270.) 
26
 Drahos A Philosophy of Intellectual Property 4. 
27
 Deazley Rethinking Copyright: History, Theory, Language 140.  Deazley based this characterisation 
of property by Penner (Penner J The Idea of Property in Law (1997) OUP).  Jeremy Waldron (cited in 
Trosow "The Illusive Search for Justificatory Theories: Copyright, Commodification and Capital"  223) 
and Wendy Gordon (Gordon "An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, 
Consent, and Encouragement Theory" 1354) also regard the right to use as being integral to a 
property right.  However, Gordon considers the right to exclude as generally the most important right 
(1356). 
28
 Deazley Rethinking Copyright: History, Theory, Language 160. 
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of title to property”.29  Due to its intangible, and non-excludable, nature the subject 
matter could not be occupied in a similar manner to corporeal property.30  English 
law classified intellectual property rights as personal rights, but this is said to have 
had little to with logic, and more “to do with chance, history and the internal dynamics 
of the English legal system.”31  Copyright is, thus, said to be at most a personal right, 
allowed to function like a real right because of the award of state-sanctioned 
privileges.32   
 
Furthermore, it is claimed that the use of the term “property” — a veritable 
“conceptual juggernaut”33 — in relation to copyright is no accident.  The association 
of the term “property” with the monopoly or privilege granted by the state is said to 
be the result of a deliberate campaign by the 17th-century English publishers and 
booksellers in order to strengthen their case by invoking rhetoric.34  As the earliest 
form of protection in relation to literary works was by way of the grant of a crown 
privilege, which process was riddled with corruption, they adopted the term 
“property” as a substitute for “privilege,” which had a distinctly negative 
connotation.35  Having embraced the use of the term “property”, the language of the 
system “represents part of the reason for the system existing in its current form.”36  It 
is also submitted that the uniformity with which all forms of property are justified is a 
deliberate consequence of political economic power to give primacy to ownership 
rights in order to ensure that a system of exchange, and markets, can be 
                                            
29
 Sherman B and Bently L The Making of Modern Intellectual Property Law: The British Experience, 
1760 - 1911 1ed (2000) 21. 
30
 21. 
31
 Drahos A Philosophy of Intellectual Property 20. 
32
 Deazley Rethinking Copyright: History, Theory, Language 160. 
33
 160. 
34
 143.  According to Mackaay, it was at the time of the French Revolution that the notion of 
intellectual creations as constituting property first appeared.  This was a reaction to the generally 
corrupt system of privileges, which was replaced by a system, based on individual liberty, giving every 
person the right to exploit their creations (Mackaay E "Economic Incentives in Markets for Information 
and Innovation" 1990 Harv J L & Pub Pol'y 13 867 867-8). 
35
 Palmer "Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philospophy of Property Rights and 
Ideal Objects" 821. 
36
 Deazley Rethinking Copyright: History, Theory, Language 163. 
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established.37  The successful use of the term “property” in relation to the privileges 
granted in respect of intellectual creations, as in “intellectual property,” is said to 
have resulted in the continual “reification” of such rights, and the relentless, 
expansion of the domain and duration of copyright protection.38  Deazley sums up 
this position as follows: 
“[T]he conceit and language of intellectual property as a natural property right has 
provided one of the key foundations for rampant expansionism which is the story of 
copyright law throughout the twentieth and into the twenty-first century.”39 
 
The role of the state in the reification of intellectual creations has been noted.  
Property is not protected because it has an existence independent of the state, 
which existence is merely recognised or acknowledged by the state: it exists 
because it is recognised by the state.40  The state is essential for property rights: 
“without it there would be no institution of property.”41  Copyright protection afforded 
to authors is a consequence of state coercion, which prevents an author’s work from 
being copied.42  In fact, the guaranteeing of property rights is a raison d'être for the 
existence of the state.43  Furthermore, it is claimed that the recognition and the 
continuing expansion of property rights – particularly intellectual property - has only 
been possible as a result of the increase in the power of the state, which is required 
to enforce those rights.  May quotes the following passage from De Jouvenel to 
highlight the growth of power of the modern state, which makes such enforcement 
possible: 44 
“[O]ne observes on the contrary that the evolution from monarchy to democracy has 
been accompanied by a prodigious development of the means of coercion.  No king 
has had at his disposal a police force comparable to that of modern democracies.” 
 
                                            
37
 May A Global Political Economy of Intellectual Property Right: The new enclosures? 23. 
38
 Deazley Rethinking Copyright: History, Theory, Language 144. 
39
 152. 
40
 May A Global Political Economy of Intellectual Property Right: The new enclosures? 16. 
41
 17. 
42
 Hurt and Schuchman "The Economic Rationale of Copyright" 421. 
43
 Mackaay "Economic Incentives in Markets for Information and Innovation" 884. 
44
 885-7. 
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There is still a reluctance to simply acknowledge that copyright, 
jurisprudentially, constitutes property.  For example, it is not uncommon to see 
copyright described as a “bundle of rights”, and thereby to avoid the thorny issue of 
whether it constitutes property.45  Gordon claims that there is an illogical 
preoccupation with trying to justify the legal institution of property, whereas there 
seems to be no such preoccupation in respect of other legal institutions such as 
contract.46  These other legal institutions require similar justification. 
 
The reticence to accept copyright as property has been challenged as being a 
consequence of adopting an “overly narrow and conservative” model of property.47  It 
has been suggested that a possible reason for the reluctance to accept intellectual 
property as property is a consequence of a human shortcoming: a psychological 
tendency to be tethered to physical objects, or a failure to realise what the advances 
in technology have made possible.48  This conservatism and adherence to the 
requirement of occupancy was considered to be inconsistent with the new social, 
economic, technological and cultural circumstances.  The notion of occupancy was 
transformed – if not rejected – to be a special instance of a more general basis for 
property: labour.  The basis for the appropriation of property, relying on Locke’s 
philosophy of “possessive individualism (or a version thereof),” was labour.49  It was 
thus claimed that whereas physical property exists independently, but can only be 
subject to private property through occupancy, copyright is created through the 
endeavours of the author, and belongs to him on creation.50 
 
                                            
45
 Klopper, et al. Law of Intellectual Property in South Africa 146. 
46
 Gordon "An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and 
Encouragement Theory" 1425. 
47
 Sherman and Bently The Making of Modern Intellectual Property Law: The British Experience, 1760 
- 1911 23. 
48
 Gordon "An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and 
Encouragement Theory" 1348. 
49
 Sherman and Bently The Making of Modern Intellectual Property Law: The British Experience, 1760 
- 1911 23-4. 
50
 Drahos A Philosophy of Intellectual Property 26. 
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In so far as the role of the state is concerned in recognising intellectual 
property as property, it is not the case that only intellectual property, and not tangible 
property, depends on state guarantees and enforcement, or that intellectual property 
requires such recognition to a greater extent than tangible property.  There are 
various types of tangible property, and tangible property will simililarly only be legally 
protected if the owners of a particular type of property act in a manner which the law 
recognises as preserving such rights.  The practical differences between tangible 
and intangible property are not as stark as it might first appear.  The differences 
between intangible property and tangible property are said to be comparable to the 
distinctions between movable and immovable property.  For example, movable and 
immovable property differs in the following respects: how transfer is effected; the 
different time periods for acquisitive prescription; the extent to which a non-owner 
can pass valid title; and, the inapplicability of neighbour law to movable property.51 
 
Although jurisprudentially the recognition of intellectual property as property 
may present problems, it is not an issue which affects the matters examined in this 
work.  It is not necessary to confute one theory of the classification of copyright, or 
other intellectual property, in favour of another.  For purposes of this study, to do so 
would be drawing distinctions without there being a difference.  The intended 
economic analysis of the justification for copyright protection of computer programs 
is not dependent on whether copyright is jurisprudentially classified as property or 
personal rights.  As this work will approach the analysis of the copyright protection of 
computer programs from an economic perspective, it is more important for there to 
be clarity concerning the economic effect of intellectual property.  We can proceed 
with the analysis on the basis that from an economic perspective copyright, and 
intellectual property generally, constitutes property.  From an economic perspective, 
“[t]he social arrangements that govern the ownership, use, and disposal of anything 
that people value are called property rights.”52 
 
Copyright confers on the copyright holder three valuable economic rights: the 
exclusive right to do, or to authorise the doing of, any of the listed acts in respect of 
                                            
51
 Mackaay "Economic Incentives in Markets for Information and Innovation" 878-9. 
52
 Parkin M Microeconomics 9ed (2010) 44. 
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the specific type of eligible work reserved to the copyright holder (the rights of 
exclusion);53 privileges of use; and, powers to transfer these entitlements, similar to 
those which the law confers in respect of tangible property.54  For purposes of this 
work, it is sufficient to note that copyright grants the holder the right to manufacture, 
distribute, or sell copies of the relevant work, or a derivative work.55  The essence of 
copyright is to control the copying of a work.56  Most significantly, it is important to 
note that these rights are exclusive to the copyright holder, and “[a]n exclusive right 
is the basic form of a property right.”57  In other words, what is required is that there 
must be certainty concerning the contents of the rights (a clear “assignment” of 
rights), the holder of the rights, and the ability of the holder to deal with such rights.58  
Property law as an institution started with its essence being the recognition of the 
possession of physical objects to allow undisturbed use by the possessor, and has 
developed into the recognition of any asset (or right) entitling the holder to withhold 
or restrict its use.59 
 
However, copyright does not protect abstract ideas or creations per se; it 
requires that they be reduced to a tangible medium of expression corresponding with 
one or more of accepted categories of protected expression.60  More specifically, the 
                                            
53
 See, for example, sections 6 – 11B Copyright Act 98 of 1978. 
54
 Gordon "An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and 
Encouragement Theory" 1365; Moore A "A Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property" 1997 Hamline L 
Rev 21 65 87. 
55
 Abrams H "The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law: Exploding the Myth of Common 
Law Copyright" 1983 Wayne L Rev 29 (3) 1119 1129; Hettinger E "Justifying Intellectual Property" 
1989 Philosophy and Public Affairs 18 (1) 31 34. 
56
 Abrams "The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law: Exploding the Myth of Common Law 
Copyright" 1133. 
57
 Mackaay "Economic Incentives in Markets for Information and Innovation" 876. 
58
 O'Hare M "Copyright: When is Monopoly Efficient?" 1985 Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Management 4 (3) 407 408. 
59
 May A Global Political Economy of Intellectual Property Right: The new enclosures? 20-1.  This is 
of course not to deny that the recognition of property or rights is contingent on the prevailing political 
and economic environments. 
60
 S 2(2) CA 1978 and s 3(2) CDPA 1988.  The requirement in s 2(2) CA 1978 does not apply to 
broadcasts or programme-carrying signals.  A more detailed consideration of the idea-expression 
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Copyright Act61 (CA 1978) specifies nine types of eligible work, including literary 
works, artistic works and computer programs.62  The position is similar in England, 
where the eligible works are defined in the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 
(CDPA 1988).63   
 
Although protection is only afforded to the specified types of work, some of 
these types of work are broadly and non-exhaustively defined.  For example, literary 
works are defined to include novels, poetry, letters, lectures, scripts, memos, tables 
and compilations (including computer data).64  Dean correctly notes that to describe 
the listed examples which could be protected as "literary" works is a misnomer.65  
The term is not meant to imply that the subject matter needs to satisfy any literary 
standard as the Act expressly prohibits any assessment of literary quality.66  As is 
evident from the case law, both in South Africa and England, copyright protection 
may be extended to subject matter as banal as the insert included in medication 
packaging (which contains details about its composition and contra-indications),67 
the design of medical account forms,68 and examination papers69 - “things which 
have no pretensions to literary style”.70  The essential requirement to obtain 
copyright protection is originality.71  Copyright law’s standard for originality is rather 
                                                                                                                                       
dichotomy will be undertaken in Chapter 4 (Scope of copyright protection of computer programs), 
concerning the protection of software. 
61
 Act 98 of 1978. 
62
 S 2(1).  The eligible works are literary works, musical works, artistic works, cinematograph films, 
sound recordings, broadcasts, programme-carrying signals, published editions, and computer 
programs. 
63
 Ss 3 – 8.  There are differences between the CA 1978 and the CDPA 1988: the CA 1978 protects 
dramatic works as a species of literary work (rather than as a separate type of eligible work, as is the 
case under the CDPA 1998), and the CA 1978 protects computer programs as a sui generis type of 
protected work (and not as a species of literary works, as is the case under the CDPA 1988). 
64
 S 1(1) CA 1978, definition of “literary work”. 
65
 Dean O Handbook on South African Copyright Law 14ed (2012) 1-8. 
66
 S 1(1) CA 1978, definition of “literary work”. 
67
 Biotech Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Beecham Group Plc and Another 2002 (4) SA 249 (SCA). 
68
 Accesso CC v Allforms (Pty) Ltd and Another [1998] 4 All SA 655 (T). 
69
 University of London Press v University Tutorial Press [1916] 2 Ch 601. 
70
  608, cited in Klep Valves (Pty) Ltd v Saunders Valve Co Ltd 1987 (2) SA 1 (A) 21. 
71
 S 2(1). 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
19 
 
modest.  It simply requires that the subject matter must not have been copied, and 
that it must have been produced by the author’s own, non-trivial, labour and effort.72  
Unlike patent law, there is no requirement that the subject matter must be inventive, 
novel, unique, useful or have any particular merit.73  Thus, “fairly broad rules grant 
copyright to virtually all works within specified classes.”74  The position is neatly 
summarised by Cornish, as follows:75 
“Copyright everywhere is open to those who cross a low threshold of creativity, and 
differences between national laws over the concept originality operate only at this 
margin.  No system reserves copyright only for those works which pass a substantial 
test of aesthetic merit.” 
 
The reason for mentioning these “humble and transitory” examples of subject 
matter that have received copyright protection is to contrast it with the romantic 
notions of the author which commonly features in some of the justifications for 
copyright protection, and whose works are used to demonstrate that such works 
deserve protection because of the genius which they exhibit.76  Although the author 
of a copyright work is considered to be the “corner-stone” of copyright because 
ownership either vests in the author or is derived from him,77 the idea that the author 
is central to copyright is continually looking more tenuous.  The addition of new types 
of eligible work such as sound recordings, broadcasts, program-carrying signals, and 
published editions indicates “a shift away from seeing intellectual property rights 
                                            
72
 Klep Valves (Pty) Ltd v Saunders Valve Co Ltd 22-23; Haupt t/a Soft Copy v Brewers Marketing 
Intelligence (Pty) Ltd & Others 2006 (4) SA 458 (SCA) 473; Marick Wholesalers (Pty) Ltd v Hallmark 
Hemdon (Pty) Ltd (1999) 707 JOC (T) 715-6. 
73
 Klep Valves (Pty) Ltd v Saunders Valve Co Ltd 21.  However, in Waylite Diary CC v First National 
Bank Ltd 1995 (1) SA 645 (A) the court appears to have introduced an objective test to evaluate 
whether effort expended in the creation of the work was worthy of protection by considering the effort 
expended and product of the effort.  This has decision has been criticised by Dean, who insists that 
the test of originality should be purely subjective: the only issue should be whether the requisite effort 
was expended (Dean Handbook on South African Copyright Law 1-24).  
74
 Gordon "An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and 
Encouragement Theory" 1441. 
75
 Cornish W Intellectual Property 3ed (1996) 318. 
76
 318. 
77
 Dean Handbook on South African Copyright Law 1-31. 
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primarily as rewards for mental labour to instead viewing them as important 
economic assets.”78  However, for convenience, this work will continue to refer to the 
“author” of any intellectual creation, as this is also the terminology of the CA 1978. 
 
In the UK, the CDPA 1988 already draws a distinction between those eligible 
works which are considered to be authorial works, and those considered to be 
entrepreneurial works.  Originality is a requirement for authorial works — literary 
works (including computer programs), dramatic works, musical works and artistic 
works — but not the entrepreneurial works.79  The copyright protection afforded to 
the entrepreneurial works — cinematograph films, sound recordings, broadcasts, 
cable programmes, and published editions — thus protects the financial investment 
rather than creative endeavour.  It may, therefore, not be too cynical to suggest that 
what copyright protects “might be viewed more as products of the market than of the 
mind.”80 
 
As stated above, the discussion of the jurisprudential nature of copyright qua 
property does not provide any definitive answer.  The economic analysis of the 
justifications for copyright does not require an answer.  This fact is neatly summed 
up by Benjamin Kaplan’s pragmatic approach to the analysis of intellectual 
property:81 
“Examining the view from the top of the hill, I find one temptation easy to resist, and 
that is to sum up copyright with just the word "property" or "personality" or any one of 
the other essences to which scholars, foreign and domestic, have been trying to 
reduce the subject. . . . [C]haracterizations in grand terms then seem of little value: 
we may as well go directly to the policies actuating or justifying the particular 
determinations.” 
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2 4 The historical role of justifications in the development of copyright 
 
It may come as no surprise that the history of the development of copyright (and 
patent) protection in England82 indicates that its emergence was not the result of a 
philosophically-based enquiry into the appropriateness of that type of protection, 
approved by the populace or their duly appointed representatives.  Rather, its 
emergence was dictated by the prevailing social structure and the invention of the 
European printing press.83  The emergence of copyright was “distinctly 
instrumental.”84 
 
Prior to the invention of the printing press, books were of limited economic 
value, and, hence, there was little point in seeking any copyright-type legal 
protection.85  Although copying of literary works did take place before the invention of 
the printing press, “these acts only incurred moral censure and no legal 
consequences.”86  The reasons why the printing press transformed the economic 
value of cultural assets such as literary works were the following:87 First, prior to the 
invention of the printing press there was very little demand for such works as the 
majority of the population was illiterate.  Second, the creators of such works were 
generally affluent and motivated by non-financial interests such as cultural 
advancement, producing the works in their leisure time — sometimes anonymously.  
                                            
82
 As will become clear below, the reason for specific reference to the development of English 
copyright law is the fact that England, with the passing of the Statute of Anne (1710), was the first 
country with a “modern” copyright law in that it granted general copyright protection to authors, and 
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83
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Another reason why some creators were not motivated by financial concerns was the 
fact that works were often created under a system of patronage.  If anyone claimed 
ownership of the work, it would be the patron, not the author of the work.  The 
patrons were also not financially motivated: their patronage was for personal 
consumption, and the accumulation of works was probably motivated by issues of 
status.  The invention of the printing press and the consequent development of the 
printing industry gave rise to a new profession: the literary author.88  Third, the costs 
of reproducing works before the printing press were very high because they were 
manuscripts.  The reason these copies were so expensive was that it involved the 
time-consuming task of producing another manuscript.  By the late 14th century 
there were still only a few dozen copies of any particular work.89  Furthermore, the 
copies would almost certainly be of an inferior quality because of human error, which 
reduced their value.  In other words, the quality-adjusted cost of copies was very 
high.90  Following the invention of the printing press by Johannes Gutenberg, printing 
industries rapidly arose in the European capitals, the first in Venice in 1469.91  The 
result was that good quality books, particularly reprints of popular titles, were soon 
readily available.92 
 
Although the modern justificatory theories — particularly the moral or ethical 
justifications — for copyright protection, and modern copyright laws, focus on the 
author, historically it was the publishers who initially campaigned for, and obtained, 
protection.93  Realising the commercial value of the market for books, it was not long 
before the printing industry sought to protect their new-found economic interests by 
seeking monopoly grants.  The greater availability of books did not merely make 
them commodities, they sped up the dissemination of ideas, some of which were 
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considered to be seditious, heretical, obscene or blasphemous.  Commencing with 
the first grants of privileges to the printing industry by the city council of Venice in the 
15th century,94 “the late medieval [European] states had a readymade device for 
controlling the dissemination of new ideas while solving the profitability problem of 
some printers: the crown privilege.”95  Besides its role as a device for censorship, the 
awards of printing privileges provided the medieval monarchs with revenues as 
these privileges were purchased.96  Because these monopoly awards of privilege 
were financially beneficial to both the monarchs and the publishers, they were “the 
defining economic instrument of late feudalism.”97   
 
Copyright thus had its origin in the grant of royal decrees and privileges in 
European countries during the 15th to 18th centuries.98  The practice of granting 
crown privileges was widespread in Europe by the 16th and 17th centuries.99  The 
publishers had managed to make common cause with the medieval authorities, and 
so it was that “the rise of Anglo-Saxon copyright was a saga of publishing interests 
attempting to protect a concentrated market and a central government attempting to 
apply a subtle form of censorship to the new technology of the printing press.”100  
This was significantly different to subsequent statutory copyright protection, which 
focused on creativity and the principle of authorship, whereas the crown privileges 
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were concerned with the trade in books.101  These early privileges given to specific 
publishers often gave them the exclusive rights to publish classes of books, which 
also gave them a buying monopoly over authors’ works falling within the relevant 
classes.102  Importantly though, prior to these privileges, copyright simply did not 
exist, and had not developed, under English common law.103 
 
The origin of copyright in England is very much a tale of publishing interests 
securing monopoly privilege and censorship.104  In 1553 Queen Mary assumed the 
throne in England and restored Roman Catholicism as the state religion.  She was 
notorious for her religious zealotry and the resultant persecution of the Protestants, 
which earned her the sobriquet “Bloody Mary.”105  Because it served her efforts to 
suppress the spread of seditious and heretical information, she was prepared to give 
the Stationers’ Company (the Company) control over printing in England.106  Indeed, 
the suppression of seditious and heretical views was the “prime motivation” for 
granting the Company control over printing.107 
 
The Company was a London craft guild of “writers, illuminators, bookbinders 
and booksellers, established since 1403.”108  Being a craft guild, the Company was 
eager to obtain monopoly protection for its members and eliminate any threat of 
competition from non-members.109  Following its incorporation by royal charter on 5 
May 1557, the Company was granted the exclusive privilege to print and distribute 
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books.110  The Company’s position was strengthened when, in 1637, it was 
authorised by the Star Chamber — the court tasked with the control of publishing 
and printing presses — to “seize and destroy unauthorized books and presses, 
eliminating both economic competition and threats to established political and 
religious authorities at one blow.”111  Although the Company was given the right to 
control the printing presses, and all published books were subject to its approval and 
registration,112 torture and killing remained the Crown’s preferred method of 
suppressing seditious and heretical views.113  
 
After Charles I was deposed, and the Star Chamber was abolished, in 1641 
the system of royal privileges was abolished, but was soon replaced with a series of 
Licensing Acts, commencing in 1643, which were also censorship laws and 
maintained the Company’s monopoly on printing.114  The last of the Licensing Acts 
was passed by Charles II in 1662 and lapsed on 3 May 1695.115  By this time the 
negative effects of the Company’s monopoly was becoming apparent to the English 
parliament: consumers were paying inflated prices for poor quality, error-riddled 
publications.116  The immediate effect of the lapsing of the Licensing Acts was that 
the Company lost its long-held printing monopoly, and was soon encountering 
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competition from other publishers.117  This was not a situation which the Company 
chose to ignore; its monopoly profits were fast being eroded.  Its campaign to extend 
its monopoly was at least as sophisticated as that of any modern-day lobby group.  
Plant describes its efforts as follows:118 
“Whenever exceptional profits attracted interlopers, the case against unregulated 
competition was argued by the Company with a skill which our present-day trade 
associations hardly excel.” 
 
Although the Company failed to get the Licensing Acts re-enacted, they did 
manage to secure the passing of the first copyright statute, the Statute of Anne, on 
10 April 1710.119  The Statute of Anne has been described as a “watershed” 
moment,120 or “revolutionary,”121 in the development of copyright because authors’ 
rights were recognised for the first time and they were allowed to register their own 
works.  Until the Statute of Anne, the interests of the authors were largely absent; the 
crown privileges and the Licensing Acts were solely concerned with protecting the 
interests of the printing industry.122  Drahos sums up the position of authors prior to 
the passing of the Statute of Anne as follows:123 
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“At this stage of copyright’s history the author had only a cameo role.  The central 
players were the Crown and the printing trade and neither was particularly interested 
in the rights of the author, or the value of a right of copy to the economy or culture. 
Unless an author was lucky enough to secure a personal privilege, his position was 
weak, so much so that, if he allowed a manuscript to be publicly circulated, there was 
nothing to prevent a member of the Stationers’ Company from registering the 
copyright and exploiting it.  The right to print books belonged to those members of 
the Stationers’ Company who registered the particular work and not to the author.” 
 
There is an alternative, possibly cynical, explanation for the Statute of Anne 
introducing the interests of author: it was the only way for the publishers to secure 
some legal protection for their interests following the end of the Licensing Acts.  In 
fact, after the monopoly privileges of the Company were terminated in 1641, and 
before the enactment of the Licensing Acts, the Company mentioned the interests of 
authors — as a subsidiary matter — as part of their motivations to have their 
monopoly reinstated.124  Meanwhile, the authors had also realised the economic 
value of their creations and lobbied for protection of their interests.125  Following their 
failure to get the Licensing Acts re-enacted, the publishers, realising that their earlier 
role to satisfy the desire to censor material was no longer a pressing concern, were 
astute enough to change tack and lobby for the protection of the rights of authors, 
and to ensure that any rights granted to authors were assignable.126  They argued 
that copyright could be assignable and provide an author’s heirs financial support 
after the author’s death.127  The publishers reasoned that it did not matter who the 
law gave primacy to, as any benefit derived by them also benefitted the authors, who 
could negotiate with publishers for a fair share.128 
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As was common practice in the 18th century, and indeed still is the case 
today, an author’s work would only be published if the author agreed to assign his 
rights to the publisher.129  In fact, until the end of the 18th century it was common for 
the author to only receive a lump sum payment prior to publication, irrespective of 
the subsequent success of their work.130  By supporting the Statute of Anne, the 
publishers were thus more concerned about their own financial interests, rather than 
vindicating the rights of authors.131  The publishers were thus prepared to make a 
tactical switch and advance the rights of the authors, whose interests were now 
considered to be more deserving of protection by the legislature than those of the 
discredited publishers.132  In fact, it was claimed that the publishers had virtually 
invented the idea of the author, simply to advance their own interests.133  It is for this 
reason that some commentators like Tom Palmer claim that copyright emerges out 
of state power to grant privileges, rather than out of any concern for the rights of 
authors.134 
 
Although the argument that the concept of the author was invented by the 
publishers is probably too dismissive of authors, it is probably the case that without 
the lobbying of publishers the Statute of Anne would not have been passed.  The 
basis of protection was not based on “the intellectual creativity or moral rights of the 
author.”135  Creativity and authorship as the basis for copyright protection did not 
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emerge on a consistent basis for granting property rights until the early part of the 
18th century.136 
 
The success of the copyright industry to protect their products contrasts 
sharply with the position of inventors.  Various reasons were given for the refusal to 
protect inventions:137 in The Case of Monopolies it was held that monopolies were 
contrary to the common law, which abhorred monopolies because of its detrimental 
effect on social welfare; historically, it was associated with grants by unscrupulous 
monarchs; socially and economically, these creations were considered to be too 
important to allow any form of monopoly; and, philosophically, it was claimed that 
“that authors create something while inventors merely uncover what is already 
there.”138  The other reason for the failure of inventors to garner support for their 
“natural” rights is probably the fact that inventors were individuals and lacked the 
lobbying power of the Company. 
 
It is hopefully self-evident from this brief description of the early development 
of copyright protection that it did not evolve from any sort of philosophical or 
theoretical foundation.  In fact, the first time that there was any concerted attempt to 
justify copyright protection philosophically was when the question of the existence of 
common-law copyright was being considered, approximately sixty years after the 
passing of the Statute of Anne in the case of Millar v Taylor.139  It would probably be 
difficult to find a better example of an ex post facto justification for legislation, 
particularly one so economically significant.  The issue that had to be decided 
concerned the status of literary works following the period of statutory protection 
under the Statute of Anne.140  Were these works now unprotected, and could they be 
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produced by anyone?  Apart from the statutory protection, were these works 
protected under the common law?141 
 
The Company, eager to avoid competition following the expiration of the 
statutory protected period, particularly from Scottish publishers, claimed that literary 
works were protected by perpetual common-law copyright vesting in the authors.142  
The Company once again showed itself to be tenacious in protecting its financial 
interest, even resorting to underhand tactics.  Following the passing of the Statute of 
Anne, it continued to campaign for the extension of statutory period of protection.  
Having failed to achieve this in 1735, the Company supported the idea of the 
existence of perpetual common-law copyright protection.143  The Company even 
engaged in a sham to contrive a case which could establish a precedent of 
supporting claims for perpetual common-law copyright.144  However, the House of 
Lords finally rejected the notion of perpetual common-law copyright in Donaldson v 
Becket,145 bringing to an end the 30-year “battle of the booksellers.”146  Copyright 
protection was solely created, and limited, by statute. 
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The above brief account of the development of copyright indicates that its 
development was more dependent on the political and social structure of the 
societies in which it arose, rather than as a result of a deliberate attempt to establish 
a sound rationale for its creation.  Indeed, copyright was used to suppress seditious 
and heretical material which may threaten the state.  Copyright also provided the 
publishers with protection from competition in their publications.  Its purpose was 
thus instrumental.  In contrast to the current emphasis on authors as the cornerstone 
of copyright, authors do not appear to have been central to the considerations.  It is, 
therefore, not sufficient to accept copyright solely on a historical basis or tradition.  In 
fact, historically, creativity and innovation does not appear to be dependent on the 
grant of property rights, and the creation of such rights appear to be contingent on a 
particular set of social relations.  For example, Imperial China was “an example of a 
society that achieved spectacular outcomes in science and innovation, yet it did not 
rely on intellectual property rights or a customary equivalent.”147  Copyright, because 
of its social and economic significance, should be grounded on a sound theoretical 
basis, particularly if protection is expanded to new types of work, as has been the 
case with computer programs.  Hughes neatly summarises this position:148 
“Husserl once observed that "tradition" meant only that the particulars of the past had 
been forgotten.  Of course, it is inevitable that the details of the past will be lost. That 
means that we have a choice between unreflective tradition and grand theories; I find 
the latter a preferable way to capture and condense a history. The grand 
characterization can be tested, more thoroughly than the tradition, as it is used as a 
guide for new situations.” 
 
However, the mere fact that the initial development of copyright was 
instrumental should not be the basis for its dismissal.  Dismissal of copyright on that 
basis fails to provide any insight as to how it actually operates and its present 
significance as a social institution.149  What we should seek when looking at the 
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historical development of copyright is not the chronological progression of copyright; 
we should try to identify those events of social and technological significance, like 
the development of the printing press, and whether there is an underlying rationale 
for development of copyright in response such changes.  Only by understanding “the 
fundamental philosophic perception of the nature of copyright and its underlying 
purpose” will we be able to respond to new technological developments, such as 
computer programs and the Internet, on a principled and consistent basis.150 
 
2 5 Classification of justifications 
 
As stated above, the fact that copyright, by virtue of its grant of property rights, has 
such significant social and economic effects requires that it should be grounded on a 
sound theoretical basis.  However, attempting to formulate a coherent justification for 
intellectual property is a “formidable task.”151  Hettinger, rather dramatically, in tones 
reminiscent of John F Kennedy’s rousing speech concerning the need for America to 
put a man on the moon, emphasises the importance and difficulty of formulating 
such a justification:152  
“Focusing on the problems of justifying intellectual property is important not because 
these institutions lack any sort of justification, but because they are not so obviously 
or easily justified as many people think.” 
 
When justifications for copyright are proffered, they almost invariably fall into 
three categories: (1) those based on the natural rights of the author to the product of 
his creation (natural rights theory), or that the property right is an author’s “just 
desert” for his labour (reward theory), (2) those which require the extension of a 
property right to an author in respect of his creation because it serves to protect his 
personality (personality theory), and (3) those which consider copyright as producing 
socially beneficial effects (utilitarian theory).  The first category of justifications — the 
natural rights theory and the reward theory — will collectively be referred to as the 
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“labour-based” justifications, for reasons that will soon become clear.  Both the 
labour-based justifications and the personality theory are examples of moral or 
ethical justifications for copyright.153 
 
Interestingly, the above justificatory theories have been employed, in one or 
other form, since the earliest attempts to justify copyright.  Already during the 18th 
and 19th centuries in Britain, there was a debate concerning the nature of copyright 
in which the proponents of copyright either considered copyright as being a natural 
(or moral) right, or considered copyright as an instrument, which may serve the 
broader interests of society.154  Those who sought a moral or ethical justification for 
copyright based their arguments on either the Lockean “notions of occupancy and 
labour as the foundation for a property system”, or the Kantian and Hegelian notions 
of personality, which were favoured in civil law jurisdictions – or both.  Relevant to 
this study, the economic efficiency of copyright would satisfy the instrumentalist 
requirement that copyright serves a broader utilitarian goal.  The utilitarian theory is 
thus distinctly instrumentalist as copyright is the means by which the desired social 
goal is realised.  An economic justification for copyright, particularly computer 
programs, which forms the main subject of this work, would consider copyright as an 
instrument to promote economic efficiency, and thereby its utilitarian goal, by 
providing economic agents with the necessary incentives.155 
 
There is of course no a priori validity to the above categorisation, and 
commentators have chosen to label and group the justifications differently, based on 
their particular paradigms.  Spector, for example, seeks to base his justification for 
copyright on the distinction between deontological or consequentialist justifications 
for social institutions.  A deontological justification is similar to the natural rights 
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theory as it is based on the moral or ethical notion that certain persons are entitled to 
particular rights.  A consequentialist justification enforces rights based on the socially 
beneficial consequences of the particular institution, whether it is allocative efficiency 
or well-being.  A consequentialist justification is therefore equivalent to the utilitarian 
theory.156  However, because he further considers that all institutional rules comprise 
a combination of structural rules (those rules which define the bundle of rights) and 
and positional rules (those rules which determine the recipients of the rights), he 
does not consider the natural rights theory and the economic justifications (utilitarian 
theory) as alternative justifications for copyright.  They are, according to his 
paradigm, complementary justifications.157  The economic theory of property rights 
defines the bundle of rights necessary for efficiency, whereas the natural rights 
theory is considered to be the only equitable option to distribute such rights.158 
 
Because the primary focus will be on the economic justifications for copyright, 
no attempt to will be made to provide a taxonomy of the various justificatory 
paradigms.  Although there may be “many and varied" justifications for copyright, the 
three categories mentioned at the start of this section continue to be the most 
common justifications.159  The labour-based justifications and the personality theory 
are based on ethical or moral arguments, and will be dealt with first.  The economic 
(and utilitarian) theory of copyright, which will be the main focus of this work will be 
considered in the following chapter.160  As will become clear in the course of 
discussing the moral — non-economic — justificatory theories, despite their 
continued use and intuitive appeal, they fail to provide satisfactory explanations for 
the institution of copyright.161  For example, right from the beginning of the search for 
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justificatory theories, the natural rights theory proved to be unconvincing.  Those who 
had, unsuccessfully, argued in favour of common-law copyright in the 18th century 
relied on the notion that it was a natural right of an author.162  If there is a satisfactory 
justification for copyright, and specifically computer programs, it is the economic 
case for copyright.  This is probably the reason why the “English judges took as their 
point of departure” the economic justification for copyright.163 
 
2 6 Labour-based justifications 
 
As indicated above, the moral justifications for copyright can be divided into two main 
categories: the labour-based justifications, and the personality theory.  In turn, the 
labour-based justifications can be divided into the natural rights theory and the 
reward theory, and this is the order in which they will be discussed.   
 
2 6 1 Natural rights theory 
 
Simply stated, the natural rights theory of copyright is based on the moral notion that 
an author is entitled to copyright protection because it protects the “fruits of his 
labours”: something which he has a natural, or inherent, right to.  An author’s 
creation is his property, and copyright simply vindicates the author’s natural rights 
and prevents unauthorised exploitation of the author’s work.164  The rights which 
copyright afford the author is, thus, not a privilege or some type of reward.  
Economic considerations, such a providing authors with incentives to create works, 
are, at best, secondary considerations.165 
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2 6 1 1 John Locke 
 
Although he may not have been the first proponent of the natural rights theory, John 
Locke is often cited as the person who formulated the theory as a basis for property 
ownership.166  In fact, there was little that was original in Locke's political 
philosophy.167  Before considering his philosophical theory of property, it is important 
to place John Locke and his written works in their social and historical context.  We 
are all, in varying degrees, products of our social and historical environment, and it is 
therefore necessary to appreciate the context in which statements were made if we 
are to understand their proper meaning.  Accordingly, we will briefly consider the 
political environment in which Locke wrote, and his political views. 
 
Locke supported, and sought to justify, the deposition of the English king, 
James II, during the so-called Glorious Revolution of 1688.168  The Glorious 
Revolution was led by the landed aristocracy, who owned about 65% of the land in 
England despite only comprising approximately 2% of the population.169  The 
Glorious Revolution is considered to have ended the absolute right of kings, and to 
have ushered in a new era of parliamentary democracy.  It is therefore not surprising 
that Locke, as a supporter of the revolution, attacked the basis on which monarchs 
had hitherto claimed authority – the Divine Right of Kings.  His opponent in the 
debate concerning the Divine Right of Kings was Robert Filmer.170  Having rejected 
the Divine Right of Kings, Locke’s first Treatise on Government criticised the concept 
of hereditary power,171 and sought an alternative justification for obeying 
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governments.172  This alternate justification also had to legitimise rule by the landed 
aristocracy or their representatives.173  Apart from these theoretical matters, Locke’s 
work also needed to reassure “middle England that revolution against a particular 
monarch did not need to threaten economic or social security.”174 
 
Locke dismissed the Divine Right of Kings by rubbishing the idea that the 
monarchs were the actual heirs of Adam.  Possibly because the deposed king 
Charles II had planned to make his recently-born Catholic son heir, instead of his 
Protestant daughter Mary, who was married to the Dutch king William of Orange, 
Locke condemned the paternal monarchical structures and primogeniture as also 
being inconsistent with the notion of hereditary succession among the supposed 
heirs of Adam.  Furthermore, even if the king was considered to be in a quasi-
paternal role, no paternal right extended to control the life and property of his 
children.175 
 
Locke, like Aristotle, believed that a government does not have a timeless 
existence, but is created and shaped by the people.176  Importantly for our purposes, 
there are some rights, like the right to own property, which are natural rights and 
precede the existence of a government or law.177  Before the creation of a 
government, people were in a “state of nature,” governed by divine, natural laws.  
The state of nature “is characterized as that state where the moral landscape has yet 
to be changed by formal property relations.”178  Without the emergence of a 
government, the state of nature will persist.  However, the natural rights which we 
enjoy, such as the right to life, liberty and propery, are often exercised in a way 
which infringes the rights of others.  This results in conflicts, and prevents humans 
from enjoying their natural rights.  It is because of this that humans chose to enter 
into a social contract to form a government, and by doing so they get to enjoy their 
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natural rights.  By allowing a government to curb certain behaviour, the citizens get 
to enjoy their rights to a greater extent than would have been possible without a 
government.179  Unlike Hobbes, Locke considered a government to enhance the 
human experience and personal liberty, rather than being “some sort of necessary 
evil”.180 
 
Following Grotius, Locke held that a government thus derived its power and 
legitimacy from the consent of the governed, through the social contract.  There was 
nothing divine about a government’s authority.181  A government that disregards the 
will of the majority has breached its obligation of trust.182  Although he regarded the 
role of government as being instrumental, and not simply as a necessary evil, he 
believed that the role of government was distinctly limited: government authority 
should only extend to facilitate individual autonomy.183  More precisely, the purpose 
of government, as constituted by the social contract, is to protect life, liberty and 
property; it should seek to maximise the well-being of its citizens, not act to 
propagate any particular form of ideology.184  Because he advocated this notion of 
minimalist government, Locke is considered to be the father of modern liberal 
democracy.185   
2 6 1 2 Property as natural right 
 
As indicated above, Locke considered property ownership to be a natural right which 
preceded the existence of a government or law.186  Property is much more than a 
natural right; it plays the central role in justifying the existence of government, and a 
government’s actions in relation to property determines whether it (and its laws) 
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remains faithful to the social contract by which it was created.187  Conversely, 
property determined “contractual capacity” for purposes of the social contract as 
Locke advocated a qualified franchise: if you did not own property, you were not 
considered to be a citizen.188  The centrality of property to the existence of 
government and political rights has been summarised as follows:189 
“The preservation of estates is the ‘great and chief end’ of government.  Property 
rights underpin political rights, and political rights serve to illustrate and preserve 
property rights.” 
 
Government’s principal role, and the function of law, is to protect property.190  
Legitimate government does therefore not arbitrarily deprive persons of their 
property, or threaten to do so.  The other function of the law is to protect a person’s 
property against the involuntary deprivation by other persons.  It is only when our 
property rights are protected that we can experience liberty.  The centrality of 
property to Locke’s constitutional order means that property was not viewed as 
something meant to be considered in economic terms – as having a market value.  
In fact, because property ownership determined a person’s political rights, “[i]t was 
inconceivable to Locke that anyone should want to alienate property, unless forced 
to do so by adverse economic conditions.”191  However, today property, such as 
copyright, is almost exclusively considered in economic terms and is the cornerstone 
of the market economy.  As we will see in the next section, according to Lockean 
theory, property is more than a natural right; it also fulfils a divine plan to reward 
those who have laboured on that which God has provided.192 
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2 6 1 3 Acquisition of property 
 
We will now consider how, according to Locke’s political philosophy, private property 
may be acquired and how the institution of private property is justified.  It is important 
to note that, despite the common employment of Locke’s philosophy in the context of 
justifying intellectual property, he made no specific reference to any aspect of 
intellectual property.193  At the time he wrote the issue of copyright for authors was 
not yet a topical matter.  It was only later that his works were applied to the subject of 
intellectual property.194  Locke’s focus, given his political affiliation to the land-owning 
aristocracy, was on the ownership of land.195   
 
According to Locke, God created the world for the common benefit of 
humans, and intended that they make use of it.196  Original acquisition of property 
from this common, unowned pool of resources is possible through the application of 
sufficient labour.197  By toiling and cultivating a piece of land a person becomes 
entitled to own it because he has used that which God has made available.198  
Through the application of labour one is able to appropriate that which was formerly 
in the common pool of resources, and exclude the rights of others to those 
resources.199  Thus, the key factor which must be established when determining if 
someone is entitled to claim ownership is whether they have expended labour on the 
land claimed to the extent that the land can be said to be transformed.200  The notion 
that through expending labour one is entitled to claim ownership of the fruits of one’s 
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labour becomes a general principle; “everyman has private property in the produce 
of his own labour — or, at least, should have.”201  But why should this be the case? 
 
According to Locke, the law of nature accords each person freedom, and that 
is why the rights to life and liberty are natural rights.202  Our right to liberty is not a 
special dispensation from any government; if anything, the institution of government 
serves merely to confirm our right to liberty, and property in our person.203  Because 
we own our own bodies, our labour is also our “unquestionable property”.204  When 
we expend labour on a common resource, we increase its value.  Locke believed 
that most of the value attributed to an item is as a consequence of the labour 
expended on it.205  But it is not just the increase in value that justifies the claim to 
ownership, it is because the object becomes an inseparable part of our person that 
entitles us to claim ownership.206  We are entitled to assert ownership over our 
external creations, by virtue of the labour expended; it represents “an outgrowth of 
rights over one's personal self”.207  If we are denied the right to claim property in the 
objects we have increased in value, it would constitute a violation of our right to 
liberty.  To deny us property in the fruits of our labour is to deny us property in our 
labour, and, in turn, property in our own bodies.208  His argument for private property 
is neatly paraphrased as follows by Hettinger:209 
“A person owns her body and hence she owns what it does, namely, its labor.  A 
person's labor and its product are inseparable, and so ownership of one can be 
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secured only by owning the other.  Hence, if a person is to own her body and thus its 
labor, she must also own what she joins her labor with-namely, the product of her 
labor.” 
 
The right to property is, thus, not dependent on the consent of, or recognition 
by, others or the government.  Although government exists as a result of a social 
contract, property precedes this social institution, and government merely 
acknowledges its existence.  By this reasoning Locke intended to negate any 
arguments that the institution of property was derived from the royal prerogative, or 
unanimous assent (which required the consent of the king, in any event), as Filmer 
had argued.210   
 
2 6 1 4 Locke’s provisos 
 
From the above, an impression may be created that Locke advocated, or condoned, 
the avaricious appropriation of resources.  However, other than the requirement that 
sufficient labour must be mixed with a common resource for ownership to vest, 
Locke required that two further conditions, or provisos, needed to be satisfied before 
ownership could be acquired: first, the appropriation of ownership must not result in 
a loss to others as there should still be sufficient resources available for others to 
use (the “enough-and-as-good” or the “no-loss-to-others” requirement);211 and, 
second, that which is appropriated must be no more than that which is necessary 
(the “no-waste” requirement).212  The standard for determining whether a loss is 
suffered by others according to the enough-and-as-good requirement is human 
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happiness or well-being, which “is the sole standard of intrinsic value.”213  This 
requirement is substantially similar to the economic measurement of Pareto 
improvements when determining efficiency.214  If these provisos are satisfied, there 
can be no objection to the appropriation of ownership based on labour. 
 
The existence of these provisos has meant that Locke’s political philosophy is 
employed to justify actions by both those who are on the left and right of the political 
spectrum.  A selective extract of Locke’s views on property can be used to justify 
individual avarice and capitalism, but at the same time, it can be used to adopt a 
more socialistic outlook.215  On the one hand, Locke appears to stress the 
importance of individual autonomy, the right to be free from governmental 
intervention.  The individual is entitled to the fruits of his labours, and everyone has 
an equal opportunity to endeavour in pursuit of the good life.216  By using the 
resources which God has made available, the individual who endeavours is also 
doing that which God intended.217  Reasoning in this manner, it is easy to conclude 
that “God intended the harder worker to be the richer” and that any failure to 
accumulate wealth “is not misfortune, but negligence.”218  On the other hand, 
although God appears to have overlooked the prospect of scarcity, and the 
propensity for human greed, Locke tried to address these problems by requiring 
satisfaction of the provisos.  He considers these problems to be a consequence of 
the emergence of the money economy.219  The fact that property can be exchanged 
for money motivates people to appropriate more property that is necessary, which 
results in overuse of the common resources and waste.220  However, Locke’s 
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commitment to the satisfaction of these provisos has been questioned by critics 
because of the ease with which he was prepared to abandon them.  Locke, rather 
too conveniently, considered positive laws which permit this scramble for resources, 
and which may result in an unequal distribution of wealth, to be legitimate because 
they have the tacit consent of the electorate.221  It is probably because of this that a 
commentator like Moore argues that the provisos are not necessary conditions for 
appropriation, they are merely sufficient conditions.222 
 
2 6 1 5 Natural rights theory and intellectual property 
 
Despite the fact that Locke made no specific reference to claims relating to 
intellectual property, it is not hard to see why his arguments have found a receptive 
audience among the advocates of intellectual property.223  Intellectual property, such 
as copyright, can be more intuitively, and, arguably, plausibly justified in accordance 
with his political philosophy than claims to land.224  Whereas land is not created by 
the claimant, and the entitlement to claim specific land means that it is no longer 
available for use by others in common, no such issues arises in relation to 
intellectual property.  Intellectual property, copyright, in particular, does not deprive 
others of anything as it would not exist but for the labour expended by its author.  If it 
is the case that nothing could so clearly be one's own property as one’s labour, then 
nothing can more clearly be the product of one’s labour than that which he has 
exclusively created.225  Hettinger expresses this proposition as follows:226 
“What a person produces with her own intelligence, effort, and perseverance ought to 
belong to her and to no one else.  "Why is it mine? Well, it's mine because I made it, 
that's why. It wouldn't have existed but for me."” 
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Besides satisfying the requirement that labour be expended to vest property, 
intellectual creations, such as copyright works, also seems to satisfy Locke’s 
provisos.227  As copyright does not protect the facts or ideas on which a copyright 
work is based, nothing can be said to be removed from the common pool of 
resources – “the common of ideas seems inexhaustible.”228  Others can freely create 
as there is no loss in resources, so no one is worse off.  In fact, a copyright work 
may actually contribute ideas, which others are again free to use.  After all, ideas are 
created by individuals, not society.229  So why should individuals not own their own 
creations?  Copyright law places far fewer restrictions on others than patent law: it 
even allows other persons to exploit identical expressions of the same ideas and 
facts, provided that they were independently created.230  In comparison with other 
property, intellectual property does seem to place a far lower cost on society:231 
“[U]nlike the farmer or the industrialist, who must combine labor with liberal doses of 
land or capital to create something of value, the author or artist draws only on 
inexhaustible resources -- the wealth of human experience -- to create works of 
value.  Thus, the author, more than most property claimants, appears quite likely to 
satisfy the Lockean “proviso”: after the author uses common resources, “there is 
enough, and as good left in common for others.”” 
 
Also, questions of a wasteful use of resources “are few and far between.”232  
Copyright law does not enable the wasteful hording of facts and ideas.  If anything, 
encouraging intellectual activity increases the possibility of generating new ideas.  In 
any event, ideas are not protected, and, unlike perishable goods, they rarely lose 
their usefulness.233 
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2 6 2 Reward theory 
 
As mentioned above, the other labour-based theory of property is the reward theory, 
which is based on the notion that the property right is an author’s “just desert” for his 
labour.234  Although the reward theory can be justified on a consequentialist basis, 
namely, that by affording property protection, we provide persons with the necessary 
incentive to create new works, in this section we will only consider it on the basis of a 
normative proposition.  In other words, we will simply consider whether proprietary 
rights ought to be granted in respect of an item on the basis that the claimant has 
expended labour in creating the item.235 
 
The normative proposition that property rights should be awarded is obviously 
based on moral or ethical considerations.236  Labour, by its nature, is considered as 
something which is unpleasant and best avoided, not something that a person will 
ordinarily do in preference to enjoying leisure time.  The reward theory tends to 
adopt a rather sentimental view of the author of a work.  An author is regarded as a 
self-sacrificing genius, more concerned with creating a work, which contributes to 
society, rather than being concerned with receiving commensurate compensation for 
such contribution.237  Thus, an author who expends labour to create something 
socially beneficial, is morally entitled to own it, not because it would serve as an 
incentive to engage in creative activity but as a form of compensation for their 
efforts.238  The reward theory therefore encapsulates an element of distributive 
justice: there is the idea that the creator should be able to recoup some of the benefit 
of his contribution to society, which is what the award of property rights seeks to 
achieve.239 
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Another reason for the idea that authors need to be rewarded for their labours 
is that denial of such a right would undermine claims that other — influential and 
powerful — persons deserve their good fortune.  These prosperous persons, who 
include those involved in the law-making process like legislators, lawyers, judges, 
lobbying groups and other professionals, are protecting their own interests by 
promoting the interests of authors.  These professionals would like to believe that 
they deserve their success.  In a world with huge disparities of income and wealth, 
the belief that they deserve success helps them assuage any feelings of guilt they 
may have.  The prosperous distinguish themselves from those less fortunate by their 
higher education levels and supposed intelligence.  These professionals therefore 
ascribe their higher levels of remuneration to market rewards for the costly 
investment — sums spent and the opportunity costs — they have made in their 
education.  Authors are considered to, generally, have similar educational and 
intelligence levels to those of their prosperous professional counterparts.  Thus, if 
authors are not entitled to higher levels of remuneration, it becomes difficult for the 
prosperous few to explain the basis for their prosperity.  Authors must therefore be 
similarly rewarded by the market, and, if the creation of property rights is necessary 
to achieve this, so be it.240 
 
2 6 3 Criticism of the labour-based justifications 
 
Although the labour-based justifications appear be intuitively appealing, on closer 
examination it will become apparent that they are not sound arguments for justifying 
the grant of property rights to authors.  The claim that an author should have a 
property right over his creation has been stated as being "an intuitive, and 
unanalyzed feeling".241  This section will therefore critically consider some of 
arguments, or implications of, supporting a rights-based justification of property 
rights. 
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2 6 3 1 Criticism of the natural rights theory 
 
Although supporters of intellectual property rights who rely on the natural rights 
theory may consider such rights as being more plausibly justified as property in 
accordance with Locke’s political philosophy than claims to land, critics have 
responded that the intangible nature of intellectual property makes it inappropriate 
for protection using arguments analogous to those used to justify ownership of land.  
Given its intangible nature, critics suggest that intellectual property is simply not 
capable of being privately owned.  The reasons why Locke advocated the institution 
of private property in the case of land simply do not apply in the case of intangible 
creations.  Locke considered private property as the preferred mode of control of 
land because it results in the optimal use of resources, and it advances individual 
autonomy.  These critics thus, quite plausibly, adopt a more utilitarian approach to 
Locke’s concept of private property, and emphasise the idea that resources are to be 
held in common ownership unless it is in the interests of social welfare to adopt a 
different model.242  In the absence of property rights in land, there is a risk that the 
resource will be overused,243 and tensions between rival users could result in 
conflicts and unrest.  Intellectual creations are radically different from tangible items 
because “property rights are not needed to prevent congestion, interference, or 
strife.”244   
 
Not only have critics claimed that the intangible nature of intellectual property 
make it difficult to justify according to Locke’s natural rights theory, others have 
challenged the very idea that a person is entitled to the product of his labour.  
Because of differing abilities between human beings, the same amount of effort 
expended does not necessarily result in equivalent levels of output.  If labour is the 
basis of ownership, we then by implication also accept that there will be disparities of 
wealth on the basis of talent or ability.  Critics, like John Rawls, argue that “the 
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distribution of talents is arbitrary from a moral point of view and should not furnish a 
basis for the distribution of social resources.”245  Rawls does not deny that talents 
should not be rewarded.  These talents must be used optimally, for the benefit of 
society, which means that those who are talented must be encouraged to enhance 
their abilities through education and so direct them to vocations where their talents 
will best serve society.  These vocations will remunerate individuals at higher levels, 
and so they will be motivated to seek these greater benefits for their talents.  It is 
important to emphasise that they are not being reward for merely having had the 
good fortune of being talented; the higher premiums of these vocations simply reflect 
society’s need for such activities, and serves as a signal to invest in exploiting their 
talents for the benefit of society through education.  This is therefore a distinctly 
instrumentalist approach to property and remuneration.246 
 
The idea that labour should form the basis of ownership raises a number of 
further matters that are not easily resolved.  First, how does one determine whether 
an appropriate level of effort has been expended to justify the grant of ownership?  
When can it be said that the amount of labour expended is so trifling that no property 
right could have arisen?  Robert Nozick, for example, poses the question whether a 
person who has added a can of tomato juice to an ocean has a claim to the ocean.  
If a person is particularly incompetent and expends an extraordinary amount of 
labour doing a relatively menial task, does that justify him having property rights in 
the product?  Second, instead of asserting that labour forms the basis of ownership, 
it may be contended that the labour and its results are donated to society.  Perhaps, 
the person in the above example has lost his right to the tomato juice rather than 
have a property right to the ocean.  Third, Locke’s suggestion that most of the value 
of a commodity can be ascribed to the labour expended on it is not tenable in 
respect of most natural resources, which was the main focus of his work.  It is 
certainly not the case that someone who has harvested apples is responsible for 
creating 99 percent of its value, as Locke suggested.247 
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A possible counter-argument which may suggest that intangible objects are 
very different to physical items such as apples, because they are the human 
creations, also does not provide an accurate account of the relative contributions to 
such objects.  Intellectual creations do not spontaneously come into existence; they 
are the result of an incremental process which builds on what has preceded it.248  It 
cannot, therefore, be equitable, or justified, to allow the person who has merely put 
the finishing touches to an intellectual creation, or who has simply pulled the various 
conceptual strands together, to appropriate the full benefit of such creation by 
claiming property rights in it.249  The difficulty in determining the contribution of the 
last contributor has been referred to as the baseline problem.  Trosow sums up the 
nature of problem as follows:250 
“To the extent an intellectual work is based upon materials extracted from the 
commons, it is a mistake to set the baseline for applying the provisos to the point in 
time after the creation of the work.” 
 
A possible riposte may be that the final product, unlike the various constituent 
elements of the creation, may have a significant market value.  However, this also 
does not provide a justification for giving the final contributor the sole property right.  
The market value of a product is not simply a factor of the efforts of the final 
contributor, or even the collective efforts of all the contributors of a product.  If the 
product is to have a market, consumers must have disposable income with which to 
purchase the new item.  This disposable income is the result of the trade in other 
commodities, the efforts of persons other than the creator of the new item.251  These 
other persons are required to operate in competitive markets, pricing their products 
at marginal costs, which benefits consumers and enables them to accumulate their 
disposable income.  The market value of a product is thus “a socially created 
                                            
248
 Harison Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Software Technologies: The Economics of 
Monopoly Rights and Knowledge Disclosure 22; Posner "Intellectual Property: The Law and 
Economics Approach" 60. 
249
 Hettinger "Justifying Intellectual Property" 38; Lunney G "Reexamining Copyright's Incentive-
Access Paradigm" 1996 Vand L Rev 49 483 572-3 and 631-2. 
250
 Trosow "The Illusive Search for Justificatory Theories: Copyright, Commodification and Capital" 
225. 
251
 Lunney "Reexamining Copyright's Incentive-Access Paradigm" 572. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
51 
 
phenomenon, depending on the activity (or non-activity) of other producers, the 
monetary demand of purchasers, and the kinds of property rights, contracts, and 
markets the state has established and enforced.  The market value of the same fruits 
of labour will differ greatly with variations in these social factors.”252  In other words, 
the market value of a product has not been produced by labour of its creators - 
certainly not the final contributor – so why should they be entitled to appropriate such 
value, and, worse still, through monopolistic pricing?253 
 
Furthermore, the idea that a person is entitled to (or should be rewarded with) 
a property right in anything he has laboriously created is not a “natural right” which 
we generally recognise.254  There are numerous instances of intangible, and 
valuable, objects that are created through the expending of labour but not protected 
in a manner similar to intellectual property.  For example, the discovery of a new 
mathematical technique, or the establishment of a large business (guaranteed to 
draw a large number of consumers) in an area, may provide tangible benefits for 
others, but we do not permit the discoverer of the mathematical technique or the 
owner of the business to extract any form of compensation from others who benefit 
from their efforts.  There is no principled basis on which these intangible objects 
bestowed on others — also called positive externalities in economic literature — can 
be distinguished from those which the law does protect, like the specified works 
under copyright law.255  It is not simply a matter of the ease with which others can be 
charged for these benefits, but whether any rights to charge should be recognised.256 
 
On a more contemporary and practical note, the Lockean principle 
emphasising the right of a person to claim ownership of the fruits of his labour may 
be inapplicable in respect of an ever growing number of new creations.  Locke’s 
political philosophy was, on the whole, adequate and useful until the industrial 
revolution.  New products, like sophisticated computer programs, are complex 
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products, requiring contributions from large numbers of persons.  Furthermore, these 
creations are increasingly developed and owned by corporations, who have become 
hugely important economically and something which Locke had not factored into his 
philosophy.257 
 
Thus, although we can readily accept that each person should own their own 
body, there is no clear case for asserting that a person should similarly be given 
ownership of other objects, even if it has been created by him.258  The reward theory 
too faces some strong criticisms. 
 
2 6 3 2 Criticism of the reward theory 
 
The reward theory, as mentioned above, is based on the notion that the property 
right is an author’s “just desert” for his labour.  As with the natural rights theory, there 
are some cogent arguments against the reward theory.  Again, the idea that the 
author of a work deserves property rights in his creation raises a number of issues 
that are not easily resolved.  Some of these issues have already been raised in 
respect of the natural rights theory, and, where this has been done, they will be dealt 
with more briefly in this section to avoid any unnecessary repetition. 
 
If someone is to be rewarded for their labour, the reward must presumably be 
proportional to the effort expended.  It is thus necessary to somehow measure the 
effort expended because that will allow the determination of the appropriate reward, 
based on the level effort expended.  But measuring the amount of effort expended is 
anything but straightforward.  Should someone be entitled to a reward for expending 
large amounts of labour although the social contribution of the result achieved could 
have been achieved with considerably less effort.  For example, a talented individual 
who only needs to exert a trivial amount of effort would, on this basis, thus be 
entitled to little or no reward for his creation.  Should effort be exalted at the expense 
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of its social contribution?  There is, at present, no objective way of measuring, and 
comparing, the efforts of two people which can be used as a basis for the reward 
theory.259  There may also be other factors that could be regarded as material when 
considering the level of effort, such as the level of risk of embarking on a particular 
project or the social value of the product produced.  However, rewarding persons on 
the basis of these two factors serves to incentivise people to engage in a particular 
activity, rather than rewarding them for their efforts.  The reward theory can only 
consider voluntary past action as the basis for reward.260  To do otherwise would 
involve seeking justifications in terms of the incentive theory, which will be 
considered with the other utilitarian justifications in the next chapter. 
 
Alternatively, it may be suggested that the reward must be based on the 
market value of the object produced.  However, as has already been discussed 
above, the market value of a product is a socially created phenomenon which 
depends on numerous factors, which have nothing to do with the labour expended 
on its production.  It would, therefore, be untenable to reward the author of work 
based on the market value of his creation, as this would, almost certainly, result in 
disproportional remuneration.  More importantly, to base the remuneration of authors 
on market rewards is to fail to appreciate the basis of the market economy.  The 
market price of a product serves as a signal to influence future behaviour rather than 
serving as reward for the producer of the product for the effort expended.  For 
example, if the current price of a product is high and enables its producer to earn an 
economic profit, it serves as a signal to other producers to enter the market for such 
product.  The market price for the product cannot be a reward for labour expended 
because the same amount of labour will be expended on the continued production of 
the product when its price falls, following the entrance of competitors to the market.  
If the market price is considered to be reward for labour expended, it would be 
difficult to explain why, later, the same amount of effort realises a lesser return for 
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the same amount of labour expended.261   Sterk quotes Hayek’s summing up of this 
position:262 
“The remunerations which the market determines are, as it were, not functionally 
related with what people have done, but only with what they ought to do.  They are 
incentives which as a rule guide people to success, but will produce a viable order 
only because they often disappoint the expectations they have caused when relevant 
circumstances have unexpectedly changed … The element of luck is as inseparable 
from the operation of the market as the element of skill.” 
 
Furthermore, a grant of property rights would subject such reward mechanism 
to the dictates of the market economy, which can be very fickle indeed.  Despite its 
market failure, a particular author’s work may be of huge social importance.  Leaving 
a deserving author’s remuneration to the vagaries of the market economy would 
therefore, arguably, be a rather dismissive approach to rewarding deserving 
people.263   
 
As explained in relation to the criticism of the natural rights theory, it is not 
suggested that there should be no reward for talented individuals.  What should be 
rewarded is not the talent per se because, as John Rawls has argued, the 
distribution of talents is arbitrary.  What should be done is to incentivise such 
persons to invest in the further development of their talents for the benefit of society.  
The market economy will give talented individuals the necessary signals of the 
vocations where to best invest their efforts in a manner that will be socially beneficial.  
These signals will be in the form of higher remuneration levels in such vocations.264   
 
Even if one subscribes to the view that talents should be rewarded in a more 
direct manner, there are various forms of reward which could be used, other than the 
grant of property rights in the object which has been created.  We do not generally 
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accept that property rights are the appropriate reward for creating something.265  
Parents are not afforded property rights in their children, and discoverer of a new 
mathematical technique or scientific principle is not entitled to exclusive rights in 
relation to his discovery.266  Indeed, we cannot claim that our right to own our bodies 
is based on the reward for labour expended.267  The alternative, and possibly more 
effective, forms of reward may include prizes, tax reliefs, financial support or public 
recognition.268  These alternative methods of reward may be more appropriate than 
the automatic grant of property rights.  The reward theory conjures up images of the 
beneficiaries of copyright protection as being stoic authors, struggling to make ends 
meet.  However, particularly in the area of computer programs, the beneficiaries of 
copyright protection “are not struggling authors but faceless corporate assignees 
well-versed in the ways of the business world.”269 
 
Thus, despite their intuitive appeal, neither the natural rights theory nor the 
reward theory provide adequate justifications for a property right, in the form of 
copyright. 
 
2 7 Personality theory 
 
As indicated above, apart from the labour-based theories of intellectual property, the 
other moral or ethical justification for copyright is the personality theory.  It is often 
referenced in relation to intellectual property and is considered to be “[t]he most 
powerful alternative to a Lockean model of property”.270  The personality theory 
considers the extension of intellectual property rights to the author of an intangible 
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object in his creation as the means by which the creator’s personal identity can be 
protected. 
 
2 7 1 Hegel and the German Idealists 
 
The origin of this theory is generally attributed to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.271  
However, Hegel was not the only philosopher of his generation who suggested that 
the development of individual personality and liberty was linked to property rights.  
Other contemporary writers like Wilhelm von Humboldt and Immanuel Kant also 
advocated the importance of property rights.272   
 
Whereas Locke emphasised the importance of property for an individual’s 
physical needs and safety, the personality theorists focused on the importance of 
property to the development of human potential.  What both the natural rights 
theorists and personality theorists had in common was their desire to increase 
individual liberty.273  However, Hegel and Locke had very different concepts of 
liberty.  As stated above, Locke rejected the Divine Right of Kings and sought to limit 
the power of the state over individuals.  According to Hegel, the state is not an 
institution which fetters individual freedom.  The restrictions imposed by the state 
makes citizens feel more secure, and these restrictions are the way in which 
individual freedom is realised.274  Hegel appeared to be prepared to do anything to 
ingratiate himself with the Prussian monarchy.  He went so far as regarding the 
Prussian state as the culmination of the development of government, without any 
apparent contradiction with his philosophy.  His account of world history as being a 
chronological development towards the Absolute Idea, and very nearly finding its 
ultimate realisation in the Prussian state, conflicted with his view that time and space 
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are not absolute.  The Absolute Idea is just a state of “pure thought thinking about 
pure thought.”275 
 
And if this malarkey of “pure thought thinking about pure thought” seems 
confusing, it is because it is confusing, and much of Hegel’s philosophy is 
intractable.  The difficulty in comprehending his philosophy is expressed in the 
following pithy passage, which also neatly ties in with the subject matter of this 
study:276 
“All anyone knows about Hegel could be written on the back of a post-card, and even 
then would be unintelligible. He had, in an advanced form, the talents common to 
solicitors, computer enthusiasts and German philosophers, of making the basically 
simple fantastically complex." 
 
Another difference between the German Idealists like Kant and Hegel, and 
Locke, is that, unlike Locke, they did make specific reference to the idea of 
intellectual property rights in intangible objects in their writings.  Hegel, for example, 
saw no need to justify intellectual property by analogy to tangible property.  
Intellectual property, once it has been expressed, is as real as any tangible property.  
Property per se is important in Hegel’s system.277  They expressly recognised an 
author’s rights to his literary works.  To permit unauthorised reproductions of such 
works would not only allow copiers to disregard the rights of the author to control the 
dissemination of his ideas, it would also negatively impact on the economic value of 
the work.  However, their conceptions of the types of intellectual property that could 
be legitimately protected were, probably because of the period in which they wrote, 
considerably narrower than that which is accepted today.  For example, they did not 
consider translations or derivative works of literary works, or copies of artistic works 
as infringing any rights in the original works.  These adaptations or reproductions 
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could not be regarded as being attributable to the creator of the original works.278  
This narrower scope of protection could probably be ascribed to the available 
reprographic technology at that time.  Presumably these adaptations or 
reproductions would have involved considerable effort, and could, as a result, 
properly be considered to be new works.  Again, it was probably because of the high 
quality-adjusted cost of copying that they were not considered as worth protecting.279 
 
2 7 2 Hegel’s conception of personality and property 
 
Although Hegel recognises the economic value of intellectual property,280 protection 
of intellectual property is important, not because of its economic value, but because 
of its vital role in personal development.  Kant similarly defended copyright on the 
basis that an author’s work is an extension of his personality, and not simply 
something of economic value.281  For Hegel property is not simply a necessary 
condition for personal development but is the foremost example of the embodiment 
of liberty.282  Property is the mechanism by which self-actualisation and personal 
identity are realised.283 
 
For Hegel, personal identity is established only when it is recognised by 
others, and for this to happen one’s personality needs to manifest itself externally.284  
It is only through property that we are recognised by others.  A property right helps 
us to identify those who recognise and respect us as individuals because the 
property right compels them to interact with us.  Without protection this interaction 
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would not take place.  For Hegel, these interpersonal relations are vital because it is 
through such relationships, and the respect for our property, that we become free. 
 
Property is thus crucial for establishing interpersonal relations, and personal 
identity.285  Because property is essential to the development of the human spirit, it 
needs to be protected by the state.286  The protection of property establishes the 
environment in which persons can establish their personal identities through external 
manifestations, without fear of appropriation by others.287  If other members in 
society accept an individual’s claim to property, they are recognising the individual as 
a person.288  Although the protection of property reduces interpersonal conflict, that 
is not its primary purpose.  The reduction of conflicts per se is not important.  In 
contrast to Locke, Hegel does not see property in terms of a need to give legitimacy 
to the institution of government, establish order, or satisfy wants and desires.289 Also, 
unlike Locke, there was nothing natural about freedom or the institution of property.  
We become free as a consequence of the recognition of our individuality.290  There is 
no natural right to property; property is simply a social construct.291  For Hegel, 
individual freedom is the ultimate goal, and society has to facilitate the achievement 
of that goal.292  Property as an institution is essential for an individual’s survival and 
development, not just in the biological sense.293 
 
The notion that property fosters personal development does have intuitive 
appeal, particularly in the case of intellectual property.  After all, what could say more 
about our personalities than the creations produced by our mental faculties.294  Our 
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creations are probably the most revealing way of showing our personalities to others, 
and can serve to distinguish us as individuals.  They embody the personality of the 
creator.295  It, therefore, seems perfectly obvious that respect for the individual 
demands that the creation of such intellectual objects, and the concomitant personal 
development, should be encouraged.  There should be an environment where we 
feel free to create, safe in the knowledge that our creations will not be appropriated 
by others.  One way to encourage the creation of intellectual creations is to extend 
property rights to such creations.  This type of protection seems to be 
unobjectionable “because the res is not merely seized by the individual, but rather it 
is a product of the individual.”296  In fact, it would be incorrect to simply regard the 
intellectual creations as products; for some people their works are the very 
embodiment of their personalities.297  In other words, it is important that our creations 
should be protected as property if our individuality is to be recognised. 
 
2 7 3 Acquisition of property 
 
Under the Hegelian system, property is acquired through occupation.  However, 
occupation does not require a physical act.  Although physical acts like possession, 
labour or use may serve to indicate that the requirement of occupation has been 
satisfied, occupation actually arises from the subjective will to occupy the object.298  
Because property starts as a subjective act of the will, provided it is recognised by 
others, there is no limitation as to what can be regarded as property.299  Because the 
subjective act of the will depends on the recognition by others, property is seen as 
an aspect of personality.  As stated above, we only actualise our identity through 
recognition by others.  Property is as much a part of a person as any other aspect of 
his personality; it is the embodiment of personality.300   
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Although private property is essential in Hegel’s philosophy of society, he 
does not support a right of absolute ownership.  Probably because property is merely 
instrumental, he recognises the fact that someone else’s property can be 
appropriated on the basis of need.301  This would be the case if depriving such other 
person of the property would amount to denying such person the opportunity to 
realise their freedom.302 
 
2 7 4 Moral rights 
 
The personality-based theories of intellectual property had a strong influence on the 
historical development of copyright in European systems, which emphasised the 
non-economic, moral interests of authors.303  In contrast, the Anglo-American 
development of copyright was, if anything, more focused on its utilitarian 
justifications or as tradable property.  Because the European approach considered 
the non-economic interests — respect, honor, and admiration — to be the most 
important to the author, it is important that that which is associated with the author 
reflects the creator’s personality.  In order to preserve the author’s non-economic 
interests, Hegel drew a distinction between intellectual property, such as copyright, 
and other property.  Intellectual property cannot be alienated in the same manner as 
other property.304  He considered intellectual property as a “universal” aspect of an 
individual, alienation of which would be tantamount to slavery or suicide.  Intellectual 
objects are considered to be continuing expressions of its creator.305  The creator of 
intellectual property does not lose the right over his work by making copies available.  
They are merely made available to others in so far as it contains ideas that they can 
use to attain self-realisation.306  An author’s moral rights assist the author to assert 
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the necessary rights to ensure that he gets the necessary recognition and that his 
work is accurately represented.  
 
As a result of attempts to harmonise copyright law, countries following the 
Anglo-American tradition in copyright law have been compelled to recognise authors’ 
moral rights, or aspects thereof.  The most important of these moral rights are the 
paternity (or attribution) right and the integrity right.307  The paternity right gives the 
author of specified eligible works the right to be identified as author, and the integrity 
right gives the author the right to prevent unauthorised changes which are prejudicial 
to the honour or reputation of the author.  French law recognises two additional 
moral rights: the right of disclosure and the right of retraction.  The disclosure right 
allows an author to publish their works in any form desired, and the retraction right 
allows an author to withdraw any previously planned publication.308  These rights are 
said to help prevent the misrepresentation, or unauthorised dissemination, of an 
author’s work.  Kant regarded the communication of the written work to be the 
prerogative of the author, and any deprivation of such rights was an unjustified 
constraint on the author's liberty.309  The significant point about moral rights is that 
they remain vested in the author irrespective of whether copyright in the work has 
been assigned.310   
 
2 7 5 Criticism of the personality theory 
 
Hegel’s view of the centrality of property to personality, his idea that products of our 
intellect give rise to a property right because they are aspects of our personality, his 
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claims concerning how property is acquired, and the alienability of property in terms 
of personality theory all have some fundamental problems.   
 
The personality theory raises a similar problem to that raised by the labour-
based theories: the extent to which certain acts will be sufficient to qualify as 
bestowing property.  Can it be said that every intellectual creation, no matter how 
trivial or generic, embodies the personality of its author?  It is difficult to justify a 
creation which is extensively constrained by prescriptions, for example, a picture 
painted by numbers, as being reflective of the personality of its creator in any 
significant sense.  Some creative works could more plausibly be said to embody the 
personality of its creator, like works of art like sculptures or paintings.  Of course, this 
does not deny that the ability to make judgements on whether some types of work 
display an element of the author’s personality may require skills in a particular 
field.311  However, the problem still remains.  To what extent can the compilation of 
mundane information, such as a telephone directory, be justified as being entitled to 
the same proprietary protection as an epic novel, on the basis that they are both 
literary works, reflecting the personality of the creator?  This is another problem with 
Hegel’s philosophy of property.  He provided no content to these rights of ownership.  
Rather unhelpfully, he considered the substantive content of property ownership to 
be unimportant; all that mattered was that property law should facilitate relations 
between people.312 
 
The “personality stake” in different intellectual creations vary and lie on a 
spectrum – ranging from those which could be considered as being an embodiment 
of personality to those which are simply generic – rather than simply falling into two 
discrete categories.313  The issue therefore becomes a determination of where along 
the spectrum one can rightly say that intellectual creations are too generic to reflect 
personality, and, thus, be said to not constitute property?  Relevant to this study, the 
issue is whether computer programs can simply be said to be too utilitarian to be 
considered as embodying the personality of its creator.  Does the design of a 
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computer program depend more on techniques and solutions for effective operation, 
or do they reflect individual idiosyncrasies?314  It is arguable whether the technical 
constraints on a computer program, and the fact that it is composed of collections of 
algorithms, leave sufficient scope for a computer programmer to incorporate his own 
aesthetic.315  However, this issue becomes more problematic when considering the 
fact that a sophisticated computer program is usually created by corporate entities 
employing hundreds of computer programmers.  The personality theory cannot serve 
as justification for works created by corporate entities using employees to perform 
menial or formulaic tasks.  It fails to account for the protection of works which cannot 
be said to embody personal expression.316  At present, artistic or literary works, as 
opposed to more technical creations created by corporate entities, are not 
considered greater expressions of personality, and, therefore, more deserving of 
protection.317  Expression of personality is not, therefore, the primary basis of current 
copyright protection.  Hegel’s philosophy does not seek to justify property; property is 
merely instrumental to the realisation of individual freedom.318 
 
Also, given the fact that personality theory seeks to protect that which can be 
considered to be expressive of the creator’s personality, there is no principled reason 
why the types of works protected should be limited to those currently protected by 
intellectual property.  Why do we consider a writer’s work to be more expressive of 
his personality than a landscape gardener?  Should he also have the right to object 
to his design being copied or changes being made to his design of a garden without 
his consent?  Although the two situations might be distinguished on the basis of the 
public good nature of the literary work and utilitarian concerns, or matters of contract, 
it cannot be done on the basis that one creation embodies the personality of the 
author, and the other does not.319  Similarly, does currently unprotected matter such 
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as mathematical techniques and a new commercial concept not embody the 
personalities of their authors? 
 
Of course, a more direct criticism of Hegel’s theory of personality concerns 
the ontological nature of intellectual creations, and challenges his contentions that 
they reflect individuality.  It is debatable whether anything we produce is capable of 
reflecting who we are in any significant sense, or whether products of our being can 
be considered as part of our person.320  Can knowledge of someone only be 
obtained through that which they have produced?  If anything, something that has 
been produced by an individual can only provide the briefest insight to the 
individual’s personality.  The product takes on an independent existence, and cannot 
be said to be of much assistance in reflecting personality at any time before or after 
such event.321  How an object is perceived by others is perhaps more revealing 
about them than it is of the author of the object.322  Also, the types of issues 
addressed by the moral rights could more plausibly be justified on the basis that they 
protect the public, rather than the author of a work.  It is the public that has the 
greater interest in being assured that the works they receive have been faithfully 
reproduced in their original form.323  Furthermore, from the author’s perspective, 
these types of issues could, in any event, have been protected under the common 
law, using contract or delict.  There was no need to introduce a proprietary right.324 
 
The fact that acquisition of property allegedly takes place by means of the 
expansive, subjective idea of occupation, discussed above, is problematic.  
Acquisition depends “on an internal quality in the holder or a subjective relationship 
between the holder and the thing”, which does not allow for the objective 
determination of ownership.  As there is no objective manner in which to determine 
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whether acquisition of property has occurred, it allows “excessive claims” of 
ownership.325   
 
The fact that the personality theory considers intellectual property, like 
copyright, as being an aspect of the author’s knowledge raises difficulties when it 
comes to the alienability of such property.326  If such property cannot be alienated, it, 
“in an Anglo-American legal sense, [is] not property at all.”327  There seems to be a 
difference of opinion whether Hegel considered such property to be alienable.  
Whereas, certain commentators consider intellectual property to be inalienable 
according to Hegel’s personality theory,328 others claim that Hegel “explicitly 
acknowledged the power of a person to alienate … products of his physical and 
mental skill.”329  Under the influence of European law, the concept of the alienability 
of copyright has been changing in Anglo-American systems.  For example, besides 
the moral rights, the droit de suite, or inalienable resale royalty right, which, under 
French law, gives the author of an artistic copyright work, or his successors in title, a 
right to a fixed percentage of subsequent sale profit, has been adopted by some 
American states and the United Kingdom.330  Contrary to intuition, economic analysis 
suggests that the droit de suite reduces the financial returns received by authors, 
and, therefore, also reduces their incentive to create.  Without the droit de suite, an 
author is able to transfer the risk of the commercial value or success of the created 
work to the assignee.  The droit de suite particularly affects a risk averse author 
because the assignee is likely to pay less for the transfer of the rights in the work as 
a result of the fact that the assignee will have to share future profits on a disposal 
with the author.331  Although the droit de suite is regarded as a moral right,332 it is 
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simply a perpetual right of co-ownership.  Irrespective of which view is adopted, it 
seems clear that if these creations are an aspect of the author’s personality, they 
cannot be considered to property after the author’s death.  Thus, the personality 
theory fails to provide adequate justification for modern intellectual property, which 
continues to exist after the death of the author or inventor.333 
 
2 8 Conclusion 
 
As indicated, given the technological and communication revolution we are currently 
experiencing, it has become more important than ever to place copyright on a sound 
theoretical basis to withstand challenges that the institution of intellectual property, 
generally, is facing if it is to continue.  However, as illustrated above, the labour-
based theories and the personality theory fail to provide adequate justification for the 
institution of intellectual property generally, and copyright, in particular.  We will next 
consider the utilitarian and economic justifications for copyright protection.  
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Chapter 3: Economic justification for copyright protection 
 
“While pre-modern law utilised the language, concepts and questions of 
classical jurisprudence, modern intellectual property law employed the 
resources of political economy and utilitarianism.  More specifically, while pre-
modern law was characterised by self-styled metaphysical discussions about 
the nature of intangible property — such as how the essence of the protected 
subject matter was to be identified — with the closure of intangible property, 
modern intellectual property law abrogated all interest in this way of thinking 
about and dealing with the subject matter it protected.”1 
 
3 1 Introduction 
 
As demonstrated in Chapter 2 (History of copyright and the moral justifications for 
copyright protection), the labour-based and personality theories for copyright 
protection do not provide adequate justifications for the system of copyright 
protection.  If copyright as an institution is justifiable, it has to be on the basis of 
utilitarian or economic theory.  Accordingly, in this chapter we will consider the 
utilitarian and economic theories to determine whether an acceptable justification for 
copyright can be established. 
 
As will become apparent, there are material shortcomings with a narrow 
utilitarian justification for copyright protection.  Although it does not provide an 
adequate justification, utilitarianism is important for another reason: it is sometimes 
claimed that the law-and-economics approach to the analysis of law is simply a form 
of utilitarianism, and, therefore, subject to the same criticisms.  That is why the 
utilitarian justification is considered in this chapter and not with the other moral 
justifications in Chapter 2.  After an introduction to economic analysis, an argument 
will be made in support of the economic pursuit of efficiency (or wealth 
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maximisation),2 which is advocated by economic analysts, and why it is considered 
to be a superior norm for legal theory than utilitarianism. 
 
Before considering the economic justifications for copyright protection, we will 
first consider the economic nature of copyright works, and the main non-copyright 
solutions to address the identified problem of the need to incentivise the production 
of copyright works.  Given the fact that the pursuit of wealth maximisation is not 
based on the existence of any objective norms or rights, it comes as no surprise that 
there are economic analysts that criticise the economic case for copyright protection.  
We will thus also consider some of the economic criticisms of copyright protection, 
particularly the claim that it amounts to the award of a monopoly. 
 
3 2 Utilitarian justification 
 
A utilitarian justification of legal institutions like copyright protection is premised on 
the fact that it is socially beneficial to society.  Given the problems with the other 
moral justifications that we have considered, the utilitarian justification is claimed to 
be the “predominant justification” for intellectual property rights.3  Utilitarian 
philosophy advocates that an act or institution is preferred if it is likely to maximise 
social happiness or utility, namely, the extent by which pleasure exceeds pain.4  The 
appropriate course of action or policy requires a calculation of the associated 
benefits and costs.  Russell states that “[i]n its absolute form, the doctrine that an 
individual has certain inalienable rights is incompatible with utilitarianism, i.e. with the 
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doctrine that the right acts are those that do most to promote the general 
happiness.”5  In other words, utilitarianism is an outcome-based morality.  As will be 
discussed below, the economic analysis of law is sometimes regarded as a form of 
utilitarianism, but they can be differentiated, and will, therefore, be dealt with 
separately. 
 
From a historical perspective, the utilitarian justification of copyright protection 
has been very influential in the evolution of copyright in Anglo-American systems of 
intellectual property.6  In the first statutory embodiment of copyright, the Statute of 
Anne in 1710, the stated social purpose of copyright legislation was an “[a]ct for the 
encouragement of learning, by vesting the copies of printed books in the authors or 
purchasers of such copies, during the times therein mentioned.”7  It is claimed to be 
the “strongest and most widely appealed to justification for intellectual property” in 
the United States of America (US), having been enshrined in the constitutional 
foundations of US intellectual property law.8  The US constitutional provision which 
authorises the US Congress to enact laws to protect authors reflects the utilitarian 
(instrumental) basis for copyright protection: “[t]o promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”9  Consistent with this stated 
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purpose, the first US copyright legislation in 1790 reflected its intended purpose of 
promoting social development through the encouragement of written works.10 
 
The utilitarian justification of copyright protection is premised on the fact that 
the copyright works are beneficial to society and their production should be 
encouraged.  Locke, besides his labour theory justifying the institution of property, 
also considered it beneficial to society as it encourages increased productivity.11  
However, the utilitarian justificatory approach is fundamentally different to the labour-
based or personality justifications for copyright protection.  The utilitarian justification 
is concerned with social utility; it is the public interest that is of primary importance, 
not the interests of individual authors.12  Any form of restriction on personal liberty, 
which is what copyright protection amounts to by restricting use of copyright works, 
can be justified if it achieves some greater social purpose.13  In other words, the 
primary motivation for awarding copyright protection is “to encourage the production 
and dissemination of intellectual works" and not to reward authors.14   
 
Copyright protection is simply a means to an end: by granting authors 
property rights in their creations authors are encouraged to produce sufficient works, 
which serves the public interest.15  The utilitarian justification of copyright is therefore 
instrumental (or outcome-driven), rather than rooted in notions of the natural or 
inherent rights of authors.16  Because these property rights are instrumental in 
nature, they are “something decidedly less than what we typically mean when we 
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say someone has a ‘right.’”17  This state of affairs is troubling for those who adopt a 
principled stance to copyright protection, or those who consider rights to be divorced 
from “considerations of utility maximization or promotion of the social good.”18 
 
As the utilitarian justification for copyright protection only permits the grant of 
property rights provided it serves the public interest, copyright as an institution is 
decidedly “society-oriented,” rather than “author-centered.”19  Utilitarian philosophy 
subordinates the interests of authors to those of the society.20  Also, the analysis of 
the effects of copyright is only relevant at an institutional, or societal, level; it is not 
concerned with position of individual authors.21  The implication is that if the property 
rights afforded to authors do not serve to maximise social utility their grant cannot be 
justified, and copyright as an institution should be abolished.22  Utilitarian arguments 
can serve to justify the institution of copyright or to undermine it should it not 
maximise social utility.  The utility costs of awarding private rights might outweigh the 
utility benefits.23  Some commentators have strongly emphasised the public nature of 
copyright in stronger terms, equating it with privatisation, and that the public interest 
— not private rights — will dictate whether copyright should be de-privatised.24  
According to this view, copyright works are considered to be public property and 
copyright removes it from the public domain.  Utilitarianism thus mandates an inquiry 
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into whether property rights of the kind copyright grants to authors, and the types of 
works protected, is the most efficient way of ensuring the production of socially 
beneficial works.25 
 
Accordingly, there should be a periodic re-evaluation of the overall social 
utility of the institution of copyright, and of the protection afforded to specific types of 
works.  It may be the case that some types of work should no longer be protected, 
while new types of work should receive copyright protection.  In fact, such 
considerations led to the extension of copyright protection to computer programs.26  
To some extent this work, by considering the economic case for protecting computer 
programs, seeks to re-evaluate the social utility of protecting computer programs. 
 
When determining whether copyright protection maximises social utility, it is 
necessary to ascertain the net utility of copyright as an institution, taking into account 
the negative effects of copyright.  The negative effects of copyright must be 
sufficiently offset by the social utility which copyright generates.  By granting authors 
property rights in the works they create, copyright law establishes a seemingly 
paradoxical method of advancing the public interest.27  The property rights granted to 
authors incentivises them to use their talents to produce works as it enhances their 
control over, and ability to exploit, their creations, and realise an adequate return on 
their investment.  Despite the persuasiveness of the argument in favour of property 
rights for authors, which benefit society, current copyright protection, arguably, 
unduly restricts the dissemination of these works to the public, who are meant to be 
the real beneficiaries in terms of the utilitarian argument in favour of copyright.  For 
example, while it is true that these restrictions are of limited duration, and that after 
such period of protection the works enter the public domain, the period of protection 
has been continually extended without any evidence that these extended periods of 
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protection are required to incentivise authors.28  The constant ratcheting up of 
copyright protection granted to copyright holders have led commentators to question 
whether copyright protection maximises social utility.29  As the focus of this work is 
the economic analysis of copyright protection of computer programs, and the fact 
that the utilitarian theory has significant problems (as will be discussed below), no 
purpose would be served by engaging in further investigation of the utility calculus of 
copyright protection. 
 
Although the next section will deal with criticisms of utilitarianism, it is 
important to emphasise that utilitarian theory does not provide an a priori case for or 
against copyright.  Whether copyright protection should be provided is a contingent 
matter: it depends on issues such as the state of technology and social practices.30 
 
3 2 1 Criticism of the utilitarian justification 
 
There are “powerful” objections to utilitarianism which are directed at both its 
substantive merits due to its consequentialist nature, and the practical (or technical) 
difficulties when attempting to apply it in any particular situation.31  The principal 
shortcoming of the utilitarian justification is its substantive merit due to its 
consequentialist nature.32  As indicated above, any rights which are recognised on 
the basis of a utilitarian justification are distinctly instrumental; they will only be 
recognised to the extent that they maximise social utility.  While justifications of rights 
based on moral theories such as libertarianism are indeterminate, the 
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consequentialist nature of utilitarianism makes the utilitarian justificatory arguments 
more problematic.33   
 
There are four reasons why a utilitarian justificatory paradigm is substantively 
flawed.  First, as already indicated, utilitarian theory does not provide an a priori case 
for or against any particular public policy or institution, such as copyright.  The 
guiding moral principle of maximising utility and calculating public utility (the “felicific 
calculus”) can lead to conflicting public policies: depending on the societal demands 
or technology, public policy could be radically different at various times.  This is 
particularly disturbing if one considers that utilitarian public policy decisions are, as 
will be demonstrated below, based on no more than guesswork that it maximises 
happiness.  Second, from a moral perspective, particularly in the case of a morality 
that is grounded in individual liberty, utilitarianism can easily justify morally repugnant 
conduct.  After all, disregarding the happiness of the individual at the expense of the 
community, is perfectly justifiable on the basis of utilitarianism.34  This could, for 
example, justify ignoring the interests of authors if it is considered to provide the 
public with greater happiness to have unrestricted access to their works.  This is 
probably what concerned Locke the most, and he was wary of narrow utilitarianism.  
He was of the opinion that if property rights are not granted to creators of items, “it 
can be wantonly appropriated by the social mob, [and] the laborer will realize quickly 
that he has no motivation to produce property and increase the common stock.”35  
Third, not only can it justify the violation of the rights of individuals - if there is 
anything such as the “rights” of individuals under utilitarianism – individuals can be 
forced to act against their own interests if it is deemed to benefit others to a greater 
extent.  Fourth, the idea of a narrow concept of utilitarianism is anachronistic under 
any type of constitutional order which enshrines fundamental rights, as does the 
South African Bill of Rights36 because it “can neither provide a theory of moral rights 
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nor take either moral or legal rights seriously.”37  It condones the violation of such 
rights, or freedoms, if it maximises utility. 
 
As a possible defense to some of these criticisms it is worth bearing in mind 
that legal doctrine is marked by instances of exceptions to established rules and 
norms.  Acceptable doctrine does not require that every possible case comply with 
the strict requirements of the doctrine, “but only that it should be true in an 
overwhelming majority of cases.”38  Thus, even within a utilitarian construct of the 
law, there may be exceptions made to allow for personal liberty and issues of 
morality.  The problem is of course to determine the circumstances in which it will be 
acceptable to deviate from the doctrine.  Crucially, this determination cannot be 
made on the principles of utilitarianism. 
 
Utilitarianism also has significant problems due to its inability to provide a 
workable basis for formulating public policy and legal rules.  If one attempts to 
calculate whether public utility would be maximised by a specific course of action or 
policy, three problems immediately become apparent: the domain or boundary 
problem, the total/average utility problem, and the interpersonal-utility problem.39  
The domain problem itself gives rise to two issues.  First, a determination has to be 
made of whether the utility of both humans and animals are to be considered.  
Second, even if we confine ourselves to consider only the utilities of humans, we 
need to determine which groups should be considered: all humans, or merely 
nationals of one state or a particular group. 
 
The total/average utility problem requires a choice to be made about whether 
total utility is to be maximised, or whether average utility is to be maximised.  In other 
words, does the distribution of utility matter?  These two goals do not necessarily 
coincide: seeking to maximise total happiness may result in individuals being made 
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worse off, and, conversely, improving average happiness may reduce total 
happiness. 
 
The interpersonal-utility comparison problem requires us to determine 
whether “a course of conduct or policy that makes some individuals better off and 
others worse off increases total utility, and if it does, by how much.”40  While it may 
be possible to reasonably infer that the utility of a particular individual has improved 
or declined in different situations, it is not something that is, as yet measurable.  The 
problem of measurability becomes exponentially more difficult, given the range of 
human emotions and responses, when trying to compare the relative utilities of 
individuals in order to ascertain whether total or average utility has increased.  
Happiness is a relative concept and sometimes individuals derive pleasure in socially 
undesirable ways (if we can be permitted to make such an a priori judgement) and, 
therefore, Posner refers to the "monstrousness" of utilitarianism, which “must 
logically ascribe value to all sorts of asocial behavior, such as envy and sadism, 
because these are common sources of personal satisfaction and hence of utility.”41 
 
Again, the determination of a particular boundary, or a desired calculus for 
happiness, cannot be done on principles of utilitarian theory.42 
 
3 3 Law and economics 
 
When the issue of the justification for copyright protection is raised, the standard 
response is inevitably an appeal to the notion that such protection is required to 
provide the necessary “incentives” to authors to create works, and to do so others 
must be prevented from exploiting (or “free-riding” on) the efforts of authors by giving 
authors a “monopoly” over their creations.  In fact, we have seen elements of this in 
some of the justifications already considered.  These concepts, and their analysis, 
are familiar to economists, which makes copyright such a suitable subject for 
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economic analysis.  Given the fact that the primary focus of this study is on the 
economic justifications for copyright protection of computer programs, it is necessary 
to provide a brief introduction to the discipline of law and economics, and the 
benefits and advantages of economic analysis.   
 
3 3 1 What is law and economics? 
 
The discipline of law and economics is an interdisciplinary subject concerned with 
the application of economic concepts and analysis to the study of legal issues.43  
Until the 1960s, the use of economic analysis in law was confined to those areas 
where the legal norms were explicitly economic, such as competition (anti-trust) law, 
regulated markets, taxation and the quantification of damages.44  Since then, 
economic analysis of law has become “pervasive” because it is claimed that 
everything we do has financial implications, and, therefore, potentially economically 
significant.  The laws we create are no exception as they can affect markets.45  
There are now a number of journals and academics — including two Nobel laureates 
— dedicated to the field and area of research.46  The significant impact of economic 
analysis has lead to claims that it is “the most important development in legal 
scholarship of the twentieth century.”47 
3 3 2 Why an economic analysis? 
 
Law is considered to be a fertile area for economics because both law and 
economics are, to varying degrees, concerned with incentives.  From an economic 
perspective, legal sanctions resemble prices because laws have implicit associated 
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prices (that is, costs or benefits), which alter the behaviour of individuals.48  For 
example, if the law imposes a severe legal sanction on a particular act (for example, 
copyright infringement), the effect of such a law is analogous to the effects of 
increasing the price of such an act.  The legal sanction, by increasing the “price” of 
such conduct (“good”), will result in individuals “consuming” less of such “good” i.e. 
avoiding the sanctioned activity.49 
 
Knowing how human behaviour is altered by laws (or incentives, in terms of 
economics) can help lawmakers design laws in order to achieve their intended 
purpose, understand why the intended goals are not being achieved, or if laws are 
the appropriate tool to achieve the intended goals.  Economics, in particular, 
microeconomics, is the study of how individuals make choices in cases of scarcity, 
and how they respond to incentives.50  Scarcity in this context means any constraints 
on an individual, be it wealth, income, time, knowledge or information.51  As laws act 
as a constraint on individual behaviour, they too can be subjected to economic 
analysis.  Thus, the economic analysis of law can be extremely useful in providing 
insights into the desirability of legal institutions – such as copyright.  
 
Some of the assumptions economists make when analysing particular 
problems have been criticised or ridiculed, but much can be learnt from artfully 
chosen, relevant assumptions which help to simplify an otherwise complex 
problem.52  The primary assumption in neo-classical economic models is that 
humans are rational maximisers of their own interests; they have to be in a world that 
has scarcity.  When economists refer to the notional “rational” agent, this idealisation 
— if any form of efficiency analysis is to be plausible — requires that such agent 
consistently acts in a manner that evidences some appreciation of the scarcity of 
resources, no more.  It is not a statement about the psychological state or the 
particular preferences of an agent.53  Economic analysis is particularly insightful if it 
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can identify such consistent behaviour in a large number of agents, and when this 
reflects the general behaviour of individuals.54  Economic analysis is simply 
concerned with the empirical question of what individuals will choose in a given set 
of circumstances, regardless of issues of morality.55   
 
Although the assumption of the individual as a rational maximiser of utility, like 
some of the other assumptions employed in economic models, may not be always 
be appropriate, it does explain a substantial spectrum of human behaviour from 
which useful conclusions can be drawn.56  It allows for an examination of how 
humans respond to incentives using theories such as game theory, and provides 
insights which are more useful than mere intuition.57  Similarly, the pursuit of 
efficiency or wealth maximisation as economic goals have also been criticised, but 
they do provide more definable and measurable criteria than other norms usually 
employed in traditional legal analysis, such as fairness or the public interest.58  The 
case for efficiency or wealth maximisation as a normative goal is considered in 
paragraph 3 4 1 (Wealth maximisation as a normative goal). 
 
This is not to deny that laws also seek to promote morals or social norms 
such as justice or individual liberty, or that a fair distribution of wealth should not be 
pursued.  The law often pursues legal notions such as equity or justice despite the 
costs of doing so; it can never simply be concerned with the ruthless pursuit of 
efficiency.59  Even if these other norms are the primary goals of law, economic 
notions such as efficiency can still contribute to their achievement because it may 
indicate how they can be achieved in the least costly manner.60  No matter what 
policy is being pursued, wasteful activity can never be considered as socially 
beneficial.61  Thus, the economic goals of efficiency or wealth maximisation can be 
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instrumental in pursuing moral goals or social norms such as justice or individual 
liberty.62 
 
The terminology used in traditional legal analysis differs from that used in 
economic analysis, although they may be concerned with the same factual problem.  
Traditional legal analysis of an area such as copyright will be concerned with 
balancing the rights of authors and the interests of the public to unfettered access to 
the works created.  Economists, on the other hand, are concerned with getting the 
incentives right in order for the outcome to be efficient or wealth maximising.  From 
an economic point of view, an analysis of copyright would, thus, involve a 
determination of whether it is efficient, or wealth maximising, to grant property rights 
in respect of creative works.63 
 
The application of economic techniques to legal analysis has been beneficial 
as it has introduced greater analytical rigour when dealing with complicated legal 
issues, yielding critical insights which may have been overlooked in traditional legal 
analysis.  Traditional legal analysis tends to be case-law based, involving a search 
for dogmatic consistencies in the legal system.64  Laws have important social goals, 
and it is important that they are placed in a proper context; they “are not just arcane, 
technical arguments.”65  Given the complexity of many legal issues, particularly 
copyright law, economic techniques can assist unpacking the various aspects of a 
problem to be addressed.  Economic analysis enables the issues to be addressed in 
a more manageable way, and, as will be demonstrated, provides us with a deeper 
understanding of the subject.66 
 
As indicated above, economists are concerned with the optimal allocation of 
scarce resources among alternative uses.  In the case of copyright protection this 
means that we are interested in a positive analysis: we are concerned with 
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ascertaining whether copyright protection promotes the efficient allocation of 
resources.67  More specifically, it is necessary to first identify the implicit price of 
copyright: the costs imposed by copyright protection, and its corresponding benefits.  
Consideration should then be given to the effect a change in the law would have on 
the implicit price.  Thereafter, a conclusion can be drawn about the efficacy, and, 
possibly, fairness of the present copyright regime.68 
 
Intellectual property law, such as copyright law, is particular suited to 
economic analysis.69  Intellectual property rights are economically significant 
because they affect the markets in information.70  More specifically, the reason it 
makes obvious sense to consider copyright from an economic perspective is that 
copyright law is primarily concerned with providing an economic incentive for 
authors.71  It is necessary to ascertain the costs and benefits of copyright in specific 
works to determine if it is socially justifiable.  Both the philosophical and economic 
approaches to intellectual property “ask the same question, what are the 
justifications for creating property rights in abstract objects?”72  Without an 
examination of the economics of copyright as an institution it “would remain an 
opaque institution.”73  Even critics of economic analysis of copyright law concede 
that it is “an important descriptive tool for understanding the operation of copyright 
law.”74 
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3 4 Utiliarianism and economic analysis 
 
Before turning to the economic analysis of copyright protection, it is necessary to 
briefly address the issue of whether economic analysis of law is simply a specific 
form of utilitarianism.  As illustrated above, the utilitarian justification for copyright, 
particularly in its narrow sense, does not provide an adequate justification for 
copyright protection, and, if economic analysis of law is simply a specific form of 
utilitarianism (which is what some scholars claim), it will be subject to the same 
criticisms.75  In fact, those who criticise the economic analysis of law more generally 
have done so on the basis that economic theory is simply a version of utilitarianism, 
and then proceeded to show why utilitarianism is flawed.76 
 
There may be a possible political motivation, on the part of utilitarian theorists, 
for the persistent attempts to equate the economic analysis of law with utilitarian 
analysis.77  Prior to the 1960s the utilitarian analysis strongly influenced legal policy, 
and the only instances of economic analysis were occasional applications of intuitive 
economic principles in judicial decisions.78  Since the 1960s, the relative importance 
of the application of economic principles and utilitarian theory have reversed; 
utilitarian philosophy has been on the wane as a normative basis for legal policy.79  
The utilitarian theorists have, accordingly, taken to considering economic analysis of 
law as a species of utilitarianism.80 
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It is the case that neo-classical economics has its origins in the same moral 
and political philosophy which gave rise to utilitarianism.81  Utilitarianism was a 
response to the prevailing paternalism, directed by the aristocracy, at the turn of the 
19th century.  Jeremy Bentham, the most well-known utilitarian, considered it 
unacceptable that social values and norms should be determined by the aristocracy, 
or based on some alleged objective standard to which an enlightened minority 
compels the majority to conform.  For him, utilitarianism was principally concerned 
with democracy because it determined social values on an aggregate basis, allowing 
everyone’s subjective tastes and preferences to be considered.82  The determination 
of aggregate preferences must necessarily be based on the individual pursuit of 
pleasure, or reduction of pain.83  People’s preferences can be ascertained from their 
statements and actions.84  Because those things that give people pleasure — be it 
material goods, time or attention from others — are scarce, aggregate pleasure can 
be maximised by the pursuit of efficiency, generally.85  Accordingly, law should try to 
promote efficiency.86  He held that the law’s role was to compel man to act in a way 
which balances his selfish interests and those of others.87 
 
Economics, in its broader sense, seeks to find the most efficient way of 
satisfying human preferences in light of scarce resources.88  Adam Smith, “the first 
and greatest theorist of capitalism,” was a professor of moral philosophy, and 
considered the market mechanism to be the most efficient way to distribute material 
wealth.  The market mechanism was not considered as the best way of satisfying all 
human preferences, or the basis for other social institutions — he was simply 
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concerned with the distribution of wealth.89  When it comes to material wealth, 
individual self-interest is the most efficient method of distributing, and maximising, 
wealth because the lawgiver is “not always wise or virtuous, and because human 
governments are not omniscient.”90  Material wealth, according to this broader 
conception of economics, is not the sole, or even primary, purpose of trading scarce 
resources in the market; it was simply considered the most efficient method of 
satisfying one of the components of overall utility — the distribution of wealth.91  
Thus, to this extent, some of the economic justifications for intellectual property law, 
that are based on wealth maximisation — as exemplified by Posner — resembles a 
utilitarian approach to intellectual property law.  Whereas the utilitarian approach 
considers the sole, or principal, purpose of intellectual property law — as with any 
law — to maximise aggregate utility, the economic approach confines itself to wealth 
maximisation.92  The goal of wealth maximisation can be achieved by seeking an 
efficient allocation of resources, and ensuring that any losses are minimised or 
adequately compensated by the associated benefits brought about by the legal 
rules.93  As with utilitarianism, the wealth-maximising economic analysis of law does 
not claim to pursue objectively determinable norms.  Depending on the economic 
consequences, there may be cases for or against intellectual property rights.94 
 
Before indicating why economic analysis is regarded as different from, and 
avoiding some of the criticisms leveled at, utilitarianism, it is necessary to clarify 
issues of terminology because this appears to be a possible source of confusion.95   
Scholars often used the term “welfare” in the context of utilitarian theory as being 
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synonymous with the concept of “happiness”.  Economists also use the term 
“welfare” in normative contexts, and employ it as a synonym for “utility”.  Because of 
the general, indistinguishable use of concepts such as “happiness, utility, or welfare” 
by both economists and utilitarians, Posner considered their use as too vague, 
preferring to use the much narrower concepts of “wealth” or “value” in their 
economic, monetary sense for purposes of economic analysis.96  By confining 
investigations to measurable transactions, whether based on voluntary transactions 
or hypothetical markets, it is considered more workable than a concept such as 
happiness.97 
 
Economic analysis, by seeking to focus on the goal of wealth maximisation, 
avoids the problems associated with utilitarianism: the boundary problem (whether 
all humans and animals are to be included in the calculus of wealth maximisation), 
and the problems of measuring average/total happiness and making interpersonal 
comparisons.  The principle of wealth maximisation draws no distinction between the 
interests of nationals and foreigners (or immigrants) as any restrictions on trade and 
resources are economically harmful.98  Furthermore, animals will be included to the 
extent that they enhance wealth; their quantities will be determined by the demand 
for them.99   
 
In the case of wealth maximisation, we are not concerned with trying to 
quantify the extent of individual or aggregate utility.  Economists are not concerned 
with what agents believe their preferences to be, they confine themselves to that 
which they actually do.100  Economic analysis, like Posner’s, restricts the concept of 
wealth to a monetary calculation and only takes into account “what people are willing 
to pay for something or, if they already own it, what they demand in money to give it 
up.  The only kind of preference that counts in a system of wealth maximization is 
thus one that is backed up by money — in other words, that is registered in a 
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market.”101  Economic analysis is concerned with aggregate effects; it merely 
attempts to determine which set of alternative arrangements is preferred over 
another, rather than in the absolute or average quantities of each set.  The analysis 
involves a comparison of the marginal efficiency (benefits and costs) of a given set of 
arrangements, that is, ordinal comparisons.102  In other words, it is not concerned 
with the intensity of individual preferences (cardinality).103  More importantly, a 
utilitarian analysis and an economic analysis of a particular issue may result in 
different conclusions being reached on the appropriate course of action or policy. 
 
3 4 1 Wealth maximisation as a normative goal 
 
While it is conceded that wealth maximisation does not necessarily result in the 
maximisation of happiness or welfare, or that people are purely wealth maximisers, it 
is nevertheless claimed that wealth maximisation may still provide invaluable 
normative guidance: it may be the best evidence of what increases happiness.  What 
could be of more persuasive proof of personal utility than voluntary interaction 
through market trades?104  Economists are not concerned with what agents believe 
their moral preferences to be, they confine themselves to that which those agents 
actually do.105  What we pursue through our transactions is arguably of greater 
import than what we claim our ethical positions to be.  Wealth maximisation is also 
considered to be a better tool in pursuing normative policies because wealth 
incentives are often more effective at achieving a desired social goal than appealing 
to moral values.106 
 
Even if policy decisions are based on moral or ethical principles, an economic 
analysis can still add to the debate by illustrating the economic consequences of any 
proposed policy.  To the extent that the moral arguments are influenced by economic 
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considerations, “the economist has a role to play in the formation of ethical 
judgments.” 107  There are very few matters of policy that are devoid of economic 
considerations.108  In other matters of policy, economic considerations may be the 
basis of such decisions, which makes the economic analysis decisive.  Thus, 
normative analysis does not require that efficiency needs to be validated as a 
normative basis before it can be used to provide normative guidance.109 
 
However, Posner goes further and suggests that ethical principles such as 
economic liberty, keeping promises, telling the truth, and altruism can be derived 
from the principal of wealth maximisation.  He claims that not only has it been 
empirically established that economic liberty leads to wealth maximisation by 
encouraging productive capacities, but that these other ethical principles reduce 
transaction costs, which is an economising principle.  Also, the pursuit of utilitarian 
happiness is arguably a more selfish, and less socially beneficial norm, than actions 
based on market forces.110  For example, whereas the economically unproductive 
activity of a thief (willing to suffer the disutility of imprisonment) may be justifiable on 
the grounds of utilitarianism, based on increasing happiness, this would not be the 
case with respect to wealth maximisation as a normative value.111   
 
Unlike utilitarianism, the economic approach does not yield “results violently 
inconsistent with our common moral intuitions.”112  The pursuit of lawful wealth 
requires cooperation between individuals because market transactions are the 
consequence of mutually beneficial exchanges.  Such exchanges can only 
materialise if self-interest is constrained and sufficient altruism is exhibited.113  The 
market system serves as a constraint on wealthy sadists who seek personal 
pleasure — “utility monsters” — by requiring the sadists to seek, and obtain, the 
consent of their victims, which will only be achieved by paying the demand level of 
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compensation.114  It is also more unlikely that minorities will be oppressed or 
persecuted in a system of wealth maximisation than in a utilitarian system because it 
will be “rare that the ostracism, expulsion, or segregation of a productive group” will 
lead to wealth maximisation.115 
Wealth maximisation is also a more sound theoretical basis for the 
establishment of exclusive rights (a theory of rights) — not just property rights but 
also so-called “natural rights” like life, liberty and property — and their initial 
assignment (which could be determinate in the presence of transaction costs) than 
utilitarianism.  Not only can wealth maximisation account for the initial vesting of 
rights (when there are transaction costs inhibiting exchange), it also provides an 
explanation for limitations on exclusive rights in cases of conflict, corrective justice 
and distributive justice.116 
 
3 5 Economics of copyright 
 
Before considering the economic justifications for copyright protection, it is 
necessary to consider the economic nature of copyright works.  We will see why it is 
claimed that the nature of copyright works creates difficulties which may prevent their 
creation at a socially desirable level in a free market without the legal protection 
afforded by copyright.  After the discussion of this alleged market failure, we will 
briefly consider the principal non-copyright alternatives to address this problem, and 
the reasons why they are considered to be inadequate solutions to this problem.  
The economic justifications for copyright will then be dealt with in more detail. 
 
The phrase “copyright works” will be used to refer to the specified types of 
work which are currently protected under copyright law, even when discussing such 
types of work in a hypothesised context where such work received no such copyright 
protection.  The reason for doing so is to avoid tortuous phrases like “the types 
works that are currently protected by copyright” when discussing such works in the 
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absence of copyright protection.  Also, most of the examples used to discuss the 
issues raised in this chapter, or to illustrate the points made, will involve literary 
works.  Literary works are the most widely-used copyright work to illustrate the 
issues of copyright for two reasons: it was historically the first type of protected work, 
and it is the type of copyright work which is most familiar to people.  Also, probably 
for these reasons, the various issues related to copyright law, be it matters of 
substantive law, such as questions of originality, or the economic justifications for 
copyright protection, have been analysed more extensively in relation to literary 
works than other types of copyright work.  Again, “author” should be assumed to 
mean, collectively, the creator of the work, holder of the copyright and the person 
who commercially seeks to exploit it (such as a publisher), unless a distinction is 
drawn between any of them.  This accords with the notion of the author as being the 
central figure in copyright legislation. 
 
When discussing economic concepts, mathematical equations and graphs will 
be avoided for two reasons: lawyers are generally averse to mathematical 
expression and tend to glaze over them, and, more importantly, descriptive accounts 
of economics are more accessible.  After all, economics is principally a study of 
human behaviour — how economic agents interact and make choices.  Excessive 
use of mathematical models and graphs has helped to create the impression that 
economics is a natural science, which is not the case.117  The economic points can 
be sufficiently conveyed through descriptive accounts of the principles. 
 
3 5 1 Economic analysis and copyright policy 
 
Before considering the economics of copyright protection, it is interesting to note 
that, thus far, the economic analysis of copyright has had very little direct influence 
on copyright law and policy, whether in the US, or elsewhere.118  Nevertheless, it is 
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claimed that the economic justification for intellectual property, such as copyright, is 
the “principal justification” for intellectual property in Anglo-American law.119  This 
seems surprising given the extensive literature concerning the economics of 
copyright protection.120  There are a number of possible reasons for the decision-
makers on copyright law — lawyers and politicians — ignoring the literature 
concerning the economic analysis of copyright. 
 
Most of the relevant professionals engaged in forming copyright law do not 
have the necessary economic expertise, which makes them reluctant to engage with 
literature concerning the economic analysis of copyright.121  Those who engage in 
economic analysis also share some of the blame for their analysis being ignored; the 
literature on the economic analysis of copyright protection tends to inaccessible to 
persons who do not have, at least, a background in economics.  There appears to be 
an unnecessary use of mathematical formulae, which could be avoided by providing 
more descriptive accounts of the analytical methods and findings.122   
 
The analytical technique of making simplifying assumptions about a given 
situation used by economists is one that is unfamiliar to the decision-makers on 
copyright law.  These decision-makers tend to immediately reject any findings 
following such an approach if any of the assumptions that have been made are 
questionable because of their generalised nature.  The cultural differences are 
compounded by the fact that economists sometimes disagree on the outcome of a 
particular situation.123  A reason for this lack of consensus is the fact that copyright 
covers a diverse range of copyright works, appearing in quite different markets, 
which makes economic analysis far too generalised to yield a definitive answer on 
                                                                                                                                       
Intl. Inc. v Altai Inc. 1992 982 F.2d 693 and Sega Enterprises Ltd. v Accolade, Inc. 1992 977 F.2d 
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the desirability of copyright protection.124  This is the reason why it is better to 
consider the impact of copyright protection in respect of specific types of copyright 
work; it is more likely to allow one to draw definite conclusions. 
 
Although the non-economic arguments relating to justifications for copyright 
protection may also not be unequivocal, the policy-makers on copyright are more 
likely to be persuaded by lobbying by the copyright industry because they tend to 
have more romantic notions about the creation of literary and artistic works.  The 
policy-makers and the lobbyist are also more likely to have similar backgrounds, 
which inevitably results in a closer working relationship.125  In this interaction, the 
sophistication and financial wherewithal of the copyright lobby makes it particular 
effective in presenting its case.  Consumers, whose interests could possibly be 
affected by undue restrictions on copyright works, have collective action difficulties 
because they are dispersed and their individual financial losses tend to be too small 
to motivate them to coordinate their efforts.126 
 
However, there have been signs of a changing attitude to using economic 
analysis in the development of copyright law.  For example, economic analysis was 
referred to in both the US and EU when the introduction of copyright protection for 
computer programs was being considered in the 1970s and 1990s, respectively.127  
Also, the 2003 US Supreme Court case of Eldred v. Ashcroft,128 which considered 
the constitutionality of the extension of the term of copyright protection pursuant to 
the US Copyright Term Extension Act 1988, included extensive testimony 
concerning the economic effects of extending the term of copyright protection to 90 
years. 
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3 5 2 Market failure 
 
In the previous chapter we briefly looked at the nature of copyright in terms of legal 
doctrine, and whether it constitutes property.  We will now consider the economic 
nature of copyright works, which will help to explain the economic analysis and 
justification for copyright protection. 
3 5 2 1 Public goods 
 
Due to their intangible nature, copyright works, like other intellectual property, are 
regarded as public goods in economics.129  Tangible property, such as a squash 
racquet, is generally considered to be a private good because it can be physically 
controlled (excludable), and enjoyed by only one person at a time (rival).  A public 
good (or service)130 is one that is both non-rival and non-excludable.  It is the public-
good quality of copyright works that makes it a particularly “interesting case for 
economists and lawyers to debate.”131  Unlike a private good, a non-rivalrous good 
can be consumed or enjoyed by an additional person without diminishing the 
enjoyment of others, at negligible, or no extra, cost.132  For example, the contents of 
a book, like the code of a computer program, can concurrently be used and enjoyed 
by more than one person, without any adverse effects on any of such users.133  It 
should be borne in mind that a copyright work — the code of a computer program or 
the content of a book — must be distinguished from the physical medium on which it 
may be conveyed.  The copyright work transcends the particular mode of delivery.134  
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The non-rivalrous nature of copyright works — the fact that they can be enjoyed by 
others at no (or negligible) cost — raises the issue of whether it is socially beneficial 
to prevent such use.  After all, if it costs nothing for others to utilise and enjoy a 
copyright work, why should they be prevented from doing so?  On a crude utilitarian 
basis, such use by others should not be prevented, and for copyright law to do so is 
socially detrimental.135 
 
The claimed non-excludability of copyright works means that persons cannot 
be prevented from using or enjoying it.  A well-known example of a non-excludable 
service is a free-to-air broadcast; no individual can be prevented from enjoying such 
a good if they have a radio and individual freedom.136  Gordon states that whether a 
good is excludable depends on whether it can be concealed, allowing the creator to 
prevent use by non-purchasers.137  Palmer, on the other hand, is of the opinion that 
whether a particular good is a public good, and, therefore, excludable, cannot be 
determined from the nature of the good itself.  Rather, whether a good is public good 
depends on the institutional context and the prior policy considerations.  A system 
can require that a good should be accessible to others or that it be produced for 
public benefit, in which case it will be more similar to a public good.  Alternatively, the 
system may avoid introducing any mechanisms to assist the producer of a good to 
exclude others from the benefit of the good but leave it up to the producer to 
determine whether it will restrict public consumption by incurring the necessary costs 
to achieve that purpose.  The cost of providing the good would thus include the cost 
of providing an exclusion mechanism.138  Trosow, it is submitted, correctly sums up 
the position in relation to intangible property when he states that the non-rivalrous 
nature of information is an intrinsic quality of information but its excludability depends 
on “various extrinsic factors” such as the legal position relating to such property.139 
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3 5 2 2 Positive externalities and free riding  
 
The non-excludable nature of public goods gives rise to the so-called free-rider 
problem: non-paying users of the public good.  The reason for non-paying users is 
that a public good creates benefits which others can enjoy, without the ability of the 
producer of the good to prevent such enjoyment.  In economic jargon, this effect of 
public goods is said to be a consequence of the positive externalities they create.  
Indeed, it is axiomatic that a public good, because of its non-excludable nature, 
produces positive externalities.  This results in market failure because, despite the 
enjoyment of the good by a large number of people, they have no incentive to pay 
any amount for such benefit.140  What makes positive externalities economically 
significant, causing market failure, is the fact that the producer of the good, who has 
created the positive externality, is unable to charge a price from all those benefiting 
from the good which reflects the benefit they derive from the good.141 
 
In terms of simple allocative efficiency, once a public good exists, it is futile to 
then insist on the exclusion of free-riders; “it is inefficient to expend resources to 
exclude non-purchasers if the marginal cost142 of making a given good available to 
one more person is zero (or less than the cost of exclusion)” because doing so 
simply reduces consumption of the good.143  While the cost of providing the good to 
an additional person may be zero (on negligible), the cost of exclusion in the case of 
public goods is not negligible.144  Although these free riders do not impose a direct 
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additional cost on the producer of the public good because of its non-rivalrous 
character, it is claimed that they have a definite deleterious effect on such producer, 
who seeks to charge for the good to recover his costs of creation.  Once intellectual 
property has been released to the public, it can generally be copied easily and 
inexpensively.145  The fact that informational works such as copyright works are so 
easy to copy means that it is costly to exclude others from exploiting it, which, in 
turn, means that it is unlikely that authors will realise sufficient returns on their 
investment in creating the work.146  The piracy of musical works is an oft-quoted 
example of such conduct.  Purchasers of a public good (or those who contemplated 
paying for such good), who contribute to the cost of creation of the good, will soon 
consider it in their own interest to also not pay for the good and be free riders.  
Consumers and competitors would prefer to wait for the product to be produced, and 
then simply free ride.147  In terms of game-theory analysis, this behaviour of 
consumers or competitors becomes the dominant strategy as all rational, self-
interested individuals will prefer to free ride; “they may receive the benefits of the 
good whether or not they pay for it.”148 
3 5 2 3 Underproduction 
 
The most significant problem faced by producers of public goods is that consumers 
— enjoying the benefits of positive externalities and the associated non-excludability 
— will understate their actual price preferences for such goods, which will cause 
producers to receive skewed signals about the actual demand for such goods, 
resulting in an insufficient supply of such goods.149  The technical reason for the 
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underproduction is that free riding prevents the establishment of a market for that 
particular good because of the unavailability of information concerning consumer 
demand: “[a] market is any arrangement that enables buyers and sellers to get 
information and to do business with each other.”150 
 
On the basis that copyright works are public goods, free-riding behaviour 
causes the economic value of a copyright work, from the author’s perspective, to be 
eroded because he is unable to sell the work in sufficiently large quantities.151  This 
problem is only aggravated by the conduct of competitors.  The costs of creating 
copyright works (fixed costs) are generally high when compared to the costs of 
copying such works.  Copies can be made relatively inexpensively once the 
copyright works are made available to the public, which gives copiers a significant 
cost advantage over the author.  For example, in the case of literary works, the free 
riding by a rival publisher causes the price of books to be driven down to the rival 
publisher’s costs of production, which would inevitably be lower than the costs of the 
author because the rival publisher does not have the additional (fixed) costs of 
creating the work.  At this lower price the author will not be able to realise a sufficient 
return.  Naturally, if this happens, the author of the work may not be able to recover 
the costs of creating the work, and will cease to produce such works.152 
 
More importantly, the possible scale of free riding might convince other 
prospective authors of copyright works not to create copyright works, or not provide 
them at the socially optimal level because of the concern that they too will not be 
able to recover their costs.  A free market requires that the actual supply and 
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demand schedules be determinable in order to efficiently allocate resources.153  In 
contrast to public goods, private goods are optimally allocated in society through 
competitive markets because “producers and consumers of private goods will 
disclose their preferences for how much a given good they will provide or buy at 
different levels of prices on the market.”154  The nature of public goods means that a 
market — which would ensure the optimal production of such goods — is unable to 
develop because of free riding, and copyright works are examples of public goods.155  
Thus, in short, it is claimed that the public-good nature of copyright works causes 
market failure because positive externalities and free riding mean that the authors 
are unable to charge users prices that reflect the value of the copyright works to 
users, and which prices would allow authors to recover their costs.156 
 
The value of intellectual property, such as copyright, to society is considered 
to generally exceed the costs of its creation.  It is because of this perceived social 
benefit of copyright works that it becomes necessary to address the problem of 
market failure, which impedes, or deters, their creation.157  There are various 
possible solutions to address such alleged market failure in the case of copyright 
works: contract; state-sponsored creation of such works; patronage; and, legal 
protection by way of property rights, as in the case of copyright law.158  The purpose 
of property rights, and to a lesser extent, contract, is to create exclusionary 
mechanisms, thus destroying the public nature of copyright works.  Exclusion 
mechanisms can also take the form of technological mechanisms, which have 
recently been reinforced by laws outlawing circumvention of such technological 
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mechanisms.159  As copyright law provides proprietary protection, the economic 
justification for this solution to the market failure will be the main focus of this 
chapter.  However, before that, the other possible alternatives to proprietary 
protection will be considered: the use of contractual provisions, the provision of 
copyright works through public funding, and patronage. 
 
3 5 3 Alternatives to copyright protection 
 
In order to properly evaluate copyright as an institution, it is necessary to consider 
and appreciate the possible alternatives to copyright protection to address the 
problem of market failure, even if only briefly.  The matter need not be restricted to a 
question of copyright protection or no protection.160  As indicated above, we will 
consider whether the problem of market failure can be addressed through the use of 
contractual provisions or whether the creation of copyright works can be encouraged 
and supported by the state, or patronage. 
 
When discussing alternatives to copyright, we are contemplating a legal 
regime that affords authors none of the special exclusion rights they enjoy under 
copyright law in respect of their copyright works and which they have made available 
to others.  The persons to whom such copyright works are made available would 
thus be free to use them as they please, including making copies thereof.  Gordon 
has coined the term “copy-privilege” to describe this state of affairs, and this chapter 
will use the term in the same way.161  The copy-privilege regime does not mean that 
authors have no rights in respect of their copyright works.   
 
Apart from contract, which will be discussed below, authors of copyright works 
can use property law, or the law of delict relating to privacy, unfair competition 
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(confidential information) or trespass to restrict use of their works.162  These types of 
restrictions, together with contractual restrictions, will collectively be referred to as 
the “common-law restrictions.”  More extreme advocates of free access to copyright 
works do not even consider the common-law restrictions as justifiable and consider 
them as unnecessary restrictions on access to copyright works.163  Although the 
common-law restrictions may restrict access to copyright works, they are not 
specifically concerned with preventing copying of such works.  The common-law 
restrictions primarily serve other interests or policies such as personal security or 
personality interests.164  
 
3 5 3 1 Contractual restrictions 
 
Given that the difficulties faced by authors of copyright works to prevent free riding 
and struggling to recoup their costs of production results in market failure, the 
question is whether authors can use contractual provisions to address these 
problems.  As indicated, in a situation of copy-privilege, apart from the common-law 
restrictions, authors would not have any special rights to enable them to prevent or 
restrict copying of their works.165  In these circumstances, the only direct method of 
restricting copying is by way of contractual restrictions on others.166  Use can be 
made of contractual provisions, such as confidentiality agreements, and property law 
(which governs the physical article in which the copyright work is embedded) to 
restrict access to the copyright work.167   
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These techniques can internalise externalities, particularly where the 
copyright work can be confined to a limited audience, and the fact that such 
arrangements are private (secret) mean that they could provide protection for 
periods exceeding those provided for by copyright law.168  The author of a copyright 
work (or his publisher) could seek to enter into contractual arrangements with those 
most likely to exploit the work to the detriment of the author, such as publishers (or 
competitors).  Subject to compliance with the requirements of competition law, 
publishers may voluntarily agree not to engage in free-riding behaviour and devise 
mechanisms to ensure compliance.  This situation may not seem as far-fetched as it 
first appears.  For a large part of the 19th century the works of British authors were 
not protected by copyright in the US, yet “both publishers and authors utilized a 
number of the voluntary and contractual mechanisms for internalization of 
externalities.”169  A similar arrange existed in the American fashion industry.170 
 
As indicated, in the absence of copyright protection, others would be entitled 
to copy works which are made available to them, so these contractual obligations or 
similar arrangements seek to prevent copying, which is precisely what copyright law 
does.  According to supporters of the contractual approach, copyright law can 
therefore be characterised as simply providing “standard terms” which substitute for 
actual contracts; the terms are the same as the parties would otherwise agree to, as 
“normal” users simply want access to the work.  For example, someone who merely 
wants to read a book would freely accept terms that impose restrictions similar to 
those which copyright law currently imposes.  Those persons who would not agree to 
these terms are those who contemplate “abnormal” use such as seeking to copy the 
work in a manner detrimental to the interests of the author; those persons, therefore, 
require actual consent from the author, as they would under copyright law.171  Thus, 
it is argued that contractual arrangements can provide much of the protection 
afforded by copyright law, and not much would be lost by its abolition.172 
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Of course, the material difference between the statutory copyright protection 
and the contractual approach is that the latter requires individual consent before 
such prohibition is effective.  Only those who agreed not to copy the copyright work 
can be prevented from doing so, whereas copyright protection creates rights against 
the whole world.173  In the absence of such agreement, copy-privilege means that 
there are no enforceable rights against third parties who copy a copyright work but 
who have not agreed not to do so.174  It is due to the fact that copyright goes further 
than protection via a contractual regime — binding all persons equally, irrespective 
of how they came into possession of a copyright work — that it is valued.175   
 
As a result of the fact that contract is based on consensual agreement, it is an 
unsatisfactory solution to the market failure which supposedly exists in respect of 
copyright works.  The prospect of free riding is a persistent threat as anyone “free of 
a contractual duty not to copy can make thousands of copies, and all who purchase 
their access from her would similarly be free of the author's restrictions.”176  Authors 
would also be vulnerable to greater exploitation by publishers if they are deprived of 
the automatic rights which copyright law currently grants them.  Possessed with 
these rights authors have something of economic value with which to negotiate with 
publishers.177  Bereft of these rights, publishers could easily exploit authors due to 
the inequality of bargaining power: authors would not have any leverage to get 
publishers to agree not to free ride if the copyright work becomes available.  This 
may result in authors receiving prices for their copyright works which are insufficient 
to recoup their costs.  Paying these much-reduced prices are also justifiable from a 
publisher’s perspective because a system of copy-privilege, similarly, leaves the 
publisher itself vulnerable to free riding by competitors.178   
 
It therefore appears that relying on contractual provisions in a copy-privilege 
regime will not yield the desired level of creative activity because authors are unlikely 
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to realise a sufficient economic return because the market failure is not adequately 
addressed.179  Also, the fact that contractual mechanisms encourage secrecy and 
may provide for periods of protection exceeding those currently provided by 
copyright law is, arguably, not socially beneficial.  After all, the reason why it is 
considered necessary to address the problem of market failure is because copyright 
works are considered to be beneficial to society and their production, and 
dissemination, should be encouraged.  Furthermore, the contractual arguments can 
actually serve to support copyright protection.  If it is correct that copyright protection 
simply corresponds to the “standard terms” that “normal” users of copyright works 
would agree to, copyright protection may be said to represent a form of social 
contract, which avoids the transaction costs180 associated with explicit or implied 
contracts. 
 
3 5 3 2 Public financing of copyright works 
 
There are generally two standard responses to address the market failure caused by 
the production of a public good: the legal system can create property rights in 
relation to such good, which would create an exclusion mechanism, or there could 
be direct government involvement, either by the government providing such goods 
itself or encouraging its production through the provision of subsidies.181  It is 
claimed that government funding received by authors will incentivise them in a 
similar way the financial rewards they seek to earn under the proprietary system 
which copyright law creates.182  The attractiveness of government-sponsored 
creation of intellectual property is that the product, produced for public, will be 
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available for use by all as it will form part of the public domain.183  The benefit that 
the creation will fall in the public domain is, arguably, not as great in the case of 
copyright works as it would be in the case of technical inventions which are currently 
protected by patent law.  Unlike patent law, copyright does not protect the underlying 
idea embodied in a work, which does not inhibit new creations to the extent that 
patent law does.  It is probably due to the perceived social benefit of copyright works 
and innovation that governments already fund a large portion of academic research 
publications.184 
 
Some commentators regard public funding of intellectual property to be a 
more socially optimal system than the current system of intellectual property, and 
advocate the expansion of the system by which academic research is incentivised to 
all types of intellectual creation.185  Public funding (or patronage) can be a 
particularly useful way of encouraging the creation of “works which require long 
periods of research or high costs of creation before they reach the publishing 
stage.”186  These works will be unlikely to be produced in the absence of such 
funding, and, if produced, too costly for most consumers.187  The market cannot be 
guaranteed to provide sufficient incentive for all types of copyright work.  For 
example, the production of scientific publications or works which are considered as 
too esoteric for a sufficient market return are examples of works which could benefit 
from such funding.188  It is claimed that this system benefits consumers in a more 
direct way: as the author will no longer have the exclusive rights which he does 
under copyright, competition among publishers will mean that the works will be more 
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widely disseminated and priced at their marginal cost of production.189  In contrast 
with the position under the current copyright regime, this enables large numbers of 
consumers with lower incomes to have greater access to copyright works. 
 
Although such government support will necessarily be funded from tax 
revenues and may result in increased taxation, supporters of publicly funded 
incentives argue that it is more efficient than the copyright system.  It is claimed that 
the benefit of the lower prices paid by consumers will more than offset the additional 
taxes paid.190  Accordingly, such a system of publicly-funded subsidies, grants or 
prizes may be considered a more equitable way to distribute the social costs of, and 
benefits associated with, the production and dissemination of copyright works.191  
Despite the apparent benefits of such a system — providing the necessary 
incentives to authors and the cost savings experienced by consumers — a system of 
government support is not considered to be desirable. 
 
Critics of the public-funding option to address the problem of the public-good 
nature of intellectual property point out that such a system would be impractical; the 
determination of the appropriate rewards for authors will be difficult to calculate and it 
will affect creative independence.192  Informational deficiencies have tended to be a 
particularly troublesome aspect of any centrally-planned economic activity, and, thus, 
determining consumer demand will prove to be difficult.193  The costs of 
administering such a government-financed system may not represent good value for 
citizens.  It will require the establishment of a bureaucratic system to determine 
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acceptable projects and the appropriate amounts to incentivise authors.194  On the 
plus side, given the fact that the creations in a publicly-funded system will form part 
of the public domain, “the reward regime would save on the legal, private, and social 
enforcement costs involved in protecting property rights from theft, infringement, or 
copying by others.”195  But even a critic of copyright protection like Breyer considers 
it unlikely that a practical administrative system can be established which is more 
efficient than copyright protection.196 
 
The determination of appropriate rewards for authors — even if such 
remuneration is based on the volume of use and utility, as seems sensible — is a 
particularly thorny issue.  Calandrillo, a supporter of public financing of intellectual 
property, acknowledges that this issue is the Achilles heel of any such proposed 
system.197  For John Stuart Mill an administered system of remuneration will 
necessarily involve human decision making, introducing discretionary action which 
can result in arbitrary action and inadequate compensation for authors.  Mill 
considered this problem as sufficiently serious to reject public financing in favour of a 
proprietary system.198  A further complication of public funding that needs to be 
addressed are issues that involve cross-border elements: should funding be confined 
to copyright works produced by citizens or will foreigners who produce copyright 
works used domestically also be entitled to rewards; and, what about works 
produced by a citizen but of most value to foreigners?199 
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Government financing also has the following non-economic problems: 
whether there will be the political will to provide the necessary funding for all forms of 
books, and whether there is a risk of greater censorship.  While government-funded 
academic research has been considered to be substantially free from government 
interference, there is a considerable concern about the politicisation of such a 
system.200  The reason government interference may not have presented a problem 
in relation to academic works might be because governments generally prefer the 
production of utilitarian works, and a substantial portion of academic literature, such 
as scientific literature, is of a utilitarian nature.  Public financing may therefore result 
in the skewed production of works to the prejudice of “pure” literature.  By protecting 
all types of literary (and other creative) works, copyright avoids the use of value 
judgements, and lets the market determine the merits or monetary value of a 
work.201  Furthermore, if authors are dependent on government funding, it will 
comprise their literary independence, and it could be a shortcut to censorship.202  
This makes government financing a less than suitable alternative to copyright 
protection.203 
3 5 3 3 Patronage 
 
As already mentioned, patronage may be a useful way of ensuring the production of 
works involving large investments of time and resources.  Historically, patronage was 
an important mechanism which led to the production of great works, prior to the 
existence of copyright protection.  Patronage does not necessarily compromise 
artistic integrity: if the author considers the assignment to be distasteful, he could 
decline the assignment or charge an amount which compensates him for any 
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displeasure caused by carrying out the assignment.204  However, patronage was 
vehemently opposed as an alternative to copyright during the parliamentary debates 
concerning the Copyright Bill in 1841, while recognising the negative tax-like effects 
of a “monopoly” granted by copyright.205 
 
Patronage has a similar pernicious quality to public funding as it could skew 
the types of works produced, depriving authors of their creative independence.  It is 
also not a guarantee that the products of patronage will be disseminated to the same 
extent as under a copyright regime, and at similar (or cheaper) prices.206  More 
importantly, a system of patronage can hardly be said to encourage widespread 
authorship.  It may favour established authors whereas new authors may be left 
without adequate reward for their works, which could have a chilling effect on the 
pursuit of creative endeavours.  In comparison to copyright protection, patronage will 
extend to far fewer persons, which makes it more exclusionary in nature. 
 
3 5 4 Economic justifications for copyright 
 
The principal economic justification for copyright protection is to provide authors with 
the necessary incentives to create works.  It is claimed that incentives are necessary 
because in the absence of copyright protection authors will not create copyright 
works (or create them in insufficient numbers) due to the public-good nature of such 
works.  The reason for authors’ unwillingness to create such works is the ease with 
which others are able to benefit from the efforts of authors, at the expense of 
authors.  Protection, through the provision of property rights, is thus required to 
rectify this market failure because these works are considered to be socially 
beneficial and, therefore, their production should be encouraged.207  The literature on 
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the economic analysis of copyright law contains various forms of this argument.208  
For example, some commentators start by indicating that the nature of copyright 
works means that the market cannot efficiently allocate resources, which results in 
market failure that needs to be addressed.209  However, the essence of the argument 
is as summarised here, and will be expanded below.  It is an ex ante justification: it is 
forward looking in that is seeks to influence future conduct, by granting legal rights 
on the basis that an individual engages in the desired creative activities.210 
 
A second economic justification approaches the problem of market failure 
from the opposite perspective: it focuses on the strategic behaviour of consumers 
and competitors in a free market, rather than providing incentives to authors of works 
per se, and the mutually destructive, free-riding behaviour that would ensue in the 
absence of copyright protection.211  Again, it is claimed that new works will not be 
created because of the ease with which others, particularly competitors, can benefit 
from free riding off such investment by others.  This pattern of behaviour is said to 
conform, analytically, to the well-known prisoner's dilemma game analysed in game 
theory.  As we have seen, the public-good quality of copyright works means that a 
likely response for consumers and competitors is to wait for the good to be produced 
and then to free ride.212  Copyright protection is thus a mechanism which can prevent 
such socially unproductive, parasitic behaviour.  This type of strategic behaviour 
occurs in a wide variety of everyday circumstances, and is described in common 
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parlance by expressions such as “loafing on the job, shirking, cheating, free riding, or 
moral hazard in insurance contexts.”213 
 
We will now consider these economic justifications in more detail.  The first 
economic justification, the traditional or standard economic justification, for copyright 
protection will be considered in detail.   
 
3 5 4 1 Proprietary incentives 
 
As discussed above, the claimed public-good nature of copyright works, and their 
positive externalities, encourages free-riding behaviour by consumers (and 
competitors) causing them to understate their actual price preferences for such 
goods.  This leads to producers of such goods to abandon, or not commence, 
production because the prices received, and the quantity sold, will result in an 
inadequate return on their investment.  The resulting market failure leads to a 
decrease in social welfare because copyright works are not produced at the socially 
desired levels.  It is thus necessary to incentivise authors to create such works by 
eliminating such free-riding conduct, and enabling them to realise a sufficient return 
on their investments.214 
 
Of course, it is true that copyright works such as literary and artistic works 
have been created through the ages, even before the introduction of copyright 
protection.  Indeed, some of the most well-known and influential creations, such as 
Homer’s Iliad, and Leonardo Da Vinci’s Vitruvian Man, were created without the 
incentives provided by copyright law.  It is still the case that creative works, like those 
of Franz Kafka, may be created without any intention of publication, or for non-
commercial motives, such as pleasure, ideological reasons or establishing one’s 
reputation.  The authors of the latter types of work would also generally not object to 
the free and widespread dissemination of their works under a system of copy-
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privilege.215  However, other copyright works will simply not be created if there is no 
reasonable prospect of an adequate return on the amount of the investment made in 
creating such works. This will particularly be the case where there are significant 
costs in creating such works, or where they are created to generate an income for 
their creators, such as “encyclopedias, almanacs, mass circulation periodicals, 
technical subscription services for professions (such as citators and digests for 
lawyers), and motion pictures.”216  Computer programs would, arguably, also fall into 
this category of copyright works which are costly to develop, and from which their 
authors seek to realise an adequate economic return. 
 
In order to address an incidence of market failure, the proposed course of 
action must provide a practicable solution to the problem.  If the purpose of the 
proposed mechanism is to provide authors with the necessary incentives by ensuring 
that they have an adequate opportunity to earn an adequate financial return, it must 
not be capable of being subverted through the actions of consumers or competitors.  
The relevant course of action will also not achieve its purpose of establishing a 
market if it too causes market failure by, for example, introducing other externalities 
or high transaction costs.  For example, a system of compulsory licensing is 
considered inappropriate because of its high administrative costs.  A system of 
compulsory licensing would fail to establish a market because of the, necessarily 
large, accompanying bureaucracy and potentially high, and costly, incidence of 
disputes concerning the appropriate levels of remuneration for authors, which would 
also discourage potential authors.217  This problem is similar to that which would 
exist in a publicly-funded system, discussed above. 
 
The recognition of property rights is a well-known mechanism to address 
problems of inefficiency which arise in relation to the utilisation of common resources 
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or to address other problems of externalities.218  An oft-cited example of the former 
problem is the so-called “tragedy of the commons” or “problem of the commons” 
which provides an account of the overgrazing which results if a village’s common 
green is available for all owners of livestock.  Because each individual livestock 
owner only considers his own interests, without considering the overall effects of his 
conduct, overgrazing affects all livestock owners.219  The award of property rights (in 
land) is considered the optimal manner to address the inefficiency arising from 
externalities because it forces the property owner to consider the implications and 
costs of all his actions, which serves to align private interests and social interests.220 
 
The rational choice paradigm, which is central in microeconomics, considers it 
to be more efficient to rely on the recognition of property rights and the self-
interested behaviour of individuals when allocating scarce resources rather than 
appealing to ideological or moral notions.  This decentralised system based on 
property rights is considered to be superior to a publicly-funded system of providing 
copyright works.221  The conviction with which some proponents of private property 
assert that it, in combination with self-interested conduct, best serves the common 
weal has been described as being something akin to “religious faith.”222  This 
conviction has resulted in an ever-expanding concept of what can be considered to 
be “property,” with some asserting that “any right which a person may agree not to 
insist on (whether personal, familial or political) should be styled a ‘property’ right, 
because the right-holder has control over the effects of the exercise of the right on 
others (its ‘externalities’).”223 
 
Commentators like Michael Novak argue that property rights are generally a 
good thing and the same principles should be applicable in the case of ideas.224  
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Similarly, some overly-zealous proponents of property even claim that the 
unrestricted use of information, which is what would be the prevailing norm in the 
case of copy-privilege, will lead to a tragedy of the commons: the overuse of 
information contained in information goods such as copyright works.  It is thus 
considered necessary to erect “fences” to prevent such overuse.225  However, this 
analogy with the problem-of-the-commons scenario is inappropriate as the nature of 
intellectual property, as discussed, is non-rivalrous, unlike tangible property.  While 
the tragedy of the commons does address the problem of externalities, it is 
concerned with the overuse of a finite, rivalrous, depleting common (natural) 
resource.  On the contrary, the use of information does not decrease it or reduce its 
benefits: “copying information actually multiplies the available resources, not only by 
making a new physical copy but by spreading the idea and therefore permitting 
others to use and enjoy it.”226  The real issue that copyright law seeks to address is 
not the preservation of a resource (information), but seeking to ensure its production 
at a socially optimal level, and an incentive to exploit it.227  It is the consumption of 
existing goods that creates the problem of the commons whereas the free-rider 
problem discourages the creation of new goods.228   
 
It is possible to make a cogent theoretical case for the protection of 
intellectual property such as copyright works without resorting to rhetoric based on 
tangible property.  While it is useful to reference the effect of property rights in 
addressing problems associated with tangible objects, and to draw analogies with 
tangible property to illustrate propositions, it is important to always bear in mind the 
differences in nature between intangible copyright works and tangible property.  The 
motivations for awarding property rights in tangible objects are not necessarily 
applicable in their entirety to intellectual property. 
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3 5 4 1 1 Private property 
 
Economically, the institution of private property is an instrument to address issues of 
resource allocation and use.  It, like any other social institution, exists to make 
coordination of social and economic activities more efficient.229  Without the 
institution of property, individuals’ lack of security would severely restrict social 
interaction.  Insecurity and uncertainty would require individuals to dedicate large 
amounts of resources to seek bi-lateral undertakings to protect their interests.  The 
resources dedicated to seeking such security are wasted if they could be employed 
more productively.  Furthermore, the imperative of having to seek bi-lateral 
undertakings is not scalable and would have a debilitating effect on any society that 
extended beyond kith and kin.230  The extent of valued interests in such a society 
would remain very modest — confined almost exclusively to the emotional and 
psychological — and individuals would forego any, but the most essential, social 
interaction in the absence of private property.  For this reason Parkin considers 
property rights to be so critical to human progress that he suggests that without it 
“we would still be hunting and gathering like our Stone Age ancestors.”231 
 
The creation and recognition of property rights is considered by many to be 
the most effective device by which scarce resources are optimally utilised.  It is 
claimed that the importance and benefits of individual control was already 
recognised under Roman law, which consequently developed the concept of 
“dominium, or exclusive control over tangible objects.”232  Property rights provide 
people with the necessary security that their creations will not be appropriated by 
others.  They prevent the arbitrary deprivation of property, and “provides incentives 
to produce, accumulate, and trade.”233  It obviates the need to devote resources to 
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protecting the products of one’s labours, which resources could be employed more 
productively.234 
Property rights create the necessary incentives for people “to specialise and 
produce the goods in which they have a comparative advantage.”235  By defining and 
protecting entitlements, the owner of such rights obtains the necessary security 
which allows him to value his interest and trade it for other entitlements.  By 
improving or producing property, an individual can exchange his rights for that which 
he requires or sell it for profit.236  Property rights therefore allow individuals to 
appropriate value, which provides powerful incentives for investing in such protected 
subject matter.237   
 
Property rights, like other institutions, attempt to provide structures through 
which we can predict the behaviour of others, particularly in societies which extend 
beyond persons with whom we have a personal or familial connection.238  Property 
law thus reduces costs by providing the basis for “patterned behaviour which can be 
easily understood and followed,” and which is enforced by the state.239 
 
3 5 4 1 2 Externalities 
 
As we have already seen what makes copyright works interesting are the positive 
externalities, and the problem of free riding.  If a good produces positive 
externalities, a non-altruistic creator will only be motivated to increase its production 
if he can capture — internalise — a sufficient part of those benefits.  His willingness 
to create the good will be dependent on the expected return on his investment in 
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creating the good.240  Private property is considered to be the best way in which the 
costs and benefits of externalities can be internalised; it internalises the costs and 
benefits of human behaviour by attributing it to the owner of the source.241  The 
success with which property rights serve to internalise externalities in relation to 
tangible property is generally recognised.  We have already seen its use to avoid the 
problem of the commons.  Property rights can reduce the inefficiencies caused by 
externalities and correct market failure.242 
 
It is claimed that the property rights afforded by copyright law are similarly 
capable of internalising costs and benefits in relation to copyright works.  An author, 
like a farmer, will not toil if others can simply reap the benefits, while he does not 
receive a sufficient financial return.243  This problem is particularly relevant in relation 
to almost all copyright works because it is easy and cheap to copy such works, while 
attempting to exclude others would involve expending substantial resources.244  
Copyright law creates an artificial mechanism by which intangible copyright works 
become excludable, enabling a market to develop.245   
 
By giving authors a property right (or exclusive rights) in their creations, 
copyright is able to address the underproduction of copyright works.246  The 
exclusive rights which copyright provides an author gives the author an artificial lead 
time to establish a market for his product, which should allow him sufficient time to 
earn an adequate return on his investment.247  Also, during such period of 
exclusivity, copyright protection serves to “increase the cost of copying, raise the 
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return on creative authorship, and, at the margin, encourage more people to 
create.”248  The rights which copyright create forces third parties to bargain with 
authors for the right to use their creations.  Through such bargaining consumers (and 
publishers) reveal their true price preferences, which allows authors to internalise 
some of the social benefits created by their works and correct some of the market 
inefficiencies.249  Also, despite these restrictions, it is claimed that copyright leaves 
enough room for creativity.  There is sufficient nonprotectable matter aside from the 
protected expression to encourage others to create their own copyright works.  This 
is a claim that will specifically be analysed when considering the protection of 
computer programs.250  Thus, in this way copyright law enhances the general welfare 
because it encourages the creation of copyright works which would not be created 
without such protection.251  It does this because it facilitates the creation of a market 
through which authorship is rewarded and incentivised.252 
 
But for something to constitute property in any meaningful sense and for a 
market to develop, it is not sufficient that others are prevented from appropriating or 
using someone else’s creation; it has to have value and have the character of being 
transferable.  By preventing unauthorised exploitation of copyright works, copyright 
law preserves the economic value of a copyright work, which would otherwise be 
eroded due to its public-good character.  This creates the exchange-value of a 
copyright work, which copyright law then allows to be commoditised and tradable by 
providing for the transfer — assignment — of the rights afforded.  As with tangible 
property, this ensures that copyright can be transferred to someone that values it 
higher, which is a socially more efficient (wealth maximising) result.  In this way, 
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copyright law establishes a proprietary right, analogous to other forms of private 
property, which makes it tradable and allows a market to develop.253   
 
While it is the case that copyright restricts individual liberty which would 
otherwise be enjoyed under copy-privilege, it is suggested that, morally, this is no 
different to the restrictions imposed by property rights in respect of tangible 
objects.254  Copyright is simply an appropriation mechanism to encourage the 
creation of copyright works.  Whereas appropriation of tangible property can be 
justified to address problems of scarcity of resources, and the quest for its optimal 
utilisation, no such issue arises with intangible creations.  Rather, the concern which 
copyright seeks to address is how to best incentivise creative efforts.255  As we have 
seen in the previous chapter, the primary purpose of copyright cannot be to reward, 
nor is it to enrich, authors.256 
 
In fact, some would go a step further and argue that the aim of copyright is not 
only to produce the optimal amount of copyright works, it also aims to ensure that the 
works are of the highest quality.  This argument considers economic activity to take 
place at three, progressive levels: consumption, production and innovation.  By 
restricting competition (or granting property rights) at one level, it encourages 
economic activity at the next level.  Accordingly, “ownership of goods may be 
described as a restriction on competition at the level of consumption in favour of 
competition at the level of production, and intellectual and industrial property may be 
viewed as a restriction on competition at the level of production in favour of 
competition at the level of innovation.”257  It is this dual purpose of intellectual 
property that explains the difference between the property right afforded by copyright 
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and the property rights in tangible property; the property right afforded by copyright is 
of limited duration.  The protection afforded at the level of production is intended to 
be just sufficient to encourage the desired level of innovation.  Perpetual protection 
would inhibit innovation, rather than stimulating it.258 
 
It is now generally accepted by economists that legal regulation in the form of 
copyright law overcomes the problems produced by the public-good nature of 
copyright works, and incentivises authors (and others) to dedicate resources to their 
creation.259  However, copyright protection is not a costless institution, and therefore 
its claimed benefits should be weighed up against the costs it imposes on society in 
order to determine whether it is socially beneficial.  As stated above, unlike tangible 
property, the marginal cost of making a copyright work available to one more person 
is negligible (if not zero).  It would, arguably, not be justifiable, from a social welfare 
perspective, to prevent the copying of copyright works — given the fact that they can 
be enjoyed by others at no (or negligible) cost — if it does not efficiently address the 
market failure faced by authors.  But, as discussed, it is alleged that copying would 
be socially detrimental at a social level because it discourages the investment of 
resources in the production of copyright works.  In other words, the costs of the 
proposed solution, which, inter alia, includes the prohibition of unrestricted use of 
copyright works, should not outweigh the benefits, particularly if it does not facilitate 
the emergence of a market and provide authors with the necessary incentives.260 
 
The real issue is, therefore, whether copyright protection is socially efficient.  
Does it provide the ideal mechanism, not only for the production, but also, the 
dissemination of copyright works?261  In the context of computer programs, this work 
will therefore consider what it is that copyright protects, and whether it strikes an 
appropriate balance between encouraging investment in production and promoting 
social welfare.  Does copyright law leave sufficient room for development?  
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3 5 4 2 Prisoner’s dilemma 
 
As already mentioned, the second economic justification for copyright focuses on the 
harmful conduct of consumers and competitors in a free market in the absence of 
copyright protection, rather than directly focusing on the incentives for authors to 
create copyright works.  Like the previous economic justification, it too concludes 
that the strategic behaviour of consumers and competitors result in underproduction 
of copyright works.  Again, because of the recognised social benefits of copyright 
works, it is considered necessary to address such harmful behaviour to ensure the 
creation of copyright works.  The two approaches could rightly be considered to 
merely be opposite side of the same coin: underproduction.  However, there is still 
merit in considering the problem of underproduction from another perspective: it may 
provide greater insights into the nature of the problem, and it may provide an 
additional reason for such underproduction.262  We will principally be concerned with 
the free-riding behaviour of commercial rivals in this case, and, for convenience, will 
use the publishing industry to illustrate the issues.  As will be demonstrated, the lack 
of production is not simply because of the potential free-riding behaviour of others, it 
is because there is a rational strategy of free riding by all individuals. 
 
Game theory analyses the strategic behaviour of individuals in society when 
trying to determine what would be their most advantageous course of action, 
knowing that other individuals are engaging in the same strategic behaviour.  It can 
suggest a pattern of behaviour when individuals are constrained by, or face, specific 
rules (or in the absence of rule), which pattern of behaviour can be used to assess 
the efficacy or social desirability of such constraints.263  The earliest forms of 
copyright protection, which only protected a work in its primary market (and not 
derivative works), is said to have been based on the prisoner’s dilemma model.264  
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Creative adaptations of a copyright work were not protected.  Current copyright 
protection, which provides authors much wider protection than in their primary 
markets, is no longer comprehensively explained in terms of a prisoner’s dilemma 
model.265 
 
The problem of strategic behaviour is particularly apparent in the case of 
technical innovations, and it is argued that this is the primary reason for patent 
protection.  For an individual innovator, as with any economic agent (a firm, or a 
country), seeking to increase its technology, it may be more efficient to simply copy 
the technology of another economic agent.  By so copying the work of another 
economic agent, it avoids having to invest in costly research and development.  This 
type of parasitic behaviour is, however, a rational course of action: not only can it be 
said to avoid unnecessary and inefficient duplication of effort, there is no guarantee 
that such investment will yield the desired result.  If such investment does result in 
an innovation, other economic agents will simply copy it, given the fact that they are 
engaging in similar strategic behaviour.  However, such a strategy, repeatedly 
playing itself out in society, will have a chilling effect on innovation if it is not 
addressed.266 
 
In the case of copyright works, in general, the ease with which copies of such 
works can be produced creates a similar threat of strategic behaviour on the part of 
publishers if there is no copyright protection.  For example, in the case of literary 
works, the first publisher of a work will necessarily incur (fixed) costs such as the 
payment of royalty fees to the author, editing, typographical layout and design, and 
marketing the work, which can be avoided by a subsequent publisher of such work.  
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Significantly, the first publisher assumes the business risk of determining the 
commercial success of the work.  Only once it is established that a work is a success 
would a free rider seek to profit by producing the work, which can be at a lower price 
than that charged by the original publisher because it avoids the associated fixed 
costs.267  If publishers are reluctant to produce copyright works, authors will suffer as 
a result of the reduced royalty fees they can earn and be discouraged from engaging 
in creative endeavours.  
 
These situations in which creators (and innovators) face the prospect of such 
parasitic, competitive conduct are said to “generally conform to the dynamics of the 
prisoner's dilemma game.”268  The prisoner’s dilemma describes situations in which 
the returns (“payoffs”) a rational individual will receive causes such an individual to 
make choices which leads to the participants, as a whole, being made worse off.  As 
a group, it would be in their interests to cooperate but such cooperation is, for some 
reason, made difficult or is unlikely to occur.  In the economic context this is 
considered to lead to wasteful or inefficient behaviour.269  Cooperation in relation to 
copyright works means that parties choose to create their own works, while engaging 
in free-riding behaviour equates to the rational, but socially harmful, conduct.  In the 
parlance of game theory analysis, this latter position is referred to as “defection” — 
cheating.270   
 
Competitors faced with a choice of whether to create their own copyright 
works (i.e. to cooperate and incur the associated costs) or to appropriate another’s 
creation, engaging in low-cost copying and undercut the creator (on the assumption 
that the competitor had created the work and copying is permissible), will each 
defect and not invest in the creation of copyright works because of the prospect of 
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financial failure as a result of free riding by their competitors.271  In this way, free 
riding behaviour — defection — becomes the dominant strategy, with the socially 
harmful consequence that not enough copyright works will be produced.  Thus, it is 
claimed that, in the absence of copyright protection, the free-riding behaviour of 
competitors conforms to a multiple player version of the prisoner’s dilemma.272 
 
When situations exhibit the characteristics of the prisoner’s dilemma game, 
the proposed solution is often legal intervention.  In the case of copyright, it is 
considered necessary to counteract the “powerful incentives not to create.”273  Legal 
regulation is considered to be the best mechanism to harness the gains from 
cooperation, which can be achieved by adjusting the payoffs which participants will 
receive.  As indicated, a prisoner’s dilemma arises because parties do not cooperate 
due to some impediment; it may be because they are unable to communicate, or that 
the other mechanisms usually employed to ensure mutual compliance, such as 
contract law, are not practicable in the circumstances.  In the case of copyright 
works, mutual trust and cooperation could be achieved through contract: each party 
could agree not to copy the copyright works of another and undertake to pay 
penalties (royalties) in the event of a breach.  However, the number of participants 
(and the threat posed by new competitors) makes such an option too costly and 
ineffective.  This is another reason why the contractual approach, previously 
discussed, is unsuitable.  Thus, legal regulation is able to “substitute for trust in 
situations too complex or dispersed for trust to arise.”274 
 
However, not every occurrence of a prisoner’s dilemma situation requires 
legal regulation.  In the case of copyright protection, some commentators suggest 
that it “is neither a necessary nor a sufficient basis for copyright protection.”275  The 
public interest and normative concerns such as protecting free speech may outweigh 
the commercial interests of individuals and the perceived social benefit of more 
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copyright works.276  Also, new evidence suggests that there may be differences in 
responses when confronted with the same payoffs due to variations in individual 
personalities.  Furthermore, in strategic situations which occur repeatedly, there may 
be cooperation without it being necessary to adjust the payoffs through legal 
regulation.  Competitors in repeat games are likely to cooperate because of the 
threat of a tit-for-tat response: if you decide to be a copyist, your competitors will 
retaliate by copying any works you produce.277 
 
3 5 5 Costs of copyright protection 
 
As discussed, the economic argument suggests that if authors are not given legal 
protection in respect of their copyright works there is a problem of market failure; the 
free-riding behaviour of others will result in the underproduction of copyright works.  
However, any assertion that the grant of property rights to address such market 
failure is efficient must take into account the costs of such a measure.  Accordingly, 
we will try to identify some of the costs associated with copyright protection.  
Although there is no empirical data available to quantify these costs (and the claimed 
benefits at this stage), it is still worthwhile identifying these costs in order to fully 
appreciate its impact.  Furthermore, when resources and technologies become 
available in the future these elements can be quantified to verify whether the current 
policy of providing copyright protection is indeed socially beneficial.  It is suggested, 
that this should be the real focus of research in relation to intellectual property 
rights.278 
 
Some commentators are critical of copyright protection, claiming that it “is 
extremely costly” because, as we have already have seen, the public-good nature of 
copyright works means that they can be enjoyed by others without diminution of 
enjoyment, at no (or negligible) extra cost.279  Given that such further use does not 
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cost anything, those who advocate restrictions on such use by way of property 
protection are said to have the burden of justification.  Whereas property rights in 
physical property are required to ensure that the owner’s ability to use his property is 
not disturbed, no justification is necessary in the case of copyright works.280  The 
latter fact is considered to render it “highly unlikely that any mechanism providing 
absolute protection would ever be socially optimal.”281  That is why copyright 
protection is of limited duration; arguably, it seeks to minimise the social cost of 
preventing unfettered access to copyright works.282   
 
Copyright protection not only allows authors the possibility of earning greater, 
incentive-providing remuneration on their creations, it, ironically, increases the costs 
of creating copyright works.  Depending on the scope of copyright protection, it may 
prevent use of certain elements contained in previous copyright works from being 
reused in subsequent creations.  Authors may be required to expend resources to 
ensure that they avoid infringing other copyright works, or seek the necessary 
permissions to use the prohibited elements.283  Critics claim that the creation of 
similar, non-infringing copyright works is wasteful from a social perspective because 
the resources dedicated to the creation of such redundant works could be more 
beneficially used by improving the quality of existing copyright works.284  In other 
words, subsequent authors should not be concerned about whether they are 
infringing copyright but simply focus their efforts on improving existing works.  
However, copyright law, arguably, minimises these costs or the possibility of other 
copyright owners withholding permission for the use of their work.  Copyright does 
not protect ideas or commonplace facts, so it leaves enough room for creativity.  It is 
arguable that the creation of similar competitive works, which copyright law permits 
(rather than parasitic copying), has been responsible for the rate of innovation we 
have witnessed over the past 40 years, which may have offset any social costs 
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associated with the creation of such works.  Also, the fair dealing exceptions such as 
use for study, review, criticism, or reporting current events avoids the need for 
requesting permission in cases where the hold-out threat of a copyright owner may 
be most significant.285  The fair dealing exceptions are not considered as decreasing 
authors’ incentives, and, if they do, these losses are considered to be more than 
offset by the social benefit of having these exceptions.286  In addition, copyright law, 
unlike patent law, does not prevent independent creation.  Again, criticisms that 
copyright restricts individual freedom because it prevents particular expressions of 
ideas, which would be a social cost, is probably overstated.  In any event, if such 
costs do exist, they are significantly reduced, if not eliminated, by the fair-dealing 
exceptions.287 
 
The proprietary system established by copyright, as with any proprietary 
system, has an associated administrative cost as it necessarily “involves costs in 
defining the scope of the rights, detecting and preventing trespass, and in foreclosing 
particular productive opportunities that might be possible if the property system did 
not exist.”288  The latter costs arise because society is deprived of the improvements 
which free riders may bring about.  Imitators may increase efficiency through new 
innovations, or forcing the author of the copyright work to reduce its costs through 
innovation.289  It is not clear whether all these costs — institutional costs — outweigh 
the benefits of incentivising the production of copyright works.  This cost-benefit 
analysis should be the focus of empirical research.290  However, it is necessary to 
distinguish the institutional costs related to copyright protection from the social 
welfare costs associated with the alleged monopoly character of copyright.291 
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3 5 5 1 Copyright and monopolies 
 
Arguably, the main criticism directed at copyright as an institution is that it grants an 
author a monopoly to produce and distribute his copyright work, and monopolies 
impose unjustifiable social costs, principally, the so-called “deadweight loss.”292  It is 
fairly common for scholars to refer to copyright protection as the grant of “monopoly 
rights,” or words to that effect.293  This type of description is not confined to critics of 
copyright protection; it is even used by proponents of copyright protection and 
textbooks on the subject.  When it is used by proponents of copyright protection it is 
claimed that such monopoly protection is justified because the social benefits of such 
protection outweigh its costs.294 
 
The description of the rights afforded by copyright protection as a monopoly 
has deliberately been avoided in this work, preferring instead to refer to such rights 
as “property rights” or “exclusive rights.”  It is more important to determine the extent 
of the institutional costs of copyright, and the preoccupation with characterising 
copyright protection as a monopoly has been unhelpful.295  As will be illustrated, to 
describe these rights as monopoly rights is a misnomer and there is no cogent 
reason why there is so much emphasis on monopoly analysis of copyright.  The 
simplest explanation for the persistent assumption that intellectual property rights 
confer economic monopolies, particularly in literature dealing with the economic 
analysis of intellectual property, may be that term “monopoly” is employed in its 
colloquial sense, rather than in a technical economic sense of “the exclusive right to 
sell into a market without competition.”296  Colloquially, the term monopoly (or its 
cognates) is used to refer to the “exclusive or dominant possession of something.”  
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In the literature “monopoly” is often used as a synonym for “property.”  The 
indiscriminate use of “monopoly” in relation to intellectual property rights makes it 
difficult to determine whether it is used in its colloquial sense of “property” or 
“exclusive right,” or whether it is being used in its technical economic sense.297   
 
However, the description of copyright as a monopoly right is not simply the 
result of carelessness; it appears that it is sometimes used for effect, particularly by 
critics of copyright protection eager to provide examples of the social costs of 
copyright protection.  An example of this is when broad statements are made about 
intellectual property rights without drawing a proper distinction between the nature of 
the different types of work included under the general category of intellectual 
property, with the consequence that the statements may be inappropriate to 
copyright protection.  Consider the following statement by Boldrin and Levine: 
“Intellectual property is the “right” to monopolize an idea by telling other people how 
they may, or more often may not, use the copies they own.”298  It is trite that 
copyright does not protect ideas, but simply a particular expression of an idea.  Even 
economics textbooks describe intellectual property, which would include copyright, 
as monopolies.299 
 
3 5 5 1 1 Monopolies 
 
Monopolies are generally disliked by economists and government regulation seeks 
to prevent them from being established.300  A monopoly exists when there is only 
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one seller of a good, and no close substitute for that good exists.301  Monopolies are 
disliked, and discouraged, because they are considered to impose social costs as a 
result of, inter alia, consumers being charged higher prices for the monopoly good, 
the monopolist producing lower output than would be produced by a competitive 
producer, the creation of a deadweight loss (loss of social surplus), technical 
inefficiency and rent seeking.302  The first two of these social costs are intuitively 
obvious.  As a consequence of being the sole supplier of a good, a monopolist can 
substantially affect the price of the good, and is said to have market power.  A 
monopolist is able to affect the market price (charge higher prices) by adjusting 
(reducing) its output and creating an artificial scarcity.303  Also, if the price of a 
monopoly good rises, consumers, constrained by their budgets and the lack of 
substitute goods, will be forced to reduce their demand for the good.304  This 
contrasts with a competitive market in which consumers can purchase the good from 
another seller should one seller raise his price, which serves to keep the demand 
(and price) constant.305  However, the issue of the deadweight loss requires further 
explanation, especially for non-economists. 
 
Economic exchanges occur when there are benefits for both consumers and 
producers.  In a competitive market, there will be consumers who value a good more 
than the price they pay for it.  The aggregate of such differences is referred to as the 
“consumer surplus.”  Similarly, there are producers whose costs are lower than the 
market price, and the aggregate of such differences is referred to as the “producer 
surplus.”  The aggregate of the consumer surplus and the producer surplus is the 
social, or total, surplus.  In the ideal depictions of competitive markets the consumer 
and producer surpluses are portrayed as being of equal magnitude.  Under 
monopoly conditions, because of the higher prices paid by consumers, the consumer 
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surplus is smaller as the monopolist is able to capture some of that benefit.306  The 
fact that the producer (monopolist’s) surplus increases at the expense of the 
consumer surplus is not, economically considered important, because economics is 
not generally concerned with the distribution of wealth, only its maximisation.  
Economists are only concerned with efficiency, namely, the net aggregate benefits of 
a situation.  In other words, they are only concerned with the magnitude of the social 
surplus, not how it is apportioned.307 
 
What is of concern to economists is that only some of the lost consumer 
surplus is captured by the producer (monopolist).  The portion of the consumer 
surplus which is “completely” lost — that is, not captured by the monopolist — is 
referred to as the “deadweight loss” or “welfare loss.”308  In practice what the 
deadweight represents is an unmet consumer demand: the consumers who are 
prepared to pay more than the monopolist’s marginal cost but less than the 
monopolist’s price are denied the good.  These mutually beneficial trades will take 
place in a competitive market, but not under monopolistic conditions.309  Neo-
classical economists regard this situation as another case of market failure, which 
should be addressed.310 
 
Technical inefficiency, also referred to as X-inefficiency, is a further social 
cost, but is more difficult to quantify than the social costs already mentioned.  As a 
result of the lack of competition a monopolist has less incentive to produce its goods 
in the most cost-efficient manner because it is able to pass on its higher costs to its 
consumers.311  Of course, if the monopolist does improve its efficiency, it can earn 
even higher supernormal profits.312  Rent-seeking refers to the efforts and resources 
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expended by a monopolist to maintain its monopoly.  For example, monopolists 
engage in political lobbying to hold on to their privileged position.  This is considered 
to be wasteful conduct, as these resources could be employed more productively, 
rather than being used to preserve a socially harmful monopoly.313 
 
3 5 5 1 2 Does copyright protection amount to a monopoly? 
 
We will now investigate whether the grant of copyright to an author in respect of a 
copyright work gives the author a monopoly.  If it does, it may still be justifiable to 
create a monopoly if the social benefits — increased production of copyright works 
— outweigh the costs associated with monopolies.  Most supporters of copyright 
protection are willing to concede that copyright protection does give an author a 
monopoly because they consider the social benefits of copyright protection to be 
sufficient compensation. 
 
The property rights created by copyright law are considered by some scholars 
as providing an author with a monopoly over the information contained in the 
copyright work.  It is said to give the author market power over the protected work, 
and copies of such work, because others are prevented from producing identical 
works.314  Accordingly, they consider that all the attendant social costs — particularly 
the deadweight loss — mentioned above will exist and that the social loss could be 
significant, particularly in cases where there is a large difference between the 
marginal cost and the price paid by consumers.315  Consumers have to pay higher 
prices, and it raises the costs of competitors as they must pay for the privilege of 
using the copyright work.  However, the fact that authors are able to appropriate a 
larger portion of the social surplus produced by their creations — at the expense of 
consumers and competitors — provides them with the necessary incentive to create 
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copyright works.  This delivers society the desired level of copyright works, and, 
therefore, the costs are considered worthwhile.316 
 
The potential size of this deadweight loss, and the supranormal profits which 
such monopoly allows authors to earn, has lead to claims that an author’s market 
power should be reduced.317  Too much protection for authors is also economically 
inefficient because it leads to an overproduction of copyright works.318  The lure of 
potential supranormal profits would cause people to divert their resources into the 
creation of copyright works whereas those resources could be employed in a more 
socially beneficial manner.  It is not just important that the creation of copyright works 
should be encouraged but that the correct persons should be incentivised to creates 
such works.319  A second consequence of increased market power is that it may 
restrict access to copyright works.320 
 
The claims that copyright protection imposes significant social costs or 
amounts to the grant of a monopoly have been questioned.321  First, any supposed 
monopoly as a consequence of copyright protection provides much less market 
power than patent protection.322  Copyright protection does not prevent independent 
creation or the creation of other works using the ideas embodied in a copyright 
work.323  Not only is it arguable that the social costs imposed by copyright protection 
are “economically insignificant,” it is possibly the case that copyright protection may 
increase competition because it encourages the creation of similar works — 
notwithstanding the fact that critics of copyright protection may regard the creation of 
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such similar works to be redundant and socially wasteful — because the market 
functions as a signal to other producers of the demand for such works.324 
 
Second, it is claimed that copyright protection “rarely” confers monopoly 
power and the attendant social costs such as resource misallocation.325  As stated 
above, a monopolist is the sole seller of a product for which there are no close 
substitutes.  It is therefore crucial to determine what the relevant market is and 
whether there are substitute goods before it can be concluded that a monopoly 
exists.  The right of an author of a novel to prevent others from copying his work 
does not give such an author a monopoly over the market for literature, or works of 
fiction — not in the economic sense.326  A copyright owner, like other intellectual 
property rights owners, does not necessarily have market power.327  The copyright 
owner receives no more of a monopoly than any other property owner.  The fact that 
some intellectual property rights are valuable, and can be said to provide incentives 
to their creators, does not imply that they constitute monopolies.   
 
It may also be the case with tangible property that one piece of land is worth 
more than another, although they are in close proximity, because of its location.328  
This difference per se would not warrant a description of the owner of the more 
valuable land as a monopolist; he is simply the owner of property rights.329  All 
property provides its owner with a measure of exclusivity and, therefore, in some 
(colloquial) sense, a “form of monopoly.”  For example, the owner of land who 
refuses to sell his land, which frustrates a large property development, may be 
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regarded by the developer as a monopolist.330  Any criticism that copyright protection 
amounts to the grant of unjustifiable monopolies must by implication be based on a 
criticism of any form of property right.331  Moreover, unlike tangible property, “any 
person has the right to obtain [copyright protection] provided that their creation 
satisfies the criteria for protection.”332   
 
Whether a copyright work gives its owner a monopoly is a “separate and 
distinct” matter to the property right in the work.333  Whether a copyright owner has 
market power, and the extent of such power, depends on two factors: the demand 
for the good, and the availability of (acceptable) substitutes.334 A copyright owner 
may have market power provided that there is sufficient demand for his good.  The 
demand for copyright works is usually generated by “dictates of fashion, as moulded 
by advertising and other promotion, criticism, the reputation of the author’s previous 
works, the shortage of new material and other factors.”335  Given the nature of 
copyright works, these works per se do not create the demand.336 
 
Although there are good substitutes for some — the minority of — copyright 
works, there are no good substitutes for others.  If there were good substitutes for all 
copyright works, it would be socially wasteful for resources to be dedicated to the 
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creation of such substitutes.337  Therefore, it is the case that copyright protection 
allows authors some market power to charge higher prices, above the marginal cost 
of production.  If this was not the case, the economic argument of providing 
incentives to authors would be rendered pointless.338  The likelihood that good 
substitutable products are likely to emerge depends, to some degree, on the scope 
of protection enjoyed by copyright owners.  This affects the extent of a copyright 
owner’s possible market power because such market power would be proportional to 
the scope of copyright protection: the narrower the scope of copyright protection, the 
more other works can copy a copyright work.339  Also, the narrower the scope of 
copyright protection, the smaller will be the difference between the price a copyright 
owner can charge and the marginal cost, which means a smaller deadweight loss 
and smaller supranormal profits.340   
 
Two additional remarks about costs and pricing used in support of claims of 
the monopolistic nature of copyright also need to be dispelled.  The fact that the 
marginal costs of making copies of copyright works may be close to zero (whereas 
they are sold for significantly higher prices than those costs) does not by itself imply 
that a monopoly exists, and does not change matters.341  It is not the marginal cost 
of making copies that is relevant; it is the marginal cost for pricing the particular 
copyright work, which includes all the costs — not just the marginal costs of making 
copies — associated with bringing the good to market.342 
 
The existence of price discrimination in relation to copyright works is proffered 
as proof of the monopolistic nature of copyright protection.  Price discrimination 
involves the business practice of a producer selling the same good at different prices 
to different customers.343  It is not theoretically possible in competitive markets 
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because perfect substitute goods are always available from competitors at the 
competitive price.344  The practice of price discrimination allows producers to 
increase their revenues without necessarily increasing the quantity of the good 
sold.345  However, in the context of a monopoly, price discrimination is also seen as 
a good thing.  There is less unmet demand when there is price discrimination 
because it allows lower-valued consumers an opportunity to also purchase the 
monopoly good at the price they are willing to pay, which may not have been 
possible if the monopolist did not use price discrimination.  Thus, it reduces the 
social cost of a monopoly by reducing the size of the deadweight loss.346 
 
The fact that copyright law does not permit perfect substitutes and price 
discrimination takes place raises the prospect that copyright protection results in a 
monopoly.  Examples of this practice are book publishers releasing more expensive 
hardcover editions before the paperback editions and premier-viewings of films 
before general release.347  However, the fact that price discrimination takes place in 
relation to goods protected by copyright, but is absent — as it is not possible — in 
competitive markets, does not imply that they constitute monopolies or indicate that it 
is a flawed institution.348  The reality is that the economic model which best describes 
copyright works is monopolistic competition, not the monopoly model.  In the case of 
monopolistic competition there are many firms (producers) but each firm produces a 
similar, differentiated product, and, therefore, has some degree of market power 
which allows price discrimination.349  The market power of a firm in monopolistic 
competition is constrained because competitors produce similar goods. 
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As copyright only protects the expression of an idea, and not the idea itself, 
generally, competitors are not prevented “from creating works with the same 
functional characteristics, as evidenced, for example, by the numerous dictionaries 
available, by the many television shows, novels, and movies with similar themes and 
characteristics, or by the many competing software programs.”350  Accordingly, it is 
probably the case that “almost all copyrights” are not monopolies.351  In fact, the 
most well-known, if not the only, instance of a copyright work conferring an economic 
monopoly involved a computer program: the Microsoft operating system.352  
 
As is clear from the above, the likelihood that copyright protection of a 
computer program conferring an economic monopoly depends on, inter alia, whether 
there are substitutable products, which, in turn, depends on the scope of protection 
enjoyed by copyright owners of computer programs.  The extent of a copyright 
owner’s market power is proportional to the scope of protection as it determines how 
closely another program can copy his copyright work.353  Given the nature of 
computer programs, we will examine the proposition that copyright leaves enough 
room for the creation of competing computer programs with the same functional 
characteristics.  In the next chapter we will consider the extent of the copyright 
protection of computer programs, in particular the application of the idea-expression 
dichotomy.  If copyright leaves insufficient room for the development of such 
competing computer programs, the economic costs of copyright protection may be 
significantly higher than in the case of other copyright works. 
 
3 5 6 Critics of copyright protection 
 
As we have seen, the economic justification for copyright is based on the premise 
that in the absence of such protection authors will not be able to realise a sufficient 
return on their creations to incentivise them to create copyright works at the socially 
desirable level.  The reason for this is the intangible nature of copyright works, which 
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have a public-good quality, creates positive externalities, and results in free-riding 
activities.  However, critics have queried this inevitable market failure suggested by 
advocates of copyright protection and argue that copyright protection may not always 
be required to encourage the creation of copyright works. 
 
Critics claim that the effect of copyright protection may be to grant authors the 
ability to realise economic profits far exceeding those which would be earned in a 
competitive market, which imposes an unacceptable economic cost on society.  
Although it may be the case that, in the absence of intellectual property rights, 
creators may not earn as much as they do with such protection, society as a whole 
benefits more than the loss of the individual creators if there is no protection.  The 
purpose of legal institutions should be to increase the benefits to consumers, on 
average, “not to make a few lucky people super wealthy.”354  More importantly, it is 
suggested that there is no evidence that underproduction, due to insufficient 
incentives, as a result of market failure is inevitable in the absence of copyright 
protection.355 
 
The treatment of the literary works of British authors in the United States 
during the 19th century is the paradigm case used to dispel the notion that copyright 
protection is essential for the optimal production of copyright works.356  British 
authors were receiving royalties from American publishers despite their works not 
being eligible for copyright protection in the US.357  In fact, the evidence suggests 
that during the latter half of the 19th century British authors often received larger 
royalty payments than they received from British publishers, where copyright 
protection existed.358  The American publishing industry, despite the absence of 
copyright protection, was certainly not a competitive market, and the ability of 
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publishers to charge prices above marginal costs, enabled them to remunerate 
authors with "handsome sums.”359  There were four reasons why publishers were 
able to make economic profits.  First, a publisher, despite a copier’s lower production 
costs, would have a crucial advantage if it was the first to publish a book, and 
publishers paid British authors for the right of first publication in order to secure such 
advantage.  Second, there was an understanding between the publishers that they 
would not copy each other's publications.  Third, if any other person copied a 
publisher’s publication, the publisher would engage in a campaign of predatory 
pricing, and release loss-making discounted "fighting editions" (“killer editions” or 
“retributive strike editions”) and eliminate such rival.  Fourth, American publishers 
charged much lower prices than their British counterparts – sometimes one-eighth of 
the price charged by British publishers.  This strategy not only prevented the 
possibility of a (profitable) rival publisher emerging, it benefited the public while still 
being profitable enough to compensate authors.360 
 
The first of these factors — the first-mover advantage — was probably the 
most significant reason that allowed authors to profitably exploit their creations.  An 
author (or his publisher), possessing his original manuscript, as the first producer of 
direct copies had two advantages over subsequent producers of copies: the first 
producer of direct copies could take advantage of the fact that there would be a time 
lag before competing copies appeared, and thus satisfy the existing demand without 
any competition; and, he could also charge a premium for the direct copies as they 
would contain fewer errors than subsequent copies.361  A matter of a few days lead 
time would have been decisive because of the speed at which the books were sold, 
particularly those of well-known authors.  If the first publisher accurately estimated 
the potential demand for a publication and satisfied such demand, there would be no 
significant remaining market for a copier to profitably exploit.  In fact, for much of the 
20th century, those at the forefront of the fashion industry continued to exploit their 
lead time in this way; designers never resorted to relying on any form of intellectual 
property protection despite copies of new creations appearing within a relatively 
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short time after its release.  The short lead-time advantage of a designer was 
sufficient to allow the designer an adequate investment return.362 
 
Having made a significant profit, the first publisher can continue to prevent 
market entry by a copier with the threat of releasing fighting editions, priced below 
the copier's costs.363  Even if unauthorised copies of a book should appear, a 
publisher might still be able to maintain sufficient market share, and possibly still 
charge higher prices through advertising: it could seek to differentiate its product 
from copies by indicating it is the “original” or “authorised” version.364  It is arguable 
that cheaper, poor-quality copies of a copyright work may constitute a distinct market 
as there will still be a significant number of consumers who will prefer to purchase 
the original good.365  Purchasers of the original could be enticed with promises with 
possible benefits like updates and preferential offers on future publications.366  There 
is therefore no reason why the first publisher, charging equivalent prices, should not 
be able to do better than a copier because of its reputation of producing a superior, 
original product, and having an established distribution channel.367  A successful 
literary or musical work involves much more than merely creating such work, and 
producing copies of it; “it must be bound and packaged into a marketable product, 
distributed, and placed on store shelves, all of which requires considerable time and 
effort.”368 
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The first-mover advantage and the threat of predatory pricing by an initial 
publisher ensures that copiers are unlikely to enter the market unless they can be 
assured of selling a sufficient number of copies in a relatively short period of time, or 
if the initial publisher is earning excessive profits.369  Also, it is claimed that the virtual 
absence of copiers of works that are no longer protected by copyright is proof of the 
fact that no copyright protection is required.370   
 
While the US example mainly involved works of literary fiction, it is claimed 
that even in the case of books which require a greater investment to produce, such 
as textbooks or reference books, and which would require a greater number sales 
(which would presumably also take place over a longer period of time) to earn a 
sufficient return on such investment, it is still possible for publishers (and authors) to 
produce such works without copyright protection.  A publisher could seek to protect 
itself from a copier emerging before it has earned a sufficient return by obtaining a 
sufficient number of advance orders, or such works could be subsidised through 
public funding.371 
 
Even if the facts concerning British authors and the US publishing industry 
during the 19th century are correct, the continued plausibility of the effectiveness of 
first-mover advantage, and the release of fighting editions, to provide authors with 
adequate returns, as being sufficient to incentivise authors, is doubtful.  While it may 
be correct that copyright protection was probably unnecessary to secure authors an 
adequate return to incentivise the creation of copyright works during the 19th century 
(and for much of the 20th century), such protection has become necessary because 
of the significant development in technology. 
 
If copyright seeks to prevent free riding, and the underproduction it causes, it 
logically becomes more important the cheaper copying becomes.372 Copying 
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technology has not only made copying cheaper, it has made it easier.  Equally 
significant is the fact that the quality of copies which can be produced is of such a 
high standard that they are often indistinguishable from the original good to most 
observers.  In the case of digital works, such as digitised books and computer 
programs, perfect copies are possible.  While it may have been the case before that 
an original good could be considered to be a distinct product from its copies, this is 
no longer necessarily the case.  In fact, it is probably meaningless to speak about 
copies and original goods in terms of the quality of the products.  Expressed in 
economic jargon, there has been a “dramatic fall in the quality-adjusted cost of (and 
delay in) copying.”373 
 
Although these advances benefit authors, by reducing the marginal costs of 
production and opening global markets, it also increases the effects of unauthorised 
copying on authors’ incentives.  Because copying has become cheap, it has 
increased the difference between the prices a copier and an author are likely to 
charge.  The fact that the copier does not incur any of the fixed costs associated with 
producing, and marketing, the copyright work, combined with the fact that it has 
become increasingly cheap and easy to copy goods, means that a copier will always 
be able to enter the market at a significantly lower price than the author.  This makes 
it more difficult for an author to recoup his investment.374  It is the ease of copying, 
which technology enables, that causes underproduction and justifies copyright 
protection.375  In the copyright context, Boldrin and Levine are incorrect when they 
suggest that no copyright protection is required because copies are costly to 
generate and there will always be a limited number of copies in circulation.376 
 
Also, and significantly, the speed at which high-quality copies can be 
produced has increased, which means that a copier’s good is likely to be competing 
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with the original good within a much-shortened period of time.  It will thus not 
necessarily be the case that a sufficiently large number of consumers will purchase 
the original good before the appearance of the copier’s good, allowing an author to 
earn a reasonable return on its investment.  Furthermore, consumers are likely to 
change their habits as a consequence of the effects of the copying technology: 
knowing that it is inevitable that a copier’s (cheaper) good will be available shortly 
after the release of the original good, consumers (as rational utility maximisers) are 
likely to wait for the copier’s good.377  Because of the prospect of diminished returns 
as a consequence of free-riding behaviour, authors will be deterred from making the 
investment to create and produce copyright works. 
 
Needless to say, computer programs — the focus of this study — are at the 
cutting edge of the interaction between technology and copyright law.  If technology 
has made the case for copyright protection of literary works (and other copyright 
works) more compelling, the case of computer programs warrants special attention.  
As creations which are digitised, they can be perfectly copied in a matter of seconds 
and be distributed over the Internet at virtually no cost.  This ostensibly makes the 
case for copyright protection of computer programs more acute than that for 
copyright works such as literary works, but things may not be that dire or straight 
forward due to the nature of computer programs. 
 
Computer programs, unlike other copyright works, can be made available 
without revealing the substance of their creation.  Technology both enables easy 
copying of computer programs and provides ways of preventing copying, or making it 
costly for a copyist.  Whether the use of technological methods of protecting 
computer programs obviates the need for copyright protection will not be addressed 
in this work, but it is suggested it is unlikely to be the case.  Suffice to simply mention 
that, in the absence of copyright protection, authors will simply have the additional 
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costs of developing and implementing such technologies.378  Authors will have to 
ensure that their technologies are adequate in a rapidly-advancing area of 
development.  In addition to the fact that these investments would probably be a 
wasteful, or inefficient, use of resources, these measures would result in restricting 
the flow of information, which is considered to be socially detrimental, and which 
copyright protection serves to encourage.  Another, possibly more significant, social 
cost is fact that, in an attempt to give these technical measures more efficacy, 
breaches of these digital defences are usually made criminal offences, which not 
only adds significantly to the costs of administering such as system — probably far 
exceeding the costs of a system based on copyright law — but would also potentially 
compound the problem of the overloaded criminal justice systems in most 
jurisdictions.  Cases will also have to be proved on the higher criminal standard of 
burden of proof.  Anyone who acquires the computer code without overcoming a 
technological barrier will be free to use it, in the absence of the author having 
proprietary rights thereto or being able to rely on the common-law restrictions.  It is 
questionable whether authors would find such a non-proprietary system, on its own, 
as providing a predictable pattern of behaviour by others and that it will give authors 
a sufficient level of comfort that they can internalise sufficient of the benefits of the 
works they have created.  As we will see in Chapter 5 (Open-source software), there 
may also be innovative business models which can ensure that authors obtain a 
sufficient economic return without utilising the direct benefits which copyright 
protection affords authors.  For example, computer programs can be sold together 
with the promise of customer support or product updates, which a copyist cannot 
cheaply replicate.379 
 
The matter is further complicated by the seeming non-use of the legal 
protection available to the copyright holders of computer programs.  Although it may 
appear counterintuitive, the emergence of copying technology can serve to increase 
the demand for original copies of copyright works like computer programs, rather 
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than cause a decline.  Despite the enforcement of infringement by the state being 
very low, due to the high cost of infringement proceedings, the software industry has 
not responded as one would expect them.  They have not sought to introduce 
technological protection measures to reduce the incidence of copying.380  A likely 
reason for this behaviour is that these producers benefit from consumers’ ability to 
copy their product.381 
 
As is clear from what has been said, the economic justification for copyright 
protection of creative works generally seems to be convincing.  However, as 
indicated, it would be more credible if this justification is shown to be valid in respect 
of specific types of copyright works.  Copyright covers a wide variety of different 
types of work and the economic justification cannot be said to provide a plausible 
case for all types of copyright work.  For example, the notion that copyright 
protection serves to incentivise the creation of architectural works has been 
described as “manifestly ridiculous”,382 and it is no different in the case of personal 
letters and diaries,383 or commercial advertising.384   
 
The most valid criticism of the current system of copyright protection is that 
the protection goes far beyond incentivising the creation of copyright works.385  It 
protects types of work where there is, arguably, no incentive required for their 
production.  Furthermore, the duration of the protection — particularly in the US and 
the EU — appears to go far beyond that which is considered economically necessary 
to incentivise production.386  The extension of the copyright term to 70 years from the 
death of the author has not led to an increased output of literary works.387   
 
                                            
380
 Palmer "Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law and Economics Approach" 297. 
381
 297-8. 
382
 Sterk "Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law" 1197-8. 
383
 Samuelson "Should Economics Play a Role in Copyright Law and Policy?" 5. 
384
 Sterk "Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law" 1214. 
385
 1213-4. 
386
 SM McJohn “The Paradoxes of Free Software” 2000 9 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 25 38; 1222. 
387
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Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
146 
 
The current copyright policy of protecting a plethora of derivative works is also 
inconsistent with the incentive motive of copyright protection.388  There would be very 
few cases where the prospective earnings on derivative works were the principal 
motivation for creating the original work.  This would presumably only be the case 
were the costs of creating the original work would be so high, and the anticipated 
returns on the original work were so low, that it would not allow the author to realise 
a return on his investment without the protection on the derivative works.  An 
example of this is possibly a cinematograph film, as the original work, and the 
product merchandising that accompanies it.  However, this is unlikely to be the case 
that where the original work was a literary work which is later turned into a 
screenplay.389 
 
As already mentioned, too much protection may result in an overproduction, 
which is also socially harmful as those resources could be used in a more beneficial 
manner.  In addition, such protection could inhibit optimal use of copyright works.  
The real issue is therefore to ensure that copyright protection is as efficient as it 
could possibly be.390  In this vein, the unique nature of computer programs means 
that the policy of affording such works copyright protection, particularly in light of the 
emergence of open-source software, requires further consideration.   
3 6 Conclusion 
 
As we have seen, the economic justification for copyright is based on the premise 
that in the absence of such protection authors will not be able to realise a sufficient 
return on their creations to incentivise them to create copyright works at the socially 
desirable level.  The reason for this is the intangible nature of copyright works, which 
have a public-good quality, creates positive externalities, and results in free-riding 
activities.  However, critics have queried this inevitable market failure suggested by 
advocates of copyright protection and argue that copyright protection may not always 
be required to encourage the creation of copyright works.  The effect of copyright 
                                            
388
 Sterk "Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law" 1217. 
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 1215-6. 
390
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protection may be to grant authors the ability to realise economic profits exceeding 
those which would be earned in a competitive market.  This imposes an 
unacceptable economic cost on society. 
 
What economic analysis allows, which utilitarian theory does not, is a more 
analytical assessment of the social benefit of copyright protection.  This work will 
therefore seek to apply such analysis to the protection of computer programs.  We 
will proceed by considering the nature of copyright protection of computer programs 
and its effect on promoting the creation of such works. 
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Chapter 4: Scope of copyright protection of computer programs 
 
“I am aware that a great deal of interest has been excited by [the scope of 
copyright protection] in the software industry.  I was particularly interested in 
the development of the law in other countries, both within the EU and outside 
it… As I should have foreseen, the law is everywhere in a state of 
development, and the results differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. … While I 
have read much of this material with interest it has not, in the end, provided 
me with assistance.  The point has evidently vexed many judges and will no 
doubt vex many more.”1 
 
4 1 Introduction 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3 (Economic justification for copyright protection), the 
economic justification for copyright protection is based on the premise that it is 
necessary to incentivise authors to create socially beneficial works.  Copyright 
protection provides authors with such incentives by granting them certain privileges, 
which enable them to realise a sufficient return on their investment.  However, the 
incentives provided by copyright law also impose costs on society, and it is 
necessary to ensure that such incentives are provided only to the extent necessary.2  
These social costs are not confined to higher prices paid by consumers for copyright-
protected works or their overproduction: excessive protection may also stifle 
creativity and innovation.3  Creativity and innovation are incremental and cumulative 
in nature: past creations are the “inputs” or “building blocks” for future creations, and 
                                            
1
 Navitaire Inc. v easyJet Airline Company & Another [2004] EWHC 1725 (Ch) 93. 
2
 Boyle The Public Domain: Enclosing the Commons of the Mind  11; Stokes S "The Development of 
UK Software Copyright Law: From John Richardson Computers to Navitaire" 2005 CTLR 11 (4) 129 
133. 
3
 Boyle The Public Domain: Enclosing the Commons of the Mind 35. 
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excessive copyright protection will raise the costs of future creations, or — even 
more socially detrimental and costly — inhibit progress.4 
 
Given that copyright protection extends to a wide variety of works, it is more 
appropriate to consider the economic justification in respect of a specific type of 
copyright work because the economic justification cannot be said to provide an 
equally plausible case for all types of copyright work.5  The scope of copyright 
protection of computer programs is central to an assessment of the social costs of 
providing copyright protection to computer programs for the following reasons: it 
determines the extent to which others can produce substitutable or interoperable 
products; it affects the market power which the copyright owner can exercise; and, 
whether there is enough room for innovation.  If the scope of copyright protection of 
computer programs results in copyright holders having too much market power, 
leaves insufficient room for development or imposes other social costs, and, if these 
social costs exceed the claimed benefits of providing incentives to authors, it would 
undermine the case in favour of such protection.6  A balance must be achieved 
whereby innovation can be achieved in the long term; it is easy to encourage 
innovation today by granting extensive protection, at the expensive of sacrificing 
further innovation.7  After all, the statutory protection provided to copyright works is 
not intended “to stifle, but rather to promote human ingenuity and industry.”8  The 
scope of copyright protection of computer programs is not only a matter of a great 
interest to the computer software industry, it is important to society as a whole due to 
our ever-increasing dependence on computerised systems.  Tumbraegel and de 
                                            
4
 40-1; Jones A "The Protection of Computer Programs Under TRIPS: The Subject Matter Issue" 1999 
J L & Inf Sci 10 (1) 7 24. 
5
 For example, as indicated in Chapter 3 (Economic justification for copyright protection), the incentive 
argument cannot account for the copyright protection of architectural works.  See Sterk "Rhetoric and 
Reality in Copyright Law"  1197-8. 
6
 Spivak "Does Form Follow Function? The Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Protection of 
Computer Software"  736-7. 
7
 Jones "The Protection of Computer Programs Under TRIPS: The Subject Matter Issue" 24-5. 
8
 Golden China TV Game Centre & Others v Nintendo Co Ltd 1997 (1) SA 405 (A) 412. 
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Villiers neatly summarise the centrality of the scope of copyright protection as 
follows:9 
“Any discussion of the scope of copyright protection inevitably involves each of the 
intellectual property law's twin objectives; namely that the law must encourage 
innovation and invention while simultaneously promoting the dissemination of ideas 
and fostering competition.” 
 
As is clear from the quotation at the start of this chapter from the UK decision 
in the Navitaire case — which established the current position in UK copyright law 
relating to computer programs — the scope of copyright protection of computer 
programs is a matter that is unlikely to be definitively settled.  This chapter will 
examine the scope of such protection of computer programs in the two leading 
jurisdictions, the US and UK, in order to get an accurate picture of what copyright 
protects.  After a historical introduction to copyright protection of computer programs, 
and the legislative provisions in South Africa, the UK, and the US, there will be a 
detailed analysis of the landmark cases in the US and UK.10  The purpose of this 
analysis is to determine which elements of a computer program are protected by 
copyright, which should provide an indication of whether the protection afforded 
exceeds that which is necessary to incentivise the creation of computer programs. 
 
However, before embarking on the legal analysis of copyright protection of 
computer programs, it is necessary to provide a description of computer programs, 
how they function, and how they are produced.  Commentators have rightly 
bemoaned the fact that the level of understanding of computers and computer 
programs is so poor, despite their proliferation in society, and have attributed some 
of the problems relating to the copyright protection of computer programs to this lack 
of understanding.11  It has been claimed that this lack of understanding has led to the 
                                            
9
 Tumbraegel K and de Villiers R "Copyright Protection for the Non Literal Elements of a Computer 
Program" 2004 CTLR 10 (2) 34 34. 
10
 As will be discussed below, there are no South African cases concerning non-literal copying of 
computer programs, and it is these cases which really define the extent of copyright protection. 
11
 De Villiers R "Computer Programs and Copyright: The South African Perspective" 2006 SALJ 123 
(2) 315 315; Hamilton M "Computer Science Concepts in Copyright Cases: The Path to a Coherent 
Law" 1997 Harv J L & Tech 10 239 245. 
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inappropriate use of well-known copyright concepts such as “structure” and 
“organisation” to computer programs.12  Use of a concept like the structure of a 
computer program necessarily requires a court to consider the program at a 
particular level of abstraction.  However, the structure of a computer program leaves 
much less choice for expression than creative works in human language, because a 
program must conform to strict syntactical and semantic criteria.  If copyright 
protection is extended to the structure of expressions at the wrong level of 
abstraction (if at all appropriate to use such concept), it could result in broader 
protection than would be appropriate.13  It has also been claimed that over-
protection, particularly in the early cases concerning computer programs, could be 
attributed due to a lack of technical understanding by the courts, which lead to courts 
being in “technological awe” and showing too much deference to the creators of 
computer programs.  An understanding of the general nature of computer programs, 
and the basic concepts of computer science, will, thus, assist a proper analysis of 
the legal issues.14 
 
4 2 Computer programs 
 
A computer program is simply a set of ordered, unambiguous instructions to be 
performed by a computer.15  In fact, without computer programs computers are just 
complex collections of electrical circuitry.  This definition of a computer program 
essentially corresponds with how “computer program” is defined in the South 
African16 and US17 copyright legislation.18  Although this work will regard the terms 
                                            
12
 Hamilton "Computer Science Concepts in Copyright Cases: The Path to a Coherent Law" 240. 
13
 273. 
14
 Spivak "Does Form Follow Function? The Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Protection of 
Computer Software" 724. 
15
 White R How Computers Work 7ed (2004) 66.  See also Appleman D How Computer Programming 
Works 1ed (2000) 3-5; Pistorius T and Visser C "The Copyright Amendment Act 125 of 1992 and 
Computer Programs: A Preliminary Overview" 1992 SA Merc L J 4 346 346; Kravetz P "Copyright 
Protection of Computer Programs" 1998 J Pat & Trademark Off Soc'y 80 41 44; Spivak "Does Form 
Follow Function? The Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Protection of Computer Software" 727. 
16
 S 1 sv “computer program” SA Copyright Act. 
17
 S 101 Copyright Act 1976, Title 17 USC. 
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“computer program” and “computer software” as interchangeable, computer program 
is the protected category of copyright work, not computer software.  Software 
generally refers to more than the computer program.  Computer programs process 
data (input data) and produce output data, which data could, for example, consist of 
text or images.19  Often, some of this input data are stored in files associated with the 
computer program that processes the data.  Computer software in the broad sense, 
thus, refers to the computer program and the associated stored data.20  However, it 
is important to distinguish the computer program from the data, which are separately 
protected.21  For example, part of the input data which a computer program may 
process may consist of a series of artistic works, which may, in turn, be combined 
with sound to produce another copyright work, such as a cinematograph film.  The 
artistic works and cinematograph film are protectable as distinct copyright works, and 
are not computer programs.22 
 
4 2 1 Computer code 
 
Computers only process instructions in binary digits or “bits”: 0s and 1s.  
Accordingly, all instructions (as in the case of computer programs) or data to be 
processed must be reduced to binary form — strings of 0s and 1s.23  Depending on 
                                                                                                                                       
18
 Neither the UK legislation (Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988), nor the EU Software 
Directive (Directive on the legal protection of computer programs 2009/24/EC) contain a definition of 
computer program. 
19
 Appleman How Computer Programming Works 21; White How Computers Work 66.  (See also 
http://www.differencebetween.net/technology/difference-between-software-and-program/ (accessed 
21 November 2010).) 
20
 Sometimes computer software is restrictively defined to correspond to the definition of “computer 
program” in the SA Copyright Act(Reynolds C and Tyman P Principles of Computer Science 1ed 
(2008) 3), while at other times it is even more extensively defined to also include any related 
documentation and operating manuals (Davidson D "Protecting Computer Software: A 
Comprehensive Analysis" 1983 Jurimetrics J 23 337 340-1). 
21
 De Villiers "Computer Programs and Copyright: The South African Perspective" 316. 
22
 Davidson "Protecting Computer Software: A Comprehensive Analysis" 373. 
23
 Technically, computer programs are not converted directly into a file in binary form but go through a 
process of transformations, which finally gets processed as electrical impulses, corresponding to the 
0s and 1s.   
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the physical design of a particular computer, instructions (or commands) specifying 
particular operations are communicated to the computer by specific patterns of bits.  
However, due to the practical difficulties of specifying computer instructions in binary 
form — which would involve laborious work as a sophisticated program would 
necessarily result in hundreds of instructions, and thousands of bits — more 
convenient tools were developed for programming computer programs.  
Programming languages were developed to allow programmers to develop computer 
programs in “high-level languages,” which are a mixture of rudimentary English 
words and algebraic instructions.24  Because of the ease with which high-level 
languages can be understood and used by humans, they greatly facilitate the 
development of computer programs: they enable programmers to more easily 
construct and follow the logic of a computer program, and allow for speedier and 
more concise creation of computer instructions.25  For example, programmers are 
able to provide useful, more easily-understood descriptive names to the different 
elements of a computer program, such as subroutines, modules, functions, 
procedures or variables.26  Some of the more well-known high-level programming 
languages are Basic, Fortran, Cobol, C++, and Java. 
                                            
24
 Banzaf J "Copyright Protection for Computer Programs" 1966 Copyright L Symp 14 118 157-8; 
Kravetz "Copyright Protection of Computer Programs" 45; Petzold C Code: The Hidden Language of 
Computer Hardware and Software 1ed (2000) 352-3.  The use of these programming languages is 
made possible as a consequence of computer programs which help to translate them into the 
necessary binary form.  Before the development of high-level languages, programmers had 
developed a more basic, low-level language — assembly language — which allowed programming 
using simple command words and hexadecimal code to represent individual computer commands.  
While assembly language is still useful because it produces computer programs which are smaller 
and requires less processing time, its use is limited.  In any event, the legal analysis relating to 
computer programs developed in high-level languages should be equally applicable to programs 
developed in assembly language.  See Appleman How Computer Programming Works 14; White How 
Computers Work 79. 
25
 Davidson "Protecting Computer Software: A Comprehensive Analysis" 368; Petzold Code: The 
Hidden Language of Computer Hardware and Software 353. 
26
 Davidson "Protecting Computer Software: A Comprehensive Analysis" 378.  Subroutines, modules, 
functions or procedures are sets of instructions in a computer program which are executable as 
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program – the kernel – which coordinates the interaction of various subprograms.  Variables are 
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The computer program written by a computer programmer in a high-level 
language is referred to as the “source code” of the program.27  Although these high-
level languages are comparatively easy to understand, they are still fairly cryptic and, 
therefore, programmers are also permitted to add notes in human language (referred 
to as “comments”), which serve to explain the various parts of the computer program 
and its internal logic.  These comments serve as an aide-memoire to program 
developers and can be used by subsequent programmers who are required to work 
on the computer program.  As computers only process bits, in order for the computer 
program to be executable it is necessary to convert the source code of the program 
into “object code” (also called “binary code,” “machine code,” “machine language,” or 
“executable code”).28  This conversion of the source code to object code is 
performed by computer programs called compilers or interpreters.29 
 
As may already be evident, the source code of a computer program, together 
with its comments, is valuable to anyone seeking to establish how the program 
works as it is readily understandable by a suitably trained or skilled programmer.  
However, the source codes of computer programs are not required to use the 
programs, only the object codes.  Therefore, the source codes are usually kept 
                                                                                                                                       
essentially the data which are to be processed by a computer program.  See Appleman How 
Computer Programming Works 19 and 59; White How Computers Work 80. 
27
 Strictly speaking, source code is the computer code produced by the computer programmer, in 
whichever form, a high-level language or directly in binary form (object code).  However, as 
programming is rarely done in object code, references to the source code of a computer program are 
generally to computer code in a high-level language. 
28
 This is a simplification as object code and machine code are not, technically, the same thing.  
Object code, although closely resembling machine code (comprising bits), is not in a form which is 
directly executable and still needs further processing to convert it into machine code.  For purposes of 
the legal analysis, object code and machine code can be regarded as equivalent, as is commonly the 
case in the literature relating to the copyright protection of computer programs. 
29
 Appleman How Computer Programming Works 149.  It is not necessary, from a legal perspective, 
to elaborate on the technical distinction between the interpretation and compilation of the source code 
of a computer program, suffice to say that most commercial programs are compiled.  Also, the 
interpretation or compilation of source code, technically, converts source code into an intermediate 
language, and not directly into object code.   However, this work will simply refer to compiled 
programs when referring to the conversion of source code to object code.  See White How Computers 
Work 86. 
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confidential and the programs are distributed only in object code.30  While the 
compilation of the source code into object code is a relatively simply process, the 
object code is not easily reversible (or “decompiled” in computer parlance) into 
source code.31  During the compilation process converting source code to object 
code, programming comments are ignored, thus, any decompilation will not yield the 
helpful comments which may have accompanied the source code.  The compilation 
process also removes the descriptive names of functions, subroutines, procedures or 
variables, which are replaced with symbolic representations.  Furthermore, the 
logical order of the source code may not be apparent from the object code, which is 
more concerned with the order of execution of the program, rather than its design 
logic.32  Thus, for anyone wanting to do more than use a computer program — for 
example, modify the program — for all practical purposes, the source code is 
required, as reconstructing it requires painstaking reverse-engineering.33 
 
Henceforth, the more general term “computer code” will be used when dealing 
with matters applicable to both the source code and object code of a computer 
program, and where, from a legal perspective, no distinction is required. 
4 2 1 Development of computer programs 
 
As stated above, a computer program is simply a set of ordered instructions to be 
performed by a computer.  In fact, the only instructions which computers are able to 
                                            
30
 McJohn "The Paradoxes of Free Software"  27-8; Nadan C "Open Source Licensing: Virus or 
virtue?" 2002 Tex Intell Prop LJ 10 349 351; Spivak "Does Form Follow Function? The 
Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Protection of Computer Software" 728-9. 
31
 McJohn "The Paradoxes of Free Software" 27-8. 
32
 Davidson "Protecting Computer Software: A Comprehensive Analysis" 378.  In fact, the compiled 
intermediate language is specifically designed to facilitate efficiency.  It can be rearranged and 
optimised for efficiency, and in this manner, programs with different source codes can result in the 
same low-level machine code.  As indicated above, the compilation process produces intermediate 
language, which is suitable for optimisation, and this is what decompilation of the object code will 
reconstruct — not the source code. 
33
 McJohn "The Paradoxes of Free Software" 27. 
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execute are very simple, individual instructions.34  A relatively simple task for 
humans, if required to be performed by a computer, must meticulously be broken 
down into several individual instructions.35  This fact suggests that computers are 
rather unremarkable, and does not account for their ubiquity in society.  However, 
the real value of computers, which accounts for their proliferation, is the fact that 
computers are able to carry out these instructions (and, thus, the particular task) at 
much greater speeds and accuracy than humans.   
 
As will become clear, the development of a computer program involves 
several layers of elaboration and gradual refinement, moving from a general idea to 
a specific application.36  Given the fact that a computer program can, for some 
purposes, be considered in layers of elaboration at various levels of abstraction, 
these levels of abstraction have been used to determine the scope of copyright 
protection for computer programs, to distinguish unprotectable ideas from protected 
expression, on the basis of the idea-expression dichotomy in cases of non-literal 
copying.37  However, this analogy, which was used because these principles of 
copyright law were applied in relation to literary works such as fiction or poetry, 
should be used with extreme caution in the case of computer programs.  In the case 
of fiction or poetry an author has greater room for individualised expression; the 
manner in which something is expressed in a work of fiction or poem says a great 
deal more about what is expressed (and its author), than in the case of a computer 
program.  Hettinger sums up this situation in the case of fiction or poetry as follows: 
“In these mediums, more so than in others, how something is said is very much part 
of what is said (and vice versa).”38   
 
                                            
34
 The individual instructions can vary from computer to computer, and is known as the particular 
“instruction set.” 
35
 Appleman How Computer Programming Works 59.  These individual instructions are limited to 
those which, ultimately, form part of the particular instruction set. 
36
 Spivak "Does Form Follow Function? The Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Protection of 
Computer Software" 729; White How Computers Work 76. 
37
 Davidson "Protecting Computer Software: A Comprehensive Analysis" 379; Spivak "Does Form 
Follow Function? The Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Protection of Computer Software" 731. 
38
 Hettinger "Justifying Intellectual Property" 32. 
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The fact is that the type of creativity involved in creating software is more akin 
to that associated with an engineering project than artistic creativity.  It is therefore 
no coincidence that the endeavour of conceptualising and designing computer 
programs is referred to as “software engineering.”39  Although the development of a 
computer program will, invariably, not be a linear process, the development process 
can be considered to comprise three stages: conceptualisation, design, and 
implementation.40 
 
The first stage in the development of a computer program is the identification 
of the particular task required to be performed: the program’s function or purpose.41  
During this initial conceptualisation phase an outline of the overall purpose (for 
example, the problem to be addressed) of the proposed program, and its functional 
specifications, are formulated.42  As indicated, computer programs process data, and 
in developing the conceptual outline of the proposed program much of the effort is 
dedicated to ensuring efficient data flow: decisions have to be made about the types 
of data required and to be processed, how and where such data will be input for 
processing, the required data outputs and their handling, and the corresponding 
interfaces.43  Through this conceptualisation process the relevant problems are 
identified and proposed solutions are developed. 
 
The second stage of the development process usually involves the outlining of 
the particular proposed solutions to the identified problems through the use of 
                                            
39
 Davidson "Protecting Computer Software: A Comprehensive Analysis" 343. 
40
 Jones "The Protection of Computer Programs Under TRIPS: The Subject Matter Issue" 15.  The 
testing stage is sometimes considered to be a distinct, additional stage of development, but for our 
purposes it can be included within implementation stage. 
41
 Appleman How Computer Programming Works 159-63.  This phase is also known as the “analysis” 
phase of the software development cycle.  The development process described here is the 
commonly-used top-down design. 
42
 Davidson "Protecting Computer Software: A Comprehensive Analysis" 341; Spivak "Does Form 
Follow Function? The Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Protection of Computer Software" 729-
30. 
43
 Jones "The Protection of Computer Programs Under TRIPS: The Subject Matter Issue" 15; Spivak 
"Does Form Follow Function? The Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Protection of Computer 
Software" 729-30. 
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flowcharts (which are graphical organisational diagrams).44  If computers could only 
perform a series of consecutive steps, their usefulness, despite the speed with which 
they are able to execute those instructions, would be severely limited.  Their real 
utility derives from the fact that, depending on the input data, it is possible to specify 
different courses of action, each involving further processing through a set of 
instructions.45  This has the consequence that the solution is broken down into a 
series of subprograms (subroutines, functions or modules), and flowcharts map the 
various alternative paths of data and the associated computational processes.46  
While there may be alternative methods of resolving the problems identified, the 
number of options are generally limited by efficiency constraints.  How the data to be 
processed are organised and managed is key to the efficiency of a computer 
program; it is not all about faster computers.47  The performance of a computer 
program can be optimised through efficient data handling and software 
architecture.48  In fact, much of the skill and effort in the development of a computer 
program concerns the optimal arrangement of data, and the ordering and interaction 
of the various subroutines.49 
 
This second stage of development, the development of a flowchart, yields an 
outline of the various elements (subroutines, functions or modules) of, or 
programming tasks to be performed by, the computer program and the relationships 
between them, leading to an overall understanding of how the program will 
operate.50  Each of these programming tasks will, in turn, be broken down into its 
                                            
44
 Appleman How Computer Programming Works 162; Spivak "Does Form Follow Function? The 
Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Protection of Computer Software" 729. 
45
 Appleman How Computer Programming Works 63. 
46
 Spivak "Does Form Follow Function? The Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Protection of 
Computer Software" 729-30. 
47
 In fact, optimal design seeks to ignore the processing speed of particular computers.  The runtime 
complexity of algorithms are deliberately measured independent of any hardware considerations. 
48
 Appleman How Computer Programming Works 75. 
49
 Jones "The Protection of Computer Programs Under TRIPS: The Subject Matter Issue" 16. 
50
 Appleman How Computer Programming Works 63; Breyer "The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A 
Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies and Computer Programs"  341. 
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more detailed constituent computational steps to accomplish the particular task.51  A 
particular description of the steps to perform a task is called an algorithm.52  The 
smaller algorithms will, in turn, constitute the individual steps in progressively larger 
algorithms, until the specified function or purpose of the computer program is 
achieved.  In other words, “[a] computer program is essentially an elaborate 
algorithm that goes through a series of steps to arrive at a specific outcome.”53  
Often, the algorithms are initially described in general terms using informal, English-
like descriptions of their operations, called pseudocode.54  The developmental 
material produced thus far is not in a form which can serve as the instructions 
capable of being processed by a computer.55 
 
In the final stage of the development process the various algorithms are 
converted into sets of instructions capable of being processed by a computer — 
computer code.  This is generally done by producing the necessary source code 
using a high-level programming language, and this process is referred to as 
“coding.”56  The choice of programming language depends on various factors: its 
suitability for the particular type of program; whether the resultant source code will 
need to be compiled or interpreted, as this impacts the development time and ease 
of debugging; the performance of the program will also be affected by whether the 
source code will be interpreted or compiled; and, whether the program will be 
required to operate on different computers.57  If the coding has been done in source 
code, rather than object code, as previously explained, the source code then needs 
                                            
51
 Spivak "Does Form Follow Function? The Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Protection of 
Computer Software" 729-30. 
52
 Appleman How Computer Programming Works 107. 
53
 White How Computers Work 76. 
54
 Appleman How Computer Programming Works 63. 
55
 The functions will be decided at this stage, but the actual implementation (algorithms) used to 
perform the functions will be fully expanded in the next stage. 
56
 Appleman How Computer Programming Works 164; Breyer "The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A 
Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies and Computer Programs" 342; Jones "The Protection of 
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to be converted (compiled) to object code.  Following the coding, and any necessary 
compilation, the computer program is tested to ensure that it functions correctly.  The 
process of testing and fixing the computer code is called debugging.58  In addition, a 
program is usually “documented.”  This involves the creation of accompanying 
descriptive material to explain the program’s purpose, overall operation and features 
to subsequent users.59  Even after commercial release, computer programs are 
periodically updated by the addition of features providing greater functionality or 
modifying existing functionality.  These updated computer programs are then 
released as new versions of the program. 
 
During the early days of software development, the third phase of 
development, implementation (in particular, coding), involved the most effort, time, 
and costs.60  Since then, it appears that the second phase of development, the 
design of a program (which involves the creation of flowcharts and ensuring the 
optimisation of performance through appropriate data management and software 
architecture), requires the greatest skill, effort, and financial resources.61  While 
implementation may still be the most time-consuming phase of development, it is a 
menial task in comparison to the work required in the design phase of 
development.62  This is particularly the case if great effort has been expended in the 
design phase, which is advisable, and sufficient detailed guidance concerning the 
architecture, algorithms and data structures has been furnished to the programmers 
responsible for implementation.63 
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There are two principal reasons why the implementation stage no longer 
requires the most effort, skill or costs.  Since the early days of computing, processing 
speed and available memory have greatly increased, and this has led to the creation 
of more sophisticated and complex computer programs, incorporating, for example, 
greater functionality, high-resolution graphical elements and various peripheral 
devices.  This has meant that consumers have become more demanding in their 
requirements, and the commercial success of a program often depends on its novel 
conceptualisation, or superior design.  The other reason is that the task of coding 
and debugging has been greatly facilitated through the development of software to 
assist programmers in the coding tasks. 
 
4 3 Evolution of copyright protection of computer programs 
 
The US led the world in the development of computer science, or, more correctly, its 
potential for commercial exploitation.64  In the first computers computer programs 
were integrated into their physical construction, and were provided as a service by 
their manufacturers as part of the supply of the computers.65  This is not surprising 
as the costs of computers were almost prohibitive because they were purpose-built 
for their customers.66  Gradually computers became general-purpose, programmable 
computers, and by the 1960s computer manufacturers realised that by developing 
and offering more computer programs it would increase the utility of their computers 
to prospective customers.67  However, at this time, due to the cost of computers, end 
users still leased computers, which made the need for protection of computer 
programs largely unnecessary.  In fact, customers were given the software at no cost 
to entice them to see the benefit of, and purchase, a computer.  It was the sale of the 
hardware which was the source of profits.  No particular value was attributed to the 
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computer programs, and the first programmers often freely shared the programs they 
developed, which helped to gradually address the problem of a paucity of available 
software for computers.68  As a consequence, the risk of unauthorised copying of 
computer programs was negligible because of the limited number of computers.  The 
cost of computers severely restricted the opportunity for the use of computer 
programs; unauthorised copying of programs was fairly easily detectable because of 
the continued relationship with the lessor of the computer, in terms of the lease 
arrangements, who also provided the programs.69 
 
The next significant change in respect of computer programs was that 
computer users (that is, the customers of the computer manufacturers) started 
developing their own programs.  Although individual manufacturers of computers 
tried to get these users to share these programs with other users of its computers, 
users — particularly the oil companies — were only willing to do so in respect of 
simple programs, and not those programs which gave them a competitive 
advantage.  These companies wanted protection for the latter type of computer 
program.70  In addition, there was also the emergence of an independent software 
industry, whose “products” were its computer programs.  This development in the 
mid-1960s was encouraged when the US Department of Justice considered the 
“bundling” of hardware and software by IBM to be anti-competitive conduct, and 
threatened legal action.71  As these software developers’ business depended on the 
willingness of computer users to pay for the privilege of using their computer 
programs, they were also keen to keep their programs secret, and this led to the first 
calls for copyright protection in the US.72  In fact, the first option which was pursued 
by software developers to attempt to secure protection for their software was to claim 
patent protection.  It was only after two unsuccessful cases claiming patent 
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71
 Murray Information Technology Law: The Law and Society 183; White How Computers Work 69. 
72
 Banzaf "Copyright Protection for Computer Programs" 166; Murray Information Technology Law: 
The Law and Society 183. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
163 
 
protection for software, and the failed attempt to secure sui generis protection (based 
on patent protection), that the copyright route was pursued.73 
 
In the absence of any express legislative recognition of copyright protection of 
computer programs, software developers, from the late 1960s until the late 1970s, 
protected their computer programs through contract; they asserted rights of 
ownership, ostensibly based on property law, and, granted licences to customers to 
use their programs.74  These licences typically imposed obligations of confidentiality 
on the users, and limited the use of the software.75  Individual negotiation of 
contracts was possible because the computer programs which were the subject of 
these agreements were purpose-built for the user, and the costs of contracting was a 
relatively small proportion of the totally value of the transaction.  The problem with 
the contractual route was that individual contracting imposed greater, possibly 
prohibitive, transaction costs on licensing with the advent of general-use, “off-the-
shelf” software, and, would not provide adequate protection because of the 
requirement of privity of contract.76 
 
During the mid-1970s the price of computer hardware started to drop 
considerably, and affordable, mass-produced computers changed the source of 
profits in the computing industry.  Until then, it was the computer manufacturers that 
made huge profits on the sale of the hardware.  With the decline in prices, these 
companies soon realised that a greater share of their future profits would be derived 
from the “sale” of computer software, and dedicated more resources to the 
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production of computer programs.  Not only would software become commoditised 
— by the production of general software applications, as opposed to the bespoke 
software that had been produced until then — it could serve to increase computer 
hardware sales if the available software could only be used on a particular 
manufacturer’s computers.  The value of such customer “lock-in” convinced the large 
computer manufacturers to also support claims for copyright protection of computer 
programs.  Thus, the computer manufacturers joined the calls of software users who 
developed their own software, and software vendors, for protection of computer 
programs.77 
 
In 1976 the US Congress enacted new legislation, the Copyright Act 197678 
(“US Copyright Act”), which comprehensively revised US copyright law and paved 
the way for the possible copyright protection of computer programs.  The US 
Copyright Act’s expanded definition of literary works in section 101, which included 
any “words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of 
the nature of the material objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, 
phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or cards, in which they are embodied,” was 
intended to be broad enough to protect computer programs as literary works, should 
such extension of protection be considered appropriate.  In fact, the US Copyright 
Act provided a place holder provision in the Act, section 117, which would contain 
the relevant provision once the issue of copyright protection of computer programs 
had been considered by the National Commission on New Technological Uses of 
Copyrighted Works (“CONTU”), which was appointed by the US Congress.  
Following CONTU’s report, copyright protection was extended to computer programs 
when the US Copyright Act was amended by the 1980 Computer Software Copyright 
Act.79  In doing so, the US became the first country to expressly provide for copyright 
protection of computer programs.80 
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The decision to protect computer programs by way of copyright law has not 
been without its critics.81  Apart from the economic criticisms, some of the criticism 
has focused on the nature of computer programs.  The reasons copyright protection 
of computer programs was considered appropriate were the following: source code 
resembles written text; the lower threshold requirements for protection; and, the lack 
of an administrative burden associated with a system which requires registration.82  
However, critics have claimed that the apparent resemblance of computer programs 
— in particular, the computer code — to other literary works protected by copyright is 
more apparent than real.83  The fact that computer code is readable by humans 
belies its true purpose; the primary function of computer code is to be executed by a 
computer in order to realise the purpose of the particular computer program.   
 
What makes computer programs different to other forms of intangible property 
is that they cause computers to function in accordance with their instructions.  Other 
forms of intellectual property, such as musical works or patents, do not have such a 
direct, and purposive (or literal, rather than literary) character.  For example, a 
musical work does not, by itself, create music, and a patent does not create the 
patented item.84  The computer code of a computer program is not just symbolic — 
like an architect’s drawing is symbolic of the building to be constructed or a cake 
recipe in relation to the cake described — it is also mechanical in the sense that it 
functions in a direct manner.  A computer program does not simply provide 
instructions for, or reveal, how a computer will work, it actually makes the computer 
work in the specified manner.85 
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Therefore, it has been claimed, not without some justification, that copyright 
protection of computer programs was misplaced; computer programs “are effectively 
a cuckoo in the copyright nest.”86  Although there may have been a more principled 
basis, or form, for protecting computer programs, the fact is that the choice of 
copyright protection emerged by default, rather than design, and it was based on 
pragmatism as copyright “proved flexible enough to accommodate new technology in 
the past.”87  To a large degree, due to the emerging international trade in computer 
software, countries felt compelled to protect computer programs by way of copyright 
after this had been accepted in the US.  Copyright protection was also attractive 
because of other pragmatic considerations: copyright law had well-developed 
international instruments, like the Berne Convention,88 providing for a high degree of 
harmonisation.89 
 
Given that copyright protection of computer programs appeared to have been 
based on the fact that computer code resembled writing — its form, rather than 
based on its nature — it is not surprising that courts had to wrestle with the nature of 
computer programs to determine the appropriate scope of protection, as will become 
clear when the cases are considered.90  The appropriate scope of copyright 
protection is central to the economic rationale of copyright law, which is to incentivise 
(stimulate) the creation of copyright works, no more.  If the scope of protection is too 
broad, the incentivising goal will be undermined as such protection will limit access 
by others to the broader themes and concepts used to create such works by other 
authors, which would offset the social benefit of protecting such works.  As will 
become clear, despite the different nature of computer programs, the courts, at first, 
incorrectly analogised computer programs with copyright works with which they were 
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familiar, such as novels, resulting in the scope of protection being too broad.  The 
problem of determining the appropriate scope of protection was, in part, made more 
difficult due to the fact that, as already mentioned, courts lacked an adequate 
understanding of the technical issues concerning the, relatively new field of computer 
science and its application. 
 
4 4 Copyright protection of computer programs 
 
We will now proceed to determine the scope of copyright protection of computer 
programs.  As the focus of the legal analysis will be to determine the extent of 
copyright protection of computer programs, the other aspects of copyright protection, 
such as who is regarded as the author of a computer program, will not be 
considered.  This work is not intended to be a detailed treatise on the law relating to 
all aspects of the copyright protection of computer programs.   
 
Copyright legislation, as a general rule, does not determine the scope of 
copyright protection.  The courts have been left with the task to define its scope.  
This has allowed the law to be dynamic: responding to the challenges brought about 
by rapid changes in technology and its impact on copyright doctrine.  It is, therefore, 
not surprising that the CONTU report, which led to the first express legislative 
recognition of copyright protection of computer programs, recommended that the 
scope of protection should be determined by the courts.91  However, significantly, in 
relation to computer programs, the copyright legislation in all three jurisdictions under 
consideration has expressly provided for excluded subject matter or exceptions to 
the exclusive rights granted to the copyright holder.  Accordingly, it is necessary to 
start with the relevant statutory provisions, as copyright protection is a statutory 
creation. 
 
                                            
91
 Pistorius T "The Copyright Protection of Computer Programs in the United States of America: The 
Second Generation Questions (Part 2)" 1992 De Jure 25 (1) 166 166. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
168 
 
As far as the legislative analysis is concerned, our starting point will be the 
South African Copyright Act 197892 (“SA Copyright Act”).  The SA Copyright Act’s 
provisions will principally be contrasted with those of the UK Copyright, Designs and 
Patents Act (“UK CDPA”).93  Besides the historical links between the South African 
legislation and the UK legislation, the other reason for focusing on this comparison 
(rather than with the US Copyright Act) is that the UK CDPA had to be harmonised 
with the EU Software Directive.94  The EU Software Directive is the most recent 
multi-national instrument reflecting a broad consensus on the scope of copyright 
protection of computer programs.  Also, as will become apparent during the course 
of this chapter, while it is true that the US cases led the way in determining the scope 
of copyright protection of computer programs, the most recent cases have been 
those decided in the UK, which have been significantly influenced by the EU 
Software Directive.95 
 
Following the consideration of the legislative provisions, we will consider the 
key cases which have determined the scope of copyright protection of computer 
programs.  However, before considering the case law, two additional aspects of 
computer programs will be considered: the implications for copyright law as a 
consequence of their functional nature, and the proctectability of the screen displays 
(or user interfaces) of computer programs.  Although screen displays are not 
computer programs, and, thus, strictly not within the scope of this work, it is 
necessary to comment on the scope of copyright protection of user interfaces 
because of their importance to the commercial success of computer programs. 
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4 4 1 Statutory protection of computer programs 
 
The general requirements for all copyright works in South Africa96 are the following: 
they have to be original (that is, the result of the author’s own efforts),97 the work 
must be reduced to a material form,98 and, the author of the work must a “qualified 
person”99 at the time of its creation or there must have been a qualifying publication 
of the work.100  Of the other general requirements relating to copyright protection in 
South Africa, it is only necessary to briefly mention those which deviate from the 
usual requirements in the case of computer programs.  Similar to cinematograph 
films and sound recordings, the author of a computer program is the person who 
exercised control over the making of the computer program, rather than the person 
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who created the work.101  Provided these requirements are satisfied, a computer 
program automatically enjoys copyright protection; there are no registration 
formalities required to obtain copyright protection of computer programs. 
 
Although a computer program was considered as being eligible for copyright 
protection as a literary work as far back as 1981, it was not until 1992 that the SA 
Copyright Act expressly provided for the copyright protection of computer 
programs.102  Following the 1992 amendment to the SA Copyright Act pursuant to 
the Copyright Amendment Act (the “1992 Amendment Act”),103 South Africa protects 
computer programs as a sui generis category of copyright work, and expressly 
excludes them from constituting either literary works or cinematograph films.104  The 
specific exclusions were considered necessary to reverse the effects of previous 
cases.105   
 
4 4 1 1 Categorisation of computer programs 
 
The decision to protect computer programs as a sui generis category of copyright 
work, and not as a form of literary work, has been criticised as being out of step with 
international practice.106  Although the memorandum to the first draft bill which led to 
the 1992 Amendment Act suggested that the decision to protect computer programs 
as a sui generis category of copyright work was in conformity with the WIPO model 
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law, it does not indicate which WIPO model law.  Neither the WIPO Model Provisions 
on the Protection of Computer Software (1978), nor the WIPO Draft Model Law on 
Copyright (1990), required that computer programs be protected as a sui generis 
category of copyright work.107  South Africa’s decision to protect computer programs 
as a sui generis category of copyright work makes it fairly unique as all the leading 
jurisdictions with computer software industries have opted for protection of computer 
programs as literary works.108  Pistorius suggested that computer programs are not 
significantly different to other utilitarian literary works, and their functionality is, also, 
irrelevant.109  It is submitted that computer programs are, indeed, significantly 
different from other literary works, as already discussed.  In fact, it is arguable that, 
although jurisdictions like the US and the UK protect computer programs as literary 
works, computer programs are only nominally literary works; for all intents and 
purposes, computer programs in those jurisdictions are, in reality, a distinct category 
of copyright work. 
 
As will be illustrated when considering the case law in the US and the UK, 
much of the problem in determining the appropriate scope of copyright protection of 
computer programs was attributable to the “uncritical” application of the copyright 
principles applicable to traditional literary works to computer programs.110  Contrary 
to Pistorius’ suggestion, the courts have accepted that the problem of determining 
the appropriate scope of copyright protection presented by computer programs is 
“fundamentally different” from other literary works due to their functional character.  
In other words, computer programs do not fit comfortably within the copyright 
framework — let alone, being comparable to other literary works.  Determining the 
appropriate scope of copyright protection of computer programs, from an economic 
perspective, requires a different calculus from other literary works — even other 
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utilitarian literary works.111  As already indicated, some commentators have 
considered computer programs to be cuckoos in the copyright nest.112  Therefore, it 
is suggested that there may not be any significance that South Africa protects 
computer programs as a sui generis category of copyright work, while the US and 
the UK protect them as literary works; it is not doctrinally problematic to consider the 
US and UK case law because the case law in those jurisdictions indicates that 
computer programs are treated, de facto, as a separate category of copyright work.  
In fact, South Africa’s decision to categorise computer programs as a sui generis 
type of copyright work is, arguably, doctrinally more acceptable as it reflects the de 
facto position in the US and the UK.  It is further submitted that the protection of 
computer programs as a sui generis category of copyright work is in compliance with 
South Africa’s obligations, as a member of the World Trade Organisation, and 
signatory to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trades (“GATT”), pursuant to 
Article 10 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(“TRIPS”), Annexure 1C of GATT.  Article 10 of TRIPS requires that computer 
programs be protected as literary works as defined in the Berne Convention.  The 
definition of “literary and artistic works” in the Berne Convention has a very wide 
meaning, and includes musical works, dramatic works and cinematograph films.  
Although most jurisdictions protect some of these works as distinct categories, it is 
commonly accepted that this still complies with the requirements of the Berne 
Convention.113  Therefore, in principle, protecting computer programs as a distinct 
category of copyright work should comply with Article 10(1) as the intention is, 
arguably, simply that the various works included within the definition of literary work 
should be protected to the same extent or in the same manner as traditional literary 
works. 
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4 4 1 2 Preparatory design material 
 
Although South Africa protects computer programs as a sui generis category of 
copyright work, this does not prevent the preparatory design material — for example, 
the program specifications and flowcharts — relating to the creation of a computer 
program being protected as distinct literary (or artistic) works.114  As a consequence 
of the way in which the SA Copyright Act defines “computer program,”115 it is only the 
computer code, which is capable of being executable by a computer, that is 
protectable as a computer program.  This does not mean that if there are errors (or 
“bugs”) in a computer program, which may mean that it sometimes does not produce 
the correct results, that it does not qualify for protection.116  No complex computer 
program will be error-free.   
 
Significantly, in terms of Article 1(1) of the EU Software Directive, the 
preparatory design material of a computer program is also included as part of the 
copyright protection of the computer program.  In other words, the preparatory 
design material and the computer program are protected as one work.  Thus, unlike 
the current position in South Africa, the position in the UK is that the preparatory 
design material of a computer program is protected as a computer program, and not 
a distinct form of literary work.117  However, there is no indication at what stage the 
preparatory design material will be considered to be a computer program.  Recital 7 
of the EU Software Directive does not provide any clarification as it merely provides 
that the preparatory design material will qualify for protection if it can result in a 
computer program at later stage.  Does the preparatory design material need to be 
so detailed that all that remains to be done is that the implementation phase (the 
coding and testing) needs to be completed?  To protect only the barest outlines of 
the conceptualisation of a computer program, although it could — eventually — 
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result in a computer program, would amount to protecting an idea of a computer 
program, rather than its particular expression. 
 
As discussed above, while the implementation phase may be time-
consuming, when compared to the design phase of the software development 
process, it is a relatively menial task.  Given the economic value attached to a 
thorough design phase, it should be protected.  Whether the current position under 
South African law provides sufficient protection to preparatory design material 
depends on whether converting the literary (or artistic) work into a computer program 
constitutes an “adaptation” of the copyright work.118  The definition of adaptation is 
non-exhaustive and, on the basis of the economic justification for copyright law, 
implementation of preparatory design materials should constitute copyright 
infringement.   
 
However, Pistorius suggests that, although the flow charts relating to the 
design of a computer program may be protected as literary works, if such works are 
directly turned into a computer program (that is, converted to computer code), no 
copyright infringement will have taken place because there is no objective similarity 
between the flowcharts and the computer program.  The flow charts and the 
computer program are entirely different expressions; the resultant computer program 
is not an adaptation of the flow charts, although the flow charts form the basis of the 
computer program, and may account for most of the development time.  The creation 
of the computer program will merely have used the idea embodied in the flowcharts, 
rather than the particular expression.119   
 
In order, to avoid any uncertainty concerning the protectability of the computer 
program described in preparatory design materials, it is suggested that the definition 
of “adaptation” or “computer program” be amended to expressly provide the 
necessary protection for such material.  As indicated, the relevant amendment 
should require that the preparatory design material be sufficiently detailed to avoid 
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protecting a bare idea.  Also, the fact that the Directive protects a computer program 
and its preparatory design material as one work means that the copyright will vest in 
the same author(s), and avoids complications which could occur should the copyright 
in a computer program and its preparatory design material vest in different 
authors.120 
4 4 2 Scope of copyright protection 
 
We will now consider the scope of copyright protection of the actual computer 
program, that is, the “coded” version of the computer program.  The scope of 
copyright protection of a copyright work, such as a computer program, depends on 
the restricted acts121 reserved exclusively for the author, and the permitted 
exceptions122 to such restricted acts.  For example, the most significant economic 
rights given to the author of a computer program are the exclusive right to reproduce 
the computer program (that is, make copies thereof), make an adaptation of the 
program, and let or hire copies of the computer program.  These rights are granted 
for a period of fifty years from when the computer program is first published or is 
made available to the public.123  While it is the case that if computer programs had 
been protected as literary works in South Africa, computer programs may have 
enjoyed a longer period of protection — the life of the author plus fifty years — this is 
not economically significant.  The period over which computer programs have a 
commercial value is much shorter than fifty years. 
 
Before considering the case law relating to copyright infringement — which 
concerns breaches of the restricted acts reserved exclusively for the author — we 
will first consider the express statutory exceptions to copyright protection.  Although 
this approach subverts the orthodox order of copyright analysis applied in 
infringement cases, it makes more sense when trying to gain an overall impression 
of the scope of copyright protection of computer programs to first consider the 
exceptions.  The reason why this subverts the orthodox order of copyright analysis 
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applied in infringement cases is that the exceptions are only considered once it has 
been established that copyright infringement had taken place; they are a defence to 
a claim of copyright infringement.  In other words, the exceptions have no application 
in the absence of copyright infringement.  The reason it makes more sense to 
consider the exceptions first is that third parties, when considering, for example, 
whether to develop a computer program similar to another program, may wish to 
refer to these exceptions in order to determine what would be considered to be non-
infringing conduct.  These exceptions are, thus, useful for potential competitors when 
considering whether they are permitted to develop a substitute, competitive 
computer programs.  Competitors would want their product to be as close as 
possible to a perfect substitute to a successful product, if not superior. 
 
4 4 2 1 Statutory exceptions 
 
The privileges which copyright grants to authors are subject to limitations which allow 
others to use copyright works in certain circumstances.  These permitted uses 
would, in the absence of these provisions, constitute copyright infringement.  The 
permitted uses, or limitations, are referred to as the “fair-dealing” exceptions.124  
Specific exceptions apply in respect of each category of copyright work, and the 
most well-known exceptions are those applicable to literary (or artistic) works: the 
right to use the works for research or private study, or for personal or private use; for 
criticism or review; or, for reporting current events.125  There are various policy 
reasons that have been proffered for these limitations, for example: the need for 
advancement of knowledge and innovation; that freedom of expression should not 
be stifled; or, the public need for information.   
 
In the US, the ambit of the permissible acts (fair use) fuels a continuing 
debate about the basis of intellectual property rights, and its relation to the public 
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domain (or the commons).126  For some, intellectual property rights are the exception 
to the public domain: the purpose of intellectual property law is, paradoxically, to 
increase the size of the public domain.  Intellectual property rights are only 
permissible to the extent that they incentivise creation and enlarge the public 
domain.127  According to this view, which is based on a particular interpretation of the 
US constitutional provision which authorises the US Congress to create copyright,128 
fair use is not the exception to the property rights granted to authors; there is no 
need for its justification.129 
 
Again, economic analysis can provide valuable insights into the need or the 
benefits of the fair-dealing exceptions.  From an economic perspective, fair-dealing 
exceptions should apply where the costs of gaining the author’s permission for a 
third party seeking to use the copyright work are so disproportionate to the expected 
benefits of using the copyright work (or, a substantial portion thereof) that the third 
party does not bother to seek the necessary permission (and abandons its intentions 
to use the work).  What makes this situation socially wasteful is that the copyright 
work will not be used in situations where the author would have granted permission, 
if requested, as the proposed use does not affect the author’s market for the 
copyright work.130  In other words, “requiring permission would impose a transaction 
cost with no offsetting benefit.”131 
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For example, the fair-dealing exceptions applicable to literary works 
mentioned above generally comply with this economic rationale.  Although at first 
glance one would think that, for example, an author of a book would not be happy to 
give consent to a critic to quote from his work, such consent makes sense in the 
publishing industry.  Publishers would generally consent (or require authors to 
consent) to such use, if permission was sought, because such criticisms provide free 
marketing and may increase the demand for the work.132  Also, because books or 
films are experience goods, rather than inspection goods, consumers are assisted 
by, and require, accurate reviews.  Although some reviews may be unfavourable, 
publishers consider it, overall, to be in their best interest to, ex ante, permit reviews 
because a system of publisher-approved reviews would not benefit publishers 
because it would lack credibility.133 
 
As South Africa protects computer programs as a sui generis category of 
copyright work, and not as a literary (or artistic) works, the three well-known fair-
dealing exceptions are not applicable to computer programs.  As will be discussed, 
the substantive fair dealing exceptions applicable to computer programs in South 
Africa differ significantly from those in the UK.  This is not simply due to the fact that 
the UK protects computer programs as literary works, whereas South Africa protects 
them as sui generis copyright works.  While it is the case that the UK protects 
computer programs as literary works, the private study and research fair-dealing 
exceptions generally applicable to literary works are, effectively, excluded in the case 
of computer programs.134  The UK CDPA introduced a number of specific fair-dealing 
exceptions, including those for private study and research, relating to computer 
programs, which go far wider than those in South Africa.135 
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The UK fair-dealing exceptions provide four permissible rights to lawful users: 
the right to make back-up copies of a computer program, decompile a program, 
modify a program to remedy errors, and to study and test a program.136  These rights 
are intended to facilitate the use of computer programs, and allow sufficient room for 
software development.137  Other than the right to modify a program to remedy errors, 
these rights of lawful users cannot be contractually excluded.138  As this work 
focuses on whether copyright provides the necessary incentivises for the production 
of computer programs, without stifling innovation, the exceptions, other than the right 
to make back-up copies,139 are more important as they possibly impact software 
development. 
 
In terms of section 50B of the UK CDPA a lawful user is entitled to decompile 
a computer program for certain purposes, and is entitled to copy the program for 
purpose of decompilation.140  The right of decompilation is solely for purposes of 
allowing the development of interoperable software, that is, software that can work 
either with the decompiled program or another program.141  From an economic 
perspective, this is important because it seeks to prevent a software manufacturer 
which has market power using its dominant position to prevent competitors from 
entering the market.  For example, in the absence of such a provision, Microsoft 
could prevent others from developing rival word-processing programs to its Microsoft 
                                                                                                                                       
way of licence, rather than through a sale.  Interestingly, the US Copyright Act allows a purchaser to 
install multiple copies, which may materially affect the business model of the author as it is usually 
based on a per-computer basis. As already stated, the more general fair-dealing exception in the US 
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computer program for teaching, research, or scholarship will not constitute copyright infringement.  
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Word application as it would be necessary for competitors to determine the essential 
characteristics of its file extensions142 or access content protected by its digital rights 
management system.  If Microsoft’s file extensions are revealed competitors are able 
to develop word-processing programs that allow users to create documents which 
are compatible with Microsoft Word.  Similarly, documents created in Microsoft Word 
should be accessible and editable by users of the new word-processing program.143 
 
However, the decompilation right is subject to conditions, which seek to 
prevent a competitor from simply decompiling a computer program and using the 
decompilation as an “unfair” shortcut to producing a competitive, substitute computer 
program.  For example, the decompilation right does not assist a potential competitor 
who seeks to develop a substitute computer program by simply copying the source 
code of the decompiled program.  Section 50B(3)(d) expressly prohibits the 
decompilation of a computer program for purposes of creating “a program which is 
substantially similar in its expression to the program decompiled or to do any act 
restricted by copyright.”  The decompiled code may also not be used to study the 
operation of a computer program in order to determine how it functions; it is to be 
used strictly for purposes of ensuring interoperability.144  In order to avoid its 
computer program being the subject of prying for purposes other than ensuring 
interoperability, section 50B(3)(a) gives authors the right to prevent decompilation of 
their programs.  If the necessary information to develop an interoperable computer 
program is readily available, the decompilation right does not exist.  This is precisely 
what proprietary-software developers chose to do; they make the specifications for 
interoperability — the application programming interface (API) — with their computer 
programs publicly available. 
 
Although seemingly superfluous, section 50BA expressly provides that a 
lawful user of a computer program has the right to study “the functioning of the 
program in order to determine the ideas and principles which underlie any element of 
the program if he does so while performing any of the acts of loading, displaying, 
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running, transmitting or storing the program which he is entitled to do.”  As will be 
discussed below, this provision, to some extent, supports the narrow protection 
developed in the English cases, culminating in the Navitaire case.145  It is submitted 
that its real purpose is to emphasise the fact that under UK copyright law, while a 
computer program cannot be copied by decompiling it (and copying its source code 
or directly studying its construction), it is entirely permissible to reverse engineer the 
functionality of a program by observing its operation.   
 
In that sense, the combined effect of sections 50B and 50BA of the UK CDPA 
is comparable to the permissible reverse engineering of three-dimensional utilitarian 
articles based on artistic works, which were produced for the public by an industrial 
process.146  The permissible reverse engineering of three-dimensional utilitarian 
articles has been of significant economic importance, as it benefits consumers by 
allowing the production of cheap spare parts for a range of utilitarian, mass-produced 
articles.  In the absence of this exception, the production of such spare parts would 
have been preventable as infringing the artistic works (the design drawings or the 
prototypes) on which they were based, and would allow the manufacturer to be a 
monopolist in respect of these articles. 
 
Thus, the economic essence of sections 50B and 50BA of the UK CDPA is 
that reverse engineering is permitted provided that the subsequent producer of an 
equivalent program has gone through the expense and effort of producing such 
program from observing the functioning of the computer program.  It is not permitted 
to produce an equivalent program by engaging in shortcuts such as simply using the 
decompiled object code.  However, it is submitted that this limited right of 
decompilation provides excessive protection for computer programs.  Decompiling 
the object code of a computer program does not yield directly usable source code of 
a computer program.  To produce the source code for an equivalent program still 
requires significant effort and skill.  Thus, allowing decompilation does not amount to 
allowing a competitor the equivalent of producing a competitive program from the 
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original blueprint for the program, similar to having the design drawing or prototype 
of a three-dimensional utilitarian article.147   
 
The provision of an unfettered decompilation right is, therefore, preferable as 
it encourages innovation and the dissemination of ideas.  In contrast to the position 
in the UK, US courts have interpreted the fair use doctrine as providing a general 
decompilation right.  It is permissible for anyone, even a competitor of the author of a 
computer program, to decompile a program in order to determine how it functions.  
Thus, US copyright law gives competitors an unfettered right to produce competitive 
substitute programs, provided they are prepared to undertake the necessary effort, 
and incur the expense of reverse engineering.148 
 
Briefly, the final permitted act under the UK CDPA, unless this has 
contractually been excluded, is the right of a lawful user to make necessary 
modifications to a computer program in order to use it, including for purposes of error 
correction.149  Following the decision in Mars UK Ltd v Teknowledge Ltd,150 the 
scope of the right to correct errors has been construed more narrowly than 
previously considered to be the case.  Changes to software brought about by 
environmental changes, such as desired additional functionality or improvements, 
will not be considered as permissible error correction.151 
 
In contrast with the UK’s quite detailed fair-dealing provisions relating to 
computer programs, South Africa provides only a very limited exception to the lawful 
user of a computer program to make a back-up copy of a program.152  Even this 
limited right which the SA Copyright Act provides has been criticised as being 
narrower than the corresponding provision in the UK CDPA: “Section 19B(2) allows 
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the making of back-up copies for private and personal purposes only, whereas s 50A 
has no such limitation.”153   
 
Thus, simply on the basis of the express statutory provisions, the scope of 
copyright protection afforded to computer programs under the UK CDPA is 
considerably narrower than that provided under the SA Copyright Act.  This narrower 
scope of protection of computer programs is deliberate: the UK provisions “are 
clearly designed to stimulate competition and further development and to prevent 
unwarranted monopolies.”154  Similarly, the US courts have interpreted the more 
open-ended fair-use provisions in an even broader manner than the UK provisions, 
and, thus, provide even narrower protection to computer programs.  Until the recent 
enactment of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,155 the US courts have tended to 
use the fair-use doctrine to prevent perceived anti-competitive behaviour.156  For 
example, as indicated, the fair-use provisions in the US have been interpreted as 
permitting an unfettered decompilation right, which includes the right to determine 
the functioning of a computer program where there is a legitimate purpose, such as 
error correction or developing a competitive substitute program.157  Accordingly, it is 
submitted that South Africa appears to provide excessive copyright protection for 
computer programs, and the exceptions identified in the US and UK should be 
incorporated in the SA Copyright Act. 
 
4 4 2 2 Copyright implications of the functional nature of computer programs 
 
As the functional nature of computer programs impacts both cases involving literal 
and non-literal infringement, it would be convenient, at this stage, to consider the 
challenges posed to copyright law by functional copyright works such as computer 
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programs.  The functional nature of computer programs necessitates a careful 
assessment of what exactly the courts are asked to protect: the assessment of 
whether a substantial part of a computer program has been copied should identify — 
and disregard — any unprotectable elements, and give the appropriate weight to 
those elements which are entitled to only limited (or “thin”) copyright protection.  For 
example, expressions of commonplace ideas receive limited protection in the sense 
that they will only be infringed if exactly copied.158   
 
Non-functional copyright works, like fictional literary works, are purer 
expressions of an author’s creative mind: other than the fact that a literary work may 
make use of general plot lines, themes, literary techniques, or stock characters, 
authors are not constrained by functional considerations.  In contrast to fictional 
literary works, computer programs with a similar function (or addressing a particular 
problem) will — because of their functional nature — necessarily exhibit a greater 
degree of similarity.  Thus, due to the fact that computer programs will invariably 
have to conform to technical requirements, and employ standard techniques and 
common expressions, a greater degree of similarity may be required before a finding 
of substantial similarity can be sustained.159  In this sense, copyright protection of 
computer programs may be required to be more limited.  For example in Lotus 
Development Corp. v Borland International Inc. it was stated that the functional 
nature of computer programs does not prevent them from being copyrightable, but it 
does change how they should be assessed in terms of copyright doctrine.160 
 
De Villiers states that, unlike the US courts, the UK and South African courts 
have not drawn a proper distinction between functional works — such as computer 
programs — and other works, with the result that they are more likely to protect 
ideas, rather than their particular expression.161  While this may be a fair comment of 
the South African cases which have dealt with alleged copyright infringement of 
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computer programs, it is submitted that the Navitaire case represented a sea-change 
in UK copyright law relating to computer programs, and that his comment in relation 
to the UK position is incorrect.162  In any event, even before the Navitaire decision, 
UK copyright law (and, by extension, South African law) has — contrary to the claim 
in the IBCOS case — generally distinguished functional and non-functional works 
when considering what the appropriate level of copyright protection should be.163  UK 
courts have, as far back as the 19th century, sought to deny affording inappropriate 
copyright protection to functional works.  This was done by either denying that the 
alleged copyright infringement had occurred (that is, providing thin copyright 
protection) or denying the existence of copyright in a functional work. 
 
In Kenrick v Lawrence, the plaintiff alleged copyright infringement of its 
illustration of a hand holding a pencil, and placing a cross on a ballot paper.164  The 
illustration had no artistic merit and was functional: its purpose was to instruct 
illiterate voters how to record their vote.  It was considered to be the most effective 
manner of educating illiterate voters how to vote, and the defendant made use of this 
novel idea to create a similar illustration.165  The court held that copyright does not 
protect the idea of the subject matter of the illustration, even if the idea was the 
plaintiff’s creation.166  Given the simplistic, functional nature of the illustration, it 
would only be infringed if the defendant produced an almost identical copy.  There 
was very little room left for anyone to treat the subject matter of the illustration in a 
substantially different manner.167  Significantly, the court held that the scope and kind 
of copyright protection which would be extended depended on the character of the 
drawing; the nature of the drawing meant that the copyright will be of an “extremely 
limited character.”168  The value of the drawing did not lie in its artistic or aesthetic 
                                            
162
 It is not clear why the de Villiers article did not refer to the Navitaire case, which appears to have 
been published by the time of its publication.  Perhaps the article had already been submitted for 
publication at the time the judgment was published. 
163
 IBCOS Computers Ltd & Another v Barclays Highland Finance Ltd & Others [1994] FSR 275 291. 
164
 Kenrick & Co v Lawrence & Co (1890) LR 25 QBD 99. 
165
 99-100. 
166
 100-1. 
167
 102-3. 
168
 104. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
186 
 
appeal.169  A critical factor in the court’s deliberations was the economic monopoly 
that would result if the plaintiff were allowed the exclusive right to “practically the only 
mode of instructing the illiterate voter how to record his vote,” given the duration of 
copyright protection.170  Accordingly, the plaintiff failed in its claim.171 
 
Similarly, the plaintiff in Hollinrake v Truswell sought to claim copyright 
protection in a printed sleeve chart, and alleged that the defendant had infringed his 
copyright.172  The printed sleeve chart included words and figures, and its purpose 
was to accurately measure the correct proportions of the inner, and outer, parts of a 
sleeve.  It greatly simplified the calculations that would otherwise have been 
necessary to obtain the correct proportions.173  The court held that the words and 
figures on the sleeve did not constitute a literary work because they were not 
capable of having an existence distinct from the sleeve on which it was printed.174  A 
literary work is intended to provide information (and instruction), or pleasure, in the 
form of literary enjoyment.175  The words and figures were not merely directions for 
the use of the sleeve chart, they were an integral and inseparable part of the sleeve 
chart, as a measuring apparatus.176  As the printed sleeve chart was a measuring 
tool or apparatus — “a mechanical contrivance” — it was not protectable by 
copyright.177  The court held that copyright did not protect a method of measuring: 
protection “does not extend to ideas, or schemes, or systems, or methods; it is 
confined to their expression; and if their expression is not copied the copyright is not 
infringed.”178   
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The exceptions listed in the above quotation from the Hollinrake case reflects 
the subject matter excluded from US copyright law pursuant to section 102(b) of the 
US Copyright Act, which is simply a codification of the common law.179  Accordingly, 
section 102(b) of the US Copyright Act, and the distinction between functional and 
non-functional copyright works, does not reflect a substantive difference between US 
copyright law, on the one hand, and UK and South African copyright law, on the 
other hand.180 
 
4 4 2 2 1 Idea-expression dichotomy 
 
One area in which the functional nature of computer programs causes problems is 
when trying to distinguish ideas from their expression.  These problems arise 
particularly when a court has to consider allegations of non-literal copying.  The idea-
expression dichotomy is a fundamental doctrine of copyright law.  Copyright does not 
protect ideas; only the expressions of ideas are protected.  This is a crucial 
distinction between copyright law and patent law.  Patent law protects a novel, 
inventive idea, and grants the patent holder the exclusive right to exploit the 
protected idea.  Copyright, for example, does not prohibit the implementation of a 
disclosed process or procedure.  However, the copying of the literal text describing 
such process or procedure may constitute copyright infringement.181 
 
Other than a cursory statement that copyright does not protect ideas or 
information,182 the South African cases dealing with copyright infringement of 
computer programs have not sought to adequately apply this principle to distinguish 
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the unprotectable elements from any protected expression.  This may be due to 
various factors: the way in which the cases were presented in court; the paucity of 
cases involving alleged copyright infringement of computer programs; and, the fact 
that, as yet, there have been no cases in which non-literal copying has been alleged.  
Until the Navitaire case, the UK courts, too, have avoided direct consideration of the 
idea-expression in copyright infringement cases involving computer programs.  
Given that, prior to the Navitaire case, there were opportunities to consider the 
doctrine in the context of the copyright protection of computer programs — which 
were rejected — this failure was regrettable.183  It is submitted that this failure was as 
a consequence of a stubborn reluctance on the part of the UK courts to engage with 
the idea-expression dichotomy in the context of computer programs, which 
amounted to a form of jurisprudential chauvinism.  The UK courts did not want to be 
viewed as simply following the path being blazed by the US courts concerning the 
copyright protection of computer programs.184 
 
In contrast to the South African and UK courts, the US courts have, for some 
considerable time, been vigilant in trying to ensure that copyright protection of 
functional works, such as computer programs, receive the appropriate level of 
protection.185  It is claimed that the US courts have more actively sought to apply the 
idea-expression dichotomy than their UK counterparts because of its express 
statutory basis in the US.186  This is an unsatisfactory explanation, and seeks 
differences, without their being a distinction.  It is trite, in all the jurisdictions under 
consideration, that copyright does not protect ideas.  The statutory provision in the 
US simply codified the well-established, common-law, idea-expression dichotomy.187  
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Therefore, the statutory embodiment of this principle does not provide an adequate 
explanation for its disproportional development, and application, in the US.  In fact, 
the locus classicus in US copyright law, routinely used to illustrate the idea-
expression dichotomy, Baker v Selden,188 pre-dates the US Copyright Act by almost 
a century.  The US courts have, since then, sought to develop rules to give 
expression to this copyright doctrine, spawning ancillary principles — such as the 
merger doctrine and scènes à faire — to distinguish unprotected subject matter from 
protectable expression.  In any event, pursuant to Article 1(2) of the EU Software 
Directive, the UK courts are now compelled to recognise the distinction between 
ideas and expressions in relation to the copyright protection of computer 
programs.189 
 
It is submitted that the US courts have, traditionally, not shied away from the 
idea-expression dichotomy because they have been more acutely aware of the 
economic effects of copyright law, and its social purpose.  For example, in the 
Whelan case — the first important case concerning the appropriate level of copyright 
protection for non-literal elements of a computer program — the purpose, and 
importance, of the idea-expression doctrine in copyright law was made clear, while it 
was conceded that the doctrine was notoriously difficult to apply:190 
“[P]recisely because the line between idea and expression is elusive, we must pay 
particular attention to the pragmatic considerations that underlie the distinction and 
copyright law generally.  In this regard, we must remember that the purpose of the 
copyright law is to create the most efficient and productive balance between 
protection (incentive) and dissemination of information, to promote learning, culture 
and development.” 
 
The fact that copyright doctrine refuses protection for ideas is incongruous 
with the notion that the justification for copyright protection is based on an author’s 
natural rights or reward for creation.  It is indeed paradoxical that the more socially 
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valuable scientific or functional works, despite the effort which may have been 
expended in their creation, are denied any significant form of protection or provide 
any great reward for their creators by way of copyright protection.  For example, the 
inventor of a new search algorithm which allows for more efficient website searches, 
would not be able to prevent others from using the idea contained within it, once it 
has been disclosed.  All the creator would be entitled to is — extremely thin — 
copyright protection for his particular description of the algorithm, but not the 
particular method or other explanations of the algorithm.  On the other hand, the 
author of a fictitious work, arguably, receives greater protection.  The author of a 
work of fiction about a boy attending a boarding school for wizards can prevent 
another person copying a substantial part of the literal text, using similar characters 
with the same names, having the same book title, or following the detailed plot of the 
book. 
 
The seemingly absurd situation of providing more copyright protection to 
aesthetic works than to more socially beneficial scientific or functional works is, 
however, explicable in terms of the economic justification for copyright law.  Creation 
and innovation are incremental processes: they rely on previous creations, which 
serve as their building blocks or source material.  If the scope of copyright protection 
is too broad, it will adversely affect future production of copyright works because of 
the increased transaction costs.  Authors of new works would have to do one, or a 
combination, of the following things: to engage in the costly exercise of constantly 
seeking out and requesting permission from the authors of previous works which 
they have relied upon; engage in the unproductive (and socially wasteful) exercise of 
disguising their copying; or, develop costly workarounds to avoid allegations of 
copyright infringement.  If they want to avoid these costs, they would be confined to 
using material which is in the public domain.  Because of the increased fixed costs 
associated with creating new works caused by excessive copyright protection, there 
will be a lower production of new works.  In other words, by not protecting ideas — 
only their particular expression — and permitting free use of commonplace elements 
(or construing certain elements to be commonplace), copyright law seeks to reduce 
the costs of creating new works, and, thus, encourages their creation.191  Given the 
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social value of functional works, leaving adequate room for their creation is socially 
desirable. 
 
Naturally, the prospect of excessive copyright protection suits existing 
copyright owners, who are able to extract handsome returns for authorising use of 
their works: one man’s increased fixed costs, is another man’s rent-seeking royalty 
payment.  However, authors are, as a general rule, involved in a continuous series of 
creative endeavours; they tend not to be one-off creators.  As such, they will find 
themselves in both the position of enjoying, and being potentially inhibited by, large, 
rent-seeking royalty payments as a consequence of excessive copyright protection.  
This realisation on the part of authors would result in them considering it optimal to, 
ex ante, limit copyright protection.  In other words, if copyright law provides 
excessive copyright protection, authors will come to an agreement amongst 
themselves not to enforce their rights in situations corresponding to the accepted 
idea-expression dichotomy developed by the common law.192  Landes and Posner 
sum up this position as follows:193 
“[The] various doctrines of copyright law, such as the distinction between idea and 
expression and the fair use doctrine, can be understood as attempts to promote 
economic efficiency by balancing the effect of greater copyright protection — in 
encouraging the creation of new works by reducing copying — against the effect of 
less protection — in encouraging the creation of new works by reducing the cost of 
creating them.” 
 
This explains why, seemingly paradoxically, socially-valuable scientific or 
functional works do not receive more extensive protection.  In contrast, to fictional 
(aesthetic) creations, the building blocks of scientific or functional works, because of 
their utility, would result in greater social costs, if protected to the same extent as 
fictional creations.  Moreover, their utility would mean that they would probably have 
been independently created within a relatively short time of their initial creation.  In 
other words, excessive copyright protection would lead to socially wasteful duplicate 
investments in creating similar works, because such a system would, effectively, 
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allow one person — the first author — to appropriate the benefits of this cumulative 
social investment.194  Of course, while it is true that copyright does not preclude 
independent creations, this will not prevent the institution of socially costly actions 
claiming copyright infringement where two works are substantially similar.  If 
copyright protection is too broad, litigation is likely because functional works will, by 
their nature, result in a considerable degree of similarity, which may, prima facie, 
give the impression that there has been copying.  Competitors would, given a 
chance, engage in rent-seeking litigation because successful copyright infringement 
claims will give them a significant advantage.  Even the mere threat of litigation could 
have a chilling effect on the production of such copyright works.  By allowing free use 
of ideas, general concepts and other unprotectable elements embodied in copyright 
works, competition is encouraged by copyright as it “foster[s] a built-in process of 
“reverse-engineering” that enables many independently created and copyrightable 
works to cluster around common themes or ideas.”195 
 
Although it is clear that the idea-expression distinction has been established 
in copyright law because greater freedom to use ideas leads to greater social 
utility,196 this does not make the task of separating ideas from their expression 
easy.197  For example, the court in Lotus Development Corp v Paperback Software 
Intl198 referred to the idea-expression doctrine as a “riddle” because of the difficulty 
involved in its application.  It is no exaggeration to state that it has never been, and 
will never be, possible to give any precise description of the boundary line between 
ideas and their expression.199  The determination of what will be regarded as 
protectable expression “may depend on the type of idea being expressed, the 
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medium of expression, and even the value of the idea to society.”200  The separation 
of protectable expressions from unprotectable ideas involves the identification of a 
series of abstractions: at one extreme the abstraction may be of such a high level 
that it merely describes the general nature of the copyright work, and, at the other 
extreme, there is simply the specific expression.  A court has to determine the 
specific protectable abstraction between these two extremes.201  The difficulties 
presented by the application of the idea-expression doctrine to traditional copyright 
works, such as literary or artistic works, are compounded when it has to be applied 
to computer programs.  Computer programs are both functional and expressive, and 
“ideas are closely intermingled with the expression thereof.”202  Much of the case law 
concerning alleged non-literal infringement of computer programs has centred on the 
issue of trying to distinguish unprotectable ideas (or elements) from protectable 
expression.   
 
The courts have tended to follow a subjective, intuitive, ad hoc approach to 
distinguish unprotectable elements from protectable expression.203  This makes it 
difficult to predict which elements of a copyright work will be protected.  It is only 
when a court has determined which elements constitute unprotectable ideas, 
following a claim of copyright infringement, that there can be clarity about the 
dividing line distinguishing ideas and expression.204  Given the difficulty in separating 
ideas from expression, and the lack of an objective basis to make this distinction, a 
sound theoretical basis is required to make the application of the idea-expression 
doctrine more predictable.  It is submitted that the determining factor should be 
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based on the economic justification for copyright protection, and, thus, the economic 
effect of permitting, or prohibiting, use of a particular element — striking a balance 
between protection and competition: providing sufficient incentives to authors, while 
ensuring a sufficient degree of freedom exists for independent creation, and lawful 
competition.205  Thus, from this perspective, it is arguable that there is no a priori 
distinction between ideas and expression; “idea” and “expression” are simply labels 
that courts should apply in a manner that best fulfills copyright's objectives.”206 
 
4 4 2 2 2 Concepts related to the idea-expression doctrine 
 
The courts in the US have given substance to the idea-expression doctrine by 
seeking to develop rules by which to determine whether elements are so integrally 
related to a particular idea that they are unprotectable.  Given a particular idea, the 
use of some elements may be the obvious, practical consequence of implementing 
such idea, or it may be a standard technique for doing so.207  The US courts have 
developed two related concepts to the idea-expression doctrine: the “merger” 
doctrine, and the “scènes à faire” doctrine.  Although these doctrines are, 
theoretically, ancillary to the idea-expression doctrine in the sense that their 
application requires an identification of a particular idea, there will inevitably be a 
reappraisal of the identified idea.  Through the application of these ancillary 
doctrines, a court may be able to better assess whether the level of abstraction at 
which it has characterised a particular idea is appropriate; that its characterisation of 
an idea does not award a person a monopoly, or create other anti-competitive 
effects. 
 
The merger doctrine (also referred to as the “idea-expression identity 
exception”) provides that where there is only a limited number of ways in which a 
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particular idea can be expressed, the idea and its expression can be said to have 
merged.  In these circumstances, the particular expression, like the idea, is 
unprotectable.208  According to the scènes à faire doctrine, copyright protection is not 
extended to two types of expression: first, if the expression is a standard or common 
method of expressing a particular idea; or, second, if the expression is unavoidable 
as it is dictated by external factors.209 
 
4 4 3 User interfaces of computer programs 
 
Before considering the case law relating to copyright infringement of computer 
programs, it is necessary to briefly discuss the user interfaces of computer 
programs.  The term user interface (also referred to the “UI” or the “look and feel” of 
a computer program) is used to refer to the screen displays or appearance the 
running software presents to the user, and how the user interacts with the 
program.210  User interfaces typically consist of a combination of text, graphic images 
or icons, and various menu commands through which users can interact with the 
computer program.211  The screen displays are part of the output data of a computer 
program, and, as such, the product (or result) of the program.  A computer 
“program's aim is to produce a result. But the result is not the program.”212  Thus, a 
screen display is not a computer program as defined; that is, it is not a set of 
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ordered, unambiguous instructions to be performed by a computer.  Although distinct 
from the underlying computer program, it has been accepted in all three jurisdictions 
that screen displays may be protectable as separate copyright works, such as a 
literary works, artistic works or cinematograph films, depending on their visual 
appearance.213 
 
The reality is that for most users of computer programs, the programs’ user 
interfaces are what they consider to be computer programs.  This is probably the 
reason why, in the past, courts have not always drawn a proper distinction between 
the user interface of a computer program (that is, its output) and the actual computer 
program.  In cases involving alleged copyright infringement of computer programs, 
similarities in the user interfaces have, in the past, wrongly been used as a shortcut 
to support a finding of copyright infringement of the underlying computer program.214  
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Replication of the screen displays of a computer program has been held to constitute 
a form of non-literal copyright infringement.215  The error in this approach becomes 
apparent when it is realised that different computer programs can produce the same 
results or screen displays; similar user interfaces may be achieved by two 
independently produced computer programs.  This does not exclude the possibility 
that similarities in user interfaces may be of some probative value, providing indirect 
evidence of infringement in the underlying computer program.216 
 
While the concept of “look and feel” may sensibly be applied to establish 
copyright infringement in relation to creative works like greeting cards or board 
games, it is not as useful when seeking to establish copyright infringement in the 
case of computer programs, particular in cases involving alleged non-literal 
copying.217  Therefore, it is important when comparing two computer programs, 
following allegations of copyright infringement, to consider the actual underlying 
programs that produced the results, rather than simply the output of the programs.218  
This distinction between a computer program’s user interface and the underlying 
program is now generally recognised, and accepted.  For example, the European 
Court of Justice recently held that a graphical user interface does not constitute a 
form of expression of a computer program within the meaning of article 1(2) of the 
EU Software Directive, and, therefore, the copyright in the computer program does 
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not protect its user interface; the user interface is not protectable as a computer 
program.219 
 
The user interfaces of computer programs, similar to the underlying computer 
programs, may be more functional in nature than may initially be apparent; they are 
generally designed to facilitate the use of the computer programs, and their various 
features.  Evidential support for the contention of their general functional, and not 
expressive, nature is the fact that computer programs are usually accompanied by 
detailed instruction manuals to assist users in how to use the various features of the 
program.220  The level of assistance which a new user of a computer program 
requires is a good indicator of the extent to which a user interface is functional, 
rather than expressive, and extent of copyright protection is should be afforded.221 
 
A computer program’s commercial successful is, to a large extent, dependent 
on the appeal of its user interface, rather than the quality of the computer code which 
creates it.  Successful computer programs tend to have user interfaces which are 
appealing to users and easy to follow, and are colloquially referred to as “user 
friendly.”222  This makes the design of user interfaces commercially valuable 
intellectual creations, and, unsurprisingly, have been focus of a number of actions 
concerning computer programs.223   
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However, providing excessive protection for these aspects of computer 
programs “could have detrimental effects on competition and innovation.”224  In fact, 
some scholars consider the protection of user interfaces to be contrary to public 
policy and economically wasteful.225  The rationale for such claims is the fact that 
users are required to devote time and effort in familiarising themselves with the user 
interface of a particular computer program.  This investment by users causes them to 
be “locked-in” to a computer program because switching to an alternative program, 
with a different user interface, will necessarily have cost implications for users.226  
For example, if computer users have become acquainted with the features of 
commonly-used applications software like spreadsheets, these features should be 
considered to form part of the public domain.  To require other software developers 
to create substantially different user interfaces would be socially wasteful; in addition 
to the increased developmental costs, software users will have to invest their time 
(and money) in learning how to use these new interfaces.  In fact, it is argued that to 
allow user interfaces to be the mimicked is essential for the development of 
competitive software applications.  Other software developers are not able to 
compete effectively if they cannot offer users an interface which is similar to that 
already used.227   
 
Another important fact that should be borne in mind when considering the 
scope of copyright protection of computer programs is that application software tend 
to create “network effects” (or “network externalities”).228  Network effects exist when 
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a consumer’s choice of a particular product will not only depend on the features of 
the particular program, but also on how many other people use it.  The simplest 
example of network effects is the acquisition of a telephone.  There is not much point 
in acquiring a telephone if most of your associates or other contacts do not have a 
telephone.  Similarly, the more users of a particular computer program there are, the 
greater the utility a user will derive, and more likely he will be to chose (if the user 
can be considered to have any choice at all) the program.  There would be very little 
utility (and actual choice) in using a spreadsheet program which produced 
documents in a format that could not be accessed by most other computer users.  
Network effects result in the emergence of single standard.  In these circumstances, 
if the producer of the most popular program is not to have a monopoly over the 
particular type of application program, other software developers should be allowed 
to develop compatible computer programs which employ the prevailing standard.229   
 
If the scope of copyright protection is too extensive, a firm that develops a 
popular user interface (or other popular feature, such as the format of the files 
created) which establishes itself as the market leader would be able to eliminate the 
emergence of substitute products with a similar user interface through well-timed 
copyright infringement actions.  Excessive copyright protection of user interfaces 
would, thus, prevent the development, and improvement, of socially beneficial 
standardised and compatible user interfaces.230   
 
As a consequence of the abovementioned economic effects of user 
interfaces, it is submitted that any copyright protection afforded to user interfaces of 
                                                                                                                                       
corners of the globe, and social networking, have given rise to network effects in a wider variety of 
software. 
229
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a functional nature — whether as literary works, artistic works or cinematograph films 
— should not be excessive.  In the case of alleged infringement of functional user 
interfaces, some sort of excising (or filtration) process — similar to that applied in 
cases involving infringement of computer programs — should be employed to 
determine whether a substantial part has been copied.  Again, those elements 
dictated by function, are commonplace in the design of user interfaces, or which 
would amount to protecting an idea rather than its particular expression, ought not to 
be protected by copyright.  The ancillary rules such as the merger doctrine and 
scènes à faire could also assist to distinguish unprotected subject matter from 
protectable expression, and ensure that the scope of protection is not too excessive 
to prevent the development of standardised and compatible user interfaces.231   
 
Again, the US courts were the first to recognise the potentially functional 
nature of user interfaces, and the economic consequences of excessive protection.  
There are examples of this type of analysis in US cases which sought to apply the 
common law principles, such as the idea-expression doctrine, and the economic 
analysis, to ensure that the level of protection for user interfaces was not 
excessive.232  For example, if it was not for the thin copyright protection afforded to 
user interfaces, the now widely-used graphical user interfaces — employing graphic 
icons which users can click or drag to perform operations such as opening computer 
programs or delete items — would only have been available on the Apple operating 
platforms.233  The use of such graphic icons had an intuitive appeal and obviated the 
need for users to learn strings of textual commands to perform the equivalent tasks, 
which was both time-consuming to use and made computers less appealing to a 
wider audience.  These graphic icons were functional and analogous to “the visual 
                                            
231
 Tumbraegel and de Villiers "Copyright Protection for the Non Literal Elements of a Computer 
Program" 36. 
232
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displays and user commands of the dashboard, steering wheel, gear shift, brakes, 
clutch and accelerator [which] serve as the user interface of an automobile.”234   
 
The court, while acknowledging the difficulty in separating protectable from 
unprotectable elements of a user interface, clearly recognised the benefits of 
standardisation and the development of a more competitive market (with 
consequential benefits for consumers) by providing thin copyright protection, and 
restricting infringement to cases of virtual identity:235  
“But overly inclusive copyright protection can produce its own negative effects by 
inhibiting the adoption of compatible standards (and reducing so-called "network 
externalities"). Such standards in a graphical user interface would enlarge the market 
for computers by making it easier to learn how to use them.  Striking the balance 
between these considerations, especially in a new and rapidly changing medium 
such as computer screen displays, represents a most ambitious enterprise.” 
 
In the US, the courts have held functional user interfaces to be unprotectable 
by copyright as they constituted a “method of operation,” which is excluded from 
copyright protection pursuant to section 102(b) of the US Copyright Act.  Thus, in the 
US, if the screen display is considered to be a method of operation, it will not be 
protected by copyright, whether as a literary, artistic or other kind of copyright work.  
An application of this US principle will be illustrated when the case of Lotus 
Development Corp. v Borland International Inc. is considered below.236   
 
Following the Navitaire case, the UK courts have adopted a similarly 
restrictive view of the copyright protection granted to functional user interfaces.  In 
the Navitaire case the text-based screen displays, were considered to be literary 
works, but due to their rudimentary, functional nature, they were considered to be 
unprotectable.  The court held that protecting such screen displays would essentially 
amount to protecting the ideas which underlie the user interfaces, which is expressly 
excluded from protection by Article 1(2) of the Software Directive.  The text-based 
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236
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screen displays were simply the means by which the data was displayed to users, 
which was the purpose of the computer program.237  In contrast, the graphic-based 
screens were protectable as artistic works as the arrangement of relatively simple 
basic elements or icons involved sufficient skill and labour.238  However, the UK 
courts are no longer prepared to simply accept that graphic-based user interfaces of 
computer games — which were previously accepted to be more expressive than 
functional (or commonplace) in nature — will enjoy a significant level of copyright 
protection as artistic works or cinematograph films.239  The recent Nova Productions 
case in the UK, discussed below, reflects the latter position, and UK courts will now 
also be more circumspect in respect of the scope of copyright protection afforded to 
user interfaces of a graphic nature.240 
 
Thus, in the US and UK, functional user interface elements will either be 
considered as unprotectable as a method of operation, or receive thin copyright 
protection.  The consequence of this policy will be to deny copyright protection to 
many aspects of a computer program’s user interface.  Copyright protection will be 
limited to the non-functional aspects of user interfaces, according to the usual rules 
relating to literary works, artistic works, or cinematograph films.  This would include 
possible protection for the particular selection and arrangement of the various 
elements, which would, in isolation, be unprotectable.241 
 
Although the South African copyright legislation does not have an equivalent 
provision to section 102(b) of the US Copyright Act, it is submitted that the US (and 
UK) practice of limiting (if not excluding) copyright protection for functional works is 
advisable if it encourages socially beneficial innovation.  As illustrated, above, the 
exceptions listed in section 102(b) of the US Copyright Act are simply a codification 
of recognised common-law doctrine in the UK and South Africa.  Thus, it is hoped 
that when the South African courts are again seized with a case like Pastel Software 
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(Pty) Ltd v Pink Software (Pty) Ltd,242 it will engage in a more thorough analysis of 
what elements of a user interface are protected.   
 
The applicant, Pastel Software (Pty) Ltd (“Pastel”), applied for an interdict, on 
an urgent basis, seeking to prevent the first respondent, Pink Software (Pty) Ltd 
(“Pink”), from infringing its copyright in its computer program.243  Pastel alleged that 
Pink’s proposed software produced screen displays which were, apart from 
differences in shading and other unimportant features, identical to Pastel’s screen 
displays, containing the same essential information and having the same basic 
format.244  It was accepted that Pink did not have access to Pastel’s source code.245   
 
However, most significantly, there was the suggestion that the screen displays 
were an indistinguishable part of the underlying computer program, and were 
regarded as “reproductions” of the program.  The court held that infringement may 
result by reproducing the screen display designs, which were considered to be 
literary works, even if Pink had no access to the source code and did not copy any 
part of it.246  Pink could not produce a computer program which intentionally 
produced screen displays resembling those of Pastel.247 The court, in a cursory 
manner and without any proper analysis of the visual elements, dismissed 
suggestions that the Pastel screen displays were merely the result of fundamental 
accounting principles or concepts.  It considered the arrangement of the screen 
displays as a product of skill or effort, constituting a protectable compilation.248 
 
                                            
242
 Pastel Software (Pty) Ltd v Pink Software (Pty) Ltd and Another (1991) 399 JOC (T).  The issues 
were probably not considered in sufficient detail because the matter was considered as part of an 
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At the time, the Pastel case was described as the “the first tentative step on 
the ‘look and feel’ road when the court issued an interdict restraining the respondent 
from infringing the applicant’s copyright in the screen display of its program.”249  As 
discussed, it is important, not only to draw a proper distinction between the user 
interface, and the underlying computer program, but also to recognise the functional 
nature of user interfaces in order to avoid provided excessive copyright protection. 
 
4 4 4 Infringement cases 
 
We now turn to determine the scope of copyright protection of computer programs 
through a consideration of the case law.  The cases which have considered the 
scope of copyright protection invariably involved the alleged infringement of a 
computer program.  As already indicated, copyright grants an author the exclusive 
right to perform the listed restricted acts, subject to the permitted fair-dealing 
exceptions.  The specific restricted acts which have been the subject of infringement, 
and required determinations of the scope of copyright protection, are the right to 
reproduce a computer program (that is, make copies thereof), or the right to make an 
adaptation thereof.250  Infringement by way of copying will take place if there is 
sufficient objective similarity between the alleged infringing computer program and 
the original program, and there is a causal connection between the original computer 
program and the creation of the alleged infringing program.251  As a preliminary 
point, it is important to bear in mind that copyright infringement does not require that 
the unauthorised restricted act, such as copying of the protected work (in our case, a 
computer program), be performed in respect of the entire copyrighted work; it is 
sufficient if such act has been done in respect of any substantial part of the work.252  
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Thus, not all forms of copying constitute copyright infringement; the copying of an 
insignificant or trivial part of a copyright work will not result in copyright infringement.  
The fact that copyright law requires that a substantial part of a copyright work be 
copied before an infringement action can succeed, rather than any similarity, can 
also be viewed as an aspect of fair dealing.253 
 
At this point it is sensible to distinguish two types of infringement cases: cases 
involving literal (or textual) copying, and those involving non-literal (or non-textual) 
copying.  Literal copying involves the verbatim copying of a program’s computer 
code, or any substantial part thereof.  Identifying literal copying of computer code is 
comparatively easy.254  In order to detect unauthorised copying of their computer 
code, computer programmers often “fingerprint” their computer code by inserting 
redundant (or dummy) code, programming idiosyncrasies, or individualised 
programming comments.255  Someone who slavishly copies computer code will tend 
not to notice these fingerprints, or will generally be too sloppy to remove all of them.  
In fact, sometimes literal copying can be detected without the use of deliberate 
fingerprinting of the computer code, and it is revealed simply because of the level of 
flagrant copying.  For example, in the SAS Institute case, the court accepted that 
there was evidence of literal copying because, inter alia, the name "SAS" appeared 
in at least 145 separate lines of the defendant’s source code, despite attempts by the 
defendant to remove all such references.256 
 
                                                                                                                                       
US equivalent is “improper appropriation,” which is the requirement that a material portion of the 
copyright work must have been copied.  In such determination will disregard the copying of facts, 
general ideas, and unoriginal expression.  See LaFrance M Copyright Law: In a nutshell 2ed (2011) 
284-5. 
253
 Landes and Posner "An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law" 360-1. 
254
 Hamilton "Computer Science Concepts in Copyright Cases: The Path to a Coherent Law" 249. 
255
 Davidson "Protecting Computer Software: A Comprehensive Analysis" 381 and 412.  The insertion 
of inconspicuous inaccuracies or fictitious information in factual copyright works to prove copying had 
previously been used in works likes maps, dictionaries, and directories (Banzaf "Copyright Protection 
for Computer Programs" 156-7).   
256
 SAS Institute Inc. v S&H Computer Systems, Inc. 1985 605 F. Supp. 816 822-3. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
207 
 
The reason for drawing a distinction between literal and non-literal copying is 
that, as a general rule, the cases concerning literal copying are not very illuminating 
about the scope of copyright protection of computer programs.  This is, no doubt, 
also true about other copyright works, when the equivalent of the literal copying of 
computer code is alleged.  In other words, while the unauthorised copying of entire 
computer programs — piracy — may clearly have a significant economic effect on 
the incentives of software developers, this type of infringement, while obviously 
constituting copyright infringement, tells us nothing about the scope of copyright 
protection of computer programs, and will, therefore, not be considered in the 
following legal analysis.  Similarly, the literal copying of a substantial part of a 
computer program, whilst constituting copyright infringement, is also not very 
instructive about the scope of copyright protection computer programs.  Accordingly, 
simply for completeness, this chapter will briefly deal with the alleged literal copying 
of a substantial part of a computer program.   
 
By far the more interesting are those cases concerning non-literal copying, 
and the determination of whether any substantial part of a computer program has 
been copied.  As will be illustrated, this has required the courts to grapple with the 
nature of computer programs, in order to ensure that their protection does not extend 
beyond incentivising their creation. 
 
4 4 4 1 Literal infringement 
 
As stated, literal copying involves the verbatim copying of a program’s computer 
code, or any substantial part thereof.  For purposes of this work, literal copying will 
include those cases were computer code has been copied and only colourable 
alterations have been made to disguise the copying, or where a computer program 
has been translated into a different programming language.  The SA Copyright Act 
defines the “adaptation” of a computer program as, inter alia, producing a version of 
the program in a different programming language or code, or providing the program 
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in a different medium.257  As stated above, making an adaptation of a computer 
program is one of the restricted acts reserved for the author.258 
 
It is trite that the unauthorised literal copying of an entire copyright work, 
including a computer program, or a substantial part thereof, will constitute copyright 
infringement.  The only interesting issue to be found in cases concerning literal 
copying, in so far as the scope of copyright protection is concerned, is what 
constitutes a substantial part of a computer program.  There are no guidelines in the 
legislation of any of the three jurisdictions under consideration to indicate what would 
constitute a substantial part of a computer program, leaving it to the courts to 
determine when a substantial part of a program has been copied.  In short, it is a 
question of fact and degree, with the emphasis on the quality of the copied portion, 
rather than its quantity.259 
 
For example, in the Haupt case, the court confirmed that the assessment of 
whether a substantial part of the computer code of a computer program was copied 
is qualitative rather than quantitative, and found that the copying of 63 lines out of 
several thousand lines of source code constituted the taking of a substantial part of 
the plaintiff’s computer program.260  It was considered to be a substantial part of the 
plaintiff’s program because it was difficult to write, and was, therefore, a valuable 
part of the program.261  Similarly, in the UK decision in the Cantor Fitzgerald262 case, 
the copying of relatively small portions of the plaintiff’s source code — no more than 
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four percent of the source code — was held to constitute the taking of a substantial 
part of the plaintiff’s computer program.  Although the portions copied were short, 
they were valuable because they were used in important modules of the program.263 
 
However, even in cases of literal copying, the assessment of the substantiality 
of the copied portion must take into consideration the nature of computer programs, 
and the functional character of computer code.  As indicated, computer instructions 
must conform to the strict syntactical and semantic criteria of the chosen 
programming language if they are to be executed.  In this sense, every portion of the 
computer code of a computer program is critical to its operation.  This, however, 
does not mean that every part can be considered a substantial part of a computer 
program for purposes of copyright law.  Similarly, substantiality does not depend on 
the extent to which a particular portion of the source code is used.  Moreover, 
although there may be differences between programming languages, there are still 
significant similarities, and they all rely on the arrangement of Boolean operations.264  
Whether the particular portion taken constitutes a substantial portion of the 
copyrighted program should depend on the skill and labour involved in its creation.265 
 
In the Computer Associates case, the court “filtered out” the following 
unprotected elements of the computer program: those dictated by efficiency or 
external factors, and those taken from the public domain.266  Although the Computer 
Associates case involved a case of non-literal copying, it was subsequently accepted 
that a similar filtration process was also applicable in cases concerning literal 
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copying.267  As the Computer Associates case will be analysed in considerable detail 
when dealing with the issue of non-literal infringement, it is simply necessary to state 
at this juncture that the filtration step is important due to the functional nature of 
computer programs.  For example, those elements dictated by function, or which 
would amount to protecting an idea rather than its particular expression, ought not to 
be protected by copyright. 
 
It is, therefore, surprising that none of the South African cases which have 
involved alleged copyright infringement of a computer program have even 
considered that some kind of filtering or excising process was necessary. 
 
4 4 4 2 Non-literal infringement 
 
Non-literal (non-textual or non-code) copying is not a term of art, and there have 
been various definitions of what constitute the non-literal components of a computer 
program.268  For example, in the Navitaire case, the court adopted a very narrow 
definition of non-literal copying: that it comprised those instances of alleged copyright 
infringement where there had been no access to the computer code.269  This would 
exclude a situation where a subsequent computer programmer had access to the 
computer code of the original computer program, and copied aspects of the original 
program without reproducing the computer code.270  Also, given the range of cases 
that will be considered in this section, the Navitaire case’s characterisation of non-
literal copying is too narrow.  For purposes of this work, non-literal copying will be 
defined as any alleged copyright infringement which is not literal copying. For 
convenience, this means any alleged copyright infringement that does not involve 
the literal copying of a program’s computer code (or any substantial part thereof), 
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does not involve only colourable alterations to disguise such verbatim copying, or a 
translation of a program into another programming language. 
 
The potential for non-literal copyright infringement claims may be greater than 
first imagined.  For example, software written for one operating system, such a 
Microsoft’s Vista, may need to be rewritten for another operating system like Apple’s 
Leopard.  A rewriting exercise may also be motivated by the termination (or 
prospective termination) of an agreement between a software vendor and a 
customer, and the customer thus seeks to develop substantively similar replacement 
software.271  This is precisely what happened in the Navitaire case,272 to be 
discussed later. 
 
Although it is trite that copyright does not protect ideas, only their expression, 
this rule, like other general legal rules, conceals its complexity.273  Copyright law has 
been faced with issues of non-literal copying in other contexts, such as fictional 
works, and developed the concept of the idea-expression dichotomy.  For example, 
copyright protection is not confined to the exact words of a literary work like a novel.  
If copyright protection was limited to literal copying, copyright protection would 
provide an author too little protection against a person who skillfully paraphrases his 
work.  It would, for example, allow a plagiarist to avoid liability by making immaterial 
variations to the copied work.  Copyright protection, therefore, necessarily has to 
protect more than just the literal text (or translation) of a copyright work.274  This 
approach has been recognised by the courts: copying that paraphrases, or loosely 
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paraphrases, rather than takes the verbatim expression of the computer code of a 
computer program can constitute copyright infringement.275  Conversely, although 
computer programs require protection against more than just literal copying (or 
translation), the protection should not be so broad as would protect the underlying 
ideas, or inhibit future creative endeavours by others.276  However, the extent to 
which paraphrasing would constitute copyright infringement should be more 
restricted in the case of computer programs than in respect of other types of 
copyright work, due to the functional nature of programs.277 
 
While cases of non-literal infringement involving fictional literary works have 
presented challenges to courts, those difficulties are of a greater order of magnitude 
in the case of computer programs.  In the case of fictional literary works, it is 
comparatively easy to identify the unprotectable elements such as scènes à faire, 
the basic plot, stock characters and theme, in order to establish whether any other 
non-literal protectable expression has been appropriated.278  As illustrated above, 
due to the functional nature of computer programs there may be a number of 
elements which ought not to be protected.  As such, not every instance of similarity 
will be relevant to an assessment of whether copyright in a computer program has 
been infringed.  For example, the mere fact that two programs, with the same 
purpose, are written in the same programming language will necessarily lead to the 
possibility of a similiarity.  The structure of the particular programming language will 
influence the logic and design of the program.279 
 
The functional nature of programs and the technical environment complicates 
any assessment of whether there has been non-literal infringement, and, as will 
become apparent, the determination of the appropriate level of protection has 
developed gradually through a series of (often controversial and criticised) US and 
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UK decisions.  The cases of non-literal copyright infringement of computer programs 
have, arguably, proved to be the most complex faced by copyright law, as will be 
illustrated when considering the cases analysed below.  They have provided courts 
with greater challenges than those presented by other types of copyright work, and 
have required a forensic examination of copyright’s idea-expression dichotomy.280  
Briefly put, the courts had to determine which non-literal elements (if any) of a 
computer program constitute its protectable expression.  In order to deal with the 
difficulty in determining whether a substantial part of a computer program had been 
copied, alternative tests were developed to determine whether infringement had 
taken place.  The development of these tests was largely a consequence of a 
greater understanding and appreciation of the nature of computer programs. 
 
As will be illustrated, in both the US and the UK, the cases involving non-
literal copyright infringement of computer program show a gradually narrowing of the 
protection afforded to computer programs.  In each of the jurisdictions, the protection 
initially afforded to computer programs was broad, providing too much protection.  In 
the early cases the courts’ analysis was primarily influenced by an analogy between 
a computer program and non-functional works such as novels, and the law 
applicable to protecting to the latter type of work, without an adequate appreciation 
of the nature of computer programs.  This approach considered the development of 
a computer program as the product of “pure creativity,” rather than as a functional 
work constrained by the particular problem to be addressed, and the technical 
means and requirements of writing computer code.281  A typical example of this form 
of analysis by analogy is the search for the “structure, sequence, and organisation” 
of a computer program.  This broad protection afforded to computer programs was 
expanded, culminating in Lotus Development Corp. v Paperback Software Intl.,282 
which provided protection to a computer program’s user interface, or “look and feel,” 
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as one of the protected elements of a computer program.283  As discussed above, a 
computer program’s user interface is distinct from the computer program, and is not 
a computer program, as defined. 
 
Following strong criticism of the courts’ initial attempts to determine the 
appropriate scope of copyright protection of computer programs, the subsequent 
cases reduced the elements considered to be protectable expression.284  This 
narrower scope of copyright protection of computer programs was considered to be 
appropriate as it would promote development and innovation.  The broader copyright 
protection forced software developers to devote costly resources to constantly find 
new methods of achieving the same results.285  Copyright protection was, thus, 
considered to go further than providing necessary incentives for program developers. 
 
While not all of the cases which will be analysed in the following section 
involved non-literal copying, the obiter statements concerning non-literal copying 
made in these cases represented sea-changes in the scope of copyright protection 
of computer programs, which influenced subsequent cases.  Also, the analysis is 
confined to a consideration of US and UK case law as there have been no reported 
cases in South Africa which have dealt with, or provided instructive comment on, the 
issue of non-literal copyright infringement, and the scope of copyright protection, of 
computer programs. 
 
4 4 4 2 1 US case law 
 
The three US cases which will be considered are: Whelan Associates Inc. v Jaslow 
Dental Laboratory Inc.;286 Computer Associates Intl. Inc. v Altai Inc.;287 and, Lotus 
Development Corp. v Borland International Inc.288 
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 T Hill “Fragmenting the Copyleft Movement: The Public Will Not Prevail” 1999 Utah L. Rev. 
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(a) Whelan Associates Inc. v Jaslow Dental Laboratory Inc. 
 
In this case the court had to consider the scope of copyright protection of a computer 
program: in particular, it had to determine, for the first time, whether the non-literal 
copying of the structure of a computer program constituted copyright infringement or 
whether copyright protection was confined to the literal computer code.289 
 
The appellant, Jaslow Dental Laboratory Inc. ("Jaslow Lab"), was a 
manufacturer of dental prosthetics and devices.  In order to facilitate the 
bookkeeping and administrative tasks peculiar to its business, occasioned by the 
need to manage the orders it received and its inventory, Jaslow Lab (represented by 
Rand Jaslow) hired the Strohl Systems Group Inc. ("Strohl"), a software 
development company, to develop a computer program to satisfy its needs.  In terms 
of an agreement between the parties, Strohl owned the copyright in the program it 
developed for Jaslow Lab, and Strohl was also entitled to market the program to 
other dental laboratories.  Jaslow Lab would receive a 10% royalty on all such 
sales.290 
 
The computer program which Strohl developed, Dentalab, was written in a 
programming language known as EDL (Event Driven Language) because it was 
designed to operate on an IBM Series One computer.  Following completion of the 
Dentalab program, the programmer at Strohl who developed it, Elaine Whelan, 
formed Whelan Associates Inc. (“Whelan Associates”).  Whelan Associates acquired 
Strohl's interest in the Dentalab program.291  Subsequently, Rand Jaslow, with the 
assistance of another computer programmer, then developed a similar program, 
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Dentcom, in the BASIC programming language, which was suitable for cheaper IBM 
PC computers.  Whelan Associates claimed that Dentcom infringed its copyright in 
its Dentalab program.292 
 
The court a quo held that the Dentcom program was not independently 
created.  It further held that, despite the fact that the Dentcom program was written in 
a different programming language from that in which Dentalab was written, and was 
not a mere translation of the Dentalab program, the Dentcom program infringed the 
copyright in the Dentalab program because its structure was substantially similar to 
that of the Dentalab program.  The court a quo, therefore, awarded Whelan 
Associates damages for these copyright infringements, and enjoined the sale of the 
Dentcom program.293  It was this decision that was the subject of the appeal. 
 
As there had been no finding, or allegation, of any copying of the computer 
code (although the defendants had access to the Dentalab program), the court had 
to address the defendants’ contention that copyright protection does not extend to 
the non-literal elements such as the structure of a computer program.  In other 
words, they contended that non-literal copying of the structure of a computer 
program cannot be the basis for a finding of substantial similarity, and, thus, 
copyright infringement, as the court a quo had found.294  The defendants argued that 
while it is true that non-literal copying of other literary works can result in substantial 
similarity, this principle should not be extended by analogy to computer programs.295  
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They argued that the structure of a computer program was simply an unprotectable 
idea, rather than the expression of an idea.  The court then set about establishing 
the rule for distinguishing an unprotectable idea from its expression in computer 
programs.296 
 
Decision 
 
Whether two works are substantially similar is judged qualitatively and not 
quantitatively.297  A computer program, like other copyright works, has some steps 
which are more important than others, and, therefore, assessments of substantial 
similarity cannot be made on a mechanical basis.  It is necessary to determine 
whether the most important elements of the two programs are similar.298 
 
The idea-expression dichotomy in copyright law had its basis in the purpose 
of the copyright law: to strike an efficient balance between incentivising the creation 
of copyright works, on the one hand, and the dissemination of information, and the 
promotion of learning, culture, development and competition, on the other hand.299  
Although it is generally difficult to distinguish the unprotectable idea from the 
protectable expression, in the case of a utilitarian (or functional) work the elusive 
dividing line depends on the purpose (or function) of such work.300  Simply put, the 
purpose of a utilitarian work would be the work's idea, and everything that is not 
necessary to that purpose or function would be part of the expression of the idea.  
Thus, where there is more than one way in which the purpose can be achieved, the 
particular means chosen would not be necessary for such purpose, and will regarded 
as protectable expression.301  The copyright doctrines which limit the protectable 
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elements, such as scènes à faire and the facts incorporated in factual copyright 
works, are similarly based on the aforesaid purpose of copyright law.  Anything that 
is necessary for the purpose or function of a work would be unprotectable (and 
considered part of such a work’s idea), otherwise it would give the first author of 
such a work a patent-like monopoly over such work.302 
 
The court considered its characterisation of what constituted copyrightable 
expression as being consistent with the notion that the idea-expression distinction is 
based on the premise that copyright law has to provide appropriate incentives for 
creation of copyright works, while allowing sufficient room for competition.  Given 
that most of the costs incurred in the development of a program relate to the design 
of its structure and logic, it is necessary to extend copyright protection to such non-
literal elements such as the structure of a program in order to provide programmers 
with the appropriate incentives to create such works.303 
 
The court rejected the economic argument for restricting copyright protection 
to the literal elements of a computer program.  It had been submitted on behalf of the 
defendants that due to the complexity of computer programs, and the 
interdependency of the various elements, from an economic perspective, the copying 
of a computer program almost invariably requires literal copying.  Merely copying its 
structure would still require a competitor to incur a similar amount of effort and costs 
as that incurred by the author of the original computer program, and a competitor 
should not be prevented from embarking on such a project.  The court rejected this 
argument for two reasons.  First, allowing a competitor to use the structure of the 
original program would give the competitor a significant advantage, as it is costly to 
develop.  Second, the level of effort involved in copying a copyright work is 
irrelevant; the issue in an infringement case is whether the author’s expression had 
been copied.304 
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The court also rejected the argument that the concept of structure in computer 
programs was too vague to be useful in copyright cases.  It conceded there was 
difficulty in its application to computer programs but ease of application should not 
be determinative of whether the concept should be used.305  The court also rejected 
the argument that the progress in computer programming was quantitatively different 
to that in other areas of science or the arts, and, therefore, copyright law should 
allow the reuse of comparatively more elements of a computer program, as they are 
required as building blocks for further progress of the field.306 
 
The court defined the purpose of the Dentalab program as the efficient 
management of the business operations of a dental laboratory.  Given that there 
were other computer programs with a similarly purpose, with different structures and 
designs, the particular detailed structure of the program was not essential to its 
function, and constituted protectable expression of that idea.  The court accepted the 
court a quo’s characterisation that “[t]he 'expression of the idea' in a software 
computer program is the manner in which the program operates, controls and 
regulates the computer in receiving, assembling, calculating, retaining, correlating, 
and producing useful information either on a screen, print-out or by audio 
communication.”307 
 
As a data file structure (how the data is stored and arranged) resembles the 
layout of a blank form, both may be protectable by copyright if their design involved 
sufficient innovation that the specific information they contain and the manner in 
which the information is arranged was informative.  The Dentalab file structure was 
sufficiently innovative because there were other programs which used different file 
structures, and, therefore the particular file structure was not required.  Thus, the 
Dentalab file structure was a protectable expression.308  Although Whelan 
Associates did not allege copyright infringement with respect to the user interface, 
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the court held that they were protectable as distinct audiovisual copyright works.309  
Although the user interface was not a computer program, the similarity of the user 
interfaces could serve as indirect, inferential evidence of infringement of the 
underlying computer program.  The screen output is produced by the computer 
program and, therefore, of some probative value.310   
 
There was sufficient evidence of substantial similarity between the data file 
structures of the programs, screen outputs and two key subroutines (invoicing 
accounts, and end-of-day and end-of-month procedures) to support a finding of 
infringement.311 
 
Comment and criticism 
 
The court expressly identified the purpose of copyright law as incentivising the 
creation of copyright works, while seeking to strike an efficient balance with other 
social goals: the dissemination of information, and the promotion of learning, culture, 
development and competitions.312  However, critics indicated that the court did not 
strike the appropriate balance, and that the scope of copyright protection it afforded 
to a computer program was far too broad.  Instead of using the idea-expression 
dichotomy to limit the protection afforded to an author, the doctrine was 
inappropriately used to provide excessive copyright protection for computer 
programs.313  
 
Equating the idea of a computer program with its overall purpose was 
simplistic, and lacked a principled basis for distinguishing ideas from protectable 
expression; it was too subjective and arbitrary.  It depended on the court’s 
description of what it defined as the program’s purpose or objective.  Defining the 
purpose of the program becomes critical, and, possibly determinative of an 
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infringement action.  By defining a program’s idea as its purpose, and everything that 
was not necessary to that purpose as part of the protectable expression, it favoured 
an expansive notion of what constitutes protectable expression.314  The court failed 
to appreciate that a computer program may contain several ideas, and their 
expression, at different levels.  Computer programs are generally constructed by the 
combination of various sub-routines, each of which may be considered as a distinct 
computer program with their own idea and expression.  This requires a more 
sophisticated approach to identify what constitutes protectable, expressive 
material.315 
 
It was suggested that the reason for the excessive copyright protection which 
the court afforded was a consequence of its failure to appreciate the functional 
nature of computer programs, and the technical aspects of developing software.  
While it is correct that there may be a number of ways in which the function — 
expressed at its most basic or abstract level — of a computer program can be 
expressed, this does not mean that each of such alternatives are of equal merit.  
Computer programs are not pure creative works like fictional literary works, and their 
development is — to a very significant degree — dictated by the technical 
constraints, and efficiency considerations, such as the need to manage data flow: 
how the data will be stored and processed.316  The failure to appreciate this 
qualitative difference meant that the court assessed the computer program in the 
same manner as it would a fictional literary work, referring to a concept such as the 
“structure” of a computer program.  However, this concept is not apposite to 
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computer programs.317  The various subroutines of a computer program and their 
interaction are determined by their functional importance, not the kind of creativity 
associated with formulating the structure of a work of literary fiction.318 
 
By ignoring the technical aspects of a computer program, too many aspects of 
a computer program were protected, which inhibited the development of other 
computer programs.  Progress in such a technical field is incremental, and excessive 
protection prevented such an incremental, cumulative process from being realised.  
For example, as a consequence of the Whelan decision, another software developer 
could be prevented from reverse engineering a program, and using the same 
processes and methods of data management in a program with a similar function, 
and possibly also in a program with a completely different function.319  This approach 
gives the author of a computer program a patent-like monopoly.320  Program 
developers were, consequently, required to devote, and waste, costly resources to 
deal with the same technical issues in order to avoid infringing copyright in the earlier 
program; they would, metaphorically, be required to reinvent the wheel to deal with 
recurring functional requirements.  These additional costs would mean that some 
program developers would abandon their efforts to develop useful computer 
programs because they would consider it economically unviable, resulting in an 
inefficient allocation of resources.  This harms consumers as there would be fewer 
available computer programs, and consumers would be required to pay higher prices 
for those which have been developed.321 
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In short, under the Whelan approach too many functional aspects of a 
computer program would be protected by copyright.  This over-broad protection 
paved the way for the subsequent expansion of copyright protection of computer 
programs, culminating in the protection of a program’s user interface as their 
replication constituted a form of non-literal copying.322 
 
(b) Computer Associates Intl. Inc. v Altai Inc. 
 
The Computer Associates case also required a determination of whether, and to 
what extent, the non-literal elements of a computer program are protected by 
copyright.323  Computer Associates Intl. Inc. (“CA”) and Altai Inc. (“Altai”) were both 
computer software companies.  CA produced CA-SCHEDULER, a job-scheduling 
program.  A job-scheduling program prioritises and manages the various tasks to be 
performed by a computer.  Computer programs, including a job-scheduling program, 
are written to operate on a specific operating system.  What made the CA-
SCHEDULER unusual was that it contained a sub-program, ADAPTER, which 
allowed the CA-SCHEDULER to operate on different operating systems.324 
 
Altai also produced a job-scheduling program, OSCAR, which included a 
compatibility component similar to CA’s ADAPTER.  Altai conceded that its first 
version of OSCAR, known as OSCAR 3.4, infringed CA’s copyright as it copied 30% 
of CA’s ADAPTER sub-program.  Altai then proceeded to rewrite the portions of the 
OSCAR program which had been copied, using a new team of programmers to avoid 
                                            
322
 De Villiers "Computer Programs and Copyright: The South African Perspective" 333; Hill 
"Fragmenting the Copyleft Movement: The Public Will Not Prevail" 805; Kravetz "Copyright Protection 
of Computer Programs" 55; Pistorius "The Copyright Protection of Computer Programs in the United 
States of America: The Second Generation Questions (Part 2)" 180; Spivak "Does Form Follow 
Function? The Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Protection of Computer Software" 754 and 
758.  For example, see Lotus Development Corp. v Paperback Software Intl.  
323
 Computer Associates Intl. Inc. v Altai Inc. 696.  This work will only discuss the aspects of the case 
relating to the scope of copyright protection, and, for example, will not address the claim that Altai had 
misappropriated CA’s trade secrets. 
324
 698-9. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
224 
 
any possible claims of copyright infringement.325  However, CA claimed that the new 
version of Altai’s OSCAR program, OSCAR 3.5, also infringed its copyright in the 
CA-SCHEDULER program because it remained substantially similar to the structure 
of its ADAPTER program despite the fact that it was accepted that there was no 
literal copying of CA’s ADAPTER when it created OSCAR 3.5.326 
 
As it was assumed that Altai had access to CA’s ADAPTER computer code, 
the only issue the court had to determine was whether Altai's OSCAR 3.5 was 
substantially similar to CA’s ADAPTER.327 
 
Decision 
 
The court held that in order to determine the scope of protection of the non-literal 
structure of a computer program it was necessary to use the idea-expression 
doctrine, while conceding the difficulty in distinguishing ideas from expressions.328  
The problem of distinguishing ideas from expressions was compounded in the case 
of utilitarian works like computer programs.  Compared to aesthetic works, which are 
not process orientated, computer programs involve both creative expression and 
technical expression.  The use of technical art, instructions, or methods to achieve a 
particular purpose (or function) expressed in a work, or matter necessarily incidental 
thereto, does not constitute copyright infringement.  It made no difference if the 
methods or instructions are directed at a human or a computer.329  Thus, those 
elements of a computer program necessarily incidental to its function or purpose are 
unprotectable.330 
 
The court rejected the approach of the court in Whelan Associates, which 
distinguished the idea of a computer program from its expression with reference to 
its ultimate function or purpose, which it considered to be its idea.  It held that there 
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was no a priori, single principle which can be applied to distinguish unprotectable 
ideas from protectable expression.  Instead, a three-step procedure, utilising the 
copyright doctrines such as merger, scènes à faire, and public domain, should be 
used to ascertain if computer programs are substantially similar.  A court should first 
break down the copyrighted program into its constituent structural parts.  Each of 
these parts must then be analysed to filter out the unprotectable elements 
(associated ideas, those ideas dictated by efficiency or external factors, and public 
domain elements) to determine the protectable kernel (the “golden nugget”) of the 
program.  This protected expression must then be compared to structure of the 
allegedly infringing work to determine if they are substantially similar.331  This three-
step procedure became known as the AFC test: an abbreviation of the three 
sequential steps — abstraction, filtration, and comparison. 
 
The court stated that the abstraction test, the first step in the suggested 
procedure, conformed with the traditional approach employed when attempting to 
distinguish unprotectable ideas from protectable expression in the case of fictional 
literary works such as novels and plays.332  This conceptual approach, when applied 
to computer programs, required its assessment in increasingly general or abstract 
terms, identifying the various levels of abstraction in the structure of the program, 
starting with the computer code (the lowest level of abstraction) and proceeding with 
more general abstractions until one ends with the program’s function or purpose (the 
highest level of abstraction).  At the lowest and highest levels of abstraction the 
structure of a computer program is trivial; at the lowest level it can simply be 
regarded as individual computer instructions, while at the highest level it will simply 
be the function of the computer program.333 
 
At each level of abstraction a determination had to be made about whether 
the structural elements at that level are unprotectable because they amounted to 
ideas, were dictated by considerations of efficiency, were required by external 
factors, or taken from the public domain.  Through this process of filtration the 
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protectable core, if any, of the computer program will be identified, and, in turn, the 
scope of the plaintiff’s copyright protection.334  The merger doctrine emerged as a 
consequence of a particular expression being necessarily incidental to the idea 
expressed, resulting in the idea and its expression being inseparable.335  If copyright 
protection was afforded to such expressions, it would amount to giving the copyright 
owner a monopoly in the idea.  This process was applicable to the structural aspects 
of a computer program, and its textual expressions.  This was particularly the case 
with aspects determined by considerations of efficiency.  There was also possibly a 
more pragmatic procedural reason for refusing copyright in efficient structural 
aspects: the computing industry was constantly striving for efficiency and it is likely 
that the same solutions will be arrived at independently.336  Thus, the existence of 
similar, efficient structures may just as likely be the result of independent creation as 
copying.337 
 
Similarly, the scènes à faire doctrine, which denies copyright protection to 
certain common features or devices one would expect to find in particular literary 
works, could be applied to the analysis of computer programs to filter out standard 
techniques dictated by extrinsic considerations.338  For example, a computer 
program may be constrained by the particular computer on which it was intended to 
operate, other programs it had to interact with, or industry standards or practices.339  
Material in the public domain would similarly be excluded from protection as such 
material was free for use by others.340 
 
Following the filtration of the non-protectable elements, a determination had to 
be made whether any aspect of the remaining protectable expression (the golden 
nugget), if any, had been copied by the defendant, and the relative importance of the 
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copied portion with respect to the plaintiff’s overall program.341  This ensured that the 
scope of copyright protection provided sufficient incentives for software developers 
to create socially beneficial works, while not unduly stifling competition.  The court 
held that this was in accordance with the fundamental principles on which copyright 
law was based.342  It also ensured “that non-protectable technical expression 
remains in the public domain for others to use freely as building blocks in their own 
work.”343 
 
Interestingly, while conceding that creating preparatory design material such 
as flow charts may involve substantial effort, the court held that this material was not 
protected by the copyright in the computer program.  The level of effort did not, per 
se, mean that the product was eligible for copyright protection.344  Also, although the 
decision was not concerned with the protection of the user interface, the court 
indicated that the user interface constituted an audiovisual work, distinct from the 
underlying computer program.345  This remark was probably intended to reverse 
earlier cases which had extended the idea of protecting the non-literal elements of a 
computer program to include a program’s user interface.346 
 
The court held that, following the filtration process, OSCAR contained no 
protectable expression.347 
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Comment and criticism 
 
The Computer Associates decision has, on the one hand, been described as 
providing a clear and easy test to assess the copyrightability of the various elements 
of computer programs,348 and, on the other hand, as the “one of the most complex 
judicial rulings in this field.”349  What is generally accepted is that it was the first case 
which adopted a narrow approach to the copyright protection of computer programs, 
as it started the reverse of the broad protection which had been afforded to computer 
programs until then — even extending to the “look and feel” of a program — which 
broad scope of protection had started with the Whelan case.350 
 
According to the Computer Associates case, instead of comparing the 
respective programs in their entirety, it was necessary to identify the protectable 
elements in the original program, following a process of excising non-copyrightable 
elements.351  Whereas the Whelan case characterised the development of computer 
programs as primarily the result of creative expression, rather than technical 
expression, the Computer Associates case appeared to adopt the reverse position.  
Critics of the Computer Associates decision were of the opinion that the application 
of the AFC test motivated the court to identify too many elements as unprotectable; it 
was claimed that it gave disproportionate importance to technical considerations 
such as efficiency and functionality in design of computer program, and 
considerations of the public domain.352 
 
Critics claimed that the court, in its application of the abstraction step failed to 
regard the overall structure of the program as a level of abstraction that may have 
protectable elements, which was the basis of the protection in the Whelan case.  The 
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structure of a program was considered to unprotectable as a process or method.353  
By failing to adequately consider a computer program in its entirety — and only 
looking at it at the level of the constituent parts as a consequence of the AFC test — 
it was submitted that insufficient (or no) protection was afforded to the considerable 
effort and skill involved in designing the optimal architecture for a computer program, 
and for a computer program as a compilation of various smaller programs.354  
However, the advantage of the Computer Associates approach is that it avoids the 
issue of trying to determine the appropriate level of abstraction at which a computer 
program should be protected.  In other words, it avoids the problem of having to 
determine whether a particular level of abstraction constitutes an abstract idea, or 
protectable expression.355  Although the AFC test creates the possibility that there 
may be protectable expression at various levels of abstraction, critics of the AFC test 
indicate that some abstractions of a computer program will not yield any protectable 
elements.  The impression that the AFC test had created, and which would not 
necessarily be the case, was that it would yield some protectable expression, and, if 
there had been unauthorised use of a substantial portion thereof, it would constitute 
copyright infringement.356 
 
In addition, the court’s application of the filtration step in relation to computer 
programs was criticised as crude.  It was submitted that once a computer program 
has been created it is very difficult for a court to separate functional elements from 
expressive elements which may warrant protection.  The reason for this is that it is 
very easy to suggest a functional or efficiency reason for a particular element after 
the fact.  After all, computer code is necessarily functional as it determines the 
specific instructions to be performed by the computer.  However, it was claimed that 
in constructing a computer program there is still enough room for creative 
expression, which should be identified and protected by copyright.  As a 
consequence of such crude application of copyright law to computer programs there 
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was a danger that too many elements of a computer program will be considered to 
be unprotectable.  Copyright rules such as the merger doctrine or scènes à faire 
should, therefore, be applied with caution to computer programs.357 
 
Critics claimed that the consequence of the new, narrower copyright 
protection afforded to computer programs would discourage the innovation in 
programming techniques because there would be insufficient incentives for software 
developers.  The approach of the court in Computer Associates meant that 
innovative programming techniques, which increase the efficiency of computer 
programs, would generally be unprotected because these elements will be regarded 
as functional.  It was even suggested that this would, perversely, mean that 
programmers will prefer more inefficient, idiosyncratic programming techniques, 
because they were more likely to be protected by copyright.358  However, there was 
no evidence that any of these retrograde processes, or reduced production of new 
computer programs, resulted from the thin copyright protection which the courts 
started granting to computer programs following the Computer Associates decision. 
 
(c) Lotus Development Corp. v Borland International Inc. 
 
In Lotus Development Corp. v Borland International Inc. the court had to decide 
whether a computer program menu command hierarchy was copyrightable subject 
matter.  More specifically, it had to decide whether Lotus Development Corporation 
(“Lotus”) had copyright in the menu command hierarchy of its Lotus 1-2-3 
spreadsheet computer program, and whether it was infringed by Borland 
International Inc. (“Borland”) in two of its Quattro spreadsheet programs.359  The 
Lotus 1-2-3 computer program was a spreadsheet program that enabled users to 
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perform accounting functions.  Users manipulated and controlled the program via a 
series of menu commands, such as “Copy,” “Print,” and “Quit.”  They could choose 
commands from its menu structure (or menu tree) either by highlighting them on the 
screen or by typing the first letter of the desired command.360  In addition, the Lotus 
1-2-3 computer program allowed users to create shortcuts for the execution of 
commands, called “macros.”  These macros allowed a user to execute a series of 
commands with a single, user-created, macro keystroke.361 
 
Borland’s Quattro programs allowed users to chose a user interface, the 
“Lotus Emulation Interface,” which “virtually identically” replicated the display of the 
Lotus 1-2-3 menu structure.  In its replication of the Lotus 1-2-3 menu structure, 
Borland had not copied any of Lotus’ underlying computer code.  The replication of 
the Lotus 1-2-3 menu structure was deliberate; it was intended to minimise any 
problems caused by a lack of familiarity with the Quattro programs which new users 
who had previously used Lotus 1-2-3 may experience.362  In summary judgment 
proceedings, the district court found Borland’s Quattro programs to have infringed 
Lotus’ menu commands and its structure because there were other ways of 
implementing menu commands and their structure.363 
 
Borland then removed the Lotus Emulation Interface from its Quattro 
programs.  While the modified versions of the Quattro programs no longer displayed 
the Lotus 1-2-3 command menus to users, users were still able to use some of the 
Lotus 1-2-3 macros as a result of the “Key Reader” feature which was retained in the 
Quattro programs.  While the Key Reader did not use the full names of the Lotus 1-
2-3 command names but only the first letter of each command, the district court 
again considered it to have infringed the Lotus 1-2-3 menu command structure.364 
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Borland appealed on the basis that the Lotus 1-2-3 menu command hierarchy 
was not copyrightable as it was a system, method of operation, process, or 
procedure, which are not copyrightable pursuant to section 102(b) of the US 
Copyright Act 1976.365  There were two unusual aspects in the case.  First, it is 
seldom in a copyright-infringement case that a defendant admits to copying material, 
and Borland admitted to copying the Lotus 1-2-3 menu command hierarchy.  
Second, no other element of the user interface relating to the menu command 
hierarchy, such as the screen display was alleged to have been infringed.366  Thus, 
the appeal solely concerned the copyrightability of the menu command hierarchy 
used to operate the computer program.367  The alleged copying of the menu 
command hierarchy was considered to involve literal copying, and the issue was 
whether the menu command hierarchy was copyrightable.368  However, the court did 
make significant general comments concerning the scope of copyright protection, 
which would be applicable to cases of literal and non-literal copying. 
 
Decision 
 
The court, per Judge Stahl, stated that in cases of alleged non-literal copying it was 
necessary to determine whether the similarities are the result of the fact that the two 
works merely shared the same underlying idea or whether the similarities are a 
consequence of the defendant having copied the plaintiff’s expression.369  The court 
appeared to tacitly approve the Computer Associates test for distinguishing 
protectable expression from unprotected ideas in cases concerning non-literal 
copying, but not for cases involving literal copying.370   
 
                                            
365
 812. 
366
 813. 
367
 814. 
368
 814-5. 
369
 814. 
370
 814.  However, as indicated above, in subsequent cases it was accepted that the AFC test was 
also applicable in cases of literal copying.  See Gates Rubber v Bando Chemical Industries ; Bateman 
v Mnemonics . 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
233 
 
The court considered the Lotus menu command hierarchy to be a “method of 
operation,” and, therefore, did not consider whether it was also uncopyrightable as a 
“system, process, or procedure.”  The statutory expression “method of operation” 
used in section 102(b) refers to the means by which a person operates something, 
whether it be a car, a food processor, or a computer.  It was irrelevant whether there 
were other methods of operation; all methods of operation were unprotectable.  The 
menu command hierarchy was not explanatory, it was what users used to operate, 
and interact with, the Lotus 1-2-3 program.371  The mere fact that specific words 
were used as commands did not make the menu protectable as the “expression” of 
an abstract “method of operation” because the specific words became part of the 
method of operation, like the buttons (not simply the labels on such buttons) on a 
video cassette recorder.372  It may have been possible for Lotus to design a user 
interface in which the command terms were merely labels, but it had not done so.373 
 
The menu command hierarchy was intended to be learnt and used by users, 
and, therefore, was more analogous to the common law notion that using a method 
or art obtained from a literary work is not protected by copyright.  The “method of 
operation” exclusion in s 102(b) was simply a codification of this common-law 
principle.374  The Lotus menu command hierarchy served as the basis for Lotus 1-2-
3 macros, and as the Lotus menu command hierarchy was a “method of operation,” 
the Key Reader’s use of the macros did not constitute copyright infringement.375   
 
In contrast, the screen displays, unlike the menu command hierarchy, were 
not required to operate the Lotus 1-2-3 program and, therefore, they do not amount 
to a “method of operation.”  As such, the screen displays were therefore protectable 
by copyright.376 Similarly, because the same menu command hierarchy can be 
                                            
371
 Lotus Development Corp. v Borland International Inc. 815. 
372
 816-7. 
373
 817. 
374
 816-7. 
375
 818.  This seems to the implication of the judgment. 
376
 815-6. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
234 
 
achieved through different computer programs, the computer code generating the 
menu command hierarchy was not an unprotectable method of operation.377 
 
Interestingly, Judge Boudin, who concurred with Judge Stahl, made some 
important observations concerning the rationale for copyright protection and what the 
appropriate scope of copyright protection of computer programs should be to fulfil 
that rationale.  The judge stated that the goal of copyright law, and its associated 
doctrines, was to incentivise (stimulate) the creation of copyright works, and, thus, it 
should not unduly limit access by others to the broader themes and concepts used to 
create such works by authors.  Providing over-broad copyright protection to literary 
works, other than computer programs, only results in a small additional social cost.  
However, computer programs are fundamentally different from other literary works 
as they are instrumental in nature in that they are intended to bring about a particular 
result.  In this respect they resemble objects of mechanical utility, which are 
generally protected by patent law.  Although the functional nature of computer 
programs did not prevent computer programs from being copyrightable, it did change 
how they should be assessed in terms of copyright doctrine.378  Although copyright 
law has a statutory basis, its scope has painstakingly been developed by the 
courts.379 
 
While the economic incentive argument for protecting computer programs 
may be stronger than in comparison with other literary works, overprotection may 
also result in greater social costs, particularly if innovative, efficient solutions are 
highly valued.  Requiring other software developers to create new command menus 
was socially inefficient: while it could be considered to protect the investment made 
by authors of existing menus, it disregarded the social cost caused by users having 
to learn new systems.380  For example, the QWERTY keyboards could be regarded 
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as a menu of letters which was not protected because it was socially wasteful for 
people to have to learn different keyboard layouts.381 
 
Judge Boudin held that Borland only copied the Lotus 1-2-3 menu command 
hierarchy to accommodate users who had previously become accustomed to that 
menu command hierarchy, and allowed those users to use their own, previously-
created macros.  It was unlikely that the ability to use the Lotus 1-2-3 menu would 
have been the reason users preferred the Quattro programs; it was likely that they 
chose the Quattro programs for their other features.382  There was also the possibility 
that if Borland was not allowed to copy the Lotus 1-2-3 menu command hierarchy 
that users who invested the time and effort to become accustomed to that menu, and 
created macros, would be locked in to the Lotus program.  The users’ investment 
could lead to Lotus 1-2-3 being the “standard” for electronic spreadsheets and in 
Lotus having a monopoly of the electronic spreadsheet market, not because it was a 
better program or because it represented better value.  Lotus could, thus, in this way, 
benefit from the investment made by users, rather than its own investment.  Lotus 
had already realised significant returns as the first mover in the market, and, if the 
Borland produced a better product it should have the opportunity to earn a return on 
its investment.383 
 
Judge Boudin held that it was clear that Borland should succeed; it was 
simply the basis that had to be determined.  While it was certainly arguable that the 
menu was a method of operation, the copying of the menu may also have been 
permitted in terms of the fair use doctrine.384  The problem with the latter approach 
was that its application was unpredictable, and, thus, costly and time consuming to 
determine when such use would be considered permissible.385 
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Comment and criticism 
 
The Lotus decision marked the peak of the narrow scope of copyright protection of 
computer programs in the US.  Commentators have claimed that following the Lotus 
decision, “virtually every nonliteral element of a computer program can be 
considered to be a ‘method of operation.’”386  The cumulative effect of the Computer 
Associates and Lotus decisions was that the look and feel, or user interface, of a 
computer program would, as a general rule, no longer be protected, and neither 
would its functional elements such as menu command hierarchies.387  Unlike the 
previous decisions, the court in the Lotus case did not seek to directly apply the idea-
expression doctrine to determine whether the menu command system amounted to a 
protectable expression.388  It chose instead to use the statutory exceptions based on 
the idea-expression doctrine. 
 
Critics suggested that the court’s analogy that the visual menu command 
system constituted a method of operation, similar to the buttons (not simply the 
labels) on a video cassette recorder, was not particularly convincing.389  If the user 
interface had been implemented slightly differently and displayed a “button” with a 
label of the command term, which a user could “click,” the command term would 
have been more like the labels on the buttons of a VCR, and, thus, possibly 
copyrightable.390  However, others have suggested that, while the Lotus decision 
may not be logically sound, it was the right decision from an economic perspective.  
Economically, the assessment of whether copyright should protect a particular 
element of a computer program should depend on whether its use by competitors 
will give them an unfair advantage.  In casu, the use of Lotus 1-2-3 menu command 
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structure did not give Lotus’ competitors such an unfair advantage.391  From this 
perspective, Judge Boudin’s suggestion that the use of the menu command 
hierarchy may have been permitted in terms of the fair use doctrine is, doctrinally, a 
more cogent reason for the court’s decision. 
 
Moreover, although the court considered user interfaces to be protectable by 
copyright, as they were not a method of operation, the concern was expressed that 
future courts were more likely to consider screen displays to be a method of 
operation.  For example, the fact that a user may need to navigate to various parts of 
a screen display to interact with a computer program may render user interfaces 
unprotectable as a method of operation.  It would mean that, in the future, most 
aspects of a user interface would be considered to be unprotectable, restricting 
protection to a small number of aesthetic features, and the literal computer code.392   
 
As will be illustrated, the Computer Associates case’s narrow characterisation 
of the scope of copyright protection of computer programs, and the Lotus case’s 
examination of the protectability of elements of the user interface, is consistent with 
the current position in the UK. 
 
4 4 4 2 2 UK case law 
 
There has been a similar development in the UK to that in the US: there was a shift 
from initially providing broad protection to much narrower copyright protection to 
computer programs.  Given the historical connections, and similarities, between 
South African and UK copyright law, the UK case law concerning the scope of 
copyright protection of computer programs is particularly persuasive and instructive.  
As indicated above, there are two further reasons for our interest in the UK case law.  
First, although the US was the first jurisdiction to consider the challenges posed to 
copyright law when applied to computer programs, the most recent developments 
concerning the scope of protection have occurred in the UK.  Second, because UK 
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copyright law has had to be harmonised with the EU Software Directive,393 its law is 
more representative of the appropriate level of copyright protection afforded to 
computer programs.  The EU Software Directive represents the consensus position 
on copyright protection of computer programs across the member states of the 
European Union. 
 
The five UK cases which will be considered are: John Richardson Computers 
Ltd v Flanders (No. 2);394 IBCOS Computers Ltd v Barclays Highland Finance Ltd;395 
Cantor Fitzgerald International v Tradition (UK) Ltd;396 Navitaire Inc v easyJet Co;397 
and Nova Productions Ltd v Mazooma Games Ltd.398 
 
(a) John Richardson Computers Ltd v Flanders (No. 2) 
 
In this, the first case of its kind to proceed to a full hearing in the UK, the court had to 
consider what the appropriate approach should be in cases involving an alleged 
copyright infringement but where there was no allegation that the computer code had 
been copied.399  The plaintiff, John Richardson Computers Limited (“JRC”), and the 
second defendant, Chemtec Limited (“Chemtec”), were software companies and 
each of them produced and marketed computer programs which could be used by 
pharmacists in the labelling of dispensed drugs and control of stock levels.400  JRC 
had developed a computer program for pharmacists in the United Kingdom which 
operated on the Video Genie computer (the “Video Genie program”), and then 
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employed Timothy Flanders (“Flanders”) to write a program for the BBC computer 
(the “BBC program”) with the same “look and feel” as the Video Genie program.401 
 
A modified version of the BBC program was then created for pharmacists in 
the Republic of Ireland.402  After leaving JRC’s employment, Flanders acted as a 
consultant to JRC, and continued to improve the BBC program.403  However, 
Flanders also developed a new program for pharmacists in the Republic of Ireland 
which would operate on IBM PCs (or compatible computers), which was sold under 
the name “Pharm-Assist.”404  He then modified the Pharm-Assist program for use in 
the United Kingdom, and formed Chemtec, the second defendant, to market this 
program (“Chemtec program”).405 
 
JRC alleged that the Chemtec program infringed its copyright in the BBC 
program, but there was no allegation of literal copying of any substantial parts of the 
computer code of the BBC program.  Instead, JRC alleged that the defendants had 
taken the general scheme of the BBC program, similar to the appropriation of the 
plot of a novel.406 
 
Decision 
 
The court held that it was clear that copyright infringement of computer programs 
can occur without literal copying of computer code.  For example, the unauthorised 
translation of the computer code of a computer program, or a substantial part it, into 
a different language would constitute copyright infringement as such translation 
would amount to an “adaptation,” which is an act reserved for the copyright owner.407   
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As different computer programs could produce the same results, when 
comparing two computer programs, it was important to consider the actual programs 
rather than what they do.408  However, the fact that two programs produce the same 
results could give rise to an inference that such similarity may have been the result 
of copyright infringement.409  The screen display of a program is the product or result 
of the program.  While the particular screen display was not a literary work, the 
screen display was possibly protectable as an artistic work or film.  However, there 
was no allegation by the plaintiff that the Chemtec program infringed the screen 
display in the BBC program.410   
 
The court held that if the results of a computer program were replicated 
through a process of reverse engineering by observing its operation, the resultant 
new computer program would probably not constitute copyright infringement as the 
creator of the new program would have simply taken the idea embodied in the first 
program.  In such cases of reverse engineering — which was not the situation in 
casu — the result would have been achieved by the latter programmer’s own efforts, 
and he cannot be considered to have taken any unfair advantage of the labour, skill 
and effort which went into the creation of the first program.411 
 
However, the position was different if the defendant had access to the 
plaintiff’s computer program.  As in the United States, English copyright law, too, 
does not extend copyright protection to ideas, only to the expression of ideas.412  
The court considered the facts of this case to be similar to those in the Computer 
Associates case as both cases involved the alleged non-literal copying of the 
structure of the plaintiff’s computer program.413  It considered the approach in cases 
of non-literal infringement set out in Computer Associates to be generally consistent 
with English law.414  However, the court considered that the appropriate approach 
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should be to first determine whether the plaintiff’s computer program, as a whole, 
was copyrightable, rather than trying to identify the core protectable expression.  If it 
was found to be copyrightable, it then had to be determined whether any similarity 
attributable to copying found in the defendant's program amounted to the copying of 
a substantial part of the plaintiff's program.  Only when making an assessment of 
whether the copied portion constituted a substantial part of the plaintiff’s program — 
which required an assessment of the originality of the plaintiff's program and the 
separation of an idea from its expression — should a similar approach to that used in 
the Computer Associates be used.415 
 
In its comparison of the two computer programs, to determine the extent of 
the similarities, the court chose to focus on three (user interface) aspects of the 
Chemtec program: the stock control system, the dose codes and the main menu.  
One of the two stock control systems in the Chemtec program was the same as in 
the BBC program.416  The dose codes (which was a list of the drugs, possible usage 
directions and warnings, and which was considered to be protectable as a 
compilation) in the Chemtec program was sufficiently similar to that used in the BBC 
program to infer that they had been copied.417  However, as far the main menu was 
concerned, there was no relevant similarity between the two computer programs.  
The similarities in the main menu could be attributed to either similarity in idea (or 
concept), rather than expression, or standard methods of operation.418 
 
However, due to the similarities that did exist between the programs, as a 
whole, it was necessary to determine whether these similarities were the result of 
copying.419  To establish whether there was copying it was necessary to consider 
three issues.  First, it was necessary to determine the process by which Flanders 
wrote the Chemtec program.  Second, whether inferences could properly be drawn 
from the surrounding circumstances.  Third, whether, based on the evidence of the 
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development process and the surrounding circumstances, the nature of similarities 
allowed for proper inferences to be drawn.420 
 
The court held that the evidence concerning the development of the Pharm-
Assist program, which was the basis of the Chemtec program, was indicative of the 
writing of a new program rather than the copying or adaptation of the BBC 
program.421  Flanders did not have access to the BBC program’s source code, and 
neither did he have access to a working version of the BBC program, while 
developing the Pharm-Assist program.  The similarities in the main routines between 
the programs were the result of his knowledge of the BBC program, given that he 
was instrumental in its development.422  Two surrounding circumstances — although 
atypical — were also considered not to infer copying of the BBC program by 
Flanders.  First, the fact that he had not produced any programming notes, flow 
charts or similar documentation in the development of the Pharm-Assist and 
Chemtec programs, while unconventional, were not unusual.423  Second, the fact 
that he did not fully exploit the superior capabilities of the IBM computer did not 
mean that he had simply copied the inefficient BBC program; this was done to 
facilitate the use of the Pharm-Assist and Chemtec programs on less sophisticated 
computers.424 
 
Although Flanders had not deliberately copied the BBC program, because of 
his intimate knowledge of the BBC program, it was still possible that he may have 
unconsciously or unintentionally copied a substantial part of the BBC program and 
infringed the copyright therein.  In determining whether the similarities are 
substantial, it was necessary to consider the copied portions as a whole to determine 
if they constituted — qualitatively rather than quantitatively — substantial portions of 
the BBC program.425  The application of the filtration step described in the CA case 
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could assist in determining substantiality, although the court admitted to not fully 
understanding its operation.426 
 
Given the fact that the similarities were the result of copying, it was necessary 
to determine whether the various instances of similarity constituted the taking of a 
substantial part of the copyright work (that is, the BBC program).427  The court held 
that while some aspects of a program may not constitute a substantial part in 
isolation, considered together they may indicate the copying of a substantial part.428  
While it was the case that in respect of literary works which are compilations, the 
copying of a sufficiently large number of items from such works may amount to 
copyright infringement (while the individual items may not be protected by copyright), 
this principle may not be appropriate in the case of computer programs.  In the case 
of computer programs the design of the individual components were more important, 
and involved greater effort than simply the selection of components.429  In casu, the 
court held that the copying that took place was limited to fairly minor copyright 
infringements.430 
 
Comment and criticism 
 
The court considered the test proposed in the US case of Computer Associates to be 
compatible with English law in cases of non-literal copying, but it considered the AFC 
test to be applicable only after a preliminary — more traditional — comparison 
between the original work and the alleged infringing work.431  It would apply the AFC 
steps if it was found that there were objective similarities between the two computer 
programs, and that such similarities were as a consequence of copying the original 
program.  The AFC test would, thus, simply be used to determine whether the copied 
portions constituted the taking of a substantial part of the original program.432  This, it 
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is submitted, was really no distinction at all as the AFC test in Computer Associates 
was, arguably, also only used when trying to determine if the two computer programs 
are substantially similar.433 
 
However, the court appeared to only pay lip service to the AFC test.  The 
court’s assessment of the two computer programs was rather superficial.  It focused 
on the user interfaces of the programs, rather than the underlying computer 
programs.434  Despite drawing a distinction between a computer program and its 
user interface, the court proceeded to describe the user interfaces of the two 
computer programs in a great amount of detail, and used the respective interfaces to 
conclude that there were similarities between the two programs.  There was even a 
suggestion that similarities not due to copying may, in combination with the copying 
of substantial parts of the program, indicate copying of a substantial part to a greater 
extent.435  This cannot be correct; similarities that are not a consequence of copying 
cannot, some how, bolster a case of copyright infringement. 
 
(b) IBCOS Computers Ltd v Barclays Highland Finance Ltd 
 
Although this case concerned an alleged instance of literal copying, the court made 
some comments on the appropriateness of the AFC test in English law.  Ibcos 
Computers Ltd (“Ibcos”) was the owner of the copyright in a computer program 
called ADS (which was an abbreviation for “Agricultural Dealer System”) which could 
be used by agricultural dealers.  Ibcos alleged that the Unicorn computer program 
marketed by Barclays Highland Finance Ltd (“Highland”) infringed its copyright in the 
ADS program.  Both the ADS and Unicorn computer programs were essentially 
created by the same computer programmer, Mr Poole.436 
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Decision 
 
The court held that in cases involving alleged copyright infringement the UK CDPA 
required a plaintiff to establish four issues, in the following order.  First, there had to 
be a determination of the work or works in which the plaintiff claims copyright.  
Second, it had to be established whether each such work was “original."  Third, it 
had to be determined whether the relevant work was copied.  Last, a determination 
had to be made whether a substantial part of the work was copied.437  Accordingly, 
the court proceeded to analyse the merits of the alleged claim in this order. 
 
It held that both the individual programs comprising the ADS program, and the 
ADS program as a whole, were copyright works.  The ADS program, as a whole, 
being composed of various interrelated programs, routines and sub-routines, could 
be categorised as a compilation — a program of programs — as it was original, 
given the fact that its creation required a substantial amount of skill, labour and 
judgment.438  Unlike other compilations, it is more difficult to simply add more code to 
a computer program; it is more complex because additional computer code might 
affect its operation, and interaction with the other parts of the program have to be 
ensured.439  The compilation of the various ADS programs constituted a copyright 
work in its own right because it involved considerable skill and effort to put 
together.440  The consequence of the computer program as a whole being protected 
by copyright is that its overall structure and design features must, similarly, be 
protected, and not just the literal computer code.441 
 
On the issue of whether a work is original, the court indicated that care had to 
be taken when seeking to apply the following two principles.  First, it was sometimes 
suggested that, in relation to functional works, if a function could only be achieved in 
one or a limited number of ways in expressing an idea, there could be no copyright in 
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the relevant expression.442  There was no basis for distinguishing between functional 
and other works.  As discussed above, it is submitted that the court was incorrect 
that UK copyright law did not draw a distinction between functional and non-
functional works.  The appropriateness of this principle depended on a proper 
assessment of what is meant by “idea” in the specific situation.  While it was true that 
copyright cannot protect any sort of general principle or idea, the detailed expression 
thereof can properly be considered as protected by copyright.  It was a matter of 
degree whether the expression is sufficiently detailed, and, therefore, protected.  
Second, the principle that there is no copyright in ideas, which is related to the 
previous principle, had often led to confusion.443  This principle was sometimes 
raised in determinations of whether copyright subsisted in a work (that is, was there 
a “work,” or was it original), or whether there had been an infringement of a 
(substantial part) copyright work.444  While the court did not elaborate further, the 
suggestion, again, was that it was a matter of degree whether the particular 
expression was sufficiently detailed to be protected or a substantial part had been 
copied. 
 
Copyright infringement can only occur if there was copying, which is a 
question of fact.  In the absence of direct evidence of copying, a plaintiff could prove 
copying by showing that there were sufficient similarities between the allegedly 
infringing work and its own, and that the defendant had access to its work.445  This 
assessment of similarity had to involve all aspects of both works — important and 
unimportant.446  The defendant could refute allegations of copying by providing 
alternative explanations for the similarities, for example: that the similarities between 
the works were the result of their mutual reliance on the work of a third party; 
material in the public domain; or, functional necessity.447  The similarities may also 
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be attributable to the style of a particular programmer, who may have been involved 
in the development of both programs.448 
 
Given the similarities between the works, the court held that there was an 
“overwhelming” inference of copying.  The similarities included the presence of 
portions of computer code from the ADS program in the Unicorn program, which 
were redundant in the Unicorn program, specious differences in names of file 
records, and common spelling mistakes in the comments and headings in both 
works.449  However, the fact that there has been copying does not necessarily mean 
that a substantial part of the copyright work has been taken.450   
 
Unlike other copyright works, when dealing with the alleged infringement of a 
computer program it was not easy to make an assessment of whether a substantial 
part of the work had been copied without the assistance of expert evidence.451  
There was evidence of substantial literal copying of the ADS program, which was not 
adequately accounted for by the defendant.452  The level of similarities was so 
significant that a mere mechanical comparison of the two programs was sufficient to 
draw a conclusion that a substantial part of the ADS program had been copied.  
However, it was suggested that a proper comparison should, ideally, include an 
assessment of the structural similarities, and that trivial similarities should be 
distinguished from more significant ones.453  The specific arrangement of the ADS 
program (which, as a whole, was a compilation) was copied, which was a substantial 
part of the ADS program.454  Also, but for the copying, it would not have been 
possible for the Unicorn program to be developed in the short time period in which 
that was done.455 
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Interestingly, the court held that if the file transfer programs had been 
reversed engineered, which would have allowed users to transfer data from the ADS 
system to the Unicorn system, it would not have constituted copyright infringement.  
However, using the actual file record layouts of the ADS program resulted in 
copyright infringement.456 
 
In summary, the court held that the determination of whether a substantial 
part of a computer program had been copied was best determined on a simple value 
judgment by the court; it was a question of degree whether the skill, labour and 
judgment of another had been appropriated.  It was unnecessary to resort to 
complicated analysis employed in the Computer Associates case.  The court in John 
Richardson Computers was, however, correct in its finding that non-literal aspects of 
a computer program, like its general structure and design features, were 
protected.457  The arrangement of a program may involve a considerable degree of 
skill, labour and judgment, and it may constitute a substantial part of the program as 
a whole.458 
 
Comment and criticism 
 
The most interesting aspect of the case was the court’s “should we, shouldn’t we” 
attitude to using US case law.  Although suggesting earlier in the judgment that US 
case law could be of assistance when determining whether a substantial part of a 
computer program had been copied,459 the court later stated that American case law 
was not of much assistance when distinguishing unprotected ideas from protectable 
expression.460  The court held that US case law should not be relied upon to 
determine if copyright subsists in a work because US copyright law, unlike UK law, 
sought to deny affording copyright protection to functional works.  This was done by 
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either denying the existence of copyright in a functional work or denying that there 
was infringement in its copying.461 
 
It is submitted that the court overstated the differences between UK and US 
copyright law.  For example, as stated above, the court itself was prepared to 
exclude functional aspects of the program when determining whether there were 
similarities between the two programs.462  Also as already indicated, the court’s 
rather irrational reluctance to be influenced by US case law concerning the scope of 
copyright protection of computer programs indicates a form of jurisprudential 
chauvinism, and lacked a rational basis.  This opinion is confirmed by the fact that 
subsequent UK cases have, following the US position, similarly narrowed the 
protection afforded to computer programs as a consequence of a better appreciation 
of the functional nature of computer programs.  Furthermore, the distinction which 
the court sought to establish between UK and US copyright law — that in the US 
ideas were not protected, whereas in the UK a detailed idea was protected — 
amounted to sophistry.463 
 
Critics have indicated that the court’s insistence on following its traditional, 
simplistic approach in evaluating copyright infringement cases involving computer 
programs would lead to excessive protection of computer programs, particularly its 
non-literal elements.464  It was, for example, suggested that according to the court’s 
approach, it would have protected the menu command system of the Lotus 1-2-3 
spreadsheet program, contrary to the US decision in Lotus Development Corp. v 
Borland International Inc.465  This excessive protection was also contrary to the EU 
Software Directive, which had been implemented in the UK pursuant to the Copyright 
(Computer Programs) Regulations 1992.  According to the Directive, the ideas 
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underlying a computer program or its user interfaces were not protected by the 
copyright in computer programs.466 
 
(c) Cantor Fitzgerald International v Tradition (UK) Ltd 
 
Although the case of Cantor Fitzgerald International v Tradition (UK) Ltd also 
concerned alleged literal copying, it displays a greater appreciation of the qualitative 
difference between computer programs and other types of copyright work.  Both 
Cantor Fitzgerald International (“CFI”) and Tradition (UK) Ltd (“Tradition”) carried on 
business as inter-dealer brokers (IDBs) in bonds in London.467  CFI claimed that the 
copyright in certain of its computer programs forming part of its bond-broking system 
had been infringed by Tradition.468   
 
Tradition had hired a number of former employees of CFI who had an intimate 
knowledge of CFI’s bond-broking system to develop its own bond-broking system.  
The computer program developed for Tradition was written in the same programming 
language as that of the CFI bond-broking system, called VAX BASIC, and it operated 
on the same types of computers as the CFI system.  CFI claimed that Tradition could 
not have developed its bond-broking system in the short time that it did without 
copying the source code from its system.469  After Tradition discovered that parts of 
its system had indeed been developed by copying CFI’s source code (as the 
programmers had a copy of CFI’s system), it appointed an expert to determine the 
extent of the copying.  Tradition’s expert concluded that about 2 per cent of CFI’s 
code was copied (which was accepted by the court),470 and that similarities at the 
“architectural” level could be attributed to the fact that both systems were written by 
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the same programmers.471  CFI contended that the copying was more extensive.  It 
asserted that a substantial part of each of 35 modules (out of 363 modules) 
comprising the “Front Office system” portion of its bond-broking system had been 
copied.472 
 
Decision 
 
The court approved the traditional, four-step approach adopted in IBCOS as correct 
when dealing with cases involving alleged copyright infringement.  However, the 
court held that in casu there was an important interrelationship between two of the 
steps identified in the IBCOS case: whether the particular work was original (the 
prerequisite for the subsistence of copyright (second step)) and whether a 
substantial part of the work had been copied (the prerequisite for infringement (final 
step)).  Computer programs are significantly different to other literary works, which 
are intended to convey meaning to humans.  Accordingly, the principles applicable to 
other literary works should not simply be applied to computer programs.473 
 
No syntactic or semantic errors are permitted in computer programs if they 
are to operate in the desired manner.  For this reason, every portion of a computer 
program can be considered to be a substantial part.474  However, this approach of 
considering portions of the computer code at too granular a level would be too 
simplistic, and inappropriate.  In the determination of whether a substantial part of a 
copyright work has been copied, copyright seeks to protect the relevant skill and 
labour expended by the author in creating that type of work.  The closest analogy in 
the field of literary copyright to the type of skill and labour involved in creating a 
computer program are compilations.475  The assessment of whether the portion 
alleged to have been copied constituted a substantial part of the copyright work was 
qualitative, rather than quantitative.476  Whether a specific portion of a program, 
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which is alleged to have been copied, constituted a substantial part depends on the 
skill and labour expended in its design and coding; it was not determined by whether 
the system would work without the code; or by the amount of use the system made 
of the code.477 
 
The court held that it was well established that copyright infringement of a 
literary work, such as a novel or play, may occur if the plot was used, while none of 
the specific expression was taken.  Similarly, the architecture of a computer program 
— the overall structure of the program and its sequence of operations — may be 
protectable if it involved a substantial amount of the programmer’s skill, labour and 
judgment.478  However, CFI did not allege copying at the level of abstraction relating 
to the architecture of the CFI program.  Most of the modules in the program were 
individually compiled, rather than forming part of a larger suite of modules.  The 
similarities in the modules of the CFI program and Tradition program could be 
attributed to extraneous matters such as the availability and skill of programmers, 
convenience of debugging and maintenance, rather than the functional aspects of 
the program as a whole.  These extraneous considerations meant that the individual 
modules were not the result of the exercise of the result of substantial skill and 
labour.  Accordingly, the similarities in the individual modules cannot be said to 
constitute the taking of a substantial part of the modules.479 
 
The mere fact that the source code of CFI’s computer program was loaded 
onto Tradition’s computer constituted copyright infringement of the CFI program.480  
More importantly, given that the programmers had a copy of the CFI program — a 
working system — they were willing to use it in order to ensure that they did not fail 
in their efforts to produce a new system for Tradition.481  The programmers worked 
very hard to produce a new system, and did not use the copy of the CFI program for 
copying per se.  However, most significantly, they resorted to using the copy of the 
                                            
477
 135. 
478
 134. 
479
 135. 
480
 103. 
481
 112. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
253 
 
CFI program when they ran into difficulties or needed to make the relevant portion 
fit.482  Although these copied portions copied were quite small, they were used in 
important modules.483 
 
Comment and criticism 
 
While the Cantor Fitzgerald case ostensibly supported the UK courts’ traditional 
approach to assessing cases of copyright infringement involving computer programs, 
there was a greater recognition of the functional nature of computer programs and 
the challenges this posed to conventional copyright analysis.  In other words, the 
Cantor Fitzgerald case suggested that the court was now more willing to excise 
functional aspects from copyright protection, or give those aspects thin copyright 
protection, similar to the approach of the US courts.484  However, there appeared to 
be a greater willingness to protect non-literal aspects of a computer program like its 
structure, based on an erroneous analogy with fictional literary works. 
 
(d) Navitaire Inc v easyJet Airline Company 
 
The Navitaire case has proved to be a watershed in defining the scope of copyright 
protection of computer programs in the UK.  Unlike the previous cases, the facts of 
this case more closely resembled the facts of the John Richardson Computers case 
as it directly concerned allegations of non-literal copying of a computer program.485  
The case concerned the alleged infringement of the claimant’s (“Navitaire”) software 
for a “ticketless” airline booking system called OpenRes.486  A ticketless airline 
booking system depends upon giving a passenger a reference number for a 
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particular booking, which is capable of being referenced at the airport of departure, 
and every airport along the itinerary, from a central database.487  It was claimed that 
a similar system developed for easyJet Airline Company (“easyJet”) by the second 
defendant, BulletProof Technologies Inc. (“BulletProof”), called eRes, infringed the 
copyright in the OpenRes system.488  Navitaire did not allege that easyJet or 
BulletProof had access to the source code of its OpenRes system.489 
 
EasyJet had used the OpenRes system and wanted a new booking system.  
However, it wanted the new booking system to have the same user interface as that 
of the OpenRes system.  BulletProof, with easyJet’s cooperation, managed to 
produce a replica booking system, without copying the underlying computer code of 
the OpenRes system.490  The similarity of the eRes system to that of OpenRes 
system extended to three aspects.  First, the overall “look and feel” of the operation 
of the OpenRes system was replicated: its user interface.  Second, the eRes system 
allowed users to use the same individual commands to achieve specific results as in 
the OpenRes system.491  However, the eRes system did not use all the available 
individual commands in the OpenRes system, only those required by its business.492  
Third, the ways in which some of the results were displayed were the same.493  The 
second and third aspects were considered as specific aspects of the user interface 
(that is, the first aspect).  In addition, it was alleged that the copyright in the web 
interface of the OpenRes system, provided by a different computer program, 
TakeFlight, was also infringed.494 
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Decision 
 
General user interface 
 
Navitaire did not allege copying of the underlying computer code but rather that the 
eRes system implemented a very similar user interface.495  The court considered the 
first, more general, aspect as distinct from the other two specific allegations 
concerning the user interface.  It was alleged that the overall similarity in the user 
functionality of the OpenRes and eRes systems amounted to non-textual copying of 
the OpenRes system; that the “business logic” of the OpenRes system had been 
appropriated.496  In this more general claim of copyright infringement, it was claimed 
that the protectability of the command codes had to be considered together with the 
other aspects of the user interface, like the screen layouts, because the OpenRes 
system was structured so that each successive command was entered in response 
to what was displayed, which in turn was a consequence of a response to a previous 
command.497  This appropriation was claimed to be analogous to copyright 
infringement involving the taking of a plot of another author’s novel or play.498   
 
The court held that despite the similarities in the appearance of the two 
systems to users, the underlying processes by which the two systems operated were 
different.499  Because a computer (along with its computer program) is a 
deterministic machine, it was possible to identify the specific responses to various 
inputs, and to replicate such behaviour by writing another appropriate program.  In 
essence, Navitaire contended that the writing of such a second program infringed the 
copyright in the source code of the first program.500  However, it was clear that 
easyJet and BulletProof had no access to the source code of the OpenRes system, 
and that there were differences in the programming languages, computer code and 
architecture between the OpenRes and eRes systems.  The court also did not 
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consider the eRes computer code to be a translation or adaptation of the OpenRes 
code.501 
 
The court accepted that, when developing business software, part of the skill 
and labour expended in its development relates to systems analysis or the 
production of functional specifications.  This effort in the development process could 
be avoided, or minimised, by a subsequent developer who studied or used the first 
program.502  While it was true that the eRes system was developed after an 
examination of the OpenRes system, the development of the OpenRes system itself 
had not followed the “full” development process because it was, similarly, based on 
experiences on how other booking systems operated.  Furthermore, the court held 
that the OpenRes system was not unique, and could not be distinguished from the 
manner in which other booking systems operated.503 
 
If Navitaire were going to succeed in this claim, they needed to show that, at 
some level of abstraction, the defendants copied something (other than the 
command set and the screen displays) that was not inherent in the nature of the 
business function to be performed by the software.  Based on the fact that computer 
programs are protected as literary works, Navitaire sought to draw an analogy 
between the function of a computer program and the plot of a fictional literary 
work.504  However, the court held that the analogy with a plot was a poor one 
because in this case the alleged copyist did not have access to the copyright work, 
the computer code.505  In any event, the notion that the overall functioning of a 
computer was analogous to, and protectable in a manner similar to, the plot of a 
novel, was incorrect.  Unlike the plot of a novel, the user interface was not part of the 
work itself as the same result could be achieved by different computer programs, 
involving no copying. 506 
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In the case of computer programs, it was possible for two completely different 
programs to produce identical results, at any level of abstraction.  Computer 
programs do not have themes, events, plots or narrative flows; they are process 
driven in order to achieve a particular outcome.  There was no discernible business 
logic which could be identified from the computer code of a computer program.507  A 
more appropriate analogy to what easyJet and BulletProof did was producing a 
pudding without ever having seen its recipe, which would not infringe the copyright in 
the recipe, as a literary work.508 
 
The court — rather unnecessarily — still considered it appropriate to support 
the view expressed in the IBCOS case, that US copyright law was different to UK 
law: US law drew a distinction between ideas and expression, and did not provide 
protection to functional works.509  However, the court was forced to acknowledge 
that, even if this was historically correct, the position had now changed: copyright 
protection should not be extended to the functional aspects of a computer program, 
such as the user interface.  Although this necessarily required drawing a line 
between idea and expression in a particular place, which may be regarded as 
providing too little protection for a particular expression, this was in accordance with 
the EU Software Directive.510 
 
Relying on Lord Hoffmann’s speech in Designers’ Guild,511 the court stated 
that the idea-expression distinction applies in two types of situations.  First, a 
copyright work which describes a system, concept or invention was not infringed by 
the use of that which was described.  Second, a particular idea incorporated in a 
work (or aspects thereof) may not be protected because it may not be original, or so 
commonplace that it does not constitute a substantial part of the work.  This 
assessment necessarily depended on a particular level of abstraction, and an 
assessment of the skill and labour involved in that aspect of the work.512  The court 
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held that the OpenRes system, as a whole, lacked substantiality and its overall 
functioning was not the result of relevant skill and effort: its inputs and outputs were 
in a form expected from a computer program carrying out that particular business 
function.  Thus, the claim for non-literal copying failed.513 
 
This position was considered to be consistent with the policy of the EU 
Software Directive to exclude both computer languages and the underlying ideas of 
the interfaces from protection.  If protection were extended to the “business logic” or 
overall function of a computer program, the provisions of the Directive could be 
circumvented.  In any event, it would not have been appropriate to extend copyright 
protection to “business logic.”514 
 
Specific user interface claims 
 
As stated above, the claimant also alleged that two specific aspects of the user 
interface had been infringed: the literal command names entered by users, and the 
screen displays.515 
 
Command names 
 
There were two types of command names, simple and complex.  The simple 
commands (or “individual commands”) were organised in command sets in which 
each set started with a particular prefix, for example, “NP” for notepad.  A prefix 
could be followed by optional suffixes which would cause specific operations to be 
performed.  The complex commands were also organised in sets, with each set 
starting with a particular prefix (command character), for example, “A” for seat 
availability.  These commands had a syntax in that they could be followed by one or 
more arguments in a particular order.  The purpose of these complex commands 
was to allow the user to extract, or change, the necessary data elements.  For 
example, “A” followed by abbreviations of the date and airport gave the user the 
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details of flights leaving that airport on the designated day and the number of seats 
available.  Thus, the complex command “A13JUNLTNAMS” would check the seat 
availability for flights on 13 June from Luton (LTN) in England to Amsterdam 
(AMS).516 
 
Crucially, the way in which the user command names were processed 
(“parsed”) depended on how the program was written.517  The complex commands 
were generated by the users, and did not exist in the OpenRes source code although 
the program recognised the relevant syntax.518  In the OpenRes system, the user 
commands did not form part of the computer code: the computer code did not 
contain any text corresponding to the commands in the forms pleaded.  What the 
program did was process the user commands in portions, following a certain logic, 
rather than expressly recognise these commands as entered by the user in the 
computer code.519  The eRes system, on the other hand, did have these commands 
in its computer code, as it processed them differently to the OpenRes system.520 
 
Although it was possible to write the program in a way that the command 
names and their syntax formed part of the source code, the court held that it would 
not have resulted in the complex command names (and syntax) being protectable.521  
The commands (and their syntax) were a form of programming language created by 
the OpenRes program, which, pursuant to Recital 14 of the EU Software Directive, 
was unprotectable.522  To protect the command names would, to some extent, result 
in protecting the ideas underlying the commands, and not just a particular 
expression.523  Article 1(2) of the EU Software Directive, contrary to what was stated 
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in the IBCOS case, required the English courts to recognise the distinction between 
ideas and expressions.524 
 
Further, it was alleged that the collection of the command names, as a whole, 
was protected as a compilation, and that each of the commands (individual 
commands and complex commands) were also individually protected by copyright.525  
The individual simple command words or letters, based on the ratio in Exxon Corp v 
Exxon Insurance Consultants International Ltd,526 did not have the necessary 
qualities to qualify as copyright works.527  The command names were common, and 
the OpenRes system was influenced by those used in other reservation systems.528  
Although there were differences between the reservation systems, the commands 
were essentially determined by the users’ need to perform certain functions.529  
Similarly, the complex command names were not copyright works.530 
 
The court also did not consider the command names to be protectable as a 
compilation because it simply comprised an ad hoc collection.531  Although the 
creation of the individual command codes did not require much skill or effort, the skill 
and judgment that went into specifying the command codes (and sub-commands) in 
general was more than negligible.532  However, the commands would only be 
protectable as a compilation if the collection constituted a whole that was more than 
the sum of its parts, and this would have been the case if the assembly of the parts 
into the whole was inspired by some governing criterion.  There was no evidence of 
a systematic designing process.533 
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To be protectable as a compilation, it was necessary that actual skill and effort 
be expended in designing the compilation.534  There was little evidence that the 
OpenRes command set was the result of a systematic design process, and there 
was no discernible overall structure to the command codes.535  Thus, the fact that 
the commands formed particular sets was considered to be of no consequence.536   
 
Screen displays 
 
It was claimed that the particular screen layouts of the OpenRes user interface were 
protectable as literary or artistic works, which had been recorded in the computer 
code, and were, thus, protected by copyright.  It was alleged that the layouts of 
particular screen displays of the eRes system had been copied from the OpenRes 
system, and, thus, infringed Navitaire’s copyright in these screen layouts.  This claim 
included the alleged copying of detailed designs on certain of the buttons forming 
part of the more graphical user interface (“GUI”), the GUI screens.537   
 
The court held that the layouts of the corresponding screen displays in the 
OpenRes and eRes systems, which were part of the respective user interfaces, 
differed in the degree of similarity.538  The screen displays used by call centre 
operatives, or airline booking clerks, were mainly text-based, rather than displaying 
complex graphics.539  These text-based screen displays were properly viewed as 
tables, and, therefore, literary works, rather than artistic works.  Furthermore, due to 
their rudimentary, functional nature, the text-based screen displays were 
unprotectable.  Protecting such screen displays would essentially amount to 
protecting the ideas which underlie the user interfaces, which was expressly 
excluded from protection pursuant to Article 1(2) of the EU Software Directive.  The 
text-based screen displays were simply the means by which the data was displayed 
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to users, which was the purpose of the computer program.540  Although, the design 
of the layouts of the screen displays involved some skill and effort, their 
implementation largely depended on how the programmers coded the system, rather 
than as a consequence of aesthetic considerations.541   
 
The GUI screens were, however, protectable as artistic works as the 
arrangement of relatively simple basic elements or icons involved sufficient skill and 
labour.542  Unlike the literary works forming part of the user interface, the EU 
Software Directive did not prevent artistic works from being protectable as part of the 
user interface.543  The copying of the GUI screens infringed Navitaire’s copyright 
because the graphic icons in the eRes system were identical copies.544 
 
Takeflight 
 
As indicated above, there was a separate claim alleging that the copyright in the web 
interface of the OpenRes system, provided by a distinct computer program, 
TakeFlight, was also infringed.545  Whereas the OpenRes system was used by 
employees (call centre operatives and airline booking clerks) of easyJet, the 
TakeFlight program allowed Internet uses to interact with the reservation system, via 
an API (Application Programming Interface) provided by one of the program 
modules, and book their own tickets.546  First, it was claimed that, in breach of its 
licence, easyJet copied and modified the source code of the TakeFlight program for 
the following purposes: fixing bugs; allowing for the display of promotions; allowing 
for foreign language interfaces; creating a website host (or “skin”); and, using the 
program for another legal entity in the easyJet group.547  Second, the equivalent 
program developed for the eRes system, easyJet.com (or NIBS (“New Internet 
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Booking System”)), was also alleged to amount to non-literal copying of the software 
by producing a user interface having the same “look and feel” as TakeFlight.  
Significantly, in this instance, easyJet did have access to the source code of the 
TakeFlight program.548  However, there was no allegation that easyJet actually 
copied the source code of the TakeFlight program.549 
 
In relation to the breach of licence claim, it was accepted that the TakeFlight 
program was not particularly well written, and it did not allow for the degree of 
customisation easyJet required for its purposes, such as publicising special offers 
and allowing different language options.  This meant that easyJet needed to access 
and modify the source code to effect the necessary customisation.  However, such 
modification constituted copyright infringement unless Navitaire agreed, or 
acquiesced, to such modifications.550  There was no such agreement with Navitaire 
and there was no reliance by easyJet on any acquiescence by Navitaire.551  
Accordingly, Navitaire was entitled to relief in respect of the unauthorised 
modifications, in breach of the licence.552 
 
The basis of the complaint of non-literal copying was the contention that the 
computer code of the TakeFlight program implemented a “five-step” booking 
process, and that copying that booking process amounted to the taking of a 
substantial part of the computer program.553  However, the court held that there was 
no basis for a claim of non-literal copying.  The five steps — ask for available flights, 
select flight, display details and price of selected flight, inviting booking, and pay and 
confirm booking — were in the form of a dialogue, similar to that which would be 
followed by a call centre agent.  As these steps were obvious in a booking process, 
they did not amount to a substantial part of the TakeFlight program.  This was 
particularly the case given the fact that the Takeflight source code was not even 
looked at when the easyJet.com program was written.  In addition, the various 
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features of the user interface, such as scrolling lists, drop down lists, radio buttons 
and the like, were widely used, and there were differences between the user 
interfaces.554 
 
Comment and criticism 
 
Commentators have, correctly, suggested that the Navitaire decision reflects the 
recognition that the purpose of the copyright protection of computer programs is to 
incentivise their creation, not to stifle new creation.  This rationale is reflected in the 
EU Software Directive, which excludes protection of ideas and principles which 
underlie any element of a program like its logic, algorithms, programming languages 
or interfaces.  This ensures that there is a sufficiently large public domain for other 
authors.  The idea-expression dichotomy also means that functional aspects will not 
be protected where these have been independently replicated.555 
 
The most important claim concerned the protectability of the business logic 
associated with the overall look and feel of the OpenRes system, which was directly 
emulated by the eRes system.  As far as end users were concerned, the OpenRes 
and the eRes systems were functionally interchangeable, providing the same user 
experience and producing the same results.556  Although the look and feel of a 
computer program may be the consequence of the effort expended in its design and 
creation, the court did not consider it to be protectable.557  None of the following 
features of a computer program are protected by copyright: the business logic; or, 
the functionality of the program like the manner in which a computer program 
requires a user to input data, the manner in which the output is displayed, or the 
records created by a computer program.558  In no sense can reverse engineering the 
functionality of a computer program be considered to amount to copyright 
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infringement.559  Thus, other than for the detailed graphic elements of the user 
interface (or GUI), not much else of a computer program’s user interface will be 
protected.  However, it is important to emphasise the fact that these graphic 
elements of a computer program are protected as artistic works, and not as part of 
the protection afforded to the underlying computer program.560 
 
Not only was the comparatively thin copyright protection for computer 
programs, following the Navitaire decision, considered to have struck the appropriate 
balance between providing the necessary incentives and a sufficiently large public 
domain, it has been described as the “gold standard” test in the UK for cases of non-
literal copyright infringement of computer programs.561   
 
(e) Nova Productions Ltd v Mazooma Games Ltd 
 
The thin copyright protection for computer programs advocated in the Navitaire case 
was confirmed in Nova Productions Ltd v Mazooma Games Ltd.562  What makes the 
Nova Productions case interesting is that it indicates that there will now also be thin 
protection for the user interface in the UK (which, as discussed, is not protected as a 
computer program but is a distinct copyright work).  The claimant, Nova Productions 
Ltd (“Nova”), instituted copyright infringement actions against the defendants 
(Mazooma Games Ltd (“Mazooma”) and Bell Fruit Games Ltd (“Bell Fruit”)) alleging 
that the defendants’ computer games infringed the copyright in its computer game.563  
All three computer games were based on the cue sport pool.564  Nova’s game was 
called “Pocket Money,” Mazooma’s “Jackpot Pool,” and Bell-Fruit’s “Trick Shot.”565 
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Nova alleged infringement in three specific types of copyright works: the 
graphics and frames generated by the computer game, as artistic works; the game 
as a dramatic work; and, the computer program and the design notes, as literary 
works.566  In addition to the three specific claims of copyright infringement, there was 
an allegation that Nova’s copyright in Pocket Money was infringed at a more general 
level; that it was the inspiration for the other two computer games.567  There was no 
allegation that the defendants had access to the source code of the claimant’s 
game.568 
 
Decision 
 
Graphics and frames as artistic works 
 
The individual freeze-frame screen graphics, stored in the memory of a computer, 
are “graphic works,” and, thus, artistic works, within the meaning of the UK CDPA.  
As the appearance of the programs were very different, there was no substantial 
copying of the claimant’s copyright work.569  The visual appearance and user 
experience of the three computer games were very different.570  While there were 
similar features in the programs, these similarities were not the result of copying but 
were either attributable to being commonplace in other pool games or games design, 
or as the result of being an obvious way to implement a commonplace idea.  This 
explained the similar features such as the use of a “power meter,” which allowed the 
user to select the level of force for a shot, “sight lines” to indicate the direction of a 
shot, and showing the pool table in plan view.571  In any event, proof of copying itself 
is not sufficient for a successful copyright infringement claim.572  These features, or 
the particular combination of these features, did not constitute a substantial part of 
the claimant’s work.  Even if such elements were copied, they did not constitute the 
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taking of a substantial part of the claimant’s artistic work.  At best for the claimant, 
the features of its game influenced the appearance of the other two games.573 
 
Game as dramatic work (film) 
 
The claimant also tried to claim artistic copyright protection in a series of images 
depicting the movement of the cue action.574  This was rejected by the court because 
a series of graphic works creating an illusion of movement was considered not to 
constitute a distinct copyright work; they were only protected as individual graphic 
works.575  Only moving images are protected by copyright as films.576 
 
Computer program and the design notes 
 
Following the coming into effect of the EU Software Directive, the protection of a 
computer program, and its preparatory design material, as literary works, had to be 
in accordance with the Directive.577  The Directive protects a computer program and 
its preparatory design material as one work, unlike what is suggested by the text of 
the UK CDPA.  If this was not the case, it could lead to complications should the 
copyright in a computer program and its preparatory design material vest in two 
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persons.578  Similarly, the UK CDPA had to be construed in a manner consistent with 
TRIPS, because the ECJ held that EU legislation, which is binding on the UK, must 
be interpreted in accordance with TRIPS.579 
 
Given the fact that there was no copying of the claimant’s source code, the 
claimant faced a “formidable objection” to its claim of copyright infringement because 
of Article 1(2), and recitals 13 and 15, of the EU Software Directive.  These 
provisions repeated the “well-known” distinction between an idea and its individual 
expression, recognised all over the world.580  This position was also recognised in 
Article 9(2) of TRIPS.581 
 
The idea of what a program should do, such as the idea of the cue pulsing 
with the power meter, had nothing to do with nature of the work — the computer 
program.  The nature of a computer program involves the necessary logical coding 
to function properly, and this is only “faintly related” to what the program is intended 
to do.  Thus, what the program was intended to do, or even a combination of things, 
was simply an idea, which was unprotectable.  The idea-expression distinction 
applies to computer programs, as it did to other copyright works.  This was not to 
deny that these unprotectable ideas involved skill; however, copyright does not 
protect all forms of skill.582  The skill of generating the aspects claimed to have been 
infringed, such as the idea of the cue pulsing with the power meter, had very little to 
do with the skill and effort necessary to program the computer game.583 
 
The unprotectable elements of a computer program are not limited to the 
“building blocks” of computer programs, such as logic, algorithms and programming 
languages.584  The court was further convinced that the concept of the cue pulsing 
with the power meter was not protectable because it was an element (i.e. idea) 
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which could be used by other pool or snooker computer games.585  Thus, the 
allegation that the claimant’s copyright in its computer program (as a literary work) 
was infringed at the general level that it was the inspiration for the other two 
computer games was dismissed because it did not constitute a substantial part of the 
claimant’s work.586 
 
The claimant’s case in Navitaire was stronger than the present claimant’s 
case, yet it was unsuccessful.587  The EU Software Directive makes it clear that the 
ideas incorporated in computer programs (which includes their preparatory design 
material) are not protected.588  What is not permitted is for another to copy the 
specific expression of those ideas or functions which have been reduced to a 
material form, as a literary work.  Others are free to use the ideas or functions.589  
Thus, as in Navitaire, others are free to develop a program which emulates another 
program if the later program has not copied the computer code of the first or any of 
its graphic elements (artistic works).590  In other words, the rules of a game are not 
protected, only its graphics.591 
 
The court held that while this position may be considered as providing no 
effective protection for game developers, the fact is that most, if not all, copyright 
works are influenced and derived from other works, and it is important that copyright 
protection encourages competition by not stifling the creation of works which are 
actually very different.592  If general ideas are protected, copyright would be an 
instrument of oppression rather than act as an incentive for creation, which is its 
purpose.593 
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Comment and criticism 
 
Apart from the poor analysis of whether a computer game can constitute a 
cinematograph film, the Nova Productions decision reflects the thin protection 
currently afforded to computer programs.  The court explicitly provided the rationale 
for this scope of protection: the concern was that any more extensive protection 
would stifle competition.  It considered this narrower scope of copyright protection of 
computer programs to be consistent with the economic rationale for copyright 
protection.  Interestingly, this narrower scope of protection was considered to be 
appropriate even in the case of computer games.  Given that computer games are 
not utilitarian works, unlike application software, there was, arguably, less danger of 
consumers being locked in to a particular program.  However, even in the case of 
computer games, the fact that many games are now (and will increasingly be) played 
online — players connecting with each other over the Internet — this creates 
network effects, and, thus, the narrow scope of copyright protection of user 
interfaces of computer games, as with other types of software, is appropriate. 
 
4 5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored the changing scope of copyright protection of computer 
programs in two of the leading jurisdictions in the field of software development, the 
US and UK (Europe).  As illustrated, in both jurisdictions, determining the appropriate 
scope of protection has proved to anything but straightforward.  What copyright law 
protects is determined by the law, guided by the policy of providing such protection: 
“there is no naturally existing core or essence of a work or invention that the law 
simply discovers.”594 
 
The earliest cases gave a broad protection to computer programs, which 
eventually extended to the “look and feel” of computer programs.  This over-broad 
protection was, arguably, attributable to an inadequate understanding of the nature 
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of computer programs (and their development), and a lack of appreciation of the 
economic implications of such broad protection.  However, in both jurisdictions there 
has been a significant narrowing of the scope of copyright protections afforded to 
computer programs.   
 
The courts in the UK and US recognised the functional nature of computer 
programs, and the need to ensure that copyright protection — while providing 
software developers with the requisite incentive — promotes the dissemination of 
ideas and does stifle competition.  This required a more earnest attempt to consider 
the application of the idea-expression distinction.  While the US courts were more 
willing to consider the implications for copyright law (such as the idea-expression 
doctrine) as a consequence of the functional nature of computer programs, the UK 
courts took longer to accept this position.  In both jurisdictions, the current protection 
provided by copyright to computer programs is narrower than that afforded to 
copyright works like fictional literary works.  If someone has not seen the source 
code or the object code, it will not have had access to the protectable expression of 
the program.  Such a person would be free to attempt to replicate the program from 
observing the input/ouput formats and the accompanying user manuals (that is, the 
external attributes) as they are unlikely to reveal more than the general design of the 
program (its internal attributes).595  The most recent decision of the European Court 
of Justice confirmed the approach in the Navitaire case that it is permissible to 
emulate the functionality of computer program, including compatibility with its data 
file formats, by simply observing its operation.596 
 
Starting at the highest level of abstraction, the case law indicates that, at 
present, copyright law does not protect the conceptualisation, design and business 
logic embodied in a computer program.  It also does not protect the structure, 
sequence or organisation of a computer program, as these concepts — based on the 
analogy with fictional literary works — are inappropriate in the context of computer 
programs.  At the level of computer code, copyright law does not protect any 
elements of a computer program dictated by function (or purpose), technical (or 
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external) constraints or efficiency considerations.  Elements of a computer program 
may also be excluded from protection on the basis that they constitute standard or 
obvious programming techniques (or methods), or are commonplace expressions.   
 
In making specific judgments of whether a particular element is unprotected, 
courts should be guided by the idea-expression doctrine and its role in fostering the 
economic goal of copyright protection; is an adequate balance being struck between 
providing sufficient incentives to authors, while ensuring a sufficient degree of 
freedom exists for other independent creations, and competition.  The current narrow 
standard of protection afforded to computer programs in the US and UK still appears 
to be sufficient to protect an author’s investment in creating a program.  Although the 
current level of protection essentially only prevents mechanical, or slavish, copying 
of computer programs as non-literal infringement of a computer program has 
effectively been rejected by the courts, this limited right to prevent piracy or slavish 
literal copying, combined with the first-mover advantage, is sufficient to ensure that a 
third party does not gain an unfair advantage over the author of the original program.   
 
More extensive copyright protection would damage social welfare as it would 
prevent the development of competing substitute computer programs, and, thus, 
higher prices for consumers.  Social welfare could be further harmed by being 
locked-in to outdated software if switching to more efficient software is costly for 
consumers as a consequence of having to invest in retraining and convert legacy 
material.  Thus, the narrow protection gives competitors the necessary comfort that 
developing more innovative, competitive substitute programs will not infringe 
copyright.  This means that a similar functional analysis of user interfaces is 
required.  As illustrated, apart from the fact that US and UK courts now draw a 
proper distinction between a user interface and the underlying computer program, 
they have, similarly, provided narrower copyright protection to user interfaces as they 
have recognised their functional nature.  Although user interfaces are protectable as 
literary and artistic works, the level of protection should not be the same as that 
afforded to such works outside the software context. 
 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
273 
 
In addition to valuable assistance which the US and UK case law can provide 
South Africa courts when next faced with having to determine the scope of copyright 
protection of computer program, it is still necessary that the SA Copyright Act be 
amended to provide for some much needed exceptions to copyright protection of 
computer programs.  Without these exceptions, acts which are necessary to facilitate 
the use of computer programs, and allow sufficient room for software development, 
are prevented.  The UK fair-dealing exceptions provide four permissible rights for 
lawful users: the right to make back-up copies of a computer program, decompile a 
program, modify a program to remedy errors, and to study and test a program.597  
However, the decompilation right should probably be an absolute right, as in the US.  
Also, in order to avoid any uncertainty concerning the protectability of the 
preparatory design materials, it is suggested that the definition of “adaptation” or 
“computer program” be amended to expressly provide the necessary protection.  As 
indicated, the relevant amendment should require that the preparatory design 
material be sufficiently detailed to avoid protecting a bare idea. 
 
Other than for the term of copyright protection of computer programs — which 
is excessive given the commercial life of software — it is submitted that the current 
scope of copyright protection of computer programs does not appear to be 
excessive.  It certainly does not appear to have inhibited innovation and the creation 
of new computer programs, which is evident from the size of the software industry. 
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Chapter 5: Open-source software 
 
“The intuitions of the late twentieth-century American resist the idea that 
thousands of volunteers could collaborate on a complex economic project.  It 
certainly should not be that these volunteers will beat the largest and best-
financed business enterprises in the world at their own game. And yet, this is 
precisely what is happening in the software industry.”1 
 
5 1 Introduction 
 
In Chapter 4 (Scope of copyright protection of computer programs) the analysis of 
the scope of copyright protection of computer programs suggested that, other than 
for the term of copyright protection, the current scope of copyright protection of 
computer programs in the UK and the US does not appear to be excessive.2  There 
is no indication that the current scope of copyright protection inhibits innovation and 
the creation of new, competitive computer programs.  However, that fact by itself 
does not provide an adequate justification for copyright protection of computer 
programs.  While it is important, from a social welfare perspective, that the scope of 
copyright protection of computer programs is not excessive, it does not provide 
adequate justification for copyright protection of computer programs.  There is still 
the preliminary issue of whether copyright protection of computer programs is 
necessary to incentivise its production, as suggested by the economic rationale for 
copyright protection.  As the quotation at the start of this chapter suggests — which 
describes development process of open-source software — sophisticated software 
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appears is apparently being developed without the type of direct financial incentives 
which copyright law considers necessary to encourage such development.3 
 
As will be discussed below, although open-source software as a matter of 
practice preceded the specific licensing regime which is the focus of this chapter, it is 
no longer confined to idealistic or academic programmers.  The software developers 
producing sophisticated open-source software now number in their tens of 
thousands, and are no longer confined to special-interest users (“hackers,” “geeks” 
or “techies”) or fringe groups.4  Open-source software is now being developed by 
public companies listed on stock exchanges, like Red Hat and Sun Microsystems 
(recently acquired by Oracle Corporation), and the estimated collective investment in 
open-source software development in 2010 exceeded $40 billion.5  This investment 
has not been unrewarded as the projected revenue from open-source software in 
2011 was estimated to be $170 billion, which clearly represents a healthy return on 
investment.6 
 
The types of open-source software currently available — downloadable for 
free from the Internet — is truly impressive and reflects the growth in open-source 
software development already referred to.  Open-source software is now responsible 
for some of the most critical functions in our networked society, namely, the 
infrastructure of the Internet and World Wide Web.  While most people have heard of 
the open-source operating system Linux, or one of its variants such as Ubuntu Linux, 
open-source software has, for example, has been developed for web browsers 
(Netscape Navigator and Mozilla Firefox), a widely-used e-mail server program 
(Sendmail), application software such as OpenOffice from Sun Microsystems, which 
                                            
3
 While it is grammatically more correct to refer to “open-source software,” it is now common to omit 
the hyphen in the compound modifier “open-source,” and simply refer to “open source software.” 
4
 Schiff A "The Economics of Open Source Software: A Survey of the Early Literature" 2002 Review of 
Network Economics 1 (1) 66 66. 
5
 Ghosh R "Open Source Software: Economics, Innovation, Law and Policy" 2010 WIPOJ 2 (1) 82 82. 
6
 Azzi "CPR: How Jacobsen v. Katzer Resuscitated the Open Source Movement"  1272. 
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includes a word-processing and spreadsheet programs, and the most-widely used 
web-server software, Apache.7 
 
Open-source software’s growing market share of the software market has, 
unsurprisingly, had a significant impact on software firms whose business model is 
based on the direct financial rewards, by charging for the access to their products, 
which copyright protection enables them to do.  Software developed by firms who 
chose to use the exclusive rights afforded by copyright, and restrict access to their 
software (in particular, its source code), is called “proprietary software.”8  The fact 
that the adoption of open-source software has been supported by the governments 
of countries, such as the US and Brazil, has meant that it has also become a political 
matter.9  It has angered developers of proprietary software, and none have been as 
vocal as the Microsoft Corporation, whose executives have railed against the 
phenomenon of open-source software, describing it as un-American because it 
undermines intellectual property rights, and “a cancer” which would be terminal for 
the software industry.10 
 
It is not surprising that the commercial success of firms that have invested in, 
or based their business model on, open-source software, and, thus, spurned the 
                                            
7
 Gomulkiewicz R "How Copyleft Uses License Rights to Succeed in the Open Source Software 
Revolution and the Implications for Article 2B" 1999 Hous L Rev 36 179 183; Lerner J and Tirole J 
"The Economics of Technology Sharing: Open Source and Beyond" 2005 Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 19 (2) 99 100; Maher M "Open Source Software: The Success of an Alternative 
Intellectual Property Incentive Program" 2000 Fordham Intell Prop Media & Ent L J 10 619 621; 
Nikulainen K "Open Source Software: Why is it Here and Will it Stick Around?" 2004 SCRIPTed 1 (1) 
136 149; Potter "Opening Up to Open Source" 2; Schiff "The Economics of Open Source Software: A 
Survey of the Early Literature" 67-8.  Web server software is used by computers which host (make 
available) web pages to users through the Internet. 
8
 Mann R "Commercializing Open Source Software: Do Property Rights Still Matter?" 2006 Harv JL & 
Tech 20 1 1-2.  As will be discussed below, to describe the latter type of software as “proprietary 
software” to distinguish it from open-source software is misleading as the basis of open-source 
software licensing is also reliance on the proprietary rights afforded by copyright protection.  It is more 
appropriate to distinguish between “open-source” and “closed source” software. 
9
 Benkler "Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and "The Nature of the Firm"" 371. 
10
 Miller "Allchin's Folly: Exploding Some Myths About Open Source Software"  491-2. 
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direct financial benefit which proprietary control afforded by copyright protection 
enables a copyright holder to earn, has also led economists to find the phenomenon 
worth analysing.11  From a legal perspective, the emergence of open-source 
software, and its current scale, suggests that we examine this phenomenon, and, if 
necessary, reappraise the correctness of the economic justification for copyright 
protection of computer programs.  Open-source software developers appear to shun 
the most basic economic right which copyright protection affords them as copyright 
holders: to recover their development costs and earn a profit by charging others for 
access to their software.  In this, economic sense, open-source software 
development “represents the antitheses of a proprietary technology strategy.”12 
 
In this chapter we will look at the phenomenon of open-source software: what 
it is; a brief history of its emergence; an analysis of it nature; and, the motivations for 
its creation.  As stated above, the primary purpose of this chapter is to determine 
whether the emergence of open-source software does indeed undermine the 
economic-incentive rationale for copyright protection of computer programs.  In the 
process we will also consider whether the emergence of open-source software is as 
detrimental to the institution of copyright protection as claimed by critics of open-
source software. 
 
5 2 What is open-source software? 
 
Although this work focuses on “open-source software” when considering the central 
issue of the justification for copyright protection of computer programs, as will be 
illustrated, it must be borne in mind that this description is really an umbrella term 
which is general enough to encapsulate the various types of software licences being 
                                            
11
 Bitzer J, et al. "Intrinsic Motivation in Open Source Software Development" 2007 Journal of 
Comparative Economics 35 160 160-1. 
12
 West J "How Open is Open Enough? Melding Proprietary and Open Source Platform Strategies" 
2003 Research Policy 32 1259 1264. 
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considered, or their lowest common denominator, if that metaphor is more helpful.13  
As discussed in Chapter 4 it is common for software to be written in a high-level 
programming language, such as Java or Python, which is a mixture of rudimentary 
English words and algebraic instructions.  This form of the computer program is 
referred to as the “source code” of the computer program, and is used because of 
the ease with which it can be understood by humans, leading to speedier 
development.  However, as computers only process, binary digits, or bits — strings 
of 0s and 1s — source code is converted into executable “object code.”  Because 
only the object code is required to use a computer program, proprietary software is 
usually distributed only in object code.   
 
As the source code of a computer program is valuable to anyone seeking to 
establish how a program works, because it is readily understandable by a suitably-
trained or skilled programmer, proprietary-software developers seek to keep the 
source code confidential.14  In addition to only distributing their software in object 
code, developers of proprietary software also seek to enhance protection of their 
software contractually by prohibiting a licensee from accessing and using the source 
code, to the extent permitted by law.15  When referring to proprietary software in this 
work, the assumption will be that the software is mass-market software, and not 
bespoke software.  In the case of bespoke software, the licensor (software 
                                            
13
 It has been claimed that term “open-source” was first used in 1998 when Netscape released the 
source code for its browser software (Taylor M ""Open Source" and "Free" Software" 2005 CTLR 11 
(3) 97 97). 
14
 As indicated in Chapter 4, reversing the object code into source code (or “decompiled” in computer 
parlance) is not simply process.  During the conversion process from source code to object code, 
programming comments are ignored; thus, any decompilation will not yield the helpful comments 
which may have accompanied the source code.  The conversion process also removes the 
descriptive names of functions, subroutines, procedures or variables, which are replaced with 
symbolic representations.  Furthermore, the logical order of the source code may not be apparent 
from the object code, which is more concerned with the order of execution of the program, rather than 
its design logic.  See Horne N "Open Source Software Licensing: Using Copyright Law to Encourage 
Free Use" 2001 Ga St U L Rev 17 863 865; Stromdale C "How Open is Open Source?" 2006 CTLR 
12 (7) 223 223. 
15
 Rehm R "Navigating the Open Source Minefield: What's a business to do?" 2009 Wake Forest Intell 
Prop LJ 10 289 289-90. 
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developer) and licensee can make specific arrangements concerning access to the 
source code.16  However, it is important to note that by only releasing the object code 
of its software the proprietor is simply using a technical device to prevent its software 
being replicated by a competitor.  Legally, there is no significance whether software 
is distributed in source code or object code.17  The copyright in a computer program 
gives the author of the computer program the exclusive right to, amongst other 
things, reproduce the computer program (that is, make copies thereof), make an 
adaptation of the program, and let or hire copies of the computer program.  Thus, 
any of these acts, if unauthorised, in relation to software constitutes copyright 
infringement. 
 
Although there is no precise definition of “open-source software,” the following 
general definition, which satisfies the requirements of the Open Source Definition 
(“OSD”) produced by the Open Source Initiative (“OSI”), and is the generally-
accepted definition of open-source software, will suffice for the purposes of this 
work.18  Open-source software is software that is publicly available in source-code 
form, and where the accompanying licence permits the recipient (licensee), on a 
non-discriminatory basis, to use (and redistribute) the software, and to modify the 
                                            
16
 Where proprietary software developers do make the source code of their software available, the 
access is usually subject to very restrictive conditions.  A typical example of the latter is the deposit of 
the source code with a third party, referred to as an escrow agent, who is permitted to release the 
source code to the licensee in certain circumstances.  For example, the escrow agent may be 
permitted to release the source code to the licensee if the licensor refuses to maintain the software, or 
is unable to do so due to insolvency. 
17
 Zittrain "Normative Principles for Evaluating Free and Proprietary Software" 271-2. 
18
 Scrimshaw W and Harris M "Open Source Software: An Overview of the Main Legal and 
Commercial Implications of its Use" 2005 CTLR 11 (7) 222 222-3; Stern A and Lee R "Open Source 
Licensing" 2008 Practising Law Institute 950 252 273-4.  The OSI is a non-profit organisation, 
founded in 1998, which evaluates software licences in terms of the OSD, and certifies them as OSD 
compliant (“OSI Certified”) if they satisfy the OSD.  The OSD certification provides a convenient 
method for software developers to ascertain whether software is open-source.  See Azzi "CPR: How 
Jacobsen v. Katzer Resuscitated the Open Source Movement" 1279; McJohn "The Paradoxes of Free 
Software" 33; Rychlicki T "GPLv3: New Software Licence and New Axiology of Intellectual Property 
Law" 2008 EIPR 30 (6) 232 233; Zittrain "Normative Principles for Evaluating Free and Proprietary 
Software" 275-6). 
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software and distribute the modified software in source-code form.19  Thus, the 
“source” in open-source software is a reference to the source code of the software, 
and “open” refers to the requirement that access to the source code (and related 
freedoms, such as the right to redistribute and modify the source code) be freely 
available.20  While this definition will suffice for purposes of the legal and economic 
analysis of this study, and, unless otherwise stated, should be borne in mind 
whenever there is a reference to “open-source software” in this work, general 
definitions inevitably do not reveal the subtleties and distinctions between various 
manifestations of the defined subject matter.  The most significant of these 
distinctions is that between open-source software and “free software.”  However, 
before considering this distinction and analysing the nature of open-source software 
in more detail, a brief history of its development will be necessary. 
 
5 3 History of open-source software 
 
Although open-source software development as a recognised concept, and the 
associated movement, emerged in 1985, the practice of sharing source code has 
existed since computer programming was in its infancy in the 1950s and 1960s.21  
As indicated in Chapter 4, the pioneering work in computer science (and 
development of the Internet) principally took place in the United States of America in 
                                            
19
 Lee J "New Perspectives on Public Goods Production: Policy Implications of Open Source 
Software" 2006 Vand J Ent & Tech L 9 45 49; Schiff "The Economics of Open Source Software: A 
Survey of the Early Literature" 66. 
20
 Dusollier "Open Source and Copyleft: Authorship Reconsidered?" 283; Gomulkiewicz "How 
Copyleft Uses License Rights to Succeed in the Open Source Software Revolution and the 
Implications for Article 2B" 180-1; Horne "Open Source Software Licensing: Using Copyright Law to 
Encourage Free Use" 864; Stromdale "How Open is Open Source?" 223. 
21
 Azzi "CPR: How Jacobsen v. Katzer Resuscitated the Open Source Movement" 1275; Harison 
Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Software Technologies: The Economics of Monopoly 
Rights and Knowledge Disclosure 87-8; Horne "Open Source Software Licensing: Using Copyright 
Law to Encourage Free Use" 864; Lerner J and Tirole J "Some Simple Economics of Open Source" 
2002 Journal of Industrial Economics 50 (2) 197 200; Mann "Commercializing Open Source Software: 
Do Property Rights Still Matter?" 10-1; Meeker H "Origins and Development of Open Source and GPL 
Licensing" 2008 CTLR 14 (2) 41 41; Taylor ""Open Source" and "Free" Software" 97. 
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academic institutions, notably the University of California at Berkeley and the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and in the corporate research facilities of 
monopolies such as AT&T’s Bell Laboratories and Xerox’s Palo Alto Research 
Centre, where researchers had a level of autonomy comparable to those in 
academic institutions.22  In addition, there was a committed group of amateur 
computer enthusiasts — hackers23 — who co-operated with the former two groups, 
and similarly engaged in pioneering work.24  During these pioneering days, the 
economic potential of software (and computing generally) was not fully appreciated, 
and the members of these communities were spurred on by curiosity and the desire 
to find solutions to identified problems in order to advance their field of interest.  In 
this milieu, collaboration and sharing of knowledge, and source code, via the 
ARPAnet (the predecessor of the Internet), was the norm.  This was the so-called 
“hacker ethic” that prevailed.25 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, at the dawn of the computer industry, software 
was not considered to be a distinct commodity but was considered as a means by 
which computer manufacturers could sell their hardware.  With the declining costs in 
the computing industry, and the development of personal computers, computers 
became ubiquitous and software became a distinct commodity.  In fact, software 
companies were soon more profitable than hardware manufacturers.  This 
                                            
22
 Azzi "CPR: How Jacobsen v. Katzer Resuscitated the Open Source Movement" 1275; Lerner and 
Tirole "The Economics of Technology Sharing: Open Source and Beyond" 101. 
23
 Unlike the current, pejorative sense of “hacker,” it initially referred to an ingenious, resourceful 
programmer, and the term “cracker” was used to refer to those who used their talents to cause harm.  
See Bollier Viral Spiral: How the Commoners Built a Digital Republic of Their Own 24; de Laat P 
"Copyright or Copyleft? An Analysis of Property Regimes for Software Development" 2005 Research 
Policy 34 1511 1518; Reynolds and Tyman Principles of Computer Science 176-7. 
24
 Nikulainen "Open Source Software: Why is it Here and Will it Stick Around?" 137. 
25
 Azzi "CPR: How Jacobsen v. Katzer Resuscitated the Open Source Movement" 1275; de Laat 
"Copyright or Copyleft? An Analysis of Property Regimes for Software Development" 1518; Kogut B 
and Metiu A "Open-source Software Development and Distributed Innovation" 2001 Oxf Rev Econ 
Policy 17 (2) 248 250-1; Taylor ""Open Source" and "Free" Software" 97; Gomulkiewicz "How 
Copyleft Uses License Rights to Succeed in the Open Source Software Revolution and the 
Implications for Article 2B" 182-3; Nikulainen "Open Source Software: Why is it Here and Will it Stick 
Around?" 137. 
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development signalled the end of the era of collaboration and sharing of software 
source code between programmers; the new producers of commercial, mass-market 
software, and firms that produced their own bespoke software (which they perceived 
as giving them an advantage over competitors), now sought legal protection for their 
software and insisted on confidentiality.26  The emergence of the commercial 
software industry — supported by copyright — and the “taking private” of software 
source code, and the resultant lack of sharing, angered members of the pioneering 
computing community, particularly those who were still imbued with the hacker ethic.  
However, the straw that broke the camel’s back was the resultant proprietary claim 
by the AT&T company in the Unix operating system software.27 
 
UNIX was a widely-used and respected operating system, which was 
developed in the 1970s and 1980s by AT&T employees at its Bell Laboratories, with 
the assistance of members of the wider community of academics, researchers and 
hackers.  Importantly, the Unix source code was made freely available to anyone.28  
The reason why Unix was not a proprietary, commercial product was a consequence 
of the legal restrictions that had been placed on AT&T as a company.  AT&T was a 
monopoly phone company, and, because of its monopoly position, it was prevented 
from earning anything from its non-phone related activities following a judicial 
decree.  As a consequence of this liberal licensing policy of the Unix operating 
system, a large amount of effort was expended in developing various versions of the 
Unix operating system, the most well-known being BSD Unix, developed at the 
University of California at Berkeley.  Subsequently, in the early 1980s, the AT&T 
company was broken up, and, freed from the legal restrictions, the company now 
sought to charge for its version of Unix, on the traditional proprietary-software 
business model.29 
                                            
26
 Azzi "CPR: How Jacobsen v. Katzer Resuscitated the Open Source Movement" 1275; de Laat 
"Copyright or Copyleft? An Analysis of Property Regimes for Software Development" 1513; Hawkins 
"The Economics of Open Source Software for Competitive Firms: Why Give it Away for Free?"  103; 
Taylor ""Open Source" and "Free" Software" 97. 
27
 Dusollier "Open Source and Copyleft: Authorship Reconsidered?" 284. 
28
 Sometimes a nominal licence fee of one dollar was payable. 
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 de Laat "Copyright or Copyleft? An Analysis of Property Regimes for Software Development" 1518; 
Henley M and Kemp R "Open Source Software: An introduction" 2008 Comp Law & Security Rep 24 
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Although there were members of the programming community, imbued with 
the hacker ethic, who considered the emerging trend of proprietary software 
development antithetical to the belief that the source code of software should be 
freely accessible, one person, Richard Stallman, is universally credited as the father 
of open-source software as presently understood.  Stallman was a programmer at 
MIT’s Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, who resigned from his job in 1984 to pursue 
his commitment to the belief that software source code should be freely accessible, 
and that anyone should have the right to disseminate or modify the source code.  
This commitment took the form of a project, GNU ("GNU's Not UNIX"),30 which 
enlisted the help of volunteers to develop a new operating system which would be 
compatible with Unix, but licensed on very different terms.  To this end, Stallman 
formed the Free Software Foundation (“FSF”), a non-profit organisation, in 1985 to 
further the project for the new operating system and to organise collaborative 
software development on a more formal basis.  By 1994, after the incorporation of 
Linus Torvald’s contribution — the Linux31 kernel — which was the product of a 
similar collaborative project, the GNU Project resulted in the GNU/Linux operating 
system (commonly referred to as simply “Linux”).32   
                                                                                                                                       
77 78; Lerner and Tirole "The Economics of Technology Sharing: Open Source and Beyond" 101; 
Mann "Commercializing Open Source Software: Do Property Rights Still Matter?" 10-1; Meeker 
"Origins and Development of Open Source and GPL Licensing" 41. 
30
 It is pronounced “guh-noo,” and is a recursive acronym and hacker’s pun. 
31
 “Linux” is simply a combination of “Linus” and “Unix.” 
32
 Bollier Viral Spiral: How the Commoners Built a Digital Republic of Their Own 12 and 23-34; de 
Laat "Copyright or Copyleft? An Analysis of Property Regimes for Software Development" 1518; 
Carver B "Share and Share Alike: Understanding and Enforcing Open Source and Free Software 
Licenses" 2005 Berkeley Tech LJ 20 443 444-6; Dusollier "Open Source and Copyleft: Authorship 
Reconsidered?" 282-4; Henley and Kemp "Open Source Software: An introduction" 78; Hill 
"Fragmenting the Copyleft Movement: The Public Will Not Prevail"  809; Lerner and Tirole "The 
Economics of Technology Sharing: Open Source and Beyond" 101-2; Mann "Commercializing Open 
Source Software: Do Property Rights Still Matter?" 11; McGowan "Legal Implications of Open-Source 
Software"  260-1; Meeker "Origins and Development of Open Source and GPL Licensing" 41; 
Nikulainen "Open Source Software: Why is it Here and Will it Stick Around?" 138; Rychlicki "GPLv3: 
New Software Licence and New Axiology of Intellectual Property Law" 232; Taylor ""Open Source" 
and "Free" Software" 97; West "How Open is Open Enough? Melding Proprietary and Open Source 
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The real reason why Stallman’s GNU Project was seminal to the open-source 
software movement was not the software it produced, rather it was the innovative 
licence under which such software was made available.  Stallman created the 
General Public License (“GPL”), the first version of which was released in 1989, and 
reflected his belief that software source code should be freely accessible to all, 
giving users the freedom to redistribute such source code or modify it.  Because of 
Stallman’s insistence that software source code should always be freely available, 
the GPL prevents any source code licensed under its terms (“GPL’d software”) being 
“taken private” by its inclusion in proprietary software.  In other words, the concern 
was that the author of a derivative work of an open-source computer program could 
claim copyright protection in such derivative work, to the extent that it contained 
original material, and, thus, exclude others from using it by asserting his proprietary 
rights.33  The mechanism by which the GPL achieves this goal of preventing such 
proprietary claims in derivative works is the inclusion of an obligation on the licensee 
of GPL’d software to also make any derivative software thereof available on the 
same licence terms.  This is the so-called “copyleft” provision or obligation.34  
Stallman coined the term "free software” for software licensed on this basis, and 
considered such licensing to be ethically important.35  The FSF also developed its 
own definition by which software could be assessed as whether it could be 
considered to be free software, its Free Software Definition (“FSD”).36  Although 
some of the open-source licence terms relevant to this study will be considered in 
greater detail later, it should simply be noted at this stage that the copyleft obligation 
(which will be discussed in greater detail below) is the most controversial aspect of 
                                            
33
 Miller "Allchin's Folly: Exploding Some Myths About Open Source Software" 495. 
34 The term “copyleft” being obviously intended as pun on the term “copyright.”  The GNU website 
states that “[t]he “left” in “copyleft” is not a reference to the verb “to leave” — only to the direction 
which is the inverse of “right” (http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/ (accessed 18 February 2012)).”  See also 
Horne "Open Source Software Licensing: Using Copyright Law to Encourage Free Use" 877-8. 
35
 Bollier Viral Spiral: How the Commoners Built a Digital Republic of Their Own 28-41; Mann 
"Commercializing Open Source Software: Do Property Rights Still Matter?" 11; McGowan "Legal 
Implications of Open-Source Software" 260-1; Nadan "Open Source Licensing: Virus or virtue?"  353; 
Lerner and Tirole "The Economics of Technology Sharing: Open Source and Beyond" 101-2; West 
"How Open is Open Enough? Melding Proprietary and Open Source Platform Strategies" 1265; 
Zittrain "Normative Principles for Evaluating Free and Proprietary Software" 268. 
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the GPL, and, as will be shown below, makes it, paradoxically, the most restrictive of 
the open-source software licences.  However, rather curiously, the FSD does not 
require that a free-software licence include a copyleft obligation. 
 
Stallman’s free software was the genesis of open-source software.37  In fact, 
the term “open-source software” only emerged in 1997, and, ironically, was coined 
as part of a deliberate attempt to distinguish it from free software.38  The additional, 
copyleft obligation on licensees, which requires them to make any derivative 
software available in source-code form, was, and continues to be, the most 
contentious aspect of the GPL.  Although a number of programmers shared 
Stallman’s calls for accessible software source code, there was a concern that the 
restrictive nature of free software, as championed by Stallman, would discourage 
wide-scale adoption of the GPL.  Stallman’s position was considered to be 
antagonistic to both commercial software companies, and intellectual property 
protection.39  For Stallman the question of free access to software source code was 
tantamount to an article of faith, or ideology, while for others like the OSI it was 
altogether more prosaic and pragmatic: it was simply considered to be a superior 
economic, organisational, method of software development in comparison to 
traditional forms of proprietary-software development.  Open-source development is 
considered to deliver better designed, and more reliable, software, which is also 
more speedily produced.  Thus, the OSD (and, as mentioned, neither does the FSD) 
does not require the inclusion of a copyleft obligation as part of its criteria for open-
source software.40  Software licences which contain the copyleft provision are 
                                            
37
 Nadan "Open Source Licensing: Virus or virtue?" 353. 
38
 Stern and Lee "Open Source Licensing" 273-4. 
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 Taylor ""Open Source" and "Free" Software" 97. 
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referred to as “copyleft licences,” “restrictive licences,” “reciprocal licences” or “full 
licences” whereas open-source software licences which do not have such an 
obligation are categorised as “permissive licences,” “academic licences” or “limited 
licences.”41 
 
Thus, having regard to the definition of open-source software adopted for 
purposes of this work, in paragraph 5.2, it should be noted that there is no copyleft 
requirement.42  Because the FSD also does not require software to be “copylefted” 
before it can be considered to be “free,” free software is not necessarily synonymous 
with copyleft software.43 However, the flagship free-software licence, the GPL, is a 
copyleft licence, and most discussions relating to free software focus on the GPL.  It 
is important to be aware of this distinction between free software that includes the 
copyleft obligation (“copyleft software”) and other open-source software, because of 
its significance, which will be analysed in greater detail.  Copyleft software, like open-
source software, is also software that is distributed in source-code form, and both 
forms of licence allow the licensee to redistribute it in that form or to modify it.  
However, copylefted software also obliges the licensee of the software to make all 
derivative software available on the same terms.  In other words, while open-source 
software permits modifications of the software by the licensee, and even permits the 
licensee to distribute derivative software in source-code form, there is no obligation 
on the licensee to make derivative software available in source-code form on the 
same licence terms.  Open-source software, in its most permissive sense, permits 
the “privatisation” of open-source computer code when it has been modified, that is, 
it permits the licensee to create derivative proprietary software.  In other words, 
whereas all free software will satisfy the definition of open-source software as set out 
in paragraph 5.2, not all open-source software will be copyleft software.  As a 
                                                                                                                                       
of the Early Literature" 72; Stern and Lee "Open Source Licensing"  273; West "How Open is Open 
Enough? Melding Proprietary and Open Source Platform Strategies" 1265. 
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consequence of the way this work has defined open-source software, free software 
is simply a subset of open-source software, a kind of special case; therefore, any 
statements or analysis in relation to open-source software generally should be 
equally applicable to free software, unless otherwise stated.44  In turn, copyleft 
software is a subset of free software, and, therefore, any statements or analysis 
concerning open-source software should, again, be equally applicable to copyleft 
software, unless otherwise stated.45  Having said this, in so far as any distinctions 
will be drawn within open-source software, it will primarily be the distinction between 
copyleft software and non-copyleft software. 
 
While the early volunteers to the open-source movement may have been 
enthusiastic and committed to the production of open-source software, the initial 
outputs were disappointing.  The crucial factor which changed this was the 
widespread diffusion of the Internet, which facilitated the distribution of computer 
code, as this could now be done at zero marginal cost, and it enabled the 
collaboration and coordination of individual efforts on a scale (and at such low cost) 
previously not possible.  In fact, the diffusion of the Internet also transformed the 
open-source movement from a being a merely American phenomenon to make it a 
worldwide phenomenon.  The scale of open-source software development was also 
boosted by the emergence of more liberal, non-copyleft licences.  This, more liberal, 
approach to licensing, encouraged the participation of commercial software firms.  It, 
therefore, should come as no surprise that since the GNU Project, there have been 
numerous open-source software projects.46 
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5 4 Other distinguishing features of open-source software 
 
Before considering open-source licences generally, and the specific implications of 
copyleft provisions, it is necessary to clarify some of the features of open-source 
software, which distinguish it from other types of software.  This will assist to clear up 
some popular misconceptions, and encourage the use of appropriate terminology.  
Arguably, the most common, and material, misconception concerning open-source 
software is that it is software that has been contributed to the public domain (or is 
copyright-free), that is, free from any copyright restrictions on its use or distribution.  
Open-source software is not software that has been placed in the public domain, 
and, therefore, non-proprietary, as it has sometimes been claimed to be.47  This is an 
easy mistake to make for people who are unfamiliar with copyright law, given its 
resemblance to public domain material.  As will be illustrated in more detail in the 
following section, open-source software does not amount to a removal, surrender or 
abandonment of the proprietary rights afforded by copyright to an author.48  In fact, it 
is rather ironic that the more ideologically motivated and restrictive copyleft licences 
are more reliant on the existence and retention of authors’ proprietary rights. 
 
The defining, or common, feature of open-source software licences is that 
they permit public access to the source code, and permit a licensee to use the 
software, modify it and redistribute the original (or modified) software in source-code 
form.  While these rights afforded to licensees extend well beyond those typically 
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associated with proprietary software, these open-source licences are also based on 
authors’ proprietary rights.49  It is important to note that the generous grants of rights 
pursuant to open-source licences are subject to the restrictions (conditions or 
obligations) imposed by the licence on licensees, and breaches of the licence are 
enforceable because the proprietary, and associated, rights are retained by their 
author.  If software has been contributed to the public domain, because its author 
has waived his proprietary rights therein, others would be entitled to use it in any 
manner they saw fit.50  Open-source software, therefore, does not constitute a waiver 
or abandonment by an author of his proprietary rights in such software and its 
contribution to the public domain, but the author simply choses to exercise those 
rights in a different manner: it, too, is, therefore, from a legal perspective, proprietary 
software.51  The difference is that in the case of “conventional” proprietary software, 
its author uses the proprietary rights afforded by copyright to earn a direct financial 
reward in the form of a licence fee in exchange for authorising the use of the 
software, which contrasts with open-source software.  It is therefore, strictly 
speaking, a misnomer to draw a distinction between “proprietary software” and open-
source software, as this work does.  However, it is common practice to refer to 
software which is only made available for use at a fee, or which is distributed without 
revealing its source code, as proprietary software.  It may be more appropriate to 
distinguish between “open-source” and “closed-source” software.52 
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It is also necessary to distinguish open-source software from “freeware” and 
“shareware” software.  Freeware and shareware is software that is made available 
free of charge, but it does not qualify as open-source software as the source code is 
generally not made available to the licensee.  Such software tends to be made 
available as a promotional device to encourage potential customers to purchase 
related software.  The producer of the freeware or shareware tends to offer it as a 
“standard” version, on a restricted basis, such as for non-commercial use only, or on 
a trial basis, hoping that users would be prepared to pay for its “premium” product.53 
 
As is apparent from the distinction drawn between open-source software, and 
freeware or shareware, whether software is distributed free of charge is not definitive 
of whether it qualifies as open-source software.  In fact, the use of the “free,” as in 
“free software,” for the kind of open-source software which Stallman champions 
appears to have generated a significant amount of criticism from some members of 
the open-source community, and is regarded as one of the reasons for the creation 
of the OSI and the coining of the alternative, more general, term “open-source 
software.”  This has resulted in the open-source community being divided between 
those who produce free software and the remainder who produce open-source 
software.54  For Stallman, access to the source code was not a question of costs; it 
was the right of a user to access the source code which was paramount.  Stallman 
was adamant that free software was the more appropriate term, as he gave primacy 
to the freedom of users.  There is nothing preventing a software proprietor from 
charging for a copy of his software, provided that the licensee obtained a copy of the 
source code, and the freedom to modify and redistribute such software.55  Having 
said that, Stallman also believes that copyright protection of computer programs 
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results in users having to pay higher prices for software without the freedoms to 
access, use and redistribute the source code, which increases the costs of software 
production, maintenance and improvement.56  The much-quoted aphorism Stallman 
used to convey his message, and the meaning of “free” in this context, was that it 
should be used in the same sense as “free speech, not free beer.”  In other words, 
“free” in this context is intended to mean free as in libre, not gratis.57  Stallman is 
contemptuous of licensees who use software licensed under non-copyleft licences to 
create derivative, proprietary software, as he regards them as only being interested 
in open-source software as in “free beer,” and not “free speech.”58 
 
Stallman’s critics claimed that the use of “free” created the impression that the 
open-source movement was antagonistic towards commercial software firms, which 
made such firms reluctant to participate in open-source development.  From a public-
relations perspective, the use of “free” was regarded as being too closely associated 
with the issue of costs: software firms and investors did not appreciate the subtle 
distinctions between freedoms and cost-free software.59  It has been claimed that the 
term “open-source software,” as opposed “free software,” led to a greater 
acceptance of open-source development of software.60  As has been indicated 
above, whereas Stallman and other members of the FSF regard free access to 
software source code as an article of faith, or ideology, the OSI simply considers 
open-source development to be a superior method of software development to the 
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traditional forms of proprietary software development, and simply seeks to 
encourage its adoption.   
 
This emphasis on nomenclature, and the alleged resultant marketing benefits, 
is fatuous as it elevates form over substance.  An inevitable consequence of the 
freedoms Stallman insists should accompany free software, and those which do 
accompany open-source software, is that a software proprietor of such software is 
unable to charge users a licence fee for using its software.  If everyone is granted 
the right to use and redistribute the source code of the software, users would have 
no incentive to pay for the right to use it.  It would not be in any particular user’s 
interest to pay the licence fee; a user would simply seek to obtain the software from 
another user and free ride off the investment of such other user who has acquired 
the software, or cooperate with others to pay one licence fee and to freely share it 
amongst themselves.61  Either way, the author is unlikely to earn a sufficient return in 
the form of licence fee in respect of free software, or open-source software.  Another 
reason why the proprietor of open-source software is unable to charge a fee for its 
use is that it may have a demotivating effect on other computer programmers who 
contribute to its development.  They would resent that their efforts are being so 
directly appropriated for gain, without them sharing in such proceeds.62 
 
In so far as a software proprietor wishes to charge users a licence fee for 
using its software, there is no substantive difference between free software or open-
source software.  Both types of software licence result in a software proprietor being 
unable to charge licensees a fee for permission to use its software.  This is not to 
deny the substantive, restrictive nature of copyleft provisions in free software 
licences such as the GPL, which are not included in other open-source software 
licences; however, this distinguishing factor between free software and open-source 
software does not change the fact that a proprietor of neither type of software is able 
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to charge a licence fee.  In fact, as will be discussed later, the business models of 
software firms who invest in free software or open-source software do not differ: they 
have to rely on revenue streams other than the charging of fees for use of software, 
such as the provision of consulting services or training.63  Thus, while the motivations 
of those who produce free software may differ from those who produce open-source 
software, economically, both forms of licensing stand in contrast to proprietary 
software, as the latter allows for software proprietors to charge for the use of their 
software.  In other words, there is no essential economic distinction between free 
software and open-source software.64 
 
5 5 Open-source licences 
 
As already indicated, open-source software is not software that has been contributed 
to the public domain, but it is software which utilises the proprietary rights afforded 
by copyright and is licensed on terms which distinguish it from proprietary software.  
In this section the nature of open-source licences will be examined and analysed.  
Given the liberal attitude of members of the open-source community in relation to the 
issue of access to the source code of their products, it is necessary to understand 
why open-source software is released under software licences rather than simply 
contributing such software to the public domain?  The distinguishing terms in open-
source software licences will be considered, in order to establish their legal 
significance, and how they achieve the goals of the open-source community. In 
particular, we are interested in the effect of such licensing on the incentive rationale 
for copyright protection of computer programs. 
 
The OSI lists more than 60 software licences which satisfy the OSD, and, 
consequently, software licensed under any of those licences is considered to be 
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open-source software.65  This work will not consider the terms of each of these 
licences, or even undertake a detailed analysis of the terms of a specific licence.  A 
detailed analysis of the specific terms of open-source licences is not required for 
purposes of this work, which is concerned with the economic impact and rationale 
associated with open-source software, in order to reflect on the current policy of 
providing copyright protection for computer programs.  This, of course, is not to 
discount the dangers inherent in discussing a phenomenon in general terms, in any 
field of enquiry, where there are differences in the various manifestations of the 
phenomenon, or, indeed, whether a particular variant forms part of the particular 
subject matter.66  However, given the nature of the enquiry of this work, the problems 
of generalisation are, for all intents and purposes, eliminated because these licences 
are considered at a particularly high level of abstraction: their implications for the 
supposed rationale for the copyright protection of computer programs. 
 
The licence that will be used to illustrate the issues, to the extent necessary, 
will be the GPL, but other open-source licences will also be considered when 
required.  Besides the fact that the GPL was the first open-source licence, there is 
another good reason for choosing the GPL.  The GPL is, by a considerable margin, 
the most widely-used open-source licence: over 48% of the open-source software 
currently licensed has been released under the GPL licence, which is at least four 
times more than that of the next most popular open-source licence, the MIT 
Licence.67  It is rather curious to see that the GPL, which is a copyleft licence, is still 
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the most popular open-source licence, despite the fact that its “free software” 
characterisation was criticised as being unattractive to, and antagonistic towards, 
software firms, as earlier discussed.  In fact, it was claimed that despite Stallman’s 
idealism, most people would simply be attracted by open-source software as “free 
beer” and not participate in his greater ethical campaign of free access to software, 
therefore, the GPL will be unattractive to future participants.  However, as the data 
indicates, the GPL is still the licence-of-choice for the open-source community.  This 
fact means that it has attracted a significant amount of attention. 
 
Although we have already noted that open-source licences permit public 
access to the software source code, and give licensees the right to use, modify and 
redistribute the software, there are so many different licences that ascertaining 
whether a particular licence is an open-source licence can be time consuming.  The 
OSD, and the associated certification, has provided a useful solution to this 
problem.68  It is, thus, instructive to consider the specific requirements of the OSD,69 
which, as noted, is a generally-accepted definition of open-source software.70  The 
OSD stipulates ten criteria before software can be considered to be open-source 
software, in addition to the requirement that the source code must be accessible.  
First, if the licensed software has been incorporated as a component of other 
software, the licence must not prevent the distribution of such other software or 
require payment to allow such distribution.  Second, access to the source code is, of 
course, central to open-source software: the software must be distributed in source-
code form, or it must be easily accessible.  If a fee is charged for access to the 
source code, it should not exceed the reasonable costs of reproducing it.  It is 
important that the source code which is made available is the means by which the 
software is modified; in other words, the software’s source code must not be 
obfuscated in any way.  In addition, the licensee must be given the right to 
redistribute the source code, in that form or as compiled code.  Third, the licensee 
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must be allowed to modify the software or create derivative works, and must have 
the right — but not the obligation — to licence such derivative works under the same 
licence as the original software.  This is the crucial difference between open-source 
software and free software licences, like the GPL, as the latter include the copyleft 
provision: a licensee is obliged to licence derivative works under the same licence as 
the original software.71  Fourth, the licence may exclude the right of a licensee to 
distribute the modified software in source-code form, provided that the licensee is 
given the right to release the source code of its modifications, and thereby allow 
others to achieve the same result as the modified software.  The purpose of this 
exception is to preserve the integrity of the original software, and thereby preserve 
the reputation of its author.  Similarly, the licence may require that derivative works 
must carry a different name or version number from that of the original software.  As 
will be discussed later, the reputational reward which is derived from participation in 
open-source development is an important factor when considering authors’ 
incentives to create such software, so it is not surprising that specific exclusions 
have been created to maintain an author’s connection with his creation.  Fifth and 
sixth, the software must be licensed on a non-discriminatory basis, and, therefore, 
the licence should not limit its use to specific persons or for specific purposes, for 
example, non-profit organisations or for non-commercial use only.  The purpose of 
this requirement is to attract the widest group of contributors as possible.  As will be 
discussed later, it is submitted that although restrictive, copyleft licences, like the 
GPL, are formally non-discriminatory, they, arguably, discourage participation by 
some contributors.  Seventh, the rights granted by the licence must automatically be 
extended to third parties to whom the software is distributed.  The purpose of this 
requirement is to prevent a licensee from inhibiting the wider distribution of the 
software, and, thereby the participation of other potential contributors, by imposing 
restrictions on third parties to whom it distributes the software.  Eighth, again, the 
further distribution of the software may not be restricted by limiting it to a particular 
distribution, for example, its inclusion in a specific product or package.  The rights 
afforded by the licence must also be extended to third parties, if the software has 
been extracted from such product and distributed to such third parties without the 
product in which the original software was incorporated.  Ninth, the licence must not 
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require that other software, which a licensee distributes together with the licensed 
software, be licensed on the same terms as the licence or place any other 
restrictions on such other licence.  Last, the licence must be technologically neutral, 
which simply means that the rights afforded must not be made conditional on a 
particular form of acceptance by the licensee, such as confirming acceptance by 
means of a click-wrap contract. 
 
Given the fact that the GPL is also a free-software licence, as well as OSD 
compliant, it is necessary to also briefly consider the requirements of the FSD.  As 
the FSF’s approach to open-source software is more principled than that of the OSI, 
its requirements are stated in more broad terms.72  According to the FSD, software 
will be considered to be free if there are four associated freedoms granted to 
licensees of the software.73  First, licensees must have the freedom to run the 
program for any purpose.  Second, licensees must be given access to the source 
code of the software, and have the freedom to learn how it works and modify it.  
Third, licensees must have the freedom to redistribute copies of the software.  Last, 
licensees must have the freedom to distribute their derivative works in source-code 
form. 
 
Although the FSF and the OSI differ in their motivations for promoting open-
source software, with the FSF approaching the issue from an ethical viewpoint and 
the OSI being altogether more pragmatic, regarding it as a more efficient form of 
software development, the four freedoms of the FSD are consistent with that of the 
OSD.74  The practical effect of both sets of requirements is the same: licensees must 
have the right to use, redistribute, modify the licensed software (which necessarily 
requires access to the source code), and to distribute derivative works of the 
licensed software.75  This is the principal reason why, as has been noted before, we 
do not have to be considered with the finer distinctions between free software and 
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open-source software as there is no significant economic distinction between 
software licences which satisfy the requirements of either the OSD or FSD.   
 
Having considered the rights which software licences are required to grant 
licensees before they can qualify as open-source software, it is also necessary to 
consider some of the obligations placed on licensees by such licences, most notably 
the copyleft obligation.  However, before doing so it is necessary to understand why 
open-source software was, and is, released under software licences rather than 
simply contributed to the public domain. 
 
5 5 1 Copyright hacked 
 
As mentioned earlier, open-source software is not software contributed to the public 
domain, which is a common misconception.  In fact, since the start of open-source 
as a movement, with Stallman’s establishment of the FSF, open-source software has 
been deliberately copyrighted.76  It is instructive to see why, despite his ethical 
position that software should be free of restrictions that were being imposed on 
proprietary software, the open-source software community chooses to utilise the 
proprietary licensing model made possible by copyright, rather than disclaiming 
those rights.  However, as will be illustrated, and as already hinted at, the open-
source community, particularly, the free-software community, used copyright in a 
different manner to that in which it was previously used. 
 
5 5 1 1 Why license and not contribute software to the public domain? 
 
The development of open-source licensing, as noted earlier, was motivated by the 
resentment felt by members of the pioneering hacking community, like Richard 
Stallman, towards the emergence of proprietary software — made possible by 
copyright protection.  It is claimed that it is a testament to the ingenuity of the 
hacking mentality how the open-source community hacked the law to reverse this 
                                            
76
 de Laat "Copyright or Copyleft? An Analysis of Property Regimes for Software Development" 1521. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
299 
 
perceived undesirable development, using the “weight” of the law against itself — a 
form of “institutional jujitsu.”77  Although the ethically-minded members of the open-
source movement preferred that no proprietary rights exist in software, their 
response was to use copyright and contract law to arrest, if not reverse, the 
privatisation of computer code.78  These individuals sought to limit the copyright 
protection enjoyed by authors of computer programs, using a private solution, 
contract or software licensing, which relies on the entitlements, or exclusive rights, 
that copyright law provides authors to control the exploitation of their copyright 
works.79   
 
Whereas the consequence of the default regime of copyright — and which 
default regime is essentially retained by proprietary software developers — is to 
create an “all rights reserved” situation,80 they would use open-source licences to 
create a software commons to permit public access to software.81  Open-source 
licensing has, in general terms, been pithily described as placing “restrictions on 
restrictions.”82  The liberal licensing policy grants users a non-exclusive licence, with 
transferable rights, obviating the need for persons seeking to perform any of the acts 
restricted by copyright in respect of an open-source computer program from having 
to obtain seek consent from its author, and in return for such rights users agree to 
comply with a few conditions.83  As a consequence of this licensed-by-default 
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position adopted by the open-source licensor, users avoid the transaction costs 
associated with having to seek permission for using the software, and they do not 
have to pay any licence fees for permission to use the software.84  This form of 
licensing avoids the loss in social welfare caused by traditional copyright, where the 
burden of such transaction costs result in copyright works not being used at the 
socially desirable level, creating a deadweight loss.  Importantly, failure to comply 
with the conditions imposed by open-source licences not only constitutes a breach of 
contract, it also results in the user’s conduct infringing the copyright in the licensed 
work as the exploitation of the work is then unauthorised.85 
 
It is important to appreciate the difference between a commons and the public 
domain in order to understand why the latter was considered as inappropriate, 
particularly for those in the free-software community.  Where material forms part of 
the public domain, such material is available to all to use it as they deem fit: there 
are no proprietary rights in relation to public-domain material and no rules governing 
its use.  The problem with donating material to the public domain is that such 
material can be used by others, without permission or restriction, to create new, 
proprietary copyright works, which new works are not also part of the public domain, 
unless their authors have decided to similarly contribute them to the public domain.86  
For persons committed to the free-source movement, permitting the creation of such 
proprietary works, which leverages on the works of others, amounts to an 
unconscionable exploitation of the efforts of others.  The ingenious hack which 
Stallman and the free-source community developed was to use copyright law, 
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software licensing and the copyleft provision, to prevent development of such 
proprietary software based on free software.87  The software licence would be used 
to create a software commons, rather than contributing the work to the public 
domain.   
 
A commons — similarly to the public domain — is also an open-access 
regime but, in contrast to the public domain, it is a legal regime, which in the case of 
open-source software is based on property rights afforded by copyright.  
Participation in the software commons created by copyleft licensing, such as the 
GPL, makes participation conditional on the promotion of the communal interest.88  
Pursuant to the terms of the licence, licensees agree that any modified or derivative 
works will be available on the same terms as the original software.  This does not 
reject the notion of self-interest, as individuals are free to benefit from their 
participation in the commons, but such benefit cannot be withheld from the other 
participants in the commons.89  By ensuring that derivative works also form part of 
the commons, copyleft “creates a virtuous cycle: each addition builds on the 
commons and is returned to it.”90  Boyle describes the importance of copyright to 
open-source licensing, and its novel use of imposing the copyleft obligation, as 
follows:91 
“The copyright over the software was the “hook” that allowed software engineers to 
create a license that gave free access and the right to modify and required future 
programmers to keep offering those freedoms.  Without the copyright, those features 
of the license would not have been enforceable.” 
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In other words, the copyleft licensing regime creates a conservancy,92 or 
“regulated” public domain,93 which prevents the kind of defection, or appropriation of 
benefits, which would be possible if software were simply contributed to the public 
domain.  If the source code was simply contributed to the public domain, open-
source software development would simply amount to an honour system, rather than 
the significant phenomenon it has developed into.94  In this way, copyleft licensing 
ensures a greater flow of information than if software had simply been contributed to 
the public domain, and certainly more than that produced by proprietary software.  
Even non-copyleft open-source software produces a greater flow of information than 
proprietary software, but probably only marginally more than that if the software is 
simply contributed to the public domain.95  McGowan describes this hack of the 
copyright system in the following, flattering, manner:96 
“The licenses, and the GNU GPL in particular, represent an elegant use of 
contractual terms and property rights to create social conditions in which 
software is produced on a model of openness rather than exclusion.” 
 
It is, of course, rather ironic that the open-source community relies on 
copyright law (and contract) to counter the alleged deleterious effect on software 
development which they believe to be a consequence of, inter alia, copyright 
protection, and the resultant development of proprietary software.  The “virtuous 
cycle” which members of the free-software movement seek to establish would not be 
possible if the copyleft provisions are not legally enforceable: others could simply 
use available open-source software and create closed proprietary software.97  In fact, 
for a considerable period after its emergence there was speculation about the 
sustainability of the open-source movement’s licensing paradigm because of the fear 
that open-source licences, particularly the obligations they imposed (like the copyleft 
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obligation) would not be legally enforceable.98  It is only following the decision in 
Jacobsen v Katzer99 that there has been some assurance the terms of open-source 
licences are enforceable.100  Jacobsen alleged that Katzer had infringed the 
copyright in his software for model-train enthusiasts as Katzer had developed similar 
proprietary software, which copied portions of Jacobsen’s software, and failed to 
adhere to the terms of the licence.  In particular, it was claimed that Katzer had failed 
to attribute authorship to Jacobsen, failed to copy and restate the copyright notices 
as in the original computer program, and to describe the changes which had been 
effected to the computer code, as required by the licence.101  The court held the 
contravention of these terms (or conditions) meant that the scope of the licence was 
exceeded, and that such actions were, accordingly, unauthorised by Jacobsen as 
the copyright holder.102 
 
The reliance of open-source licensing on copyright has meant that it has 
attracted considerable criticism, because of its questionable theoretical position.  It is 
claimed that instead of open-source licensing undermining arguments for copyright 
protection, it actually serves to reinforce arguments for proprietary protection of 
software; rather than being indicative of its inappropriateness, open-source licensing 
may only serve to entrench the proprietary nature of copyright, and the centrality of 
the author, whose consent is required if his works are to be used.103  Even the 
perceived transaction-costs problem concerning the requirement to seek necessary 
authorisations to use computer programs, and the supposed resultant deadweight 
loss are, arguably, amply addressed by the proprietary nature of copyright, as it 
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enabled open-source licensing.  In other words, the emergence of open-source 
software, it is claimed, serves as proof that the proprietary nature of copyright 
protection enables a market-based mechanism, like open-source licensing, to 
emerge to address instances of market failure.104  Because of copyright’s centrality 
to open-source software, which forms the basis for its licences, it is said the open-
source software “lives or dies on copyright law.”105 
 
These criticisms are particularly damaging to the position adopted by 
members in the open-source community who are morally opposed to copyright 
protection of computer programs, yet support open-source licensing.  A metaphor 
that has been borrowed from the feminist struggle to highlight this paradoxical attack 
by such ethically-minded opponents of copyright protection — particularly 
proponents of restrictive, copyleft licensing — is that “the master’s tools will never 
dismantle the master’s house.”106  Westkamp summarises this paradoxical position 
in a less dramatic tone, as follows:107 
“Although open-source models utilise copyright protection to protract a binding effect 
of licensing agreements, reliance on copyright is at odds with its provisions restricting 
the owner's powers for more overarching public policy concerns, such as consumer 
protection and market transparency.” 
 
Supporters of open-source software are aware of the theoretical criticisms, 
and many who oppose copyright protection accept this contradictory position; they 
choose to engage in the open-source community on the more pragmatic basis that it 
is “a second best to the politically unattainable eradication of nearly all existing 
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available proprietary rights in software.”108  Richard Stallman could not be clearer 
about the fact that he has chosen to rely on software licensing to protect his idealist 
goal of spreading freedom and cooperation when he states:109 
“If you want to accomplish something in the world, idealism is not enough—you need 
to choose a method that works to achieve the goal. In other words, you need to be 
“pragmatic.”” 
 
Stallman would also be the first to acknowledge the complete dependency of 
copyleft licensing, and open-source licensing generally, on copyright law, as the FSF 
explicitly states that without copyright law it would be “impossible.”110  However, 
these idealists still hope that, despite this paradoxical position that they have 
adopted, open-source licensing may yet undermine the institution of copyright, which 
they regard as having expanded beyond its legitimate role of incentivising creation, 
because of lobbying by the copyright industry.  In other words, open-source software 
will demonstrate that the copyright industry’s constant call for increased protection is 
not a sine qua non for creative endeavour.111  The above theoretical criticisms are, of 
course, less effective against those supporters of open-source software who do not 
seek to abolish copyright, but simply believe “that copyright law can be sufficiently 
adapted to build a sharing economy, a more competitive marketplace, and more 
humane democratic culture,”112 or those who support open-source development on 
pragmatic considerations, such as its advantages as a form of software 
development. 
 
It would, however, for purposes of this work, be a rather crude form of 
criticism of open-source software to simply state that it amounts to nothing other than 
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cost-free proprietary software, because it is based on copyright and contract.  
Similarly, it is too disingenuous to simply characterise open-source licensing as 
being the same as proprietary-software licensing, but merely involving different 
license terms.113  The fact that open-source software utilises copyright protection 
does not mean that the copyright retained by open-source authors provides them 
with the types of direct incentives which are said to justify copyright protection, and 
which, accordingly, motivates developers of proprietary software, as is sometimes 
wrongly claimed.114  Open-source licensees are, for all intents and purposes, granted 
all the economically-significant exclusive rights which copyright affords an author, for 
example, the right to authorise use of, copying, distributing and modifying, the 
software.  Copyright grants these exclusive rights to authors because it is assumed 
that by charging others to perform any of such acts, authors will have the necessary 
incentives to create such works.  This is not to suggest that all, or even most, open-
source developers are altruistic and do not seek any form of reward for their efforts.  
As will be illustrated below, the conditions which are imposed on licensees of open-
source software suggest that they may serve to provide many of their authors with 
other, indirect, incentives.115  The point is that it is easy to fixate on the copyright 
basis of open-source licences; however, it is necessary to appreciate the substantive 
difference in the manner in which open-source software is distributed to users 
(namely, in source-code form) and the range of activities they enable.116  As 
discussed in Chapter 3, copyright’s “all-rights-reserved” default regime, establishes 
proprietary rights which serve to eliminate free riding, and incentivises authors to 
create copyright works as others are required to obtain authors’ permission (usually 
against the payment of a fee) to engage in activities such as using, reproducing or 
adapting their works.  This is, after all, the economic rationale for copyright 
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protection.  Proprietary software, thus, utilises this exclusionary mechanism for direct 
reward.117  
 
In contrast to proprietary software, open-source authors use the proprietary 
rights conferred by copyright to open access to their works, rather than seeking the 
type of direct economic reward made possible as a consequence of the proprietary 
rights granted to authors by copyright.118  The proprietary rights retained by open-
source authors are simply held in reserve “to enforce a regime of “free” copying, 
modification, and distribution” if the norms of the open-source community involved in 
its creation, as embodied in the particular licence, are threatened by the conduct of 
others.119  In this way, open-source licensing, arguably, seeks to “re-establish” 
software’s public-good nature, and makes it a public resource.  What is, however, 
less debatable is that the consequence of this liberal licensing is that all open-source 
licensing (whether in the form of restrictive (copyleft) licences or permissive licences) 
is, in economic terms, seemingly more analagous to the position that would prevail if 
such software had simply been contributed to the public domain: it results in the 
creation of a public good.120  As will be recalled from the economic analysis of the 
rationale for copyright protection, the production of a public good poses specific 
problems in terms of providing the necessary incentives for their creation.  The 
positive externalities of public goods and the free-riding behaviour of others will 
cause the economic value of such a good to be eroded because its producer is 
unable to secure a sufficient return on its investment, which results in market failure 
and leads to the underproduction of the public good.  Accordingly, the mere fact that 
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both proprietary software and open-source software are based on copyright 
protection does not imply that “copyright is vital to the incentives of copyleft 
programmers,” as has been claimed.121  Copyright protection is vital, and justified, if 
authors require, and rely on, the kinds of incentive made possible by the 
exclusionary proprietary rights afforded by copyright.  This is not the case if authors, 
as in the case of open-source software, jettison the kind of exclusionary rights (and 
concomitant direct rewards) which copyright affords authors.   
 
Thus, it will, therefore, simply not be appropriate to dismiss open-source 
licensing as just another form of proprietary licensing.  Unless it is possible to 
distinguish open-source software from proprietary software in a way that accounts 
for the fact that open-source software development produces high-quality software 
without their authors seemingly requiring the direct incentives demanded by 
proprietary-software authors — which is, after all, the alleged rationale for copyright 
protection of computer programs — open-source software strikes at the very 
rationale for copyright protection of computer programs.  Before considering the 
kinds of incentives which motivate developers of open-source software, it is 
necessary to also consider some of the obligations or restrictions present in open-
source licences because, as will be discussed below, some of these conditions 
support the incentives which encourage the development of open-source software. 
 
5 5 2 Open-source licence obligations 
 
As discussed above, open-source software licensing grants users generous non-
exclusive licences, with transferable rights, but in return for such rights users agree 
to comply with a few conditions.  We will now consider some of the common 
conditions that are included in open-source licences as these conditions may be 
indicative of some of the incentives which developers may have to create open-
source software, and their effects on social welfare.  Some of the obligations or 
restrictions contained in open-source licences are not typically found in proprietary-
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software licences.122  As already noted above, open-source licences tend to be 
categorised by the conditions imposed on licensees, rather than the rights that are 
granted.  For example, whether a particular open-source licence contains a copyleft 
obligation serves as the distinguishing feature according to which it is categorised as 
either a copyleft (or restrictive) licence, or as an academic (or permissive) licence.123  
Apart from the copyleft obligation, some of the common conditions that will be 
considered are the following requirements: that licensees make appropriate 
attribution of the software to the author, and include the original copyright notices in 
subsequent distributions of the software; that licensees are prevented from imposing 
restrictions on the subsequent distribution of the software; and, that modified 
versions of the software are clearly distinguished from the original software or that 
licensees refrain from distributing modified versions.124  Also, while strictly not 
conditions, warranty disclaimers are generally included.125  Because these warranty 
disclaimers also potentially affect developers’ incentives to create open-source 
software, they will also briefly be considered.  Although the issue of incentives for 
open-source developers will be considered shortly, it is worthwhile noting at this 
stage that these requirements are all principally concerned with facilitating the 
developer’s distribution of the open-source software, and, arguably, the continued 
recognition of his authorship.126 
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5 5 2 1 Attribution and reputation 
 
While much commentary on open-source software concerns the copyleft obligation, 
it is submitted that if the incentives for open-source software development are to be 
properly understood, the obligations imposed on licensees concerning attribution of 
the software to its author, and related matters, are very instructive.  While the nature 
of the copyleft obligations, and its implications, will be considered below, the copyleft 
obligation per se is more representative of the ideological approach to software 
development, as characterised by people such as Richard Stallman and the FSF.  In 
contrast, when it comes to matters of attribution of the open-source software to its 
author, it is a requirement that is stipulated by even the most permissive licences.127  
Such requirement, while couched as a contractual obligation, from a legal 
perspective, merely amounts to a confirmation, or acknowledgement, of an author’s 
moral right of paternity, which is a right already afforded to an author by copyright 
law.128 
 
For example, the permissive BSD Unix licence requires that the licensee, 
when distributing the source code, retain the copyright notice, which indicates the 
name of the program’s author.129  Similarly, the GPL requires that when a licensee 
distributes the licensed program’s source code the licensee must conspicuously 
publish the copyright notice, which would contain details of its author.130  In this way, 
developers of open-source software, who are keen to enhance their reputations 
signal their abilities to potential employers, perpetuate their association with their 
creations.131  A licence such as the GPL ensures that not only is attribution of the 
software to its author emphasised, false attribution is also discouraged.  False 
attribution is combatted by the requirement that a licensee prominently identify its 
modifications to the software in subsequent distributions.132  The open-source 
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licence can require that such notification is given by obliging a licensee to assign a 
different version number to any derivative work, or that modifications to the source 
code are separately distributed.133  In this way, the GPL ensures that an open-source 
author is given the appropriate recognition for his efforts, by not having other 
persons’ modifications wrongly ascribed to him.134  Some open-source licences also 
seek to perpetuate the reputation of the author in respect of works derived from the 
open-source software, by requiring that licensees acknowledge the contribution of 
the authors of the open-source software in such derivative works.135  This 
requirement appears to be a distinct requirement from the copyleft obligation; the 
aim of the copyleft obligation is to ensure that derivative works are also licensed on 
the same liberal terms as the original software, and not per se with giving the author 
of the original software credit for his contribution to the derivative work. 
 
These requirements of open-source licences thus serve to protect, and, 
arguably, enhance the reputations of authors of open-source software within the 
software-development community.  In this context, an author’s moral right of 
paternity (or attribution) may be more than a simple acknowledgement, or 
confirmation, of an author’s paternity right by open-source licences; the paternity 
right is transformed into a potentially incentive-producing right in itself.  In other 
words, an author’s moral, paternity right — although not a property right — is 
explicitly utilised by open-source licences, to, arguably, serve a distinctly (indirect) 
economic function.136  By relying on the paternity right, which advances the 
                                            
133
 Horne "Open Source Software Licensing: Using Copyright Law to Encourage Free Use" 873. 
134
 873; McJohn "The Paradoxes of Free Software" 34. 
135
 Horne "Open Source Software Licensing: Using Copyright Law to Encourage Free Use" 873. 
136
 In contrast, an author’s moral right of integrity, which gives an author the right to prevent 
unauthorised changes which are prejudicial to its honour or reputation, would for similar economic 
reasons, be unlikely to be relied upon by an author of open-source software.  As indicated, a defining 
requirement in open-source licences, in addition to the access to the source code of a computer 
program, is the related freedoms, such as the right to redistribute and modify the source code.  An 
author who seeks to restricts the subsequent use of the source code, based on, potentially, subjective 
considerations, not only restricts its ability to derive indirect economic benefit from it being reused, it 
may also, depending on the nature of the restriction, mean that such software can, for all intents and 
purposes, no longer be regarded as open-source software.  Interestingly, the UK’s Copyright, Designs 
and Patents Act 1988, in any event, excludes the author’s moral right of integrity in the case of 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
312 
 
reputation of the authors of open-source software, the terms of open-source 
licensing serve a trademark-like function; by requiring that authors are given the 
credit for their creations, the licences are a badge of origin, indicating that the 
software originates from a particular author.137  Support for this badge-of-origin 
function of open-source licences is the fact that some authors of open-source 
software prohibit licensees from using their names in relation to derivative works in a 
manner which can be construed as an endorsement of any derivative works.138  
Some authors of open-source software also seek to enhance their reputations by 
ensuring that their creations enjoy the widest possible circulation.  They, therefore, 
seek to prohibit licensees from restricting circulation of the original work and any 
derivative works — by limiting use to certain individuals or groups, or for specific 
uses — and require that such works be similarly distributed on a non-discriminatory 
basis.139 
 
5 5 2 2 Disclaimer of warranty 
 
As noted above, although the warranty disclaimers and limitations of liability which 
are commonly found in open-source licences are not strictly conditions, they do, to 
some extent, provide authors of open-source software with incentives to create such 
software.  For example, the GPL provides that the open-source software is provided 
on an “as is” (or voetstoots) basis, and, unless specifically otherwise agreed in 
writing by the parties, the licensor provides no warranties concerning quality or 
                                                                                                                                       
computer programs and computer-generated works (section 81(2)).  In South Africa, which has not 
excluded the integrity right in respect of computer programs, an author of open-source software could, 
therefore, possibly object to a derivative work on the basis of its moral right of integrity.  There may, 
however, be an arguable case that the author of open-source software — given the liberal terms of 
the licence and the fact that the paternity right is expressly relied upon — has impliedly waived its 
moral right of integrity. 
137
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reputation, and is, therefore, serves a positive purpose.  On the other hand, the integrity right has a 
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performance, to the extent permitted by law.  It is expressly provided that the 
licensee assumes all risk of any loss or damage in connection with the use of such 
software.140  Similarly, the GPL excludes all liability on the part of the author of open-
source software, to the extent permitted by law, for any loss or damage which a user 
may suffer as a consequence of using the open-source software, unless such liability 
has been accepted by the author in writing.141 
 
There does not appear to be any case law indicating the extent to which the 
disclaimer of warranties or the limitations of liability of the kind included in open-
source licences, like the GPL, are valid and enforceable.  It seems obvious that 
authors of open-source software would be less willing to dedicate their efforts to the 
development of open-source software if open-source licences did not provide them 
with these protections, or if these provisions are found to be ineffective.142  In fact, it 
has been suggested that open-source authors may seek to rely on additional licence 
provisions, such as a specific choice of law or choice of venue, in order to ensure 
that these clauses are given their full intended effect.143  It is submitted that the 
extent of open-source software development will be materially affected should cases 
arise in which liability is imposed on the authors of open-source software.  A 
significant number of open-source authors would probably not consider the risk of 
liability to be outweighed by the benefit of enhancing their programming reputations 
by releasing open-source software, as they currently do. 
 
It is, therefore, not too improbable to suggest that a significant number of 
computer programmers are only prepared to enhance their reputations by engaging 
in open-source development because they have passed the risk of what they 
produce onto the users of such software.144  In other words, should liability be 
imposed on authors of open-source software for defects which such software may 
contain, a significant number of software programmers will abandon open-source 
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development and focus their efforts on the development of proprietary software.  Of 
course, even proprietary software developers also routinely seek to exclude any 
warranties that the software will work or perform to a certain standard,145 but, to the 
extent that warranties cannot be excluded or are given, the proprietary-software 
business model allows the author to charge a fee for its use, and a portion of such 
fee can be said to represent the risk of potential liability.  Moreover, even if there is 
no legal obligation on a proprietary-software developer to accept liability, because of 
reputational considerations, it will always be in its interests to address any defects as 
soon as possible, and possibly also compensate users for losses suffered.  The 
open-source licensing model simply does not allow the author of open-source 
software to spread the risks to which he is exposed in the same way as a 
proprietary-software developer as a result of making his software available to 
others.146   
5 5 2 3 Copyleft obligation 
 
Although the copyleft obligation contained in open-source licences, such as the GPL, 
has already been mentioned, it is necessary to consider this obligation more closely 
as it appears to be the most-commonly referred to aspect of open-source licensing.  
As noted above, it, for example, serves as a distinguishing factor to categorise open-
source licences as either restrictive, or permissive (academic) licences.  Also, as 
previously mentioned, the copyleft obligation in an open-source licence, such as 
clause 5 of the GPL, obliges licensees, should they distribute derivative works (or 
adaptations) of the licensed open-source software, to also licence, and make 
available, such derivative works (adaptations) on the same licensing terms.  It is, 
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therefore, critical to establish whether distribution of a derivative work is taking place, 
because the obligation only applies if there is distribution; there are no restrictions on 
the use and modification of copyleft software if it is not being distributed.147 
 
It is noteworthy that the FSD does not require the inclusion of the copyleft 
obligation for a software licence to be FSD-compliant.148  The copyleft obligation is in 
addition to, and distinct from, the FSD’s principal claims that the source code of 
computer programs should be accessible and free to use and modify.149  It may, at 
first, seem rather peculiar that the FSF, as the body responsible for promoting and 
maintaining the GPL, which is the most prominent example of a copyleft licence, and 
is considered as advancing Stallman’s beliefs concerning the freedoms that should 
accompany software, does not require the inclusion of a copyleft obligation.150  The 
FSF simply regards the copyleft obligation, like its reliance on copyright law 
generally, as a means by which the desired freedoms can be realised.151  As 
previously indicated, the purpose of the copyleft obligation is to prevent open-source 
software being used to develop proprietary software, and, by requiring licensees to 
license derivative works on the same terms as the copyleft licence, it helps to create 
a software commons from which anyone can benefit.152  If licensees do not also 
make their improvements to open-source software available for others to use, they 
deprive the public from the benefits of such improvements, which the programmer of 
the open-source software may have intended to, or hoped would, happen.153 
 
Stallman suggests that the fact that the GPL obliges licensees to also 
contribute their derivative works to this software commons, and preventing them 
from developing proprietary software derived from the open-source software, serves 
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as an incentive for software authors to participate in open-source development.  
Some open-source authors are loathe to see others making money based on their 
efforts, by creating proprietary software, and will only do so if they receive 
assurances that this will not be the case.  This is what the copyleft obligation does.154  
In other words, the copyleft obligation protects an open-source software author from 
facing competition from a free-riding rival who has used the work of the former by 
producing low-cost competitive software.155  Importantly, the copyleft obligation also 
reinforces the desire of open-source authors to be recognised (and reap the 
associated reputational, and signalling, rewards) through their creations by way of 
the required attribution of their works, as the copyleft obligation will also perpetuate 
the required copyright notices.156  It has been suggested that the undoubted 
preference for the GPL over any other open-source licence — as noted above, it is 
the most widely-used open-source software licence by some margin — gives 
credence to the contention that authors of open-source software resent the 
possibility that another person may seek to develop proprietary software based on 
their efforts.157   
 
The copyleft obligation also has a more pragmatic consequence, which may, 
of itself, encourage participation in open-source software development.  If licensees 
are required to contribute their modifications, enhancements or bug-fixes back to the 
software commons created by the open-source community, the efficiency 
advantages of open-source software development as a form of software 
development will be realised, and be self-evident to prospective open-source 
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software developers.158  This is an important consideration from an economic 
perspective as the inclusion of a copyleft obligation in software licences, arguably, 
has the effect of reducing the costs of producing, or improving, software, which 
contributes to improving social welfare.  However, it seems unlikely that the costs of 
software production will ever be reduced to such an extent that production costs will 
be trifling, and that software developers would no longer consider it worthwhile to 
seek any form of direct remuneration for their creative efforts.159 
 
The software commons made possible by copyleft provisions has been 
described in less flattering terms by its critics, who have preferred to describe 
copyleft licences by the pejorative label of “viral licences.”160  The hostility towards 
the copyleft obligation is as a consequence of its automatic binding nature; it does 
not give the licensee a choice to distribute derivative works on a conventional 
proprietary basis — or even on a non-copyleft open-source licence basis — because 
such works are “infected” by the GPL licence terms.161  This infection cannot be 
cured: it creates an endless chain of publicly-available source code because “[o]nce 
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code has been GPL-ed, it remains so forever.”162  From the perspective of a 
proprietary-software developer, the effect of the copyleft obligation is completely 
disproportionate in its effect; it lacks fairness as the proprietary-software developer 
has to, effectively, abandon the proprietary rights afforded by copyright in any 
derivative works if he uses any copyleft software in such software.  This, it is 
claimed, is not a case of a quid pro quo, but rather a quodque pro quo.163  The 
copyleft obligation, thus, has the effect of expropriating the rights of subsequent 
software authors if they use copyleft software. 
 
The very real, and practical, problem for developers of proprietary software is 
the ubiquity of open-source software, and the dangers inherent to their businesses if 
copyleft computer code has been included in their computer code, due to its viral, 
and incurable, character.  This dilemma has been succinctly described as follows:164 
“Open-source Software is an important part of any development process today. Not 
only are the economics compelling, one cannot eschew open-source software in toto 
and expect to attract and retain top development talent. In addition, many developers 
feel that they can trust open-source software, because of its transparency. Most 
developers will use open-source software anyway, so it is far better to acknowledge 
the presence and importance of open-source and make sure your development 
community does the same.” 
 
Developers of proprietary software need to be vigilant that individual computer 
programmers do not include copylefted computer code, resulting in the new 
computer program having to be made available on the same licensing terms, and 
destroying the business case (and the associated financial investment) for 
developing the particular software on a proprietary-software basis.  This concern 
about the potentially value-destroying consequence of including copylefted computer 
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code has meant that software developers must now dedicate resources to regularly 
audit the software they develop in order to ensure that copylefted computer code has 
not inadvertently been included in their software.  It is a situation which they simply 
cannot afford to occur, as its financial implications may be too much to bear.165  For 
example, companies who incorporate third-party software into their own software 
require providers of such software to warrant that it does not include any open-
source software.166  In addition, copyleft obligations create particularly thorny 
problems if copylefted computer code is combined with third-party source code.  The 
licence terms of copyleft software precludes a software developer from using it in 
conjunction with proprietary software obtained from third parties, because of the 
incompatibility of the licence terms.  As the copyleft provision requires the derivative 
work to be released on the same licence terms, it will result in infringement of other 
proprietary works which may also have been used in the creation of the particular 
software.167 
 
The cost of the additional audit process, to prevent the loss of proprietary 
rights — and the concomitant economic value of the resultant software — or the 
possible infringement of the proprietary rights in third-party software that may also 
have been included in the development of proprietary software, is significant.  In fact, 
there are now software companies, such as Black Duck Software,168 who provide 
specialist software which enables companies to effectively manage and audit their 
software-developing processes for open-source related issues, particularly those 
caused by copyleft software.  This is not to deny that copyleft software does make a 
positive contribution to social welfare, because concerns about copyleft software 
only increase the costs of production if the derivative work will be distributed to 
others.  If licensees will not be distributing their derivative works, they are given all 
the necessary freedoms to use open-source software — whether copyleft or non-
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copyleft software — as they may require.169  Without empirical evidence, it is difficult 
to state whether copyleft software leads to an overall increase in social welfare, 
given the significant cost burden it imposes on developers of proprietary software 
which is intended for distribution because of its ability to expropriate the rights of 
such, and other, authors’ works.170 
 
In addition to the additional auditing costs, where developers of proprietary 
software are aware that they may have used copyleft software, these developers 
may also need to dedicate resources to design their software in ways which preclude 
claims that it has been infected by copyleft software.  Whether a software program 
can be considered to be a derivative work which has been distributed in breach of a 
copyleft obligation depends on the way in which such program has been designed, 
and the type of interaction with the copyleft software.  There is a range of 
possibilities: at one extreme it may simply be the case that the copyleft software and 
the proprietary software are distributed on the same storage medium, without there 
being any other interactions.  It is accepted that this would not constitute the 
proprietary software being regarded as a derivative work of the copyleft software.  At 
the other extreme of the spectrum, the new software may include the computer code 
of the copyleft software, in which case it would be difficult to argue that the new 
computer program was not a derivative work.  In between these two extremes, 
software developers have attempted to design their proprietary software in a manner 
that it will be regarded as non-derivative works, while still leveraging off useful open-
source software.171  Importantly, from an efficiency perspective, it seems that the 
copyleft obligation has the consequence that software design may be sub-optimal 
because proprietary-software developers have to contrive ways to avoid its 
effects.172  Also, it is obvious that this use of human resources to find ways to avoid 
copyleft obligations does not contribute to social welfare. 
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Of course, the above value-destroying or inefficiency effects are only an issue 
in relation to the inclusion of copyleft software in a derivative work.  Software 
developers are free to use open-source software which has been available under 
permissive licences in the development of proprietary software.  These software 
licences are agnostic towards the purposes for which such software may be used, 
that is, whether it be proprietary software, or open-source software.  It would, after 
all, be foolish for software developers not to exploit such open-source software as it 
is often of a high quality, and could significantly reduce their development costs.173  
Again, there is, naturally, a fair amount of irony that non-copyleft open-source 
licences appear to be embody a greater quality of freedom than copyleft licences, 
despite Stallman’s contention that “[c]opyleft is a general method for making a 
program (or other work) free.”174  By not imposing any obligations on licensees to 
make their derivative works available to the public, non-copyleft licences actually 
restrict the freedoms of licensees to a significantly lesser degree — and, arguably, 
make a greater contribution to social welfare — than copyleft licences.  The gist of 
non-copyleft licences on the issue of derivative works — in contrast to copyleft 
licences — is to “basically say, here is the software, do whatever you want with it, it 
is not our problem.”175  Other commentators have also made similar observations; for 
example, Stromdale, correctly, submits that the non-copyleft BSD licence provides 
the greatest freedom on a scale of openness of software licences, and not the 
GPL.176  Simply put, the inclusion of the copyleft obligation in licences means that 
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such licences discriminate against third-party developers of proprietary software as 
they are unable to use (or efficiently use) such software to create derivative works.177  
Copyleft licences result in the creation of fewer derivative works than if the licensed 
works had been released under permissive licences or contributed to the public 
domain.178 
 
While there has been considerable commentary on the nature and effect of 
the copyleft obligation, as indicated in paragraph 5 4 (Other distinguishing features of 
open-source software), and its contribution to social welfare, there is no difference 
between copyleft and permissive open-source licences in terms of the economic 
incentives faced by software programmers when deciding to create open-source 
software as copylefted software or non-copylefted software.179  Both copylefted and 
non-copylefted software results in their authors being unable to charge licensees a 
fee for permission to use their software, which typically would allow them the 
possibility to realise a sufficient return on their investment.  Thus, in terms of 
incentives, from an economic perspective, the differentiation of open-source licences 
as copylefted or non-copylefted licences is a difference without distinction.  However, 
the net contribution to social welfare of copyleft software is something that needs to 
be empirically ascertained: on the positive side is the fact that the software commons 
which is constituted by its operation reduces the costs of producing, or improving, 
software, particularly software which will not be distributed to third parties; while on 
the negative side, it imposes significant additional developing costs on proprietary-
software developers, who have to ensure that their creations are not infected by 
copyleft computer code.  However, this latter cost is not strictly an additional cost of 
software production simply imposed by copyleft licences; developers of proprietary 
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software (and, indeed, developers of open-source software) have to ensure that their 
creations do not infringe any copyright in third-party software.180  It may, however, be 
the case that ubiquity of open-source software means that knowledge of it now 
generally means that it forms part of the skill set of computer programmers, and, 
therefore, it is a more onerous, and costly task to insure non-infringement.  Then, 
there are also the added social costs of developers having to find software design 
solutions to avoid the application of the copyleft obligations, or the fact that the 
copyleft obligation results in fewer derivative works than if the licensed works had 
been released under permissive licences or contributed to the public domain. 
 
5 6 Incentives for participating in the development of open-source software 
 
The conventional proprietary business model of software development corresponds 
with the economic rationale for copyright protection.  Copyright affords an author 
proprietary rights which allows him to internalise the benefits associated with his 
creation: others are required to seek his consent to use his work, and he is able to 
charge a fee for allowing such use.  In this manner, copyright, while not ensuring 
commercial success, allows the author to earn an income directly based on his 
creation, which greatly simplifies the calculus of whether the author should create 
such work in the first place.  The impressive range of high-quality open-source 
software that has been produced, such as Linux (and its variations, such as Ubuntu 
Linux), Mozilla Firefox, and OpenOffice from Sun Microsystems, suggests that 
software developers, both the individual programmers and commercial software 
firms who have invested in open-source projects, must have incentives for 
participating in such projects.181  These incentives are obviously not the direct 
benefits derived from the conventional exploitation of the proprietary rights afforded 
by copyright, such as licensing its use in exchange for a fee.  As we have seen, 
although the author of open-source software is able to charge a fee for the 
distribution costs of providing the software to a licensee on a particular medium, for 
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example a CD-ROM, this cannot serve as the basis for a profitable business 
model.182  Open-source licensors have, in other words, foresworn the direct financial 
benefits afforded by copyright and the product-based business model it makes 
possible as a result of the freedoms granted to licensees to use, modify, and 
distribute the software.183   
 
It is, therefore, necessary to ascertain what these incentives are for creating 
open-source software, and whether these incentives shed any light on the economic 
justification for the copyright protection of computer programs generally.  Are these 
incentives so powerful, and universal, that they cast doubt on the current policy of 
providing proprietary rights in computer programs, which is said to incentivise the 
creation of such works because of the potential profit which it allows their creators to 
earn?  In doing so, it is necessary to separately consider the incentives of individual 
programmers, who devote personal time to the development of open-source 
software, and those of commercial software firms which have invested resources to 
produce such software. 
 
5 6 1 Commercial firms 
 
To ascertain what the incentives of commercial firms are in producing, or dedicating 
resources such as individual developers’ time to the production of, open-source 
software is much more straight-forward than in the case of individual volunteers.  As 
the object of a commercial firm is to make a profit for its owners, its business model 
has to optimise its prospects of achieving such goal.  Commercial firms are not 
motivated by non-monetary considerations such as enhancing their reputations, 
except to the extent that such reputation adversely impacts on their commercial 
prospects.184 
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There may be various reasons why developing open-source software may be 
a sensible business strategy for a commercial firm: first, it could seek to provide 
related services in respect of such software, whether the software was initially 
developed by such firm and then released as open-source software, or whether the 
open-source software was initially developed by a third party to which the firm 
contributes; second, the software may serve to promote sales in its other 
complementary products, such as hardware or, in fact, other proprietary software.  
The decision of a commercial firm to release its own software as open-source 
software may be motivated by the desire to establish a position of market dominance 
for its software, by possibly taking advantage of being the first mover, in addition to 
seeing it as a sensible strategy to principally generate income from related services 
or products.185  The first of the above reasons for initiating, or supporting, open-
source software — the provision of related services — may be more significant to an 
enquiry into the incentives and rationale for the copyright protection of computer 
programs.   
 
The first significant example of how the release of the source code of software 
could soon result in establishing such software as dominant in a particular area, and 
focusing on providing related services, was Netscape’s web browser software, 
Communicator.  In 1998, Netscape released the source code to its software and 
soon its product was being improved by a legion of hackers, which contributed to its 
widespread acceptance by users.186  The types of services that could be provided in 
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relation to open-source software, or, indeed any software are, for example, 
consulting services, services facilitating the use of the software, such as providing 
training and support for its installation, integration, and use, and providing user-
specific (or bespoke) services such as customisation or enhancements.187  There is 
a demand for these services and the viability of the service-seller business model is 
one which is well-established in the software industry.  These services and 
enhancements help make open-source software more accessible to end-users, 
because such software, historically, was often not easy to install, integrate and 
operate for the non-technically minded user.188  Furthermore, some of these 
complementary services are not efficiently provided by the open-source 
community.189  End-users or consumers are prepared to pay for these services, or 
implementation costs, because they do not have to pay for the right to use the 
software, and the net result, including the service fees, may still represent a 
significant saving over the alternative proprietary software.  From the consumers’ 
perspective, they feel more in control of the costs related to using the software 
because they have the ability to effect modifications themselves, and only need to 
enlist the assistance of these service providers if required.  Of course, commercial 
firms producing competing proprietary software are cognisant of this fact and will 
seek to convince consumers of the superior quality of their software (requiring, for 
example, lower implementation costs), and also set their prices at a competitive 
level.190 
 
From a business perspective, it may not be unrealistic or shortsighted to focus 
on being a service seller, rather than charging licence fees for the use of software: 
more than 80% of end-user expenditure on software is in respect of associated 
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services, with the balance being attributed to licence fees for use.191  Because open-
source software is available to all, its generic, commodity nature means that service 
providers have to compete on the basis of their brand equity earned through the 
recognition of their expertise and the quality of their services.192  Given the fact that 
other service providers’ will not have had to invest resources in research and 
development costs to the extent which would have been required if they had created 
proprietary software, they can focus on their service competencies.193  It is 
interesting, and significant, that the decision of a commercial firm to release its own 
software as open-source software, and focus on the provision of related services, 
does not necessarily mean that other firms will be able to compete with it on an 
equal basis in providing such services.  The originators of such software have an 
advantage because of their intimate knowledge of their product, and users of their 
software tend to prefer to use their services.194 
 
As discussed above, open-source licences usually contain warranty 
disclaimers and blanket exclusions of liability, and commercial firms which provide 
services related to open-source software sometimes provide a quality-assurance 
function by providing users of their version of the open-source software with the 
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desired warranties and accept liability for its performance.195  Red Hat is probably 
the best example of the extent to which a successful commercial firm that provides 
related services and a quality-assurance function can be commercially successful.  
Although Red Hat’s customers can download and use its software at no cost, they 
chose to pay the associated fee, which can be characterised as an insurance 
premium.196 
 
The other business case identified above for supporting open-source software 
development is that it allows commercial firms to extend, or establish new, markets 
for their complementary products, whether it is computer hardware or software.  For 
example, suppliers of computer hardware, such as Sun Microsystems, IBM and 
Hewlett-Packard, have enabled their equipment to be compatible with, or function 
optimally using, open-source software, which is referred to as widget frosting.197  
While the financial investment of hardware manufacturers to open-source software 
may, in isolation, represent a substantial amount of money, it is submitted that this 
does not provide any insight into the rationale, or the appropriateness of, protecting 
computer programs by way of copyright.  These firms are simply developing the 
markets for their core products, and such investment does not reveal anything 
significant about the incentives for producing or investing resources in open-source 
software rather than proprietary software.  Similarly, there are commercial firms who 
invest in the production of open-source software which will serve as the platform for 
their proprietary software offerings that will run on these platforms.198  These 
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proprietary offerings may be distinct application programs which rely on the open-
source software as an intended standardised industry platform or development tool 
on which proprietary software can be developed, or where the proprietary offerings 
may be enhanced, feature-rich versions of the basic open-source software versions 
of the software.199  Where the open-source software is simply a basic version of the 
proprietary software, the open-source software can be said to fulfill a similar 
commercial role to freeware: it is a promotional device, or loss leader, to encourage 
potential customers to purchase its premium products.200 
 
Software platform products, which provide a common standard, are regarded 
as the most fertile area for open-source development among commercial firms.  The 
software-development community is wary of proprietary software platforms, on which 
others are required, or compelled, to develop software.  There is the potential danger 
that the proprietor of such software platform will become dominant in the particular 
market and then exercise its rights, or manipulate such software, in a manner which 
could prejudice the businesses of other software producers who have based their 
products on such platform.  This fear of vendor, or proprietary, lock-in could lead to 
the situation that socially beneficial software is not developed, or that other, less 
efficient, developments are pursued.  Commercial firms, at different levels of the 
value chain, thus consider it in their interests to working on a collaborative, open-
source platform.201  In addition, software developers have realised that open-source 
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software allows them to distribute the costs of development of a resource which they 
all require but which does not distinguish them from their competitors, and, therefore, 
is not something which their customers will attribute any particular value to, or for 
which customers are prepared to pay.  Economically, this type of platform is simply a 
commodity.  This type of software platform has been compared to the provision of 
streets in the subdivision of a new housing development: all the homeowners benefit 
from the street on which their houses are situated and it is in their interests to share 
the costs of the streets.  It, therefore, makes sense to spread these, largely 
unrecoverable, development, and maintenance, costs of this commodity by way of 
open-source development, and for software developers to focus their efforts on their 
core competencies: producing more differentiated, distinctive software based on 
such platform, which clients do value, and will use to evaluate and compare their 
comparison with those of other software developers.202  The other benefit from such 
cooperation is that these firms are able to identify potentially disrupting technologies, 
which knowledge they can use to avoid being committed to a business model which 
may be exposed to the impending market disruption.203   
 
The mere fact that these commercial firms chose to produce proprietary 
software is indicative of the fact that they have a purely functional approach to open-
source software.  Commercial firms make an assessment of whether they are likely 
to expand their customer base by supporting open-source software, allowing them to 
earn higher revenues from related services, or the sale of other software or products, 
than would be the case if they invested their resources in alternative proprietary 
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software.204  More generally, commercial firms seek to maximise their profits and 
reducing costs is probably the most effective way to achieve that goal.  Open-source 
software development is a device which commercial firms can use to reduce their 
development costs.205   
 
In addition, irrespective of whether a commercial firm has decided that its 
main source of revenue will come from providing software-related services, or from 
the sales of other products or software, open-source software as the basis for such 
forms of revenue generation can potentially provide a significant advantage over 
proprietary software.  Open-source software can be developed, and maintained, at 
lower costs than the equivalent proprietary software because it allows the 
commercial firm to benefit from the works created by others.206  Releasing the 
software as open-source software encourages its use by educational institutions and 
this tends to produce a community of programmers with the necessary expertise in 
the relevant software.  This so-called “alumni effect” has the effect that it reduces the 
costs of development, as these developers can be employed at lower costs than 
programmers with specialist expertise in firm-specific proprietary software, and it 
also means that this community may, on a voluntary basis, help maintain the 
software by contributing bug fixes and customisation of the software.207  Commercial 
firms have to weigh up these potential savings in development cost with the fact that 
potential competitors are, similarly, able to benefit from the software which has been 
developed in this manner.208   
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In fact, competitors will probably have even lower development costs than the 
firm that has released its own software as open-source software.  It has been 
suggested that the potential for free-riding competitors to emerge, with adverse 
consequences for the firm which has made the relevant initial investment, means 
that initial investment in open-source software by commercial firms will be limited.209  
Accordingly, commercial firms have to make forecasts of whether the cost 
advantages of engaging in open-source software development will be more than 
offset by the prospect of reduced income due to the existence of competitors who 
are also able to exploit the open-source software.210  However, commercial firms do 
not have to make these decisions on a broad, all-or-nothing basis, in respect of an 
entire computer program.  This calculus can take place at various levels of 
granularity.  Commercial firms are, for example, prepared to release certain discrete 
portions of their software as open-source software, while maintaining proprietary 
rights in the rest, because they may have failed to successfully develop such 
components internally or the future maintenance burden did not warrant it being 
economically viable for it to be developed on a proprietary basis.211  These firms 
cannot be said to, in any way, have abandoned the appropriateness, and 
incentivising nature, of the business model of developing software as an asset, 
which they can license (at a fee) to others as a consequence of their proprietary 
rights.  
 
The use of open-source software in this manner is thus consistent with the 
traditional economic rationale: firms will try to use the cheapest software and will give 
up proprietary rights when there is a cost advantage, such as the costs of 
development and maintenance, in doing so.212  With the lower coordination costs of 
software development made possible as a result of the Internet, consistent with the 
Coasean theory of the firm, firms will embrace open-source software development if 
its lower transaction, and, hence, development, costs provide an advantage over the 
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conventional development within the firm, and if such participation is complementary 
to its business model.213  In other words, the decision of whether to participate in 
open-source software is not motivated by non-commercial considerations, such as 
the desire to contribute to a software commons per se, but is simply appraised as a 
means by which profit, and a return on investment, can be maximised.214  The 
significant cost savings, and shorter development times, which open-source software 
development can yield often makes it appealing to a start-up software firm, but it 
does mean that there needs to be clarity at the outset of what its business model will 
be.  Such a firm may, effectively, deprive itself of the ability to exclusively exploit the 
resulting software, and of such software being a commercial asset.215   
 
Thus, commercial firms do not have a general a priori preference for open-
source software development;216 it is in fact arguable that they are more likely to 
consider open-source software as being inappropriate in their pursuit of profit, 
choosing instead to rely on exploiting the traditional proprietary rights afforded by 
copyright, and the types of revenue it enables.  For example, until fairly recently, the 
data in the US still suggests that the business model of the overwhelming majority of 
new commercial software firms seeking venture capital is still one based on a 
proprietary software model.217  Open-source software is, thus, simply a possible tool 
for profit maximisation, and probably not the preferred method to achieve that goal, 
given the direct benefits which conventional exploitation of the proprietary rights 
afforded by copyright potentially offers.  It has, for example, been suggested that 
commercial firms, like Netscape, only considered the open-source software 
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alternative as a desperate attempt at survival because it could no longer compete in 
respect of the actual of web-browser software due to the fierce competition from its 
rivals.218 
 
5 6 2 Volunteers 
 
It is arguable that the continuing success of open-source software development, 
despite the significant financial investment by commercial firms today, is still 
primarily dependent on the voluntary contributions of individual programmers.  There 
is much less room for doubting the pivotal role of these volunteers in the history of 
the development of open-source software.  As already noted previously, some of 
these volunteers, like Richard Stallman, were, and continue to be, motivated by 
ideological concerns about the morality of protecting software by way of proprietary 
rights.219  However, we are principally concerned with whether there are other 
significant incentives for creating computer programs, which may contribute to a 
better understanding of whether there is a need to provide incentives through the 
grant of property rights.  In any event, based on the large number of participants in 
open-source software development, it seems unlikely that most of these persons are 
simply driven by ideological considerations.220 
 
Before considering the motivations of these volunteers, it is necessary to 
make a few remarks about the interaction, or relationship, between commercial 
software firms (both providers of software-related services and developers of 
proprietary software) and these volunteers.  First, references to “volunteers” in this 
chapter, unless otherwise indicated, are confined to those persons who contribute to 
open-source software development without receiving any form of direct remuneration 
for such contribution.  This would, therefore, exclude employees of commercial firms 
who participate in open-source software development as part of their work duties to 
their employer.  The majority of contributors to open-source software are volunteers, 
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as defined.221  Second, it has been claimed that volunteers have the luxury of 
contributing to open-source software development because they are gainfully 
employed by producers of proprietary software.  Therefore, open-source software is 
wholly dependent on the producers of proprietary software, who are indirectly 
funding its development.222  Again, this broad-side dismissal of open-source software 
is reminiscent of the argument that open-source software is simply cost-free 
proprietary software, because it is based on copyright and contract.  The reality is 
that commercial firms realise that many of the participants in open-source software 
development are highly motivated, and this is not simply as a consequence of what 
they are paid in terms of their employment contracts.  Participation in open-source 
software as part of employees’ duties is encouraged by commercial firms, who see it 
as a means of ensuring that their employees are acquainted with the latest 
developments, and, through such participation, can identify possible threats to their 
business models as a result of open-source projects.  The knowledge gained by 
employees through their participation in open-source projects increases their human 
capital, and these skills benefit their employers when they produce proprietary 
software or add to open-source software used by their employers.223  Furthermore, 
such participation also serves to provide their programmers with intellectual 
stimulation and provides a forum for identifying potential employees.224  In any event, 
the commercial firms which contribute most to the development of open-source 
software are firms which provide related services, or where the open-source 
software serves to promote sales in complementary products, such as hardware.  
So, at a minimum, these commercial firms are benefitting commensurately from their 
employees’ participation in open-source software development, rather than these 
firms simply paying for their employees’ personal indulgences.  Also, as noted 
above, historically, open-source software development preceded proprietary 
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software and continues to be driven by volunteers, therefore, it is a crude 
generalisation to suggest that open-source software is simply a by-product, or 
consequence, of proprietary software, and that without proprietary software there 
would be no prospect of open-source software. 
 
The motivations of volunteers who contribute to the development of open-
source software can broadly be categorised as either intrinsic motivations or extrinsic 
motivations.225  Although these two types of motivation are not mutually exclusive 
and not easily distinguishable,226 the intrinsic motivations of volunteers are generally 
considered to be the following: the desire to contribute something of value to the 
programming community or the wider society; a personal need for the software; and, 
personal development and satisfaction from its creation.227  These intrinsic 
motivations, thus, largely relate to the alleged altruism of volunteers, their personal 
need, or the psychological benefits (for example, enjoyment and intellectual 
stimulation) volunteers derive from participation in open-source software 
development.  In contrast, the extrinsic motivations are principally concerned with 
separate, distinct pecuniary benefits, such as career concerns (with its associated 
financial rewards) and deriving an economic benefit from the activity, whether 
directly or indirectly.228 
 
Various surveys have been conducted amongst volunteers to determine their 
motivations, and to identify whether the intrinsic or extrinsic motivations are the 
prime motivations for participating in the development of open-source software.  
While the surveys clearly confirm the existence of both intrinsic or extrinsic 
motivations, they are inconclusive about which is the prime motivation.229  Given that 
                                            
225
 Bitzer, et al. "Intrinsic Motivation in Open Source Software Development" 162. 
226
 Lerner and Tirole consider there to be no difference and simply discuss both types of motivation 
under the signalling incentive (Lerner and Tirole "Some Simple Economics of Open Source" 213-4). 
227
 Bitzer, et al. "Intrinsic Motivation in Open Source Software Development" 161-2.   
228
 Kogut and Metiu "Open-source Software Development and Distributed Innovation" 258. 
229
 Lerner and Tirole "The Economics of Technology Sharing: Open Source and Beyond" 105.  The 
surveys that have been conducted have, for example, been based on a relatively small number of 
responses, and their voluntary nature may have also introduced a selection bias.  Moreover, given the 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
337 
 
this work focuses on the stated economic rationale for protecting computer 
programs, it is significant that even among volunteers, the extrinsic, economic 
motivations for participation in open-source software development are certainly not 
trivial or unimportant, and probably more substantial than reported by some 
surveys.230  The problem with the survey data that suggested intrinsic motivations 
may be more significant than extrinsic motivations are that may be skewed; the 
subjective nature of these surveys meant that volunteers may have been reluctant to 
emphasise their extrinsic motivations because it is more socially acceptable in open-
source communities to extol intrinsic motivations.231  Another possible reason for this 
is that both types of motivations may be driven by the same factor.  For example, the 
fact that the development of open-source software makes the talents of a volunteer 
visible to others, and thereby enhances the reputation of a volunteer, may both serve 
to provide a means of personal gratification, and provide a signal to prospective 
employers in the labour market or investors.232  We, therefore, have to look at other 
factors which may suggest whether the prime motivations of volunteers for 
participating in open-source software development are intrinsic or extrinsic. 
 
What is probably not contentious is to suggest that a volunteer participates in 
open-source development if the benefits of participation — both the psychological 
benefits associated with the intrinsic motivations, and the monetary rewards, direct 
or indirect, associated with the extrinsic motivations — exceed the opportunity costs 
of participation.233  The diffusion of the Internet was a major contributing factor in the 
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growth of the open-source movement, as it significantly reduced the opportunity 
costs of participation, and enabled volunteers’ efforts to be recognised on a global 
basis.  It has allowed volunteers to find like-minded individuals and to coordinate 
their efforts.234  Another factor which may have significantly reduced the opportunity 
costs of participation for a number of programmers is, as mentioned previously, the 
alumni effect: there are a significant number of people who have acquired the 
expertise to participate in such projects.  Volunteers will be more attracted to those 
activities that provide both intrinsic and extrinsic motivations, as the combined effect 
of these will be more likely to offset the opportunity costs of participation than an 
activity simply providing one of these motivations.235  This is no different to the 
considerations faced by a programmer engaged in proprietary software 
development.236  As will be illustrated below, the choices of volunteers in open-
source projects are largely consistent with the standard economic theories relating to 
labour markets and the private provision of public goods.237   
 
5 6 2 1 Altruism 
 
It has been suggested that the participation of volunteers in the development of 
open-source software may be ascribed to notions of altruism: that volunteers engage 
in such an activity as a consequence of their generosity, and consider the donation 
of their works as a socially-beneficial endeavour or duty.238  In such a “gift culture” 
individuals are said to reciprocate in kind because a person’s status in such a 
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community depends on the generosity exhibited.239  While it may be true that there 
are volunteers who have such motivations, like there are those who engage in open-
source development on the basis of ideology, this explanation for participation is less 
than convincing because it does not account for the large numbers of participants in 
the development of open-source software.  There are other, more pressing, social 
causes which these volunteers could devote their time to, which they currently 
dedicate to software development.  These actions may, thus, not be as obviously 
altruistic as suggested.  A fact that gives credence to such suspicion is the fact that a 
similar level of provision of public goods is not evident in other specialised areas.  It 
is not clear that volunteers are naturally imbued with a greater altruistic spirit than 
their counterparts in those other areas.  Therefore, the increased levels of 
participation (and, consequently, comparatively lower level of free riding in relation to 
the development of open-source software) cannot simply be ascribed to altruism.240  
Also, when it comes to the beneficiaries of this supposed largesse, there is no 
attempt to specifically address the needs of the poor or of those of developing 
countries.  The beneficiaries are as likely to be affluent individuals or commercial 
firms.241  Furthermore, if generosity and altruism is at the heart of such endeavours, 
why do volunteers insist on open-source licensing with its strong emphasis on 
individual attribution or copyleft provisions?  Genuine altruism or generosity should 
not require acknowledgements or be preoccupied with the uses to which one’s 
contribution may be put, unless the status one seeks to acquire through such 
contributions serves some other purpose.242 
 
5 6 2 2 Personal need 
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Most volunteers claim that they are motivated to engage in open-source software 
development as a result of their own software needs.243  Bearing in mind the 
comments made early relating to the reliability of survey evidence concerning the 
motivations of volunteers, there is no apparent reason to doubt this claim by 
volunteers.  It is, of course, true that some of the most successful open-source 
software projects, such as Linux, Sendmail and the Perl programming language, 
started out as projects to address the needs of their creators.  The needs of 
volunteers are generally more modest than the aforementioned projects; volunteers 
may simply wish to customise existing software, or fix bugs.244 
 
While it is obvious that someone may be motivated to create or fix something, 
like software, from which they would derive a benefit, it is not so obviously apparent 
why they would agree to make such software available as open-source software.  
Therefore, the personal-need motivation does not, on its own, provide a cogent 
reason why volunteers would produce open-source software.245  A possible reason 
for the release of software as open-source code involves the volunteer taking a more 
long-term, economic view of his creation.  If a volunteer is of the opinion that he can 
derive greater benefit, at a much-reduced cost, from his creation as a consequence 
of the improvements others could bring about, and from their efforts in maintaining 
the software, it makes economic sense to release the source code under a copyleft-
type open-source licence rather than keeping it confidential, on a proprietary basis, 
or simply contributing it to the public domain.246 
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5 6 2 3 Personal gratification 
 
It is also claimed that volunteers participate in open-source software development for 
reasons of personal gratification, rather than as a consequence of any economic 
incentive, and which may include any combination of the following motivations: it 
may satisfy a desire to be intellectually challenged, or that such participation may 
simply be the result of curiosity; it may be a way of increasing a volunteer’s skills; 
there may be an inherent need to create things, including software, and enjoyment 
associated with doing so; it may allow the volunteer to form relationships with like-
minded individuals, and give the volunteer the opportunity to share knowledge and 
skills; there may be pleasure derived from the camaraderie associated with the 
teamwork involved in creating open-source software; or, it may give the volunteer a 
greater sense of self-worth as participation could enhance his reputation as a 
consequence of the recognition of his abilities by others in his community.247  To the 
extent that these incentives are significant, it is submitted that the most likely profile 
of individuals who will seek these types of intrinsic incentives will be young 
programmers with low opportunity costs or costs of participation, and who are, thus, 
more likely to conclude that it is beneficial — due to, for example, the associated 
play value — to personally develop the desired software.248 
 
Apart from the fact that most of the abovementioned motivations are, due to 
their subjective nature, difficult to verify, no adequate explanation is provided for why 
these motivations should be so significant in relation to the creation of computer 
software, as opposed to any other creative endeavours, or why all, or most, of these 
benefits should not also be available in an employment context or enjoyed by 
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entrepreneurs developing proprietary software, individually or as part of a team.249  
Furthermore, although some of these motivations are claimed to satisfy non-
economic, personal needs, on closer examination the most important motivating 
factors clearly have an economic value to volunteers. 
 
One of the most commonly-cited reasons by volunteers for participation is to 
learn and develop their skills, not only programming skills but other related aspects 
such as team work, team management, copyright law and licensing, which they 
generally do not acquire during their formal computer science courses, if they have 
done any at all.  However, this participation is clearly not simply for self-edification or 
to fulfill a personal need for the software; employers value these skills — regarding 
participation by volunteers as form of quasi-apprenticeship — and employ volunteers 
on the basis of the acquired skills, while other volunteers utilise them in 
entrepreneurial projects.  Prospective employers particularly value the fact that the 
volunteers have acquired generic, non-firm-specific, skills, which makes such 
candidates more versatile in the workplace.  So, while the stated objective may be to 
satisfy a non-monetary objective, these skills clearly have an economic value to 
volunteers.250  It is doubtful whether, in the absence of such economic benefits, 
volunteers will participate in open-source projects in the numbers, and the extent 
hitherto.   
 
The alleged desire of volunteers simply wishing to enhance their reputation, 
and earn the respect of their peers, rather than pursue any form of monetary reward, 
is not without precedent.  Parallels are drawn with academics, who publish scholarly 
works primarily to gain the respect of their peers, and, if this is so, volunteers, like 
academics, will choose to be involved in open-source projects that maximise their 
chances of being recognised for their efforts.251  The problem is that although a 
volunteer may simply seek to increase his reputation and status within the 
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programming community, without seeking any obvious form of financial benefit, it is 
very difficult to distinguish this situation from one in which a person seeks to raise his 
profile as a signaling device in the relevant labour market.  In any event, the 
economic incentives in these two situations are similar, and the issue of signaling, 
generally, will be discussed below, when considering the extrinsic motivations of 
volunteers.  Economically, both these incentives address career concerns.252  At the 
end of the day, the recognition earned “is valuable not only in its own right, but the 
reputation gained may lead to a higher-paying regular job.”253  Furthermore, the 
signaling in a labour market and the ego gratification associated with the 
enhancement of one’s reputation both require that a volunteer’s efforts be visible to 
others.254  Whether the enhanced reputation of a volunteer is an end in itself or 
merely serves to signal his abilities, all open-source licences facilitate the show-
casing of volunteers’ contributions by imposing attribution obligations on licensees, 
which ensure that authors’ needs for recognition are satisfied.255   
 
5 6 2 4 Extrinsic incentives 
 
As indicated above, the motivations of a volunteer to participate in an open-source 
software project may, in fact, involve the same the considerations as those faced by 
a computer programmer engaged in proprietary software production.256  The choices 
of volunteers are largely consistent with the standard economic theories relating to 
labour markets and the private provision of public goods.257  As indicated above, 
volunteers will, as general rule, only participate in the development of open-source 
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software if they derive a net benefit from such participation.258  Professional 
computer programmers, to some extent, have a choice: in general, they can either 
chose to be paid directly for their services, typically, in terms of an employment 
contract, or offer their services on a more entrepreneurial basis.  In the employment 
context their earning potential is more limited than what they could earn in 
entrepreneurial endeavours, but the latter also involves greater risks.  A major factor 
which contributes to the success of entrepreneurship is whether the programmer can 
signal his superior abilities to others who may wish to engage his services.259 
 
It is claimed that in the employment environment, where a computer 
programmer typically works as part of a larger group, individual contributions are 
virtually anonymous — and programmers’ talents are considered to be 
“heterogeneous and unobservable” — and, therefore, individual ability is not 
recognised or valued.260  This accounts for the lower, but more predictable, 
economic returns for programmers in such positions.  One way for talented 
programmers to have others observe their abilities is to engage in the development 
of open-source software, this is the so-called “signalling incentive” of volunteers.  
The public nature in which open-source software is developed, and the compulsory 
attribution obligations imposed by open-source licences, means that the individual 
contributions of volunteers are observable by their peers, and talented programmers 
are able to be recognised for their abilities.  In the absence of copyright protection, 
and, therefore, the ability to enforce the compulsory attribution obligations, the 
signalling incentive would be severely hampered, if not made impossible.  The fact 
that all open-source licences have such strong attribution obligations suggests that 
the signalling, and corresponding economic, incentive may be the most important 
incentive.  Open-source projects detail the nature of the contributions of the various 
volunteers, which allows for a level of individual recognition which is not achievable 
in the context of proprietary software development.  Also, given the fact that 
volunteers’ contributions are made available immediately to other users means that a 
volunteer can gain a reputation in a much shorter period of time than if employed in 
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the development of proprietary software.  Thus, an individual who has confidence in 
his abilities may be drawn to open-source development, to use it as a springboard to 
establish his reputation, and earn a greater return (than being an employee) in the 
long run.261  It has, for example, been suggested that the signalling incentive may be 
particularly strong among talented programmers who lack formal qualifications, 
recently-graduated computer scientists, or programmers who work at small firms or 
institutions, and who all seek to use open-source projects as a showcase for their 
talents to enable them to enter the software industry or move to more lucrative 
positions.262  In other words, this group is characterised by their lower opportunity 
costs of participation.  However, open-source software development not only 
provides a showcasing opportunity for relative novices, it can also be used by vastly 
experienced computer programmers. 
 
Given the geographic spread of volunteers, the success of an open-source 
project depends to a larger degree on the management skills of its project leader to 
motivate unpaid volunteers and coordinate their efforts.  The project leader needs to 
be self-motivated, develop a critical mass of computer code to demonstrate the 
viability of the project, and make decisions on the appropriate solutions to identified 
problems; he needs to prevent the project from splintering into parallel projects, yet 
keep volunteers who disagree with the chosen course of action from defecting.  
Programming tasks that are assigned to volunteers should be discrete enough (that 
is, modularised) for them to be developed independently (without the need for 
supervision), yet be challenging enough to be intellectually stimulating and allow 
volunteers to exhibit their talents.  In other words, a good project leader needs to 
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demonstrate both his technical ability as a programmer and as an effective, and 
respected, manager.  Given the public nature of the development process, a good 
project leader’s abilities are very visible, and could potentially be richly rewarded.263 
 
The delayed economic returns of participation in open-source projects may 
more than adequately compensate a volunteer for the opportunity costs associated 
with such participation.  We have already seen that some volunteers engage in 
open-source projects to learn and develop their skills, which enable them to secure 
full-time employment.  However, the delayed rewards of the most-talented, 
entrepreneurial volunteers may significantly exceed what they would earn in full-time 
employment.  For a start, a talented volunteer may be able to provide well-paid 
consulting services or may be requested to customise software.  As previously 
noted, the market for software-related services is much bigger than that for simply 
licensing the use of software.  Furthermore, a successful project leader of an open-
source project, displaying excellent managerial skills, in addition to sound technical 
skills, may be able to attract venture capital investment for an existing or future 
project, or he may be offered shares in commercial open-source-based companies 
as part of a package to attract his services.264   
 
Open-source software development has allowed talented volunteers an 
alternative incentive structure, one which has analogies to those in the academic 
community.  Whereas participants in the private sector generally seek to rely on 
proprietary protection, or confidentiality, of their creations, and seek to earn a direct 
income therefrom, the norm in the academic community is that the individual 
publishes the product of his labours widely to establish a reputation, which could 
potentially lead to subsequent higher financial returns than can be earned by such 
an individual in the private sector.  These higher returns are possible because others 
are able to observe the individual’s abilities, and the associated reputation among his 
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peers, which may not be so evident in the context of employment in the private 
sector.265  Greater long-term returns are made possible because open-source 
software development, as supported by the associated copyright licences, allows 
volunteers’ efforts to be recognised and for them to signal their abilities, which are 
more visible, and which third parties can more accurately assess, and attribute to, 
the relevant individual.  In contrast, in the traditional employment environment, where 
talented programmers participate in the development of proprietary software, the 
employer captures most of the surplus value of such programmers, and this is 
probably a fact about which the most-talented volunteers are cognisant.266 
 
It should, therefore, be clear that volunteers are not a species distinct from 
other computer programmers who engage in the production of proprietary software; 
volunteers also require incentives, and, moreover, it appears that their economic 
incentives may be very significant.267  The evidence suggests that participants in 
open-source communities are more likely to be extrinsically motivated because 
situations in which some participants are intrinsically motivated, while others seek 
extrinsic reward, are unstable because of the obvious free-rider problem which it 
creates.268   
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5 7 Conclusion 
 
As illustrated above, the emergence of open-source software as a phenomenon 
distinct from, and, for some, opposed to, proprietary software has received 
considerable attention.  Proponents on both sides of this software divide have not 
been slow in resorting to rhetoric and hyperbole to defend their positions.  On closer 
examination, open-source software development does not represent a significant 
paradigmatic change in respect of the incentives required by participants in software 
development.  Neither is open-source software destructive, or as damaging, towards 
proprietary software as its opponents would have us believe. 
 
As illustrated, from the perspective of commercial firms, the release of 
software as open-source software may represent an opportunity to establish market 
dominance, and focus on generating revenue from related services or products.  For 
commercial firms, investment in open-source software development is often, 
therefore, a promotional device.  Another significant reason why commercial firms 
may decide to dedicate resources to open-source software development is when it is 
in their collective interest to develop a common standard or platform for further 
product development.  Open-source software, in these situations, represents a cost-
effective solution for producing a commodity from which a firm is unlikely to derive 
direct financial benefit anyway. 
 
Similarly, when it comes to individual volunteers, their actions can largely be 
accounted for by labour market economics.  While there are no doubt individuals 
who participate in open-source software development as a consequence of their 
ideological convictions, the sheer number of individuals who participate in such 
activity would suggest that they have other motivations for doing so.  While the 
intrinsic motivations for participation may be relevant, they too are probably not as 
important as the extrinsic motivations of volunteers.  Although the latter statement 
may be disputed, as there is no definitive empirical evidence to support it, what is 
less debatable is that there is nothing to suggest that the motivations which are said 
to encourage volunteers to participate in open-source software development would, 
on its own, be sufficient to sustain the current level of software development.   
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While the range of available open-source software is encouraging, it is still 
comprises only a fraction of the software market.269  In other words, most producers 
of software are likely to still require the direct economic incentives which copyright 
affords authors. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
“The presumption is that creativity and invention occur in response to the 
stimulus of reward.  But this presumption can be questioned.  The common 
response is that creativity and innovation occur independently of financial 
reward.  This criticism is true, but somewhat misdirected.  As long as some 
inventors respond to monetary rewards, the argument that intellectual 
property law spurs innovation still stands.”1 
 
There has been much scepticism about the appropriateness of protecting computer 
programs by way of copyright, and criticism that such protection prevents innovation, 
hurts consumers, and, is, ultimately, not socially beneficial.  The concern that the 
protection of computer programs should not extend beyond that which is necessary 
to encourage their creation is a material societal concern, and not simply an 
academic matter, because “[t]he levers and cogs of the machines of the modern 
economy are forged out of ones and zeros instead of steel and brass.”2  Critics of 
copyright protection of computer programs, and copyright generally, appear to have 
found support in the emergence of open-source software development.  Open-
source software is software that is publicly available in source-code form, and where 
the accompanying licence permits licensees to use (and redistribute) the software, 
and to modify the software and distribute the modified software in source-code form.  
As far as the range of criticisms directed at copyright protection of computer 
programs are concerned, on the one end, the most benign criticism is that copyright 
protection is unnecessary; while at the other end, it is claimed that copyright 
protection of computer programs inhibits software production, and leads to anti-
competitive behaviour.3 
 
In order to assess the validity of the criticisms it was necessary to consider 
the rationale for affording copyright protection generally, and for computer programs.  
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The reason for this is simply that such a system of property rights will be shaped by, 
and should be consistent with, such justifications.4  Furthermore, an evaluation of 
any specific aspect thereof, such as the scope of protection of computer programs, 
must be considered in such context.  As illustrated, the justification for the protection 
of intellectual property rights, like that for tangible property, is either said to be based 
on the ethical or moral arguments — such as labour-based justifications and the 
personality theory — or on the economic argument for such protection.5  While the 
moral justificatory theories are still regularly invoked and have intuitive appeal, it has 
been suggested that they fail to provide satisfactory explanations for copyright 
protection. 
 
It is submitted that the economic argument is the principal, and most 
plausible, justification for copyright protection; not only does it provide an account for 
the grant of property rights, it also provides a sound basis for copyright doctrine like 
the idea-expression dichotomy and the fair-dealing exceptions.  In addition, 
analysing vexing issues of copyright doctrine, such as the idea-expression 
dichotomy, from an economic perspective, gives courts a superior, defined tool — 
especially as a first touchstone — to determine the appropriate scope of copyright 
protection.  Economic analysis is a far more desirable approach than the subjective, 
intuitive, ad hoc approach which courts have tended to use to distinguish 
unprotectable elements from protectable expression.  This is not to suggest that we 
have managed to empirically confirm the correctness of the economic theory relating 
to copyright protection — which postulates that it produces net social gains — or that 
the moral justifications do not, or should not, have any bearing on copyright policy.  
More resources should be dedicated to confirm or quantify the economic impact of 
copyright protection on social welfare in order to avoid speculating on its effects on 
social welfare, and to use this information to optimise its regulation.  As for the moral 
considerations, it is submitted that where the economic analysis may be 
inconclusive, for example, due to a lack of empirical evidence, or where there are 
problems concerning the quantification of the possible effects of a particular policy or 
proposal, the moral justifications may serve to provide valuable additional 
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considerations about the appropriateness of such policy.  Of course, the possibility 
also exists that moral considerations could trump the economic arguments in a given 
situation, but this should be done on the basis of express, and defendable, policy 
considerations, having regard to the economic costs of such decision.  While it may 
be correct that, as a society, economics should not always dictate what we ought to 
do, moral arguments tend to involve incommensurable points of view, and arriving at 
a consensus where there are conflicting moral considerations is difficult.  However, 
even where copyright policy is based on moral considerations, economic analysis 
can provide useful insights into the costs of a particular policy, and can assist in 
assessing the social costs of pursuing such policy. 
 
The conventional economic justification for copyright protection is that it 
provides necessary incentives to authors to create the types of works it protects, 
and, by so doing, it encourages creation of these socially-desirable works.  Due to 
their intangible nature, copyright works, like other intellectual property, are, 
economically, regarded as public goods.  Because of their public-good nature, in the 
absence of the legal protection afforded by copyright, copyright works give rise to 
difficulties which may prevent their creation at a socially-desirable level in a free 
market.  Copyright works create positive externalities — others can enjoy the 
benefits of such works without compensating their authors — and this gives rise to 
the so-called free-rider problem: non-paying users of the public good.  In terms of 
game-theoretic descriptions of this situation, free riding becomes the dominant 
strategy for the end-users of copyright works and for authors’ competitors.  The 
consequence of this free riding is that it gives prospective authors a skewed signal of 
the actual demand for such works, leading to an underproduction (that is, below the 
socially-desirable level) of such works because authors fear that they are unable to 
recover their costs of creation, and secure an adequate return on their investment.  
In other words, the public-good nature of copyright works causes market failure (and 
consequent underproduction) because of the positive externalities, and free riding 
associated with such works.  Furthermore, where works are created in the absence 
of copyright protection, authors — in an attempt to prevent free riding — would, 
inevitably, be required to make considerable investments to develop technical, or 
other, measures to restrict access to their works.  In addition to the fact that these 
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investments would probably be a wasteful, or inefficient, use of resources, these 
measures would seek to restrict the flow of information, which is considered to be 
socially detrimental, and which copyright protection serves to encourage. 
 
Because it is generally accepted that the social benefit of intellectual 
creations, such as copyright, generally exceeds the costs of their creation, their 
production should be encouraged.  Copyright protection, through the grant of 
property rights, creates an exclusionary mechanism by which authors can prevent 
free riding, thus destroying the public-good nature of copyright works, and addresses 
the problem of market failure.  The creation of property rights is considered to be the 
most efficient way in which the costs and benefits of externalities can be internalised 
by the author of the positive externality.  Clear property rights provide authors with 
the necessary security to create copyright works knowing that they can earn a 
financial return from such works by charging for access, or exchanging such rights 
for value, and, thus, potentially earn an economic profit from such creative effort.  
This system of proprietary copyright protection is considered to be more socially 
efficient than other possible alternative solutions to the public-good problem, such as 
the public financing of production or patronage, and more effective than contractual 
restrictions. 
 
However, it is important to recognise that copyright protection also imposes 
social costs, such as the costs of administering the copyright system, and the loss of 
socially-beneficial contributions free riders could make in the absence of copyright.  
The public-good nature of copyright works, particularly computer programs, means 
that, in terms of simple allocative efficiency, restrictions are socially detrimental and 
have to be justified; once a computer program exists, it is socially wasteful to exclude 
others from its benefits if the marginal cost of them enjoying such benefit is negligible 
(or less than the cost of exclusion).  In other words, while the cost of providing the 
good to an additional person may be zero (or negligible), the cost of exclusion in the 
case of public goods is not negligible.  It is, therefore, important, to determine 
whether copyright protection is efficient in addressing the identified market failure, or 
whether such protection does not introduce distortions leading to market failure by, 
for example, introducing other externalities or high transaction costs as a result of 
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providing excessive protection.  It is, thus, necessary to ensure that such costs, 
which are a consequence of such protection, are outweighed by the perceived 
benefits due to the increased production of such works which copyright protection 
seeks to ensure.  Copyright protection should, ideally, extend only so far as to 
provide the necessary incentives for authors to create copyright works, and not be 
too wide so as to introduce, or result in, unnecessary social costs in achieving such 
objective.  Thus, while there is the concern that the absence of copyright protection 
will result in the underproduction of socially-beneficial works, the countervailing 
concern is that too much protection would result in the under-utilisation of such 
works, and the sub-optimal distribution of information, which too has a detrimental 
effect on social welfare. 
 
The most important concern, from a social-welfare perspective, for purposes 
of this study, was to establish whether copyright protection leaves enough room for 
creativity, or whether it unduly raises the cost of creating new computer programs.  If 
the scope of protection is too broad, the incentivising goal will be pursued at too 
great a social cost as such protection will limit the access of others to the broader 
themes and concepts used to create such works.  Besides limiting the period of 
protection, copyright doctrine has generally sought to minimise these costs by, for 
example, not protecting ideas (and, therefore, not preventing independent creation) 
or commonplace facts.  In the light of the analysis of the case law pertaining to non-
literal copying of computer programs in the US and the UK, it is submitted that, while 
this was not initially the case, the scope of copyright protection of computer 
programs leaves enough creative room for the production of new software. 
 
The courts in both jurisdictions recognised the functional nature of computer 
programs, and the fact that computer programs necessarily have to conform to 
certain technical requirements.  This meant that they considered it necessary to 
restrict the scope of copyright protection of computer programs; a greater degree of 
similarity between two computer programs is required before a finding of substantial 
similarity, and, consequently, copyright infringement, can be made, when compared 
to, for example, fictional literary works.  Also, it was recognised that excessive 
copyright protection of computer programs, due to their functional nature, would 
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result in a much greater additional social cost than copyright protection of aesthetic 
works, because such protection would have a similar effect to patent protection, by 
protecting ideas rather than their material expression. 
 
The most recent UK and European Court of Justice cases, which reflects the 
position under the EU Software Directive,6 exclude protection of ideas and principles 
which underlie any element of a computer program, like its logic, algorithms, 
programming languages or interfaces.  At the highest level of abstraction, the case 
law indicates that, at present, copyright law does not protect the conceptualisation, 
design and business logic embodied in a computer program.  It also does not protect 
the structure, sequence or organisation of a computer program as these concepts — 
based on the analogy with fictional literary works — are inappropriate in the context 
of computer programs.  The idea-expression dichotomy also means that functional 
aspects will not be protected where these have been independently replicated.  
Thus, reverse engineering the functionality of a computer program would not 
constitute copyright infringement.  Accordingly, at the level of computer code, 
copyright law does not protect any elements of a computer program dictated by 
function (or purpose), technical (or external) constraints or efficiency considerations.  
Elements of a computer program may also be excluded from protection on the basis 
that they constitute standard or obvious programming techniques (or methods), or 
are commonplace expressions.  This ensures that there is a sufficiently large public 
domain for other authors to create competitive computer programs. 
 
Interestingly, the effect of the US and UK case law has been that even the 
graphic elements of the user interface of a computer program — the so-called “look 
and feel” of software — which could be protected as distinct artistic works, but do not 
constitute computer programs, receive much thinner protection than traditional 
artistic works.  Others are generally free to develop a computer program which 
emulates the user interface of another program, provided that the later program has 
not copied the computer code of the first, or any of its detailed graphic elements 
(artistic works); other than for the detailed graphic elements of the user interface, not 
much else of a computer program’s user interface will be protected. 
                                            
6
 EU Directive on the legal protection of computer programs (2009/24/EC). 
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For the above reasons, it is submitted that, other than for the term of copyright 
protection of computer programs (which is excessive given the commercial life of 
software), and the remarks below, the current scope of copyright protection of 
computer programs in the US and UK does not appear to be excessive.  Thus, cases 
like Navitaire7 reflect the recognition that the purpose of the copyright protection of 
computer programs is to incentivise their creation, not to stifle new creation.8  In fact, 
it is arguable that the current level of copyright protection essentially only prevents 
mechanical, or slavish, copying of computer programs.  This view has been 
confirmed in the most recent European Court of Justice judgment concerning the 
scope of copyright protection of computer programs, SAS Institute Inc v World 
Programming Ltd,9 which decision is consistent with the Navitaire decision.  The ECJ 
stated that “the main advantage of protecting computer programs by copyright was 
that such protection covered the individual expression of the work only and therefore 
left other authors the desired latitude to create similar or even identical programs 
provided that they refrained from copying.”10  However, this limited protection, 
combined with the first-mover advantage, is sufficient to ensure that a third party 
does not gain an unfair advantage over the author of the original program.  The 
scope of copyright protection certainly does not appear to have inhibited innovation 
and the creation of new computer programs, which is evident from the size of the 
software industry. 
 
The other aspect of the investigation undertaken in this study concerning the 
rationale for the copyright protection of computer programs was to ascertain whether 
the emergence of open-source software really undermines the economic rationale 
for copyright protection of computer programs.  Put differently, is it correct that 
computer software would still be produced at the levels we currently enjoy in the 
absence of copyright protection of computer programs?  It is important to recognise 
that when Richard Stallman formed the Free Software Foundation in 1985, to pursue 
                                            
7
 Navitaire Inc. v easyJet Airline Company & Another [2004] EWHC 1725 (Ch). 
8
 Stokes "The Development of UK Software Copyright Law: From John Richardson Computers to 
Navitaire" 133. 
9
 SAS Institute Inc v World Programming Ltd 2012 Case C-406/10 [41]. 
10
 [41]. 
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his ideological objection to copyright protection of computer programs, the scope of 
copyright protection of computer programs was, at best, unclear, and, probably, 
excessive.  There was, thus, a genuine concern that copyright protection of 
computer programs would stifle creativity and innovation in the fast-developing area 
of computer software.  This concern was only confirmed by subsequent cases which 
extended protection to the look and feel of computer programs.11  However, as 
indicated, the scope of copyright protection of computer programs has narrowed 
significantly since then, and now mainly serves to prevent slavish copying of 
computer programs.   
 
The liberal licensing policy of open-source software grants users a non-
exclusive licence with transferable rights, obviating the need for persons seeking to 
perform any of the acts usually restricted by copyright, in relation to an open-source 
computer program, from having to obtain the consent of its author, and in return for 
such rights users agree to comply with a few conditions.  In other words, whereas 
the default regime of copyright is to create an “all rights reserved” situation, open-
source licences seek to remove those restrictions on third parties’ ability to use 
copyright works; it creates a licensed-by-default position.  Although the effect of 
open-source software licences is that their authors are unable to charge licensees a 
fee for permission to use their software, which is the direct reward which copyright 
enables authors to earn as an incentive to create such software, this does not mean 
that these authors — both commercial firms and individual programmers — lack 
financial incentives to create such software. 
 
The financial incentives of commercial firms are easier to identify than those 
of individual programmers as their goal is simply to maximise profits.  Their 
investments in open-source software are premised on one or both of the following 
business cases: they either seek to provide related services in respect of such 
software; or, the software may serve to promote sales in their other complementary 
products, such as hardware, or, in fact, other proprietary software.  In both these 
business cases, the investment in open-source software can represent a significant 
cost advantage over proprietary software.  Open-source software can be developed, 
                                            
11
 See, for example, Lotus Development Corp. v Paperback Software Intl. 1990 740 F. Supp. 37. 
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and maintained, at lower costs than equivalent proprietary software because it allows 
a commercial firm to benefit from the efforts of others.  The first of these business 
cases — the provision of related services — may be more significant to an enquiry 
into the incentives for software creation because it may be argued that firms, 
generally, earn significant income from providing related services, and that the 
prospect of such income should provide the necessary incentives to create software 
in the absence of copyright protection.   
 
However, the data suggests that the overwhelming majority of new 
commercial software firms still consider the proprietary-software business model to 
be more appropriate, which is an indication that copyright protection still provides 
much-needed incentives.  If software producers were forced to rely on the revenue 
from related services, it could have a deleterious effect on innovation and adversely 
affect consumers.  It is likely that the large, established software firms — who are, in 
any event, the object of the ire of those who are morally opposed to copyright 
protection of computer programs — will greatly increase their market share of the 
software industry because there will be greater consolidation.  The services business 
model suits the established software companies, who, because of their size, have a 
comparative advantage over smaller software firms in providing integrated 
services.12  In any event, the decision to base one’s business model on open-source 
software is not without considerable risk and the long-term sustainability of such 
businesses have yet to be proved.  For example, it has been suggested that Sun 
Microsystem’s decision to make its Java programming language available as open-
source software may not have benefitted the company because its competitors have 
earned more than it has from such software.13  Even the much-vaunted example of 
Red Hat, which had obtained a significant cash injection on its listing, and public 
offering, in 1999 to enable it to provide the level of services its business model would 
require, later released a proprietary version of its Linux operating-system software.  It 
is claimed the revenues attributable to the sale of its proprietary software was 
probably the reason for its first profitable year in 2004.14  A 2009 article in The New 
                                            
12
 Mann "Commercializing Open Source Software: Do Property Rights Still Matter?" 32-6. 
13
 Nikulainen "Open Source Software: Why is it Here and Will it Stick Around?" 148. 
14
 Mann "Commercializing Open Source Software: Do Property Rights Still Matter?" 35. 
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York Times reported that Red Hat was still a “rare case” of a profitable open-source 
software business; other open-source software firms generally developed a single 
product, which made them acquisition targets for proprietary-software firms.15  In 
addition, from the consumers’ perspective, although users did not pay for the open-
source Linux software, an investigation in 2002 revealed that the total cost of using 
the Linux software (i.e. taking into account the additional costs of the associated 
services) exceeded that of using the proprietary Microsoft operating system.16 
 
It is also arguable that the right to create proprietary software has been 
instrumental in the development of the vast range of applications for individual users.  
Whereas software aimed at corporate users may allow for business models based 
on revenues from related services such as maintenance and support, individual 
users are unlikely to use software that does not have a fixed cost, is not easy to 
install, and, comparatively, intuitive to use.  Thus, the option of creating proprietary 
software has allowed the authors of these computer programs to cater to the 
consumer market, and rely on possible network effects to achieve the necessary 
market penetration, allowing them to earn an adequate return on their investment.17 
 
The second of these business cases — where the software serves to promote 
sales of commercial firms’ complementary products — does not reveal anything 
significant about the incentives for investing resources in open-source software as 
these firms are simply developing the markets for their core products, or investing in 
platforms on which their proprietary software offerings will operate.  In the case of 
the development of platforms, the investment is the outcome of a straight-forward 
economic consideration: the joint development of open-source platforms allows firms 
to distribute the costs of development of a resource which they all require but which 
does not distinguish them from their competitors, and, therefore, are not recoverable 
from their customers. 
                                            
15
 Vance A "Open Source as a Model for Business is Elusive" 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/30/technology/business-
computing/30open.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all (12 August 2012). 
16
 Anderson C Free: How Today's Smartest Businesses Profit by Giving Something for Nothing 1ed 
(2010) 109. 
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 Mann "Commercializing Open Source Software: Do Property Rights Still Matter?" 41. 
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Similarly, the motivations of individual computer programmers (“volunteers”) 
who contribute to the development of open-source software are, arguably, extrinsic 
(economic) motivations, such as career concerns.  Whether volunteers have 
extrinsic motivations or intrinsic (non-economic) motivations, they will only participate 
in open-source development if the benefits of participation — both the psychological 
benefits associated with intrinsic motivations, and the extrinsic motivations — exceed 
the opportunity costs of participation.  The large number of participants in open-
source development can be attributed to the lower opportunity costs of participation, 
which have been drastically reduced due to the diffusion of the Internet, and the 
alumni effect (people who have the expertise to participate).  These lower 
opportunity costs have made participation in open-source software a cost-effective 
method of self-promotion, or a signalling device of one’s abilities.  There is strong 
support for this conclusion when one has regard to the emphasis placed on personal 
attribution in open-source licences; volunteers insist on being recognised for their 
respective contributions. 
 
In the final analysis, it appears that the choices of volunteers in open-source 
projects are largely consistent with the standard economic theories relating to labour 
markets and the private provision of public goods.  Open-source software 
development both serves as a quasi-apprenticeship for inexperienced programmers, 
and as a showcase for the most-talented programmers to demonstrate their superior 
abilities to others who may wish to engage their services or invest in their projects.  
The highly visible nature of individual programmers’ contributions in open-source 
software development provides an ideal opportunity for talented programmers to 
signal their abilities to others.  Most significantly, in the absence of copyright 
protection, and, therefore, the ability to enforce the compulsory attribution 
obligations, the signalling incentive would, at best, be severely hampered, and, 
probably, totally ineffective.  Contributions by authors would soon become 
anonymous contributions. 
 
Thus, as illustrated, the reasons commercial firms or volunteers participate in 
open-source software development are easily accounted for by standard economic 
principles.  Simply put, participants in open-source software development do so 
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when they expect that the benefits — more specifically, the economic benefits — to 
be derived from participation will significantly outweigh the costs of their 
contributions.18 
 
This is not to suggest that the open-source software phenomenon has been 
an irrelevance in the area of copyright.  First, it has provoked us to re-examine or 
confirm the case for copyright protection of computer programs, which is a good 
thing.  If the principal rationale for copyright protection is an economic one, it is 
important to periodically reflect whether incentives are still required to encourage the 
creation of protected works.  As indicated above, because copyright protection 
imposes social costs, it is necessary to ensure that such costs are justified because 
they are offset by greater social gains, and that there is no other, more efficient, 
social institution that can achieve such result.  Second, the emergence of business 
models around open-source software has meant that a software author should 
carefully consider what type of business model will give it the best chance of profiting 
from its creation.  Prior to open-source based business models, software authors 
may have simply assumed that the most appropriate way to profit from their creation 
was to use the proprietary rights afforded by copyright protection, and maintain its 
“all rights reserved” default position, charging licensees a fee for permission to use 
their software.  As indicated, while this direct reward which copyright enables authors 
to earn may still provide the necessary incentive for most authors to create computer 
software, authors should now possibly consider releasing software as open-source 
software if it is a means of accelerating market penetration, and there is a likelihood 
that significant revenues can be earned by providing related services.  Third, the 
emergence of open-source software has allowed software developers to appreciate 
the extent to which the Internet has lowered coordination costs on software 
development, allowing them to easily spread the costs of development.  This has 
encouraged software developers, particularly proprietary-software developers, to 
jointly develop standard, commoditised, software platforms which they all require 
(and on which they may seek to develop proprietary software) but which does not 
distinguish them from their competitors.  This serves to illustrate that proprietary 
software and open-source software development are not necessarily mutually 
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distinct phenomena, but may, in fact, complement each other; the synergies between 
these types of software development can be used strategically to both create more 
efficient business models and increase social welfare.19  Fourth, while the 
emergence of open-source software might not undermine the rationale for copyright 
protection of computer programs, it does pose a potential business threat to firms 
that develop proprietary software.  A proprietary-software firm now has to consider 
whether there is any competing, or potentially competing, open-source software in its 
market, and whether it can persuade consumers that paying, or continuing to pay, for 
its product is still worthwhile when the competing product is available at no initial 
cost.  Proprietary-software firms have generally been able to convince consumers to 
pay for their products, albeit at a lower price than they would have probably charged 
in the absence of open-source software, by ensuring that their offerings are of a 
superior quality (for example, ease of use requiring lower implementation costs, and 
having more features).  Having said that, open-source software has become 
increasingly easier to use, requiring lower implementation costs.  Furthermore, 
consumers are comforted by, and attach a monetary value to, the fact that 
proprietary software will be supported, and maintained, by its creator, whereas there 
are no such assurances in relation to open-source software. 
 
Therefore, the emergence of open-source software, despite its impressive 
growth, does not suggest that the economic justification for copyright protection of 
computer programs is misguided, and neither does it undermine such rationale in 
any significant sense.  Rather than open-source software being a testament to the 
ingenuity of the hacking mentality and their ability to hack the law to reverse its 
perceived undesirability, it is submitted that the open-source software phenomenon 
only serves to show how versatile, and efficient, copyright protection can be.  It 
provides authors with the flexibility to determine their own form of possible 
remuneration for their efforts, and which should, therefore, encourage them to create 
socially-beneficial copyright works like computer programs.  Copyright has allowed 
software developers to chose from a range of licences (in addition, of course, to 
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simply donating their works to the public domain): at one end of the spectrum are 
licences that are based on the fact that the software source code will be proprietary, 
with all the attendant rights granted by copyright reserved by its author, and, at the 
other end of the spectrum, are the permissive open-source licences, which allow 
users complete freedom to use the freely-available source code as they wish, 
including for purposes of creating derivative proprietary software.  While it may be 
the case that some people will create computer programs without requiring the direct 
financial rewards which copyright permit, others still require such financial rewards; 
provided that the social benefits of encouraging the creation of computer programs 
outweigh the costs of affording copyright protection, copyright protection is justified.20  
The most significant fact which supports the appropriateness of copyright protection 
of computer programs is the fact that open-source software currently still only 
accounts for a fraction of the software market.  This strongly suggests that, in the 
absence of copyright protection, open-source software development will not result in 
increased development of software, as authors still require incentives, or, at the very 
least, are motivated by the potential economic rewards which copyright protection 
enables them to earn.  In other words, copyright maximises social utility in terms of 
software creation, and the flow of related information, as it encourages the creation 
of software which may not have been produced otherwise. 
 
Moreover, the present copyright regime even appears to address the 
perceived transaction-costs problem associated with third parties having to obtain 
the necessary authorisations to use computer programs, as it enables a licensed-by-
default position to address any perceived market failure in this regards.  Copyright 
has enabled the emergence of open-source software, which avoids the transaction 
costs associated with proprietary software (where users have to seek permission to 
use the software), and have to pay licence fees for such permission.  Furthermore, 
even in the case of proprietary software, given that the scope of copyright protection 
afforded to computer programs is now so narrow, and the fact the copyright does not 
protect ideas but simply particular expressions thereof, it is arguable that the 
transaction costs associated with software must be significantly lower than other 
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types of copyright work.  Because of the wide range of elements in a computer 
program that third parties can use without the need to seek authorisation from its 
author, third parties would generally not require any consents to develop competitive 
products.  This helps to significantly reduce any socially-detrimental restriction on the 
flow of information, which critics of copyright protection are keen to highlight as one 
of the most significant social costs associated with its proprietary nature.  In this way 
copyright, particularly as a consequence of the manner in which the courts have 
limited the scope of copyright protection of computer programs, has sought to avoid 
socially-undesirable deadweight losses, and ensures a greater flow of information.  
As such, there is also no evidence to suggest that copyright protection of computer 
programs currently results in too great a social cost.  Accordingly, the claims of the 
demise, or the inapplicability, of the economic rationale for copyright protection of 
computer programs as a consequence of the emergence of open-source software 
appear to be have been greatly exaggerated.  
 
However, it is necessary, for completeness, to mention certain problems or 
shortcomings which have been identified in the course of this study relating to the 
current system of copyright protection of computer programs, both generally and with 
specific reference to South African law.  As noted above, if the economic rationale 
for copyright protection is the basis for such protection — which it is submitted is the 
most coherent, and workable, basis for such protection — copyright protection 
should extend no further than providing the necessary incentives for the creation of 
copyright works.  Because copyright protection imposes social costs, it is necessary 
to ensure that those costs are minimised by limiting the term and scope of copyright 
protection. 
 
Given the comparatively short period that computer programs are considered 
useful, and, therefore, commercially valuable, it is submitted that the current term of 
copyright protection of computer programs, in all three jurisdictions considered in this 
work, is excessive.  In this regard, South Africa, with its 50-year period of protection, 
provides more reasonable protection than the US and the UK, which provide 70 to 
95 years’ protection.  However, it is submitted that even the 50-year period of 
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protection should be reduced for computer programs.21  It should not be too difficult 
to empirically determine the average commercial life of software, which should serve 
as the point of departure for considerations of the appropriate term of copyright 
protection. 
 
The Copyright Act22 currently only contains one, rather limited, fair-dealing 
exception concerning the making of back-up copies.  It is submitted that, in addition 
to a more extensive back-up fair-dealing exception, there should be exceptions 
allowing lawful users the following rights: the right to decompile a computer program, 
modify a program for the purpose of remedying errors, and the right to study and test 
a program.  Other than the decompilation right, the fair-dealing exceptions should be 
on the same basis of the UK’s Copyright, Designs and Patents Act.23  The 
decompilation right should be a general right, as in the US, giving anyone, even a 
competitor of the author of a computer program, the right to decompile a program in 
order to determine how it functions.  It is submitted that such a general decompilation 
right, would be the software equivalent of the right to reverse engineer three-
dimensional utilitarian articles based on artistic works, which were produced for the 
public by an industrial process.24  Pursuant to our obligations under the Berne 
Convention, such decompilation right must not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the copyright owner or conflict with the normal exploitation of the 
computer program.25  It is submitted that such a general decompilation right does not 
give a competitor a decisive advantage because it does not yield directly usable 
source code of a computer program.  For a competitor to produce its own source 
code for an equivalent program would still require significant effort and skill.  
Furthermore, there is no indication that the general decompilation in the US provides 
too little protection, and has hampered software development. 
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 Of course, South Africa cannot reduce the term of protection of computer programs without an 
amendment of the Berne Convention in this regard because doing so unilaterally would result in it 
being in breach of its obligations under the Berne Convention.   
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 Copyright Act 98 of 1978 (SA Copyright Act). 
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Lastly, given the fact that the design phase in software development requires 
a significant investment, and is often vital to the success of good software, 
consideration should be given to what is the most appropriate protection for 
preparatory design material.  While the position under the EU Software Directive is 
that the preparatory design material of a computer program is also covered as part of 
the copyright protection of the computer program,26 the problem is that there is no 
clarity as to the level of detail which would be required before the preparatory design 
material can be considered to be a computer program.  The advantage of protecting 
the preparatory design material as part of the computer program is that it avoids the 
possible complication that the copyright in a computer program and its preparatory 
design material may vest in different authors. 
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